The brazen Taliban attack on a jail in Dera Ismail Khan on July 29 to free their comrades has raised important questions about the preparedness of our security apparatus for a war that involves relentless attacks on key state institutions. Top Taliban men were freed in a similar attack on Bannu jail in April 2012. The recent raid on Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (July 22), another one on Tasfirat prison in Saddam Hussein's hometown Tikrit (September 2012), and an equally brazen attack on the Kandahar jail in Afghanistan (April 2011) probably serve as a big motivation for insurgents, who embarrass and de-motivate the security forces and free hundreds of their men in such attacks. The July 29 attack is just one in a long list of daring security breaches that follow the May 2008 peace accord with militants in Swat. The deal fell flat, and insurgency grew in intensity until the Swat and South Waziristan military operations in May and October 2009. Since then, militants have made at least 14 surprise raids on various targets, including the Sri Lankan Cricket team in Lahore (March 2009), Manawan Police Training Academy in Lahore (March and October 2009), the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi (October 2009), PNS Mehran air base in Karachi (May 2011), Kamra air base (Aug 2012), and the Peshawar airport (December 2012). The insurgents also carried out major attacks on targets belonging to the ISI - a former ally - in Peshawar, Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, and Sukkur. All these attacks bear the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) signature - a multi-pronged attack involving several terrorists aimed at penetrating the target as deep as possible. The LeT made similar attacks in Indian Kashmir, and several interrogations have revealed many of the perpetrators had been affiliated with the LeT in the past. Most of them broke away from the group and fell into the laps of Al Qaeda and Taliban after finding themselves in ideological conflict with the state of Pakistan, which they believe is...

(CRSS Team Member Farooq Yousuf , who is currently studying public policy at Willy Brandt School, Erfurt, Germany, contributed this article to the Express Tribune) Regular militant attacks have now become a norm in Pakistan. The situation on the ground suggests that tracking and hunting militants is difficult, whereas for militants, carrying out their activities at will is easier. In terms of numbers, drones have killed more militants in FATA compared to on ground operations, but these drones do not conform with legal parameters set by the Pakistani constitution. A few weeks ago, I wrote ablog on dronesand the need for the Pakistan government and the military to come out clean on the issue. On July 8, 2013,it wasreportedthat the Pakistani government is considering asