By Elsa Imdad Chandio The cross-border escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan since late February 2026 has unfolded in a context in which Afghan women already live under some of the most restrictive conditions in the world. In this sense, the airstrikes, shelling, and cross-border clashes, which have affected at least ten provinces, do not introduce instability into an otherwise stable environment. Assessments by Afghanistan’s Operational Gender Coordination Group show that women and girls make up more than half of the nearly 90,000 people affected by the escalation. This alone illustrates the gendered nature of the crisis. A considerable number of communities now report that women are unable to reach health facilities. In others, access is dependent on a male guardian, or obstructed by the lack of female health workers. These constraints are not new, but increased insecurity has made them far more difficult to navigate. Daily routines have altered in visible ways. Women describe a shrinking of the physical spaces they can safely enter. Markets, water points, clinics, and even communal latrines in displacement sites are avoided due to fear of airstrikes, harassment or the unpredictable behaviour of armed personnel at checkpoints. In Kabul, many families now prevent women from leaving home entirely. Men have taken over tasks that women previously managed, not because roles are shifting, but because the risks have risen to such an extent that families are unwilling to expose women to them. As one woman explained: “We no longer feel safe going outside or continuing normal life.” Women without male relatives are facing the sharpest difficulties. Female-headed households, which are already among the most vulnerable in Afghanistan, encounter compounded barriers when attempting to secure aid, travel for medical care or obtain basic supplies. The requirement of a mahram, documentation checks and mobility restrictions intersect to limit even essential movement. In...

By Engineer Arshad H Abbasi and Engineer Musa Arshad Pakistan’s sugar industry holds an overlooked solution to rising energy and fertilizer shocks. By scaling ethanol blending and using press mud as organic fertilizer, the country can cut imports, boost resilience, and turn a recurring sugar surplus into a strategic national asset. As global energy markets grow increasingly volatile, Pakistan finds itself dangerously exposed. With most of its crude oil and fertilizer imports tied to the Middle East, geopolitical instability is no longer a distant concern—it is an immediate economic threat. Against this backdrop, a compelling opportunity lies within the country’s own borders: the sugar industry. The Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (PSMA) on 29th March 2026 urged the government to allow the export of surplus sugar and move toward deregulation, citing heavy financial losses despite a bumper production year. But beyond export policy lies a far more strategic question: can Pakistan transform its sugar surplus into a pillar of energy security and agricultural resilience? The answer lies in ethanol and the broader ecosystem of byproducts that the sugar industry already produces. Sugar mills in Pakistan primarily produce refined sugar from sugarcane while simultaneously processing the byproduct, molasses, to produce high-value ethanol for export. In Pakistan, ethanol is primarily known as a biofuel or ethanol within the energy sector, specifically regarding E10/E20 petrol blending. In industrial and chemical contexts, it is referred to as rectified spirit or alcohol, while in the beverage industry, it is the core component of IMFL (Indian-made foreign liquor). Regardless of the application, it is increasingly recognised as a sustainable, sugar-derived fuel valued for its cleaner-burning properties. Many sugarcane mills are vertically integrated with distilleries that convert this byproduct into ethanol, yielding significant export revenue, often exceeding US$300 million...

At a time of rising fuel import dependence and fertilizer supply uncertainty, this policy letter by engineers Arshad Abbasi and Musa Abbasi highlights how Pakistan’s sugar industry can play a transformative role in strengthening national energy and agricultural security. By leveraging ethanol blending (E10–E20) and utilizing press mud as organic fertilizer, the proposal presents a practical, immediately implementable pathway to reduce foreign exchange pressures, improve fuel quality, enhance soil health, and build long-term economic resilience through domestic resources. To: His Excellency Asif Ali Zardari President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Respected Mr. President, We write to draw your attention to an urgent and strategic opportunity for Pakistan at a time when global energy markets are increasingly volatile and the country faces heightened vulnerability due to its dependence on imported fuel and fertilizers. The recent geopolitical tensions in the Gulf region and the resulting disruptions in oil and gas supplies, have reinforced the need for immediate, forward-looking policy interventions to safeguard Pakistan’s energy and agricultural security. In this context, the role of the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and the broader sugar industry assumes critical importance. On 29th March 2026, PSMA urged the government to allow the export of surplus sugar and move toward deregulation, highlighting the financial strain faced by millers despite a bumper production year. However, beyond the immediate issue of exports lies a far more significant opportunity: the transformation of Pakistan’s sugar sector into a cornerstone of energy resilience and agricultural sustainability. Sugar mills in Pakistan primarily produce refined sugar from sugarcane while simultaneously processing molasses, a byproduct, into high-value ethanol for export. In the domestic context, ethanol is increasingly recognised as a clean-burning biofuel suitable for blending with petrol...

By Sohaib Syed Around 3 weeks into the war with Iran, the United States seems to have settled on four primary objectives: (1) destroying Iran’s navy; (2) destroying Iran’s missile capabilities; (3) preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons; and (4) preventing Iran from supporting proxy groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. Administration officials—notably President Trump in his initial remarks regarding the war—have hinted that regime change is also among their goals, but have consistently excluded this message in recent days. I give you a perspective that is distinct because it moves away from traditional Western-centric military metrics like air superiority or raw firepower and focuses on the geopolitical shift toward 21st-century warfare, specifically the domains of space, electronic warfare, and “system survival.” West is misjudging the nature of the conflict. For the United States and Israel, this is a war of choice, a political decision to seek regime change or regional dominance. For Iran, however, it is a war of survival. the primary reason for Iran’s confidence is the nature of the conflict itself. For Iran, which finds itself pitted against a global superpower like America, this is a war of survival rather than a war of choice. the definition of victory is simplified: if Iran can emerge with its sovereignty and territorial integrity intact, it has won. As a 5,000-year-old civilization, Iran is not a mere “artificial construct”; like many of the kingdoms and sheikhdoms in the Middle East, it is a nation-state with a deep-rooted identity that stands by itself. This civilizational resilience provides a baseline of resistance that the West continually underestimates. Iran meticulously learned the lessons from the 12-day war that occurred last year, leading to a massive organizational restructuring of its military framework. Central to this shift was the implementation of decentralized command and control. While critics argue...

Engineer Arshad H Abbasi Why should a labourer on a motorbike pay the same fuel price as the owner of a Toyota Land Cruiser 300? This piece exposes the hidden injustice in Pakistan’s fuel pricing system and makes the case for technology-led reform that protects the poor while holding luxury consumption accountable. Injustice often hides in ordinary policies. It rarely announces itself with loud slogans or dramatic speeches. Instead, it quietly settles into systems that people accept as normal. Pakistan’s fuel pricing structure is one such example. The same price per liter of petrol or diesel applies whether a citizen rides a small motorbike worth Rs 20,000 or drives a luxury vehicle such as the Toyota Land Cruiser 300 worth nearly Rs 9.40 crore. On paper, this flat-rate pricing appears simple. In reality, it creates a system that treats necessity and luxury as if they were identical. Fuel is not merely another commodity for most Pakistanis. It is a basic economic input that keeps daily life moving. Farmers rely on tractors to cultivate crops. Rickshaws and small transport vehicles provide affordable mobility in crowded cities. Buses carry thousands of workers who cannot afford private cars. Motorbikes allow students, shopkeepers, and laborers to travel long distances to work. When these essential vehicles pay the same fuel price as luxury automobiles such as the BMW X5, the BMW iX1, or high-end cars produced by Mercedes-Benz, the policy stops being neutral. It quietly transfers economic pressure onto those with the least capacity to absorb it. My understanding of this problem grew through years of personal interaction with Pakistan’s fuel regulator, the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority. What began as a technical curiosity gradually became a sobering lesson about how institutional resistance can prevent necessary reform. My journey began in 1996 when I owned a vehicle manufacturing company. I spent much of my time experimenting with engines and mechanical systems....

By Imtiaz Gul Kabul and Kandahar do not appear to be fully aligned on the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What initially seemed to be Kandahar’s position that the matter did not concern them has since shifted. There are now indications that the Taliban are open to engagement through Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, reportedly to prevent further attacks inside Pakistan. This change has drawn attention to internal dynamics within the Afghan leadership and raised questions about whether there is real policy coherence between Kabul’s administrative institutions and Kandahar’s supreme authority. Differences between Kabul and Kandahar over militant groups have added to the sharp decline in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, including Pakistan’s decision to conduct cross-border strikes. Islamabad maintains that Afghan authorities are responsible for preventing attacks launched from their territory and frames the issue as one of sovereign obligation. The Taliban, however, deny direct responsibility and point to the complex security environment they inherited. Competing narratives and growing mistrust continue to strain bilateral ties. Estimates suggest that roughly 23,000 national and foreign militants from various groups remain active in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, managing the TTP threat amid uncertain operational conditions and limited leverage over Afghan authorities has become a central security concern. As a result, the TTP now dominates the broader bilateral agenda. Since August 2021, Pakistan has sought to build confidence and has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to curb TTP activities. Diplomatic engagement has continued through bilateral channels, as well as meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh. In some discussions, it was suggested that violence attributed to the TTP may involve other actors operating behind the scenes. These differing assessments have complicated efforts to develop a shared understanding of the threat. The absence of a mutually...

Since the resurgence of Taliban-linked militancy in Pakistan after 2021, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Balochistan, the country’s counter-terrorism landscape has entered a familiar but more complex phase. Districts in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—including North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber (notably the Tirah Valley), Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram—have once again become frontline spaces where regional geopolitics, militancy, governance failures, and local livelihoods intersect. In response to rising violence attributed mainly to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani state has leaned heavily on kinetic military operations, stricter border management with Afghanistan, and diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Taliban. While these measures have produced episodic security gains, they have also generated deep humanitarian stress and exposed structural governance weaknesses in the merged districts. Within this constrained policy environment, the re-emergence of the Tribal Jirga as an informal but socially legitimate channel of engagement reflects an attempt to reconnect security policy with local realities rather than relying exclusively on coercion. The Tribal Jirga is an indigenous conflict-resolution institution deeply embedded in Pashtun society across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traditionally composed of respected elders and influential community figures, jirgas resolve disputes through mediation, consensus-building, and moral authority rather than formal legal enforcement. Their legitimacy is derived from social trust and cultural acceptance, allowing them to function in spaces where state institutions are weak, distrusted, or absent. In earlier decades, jirgas addressed land disputes, blood feuds, and inter-tribal conflicts; in the contemporary security context, however, they have increasingly been drawn into the realm of informal diplomacy. As violence escalated after the Taliban’s return to power in...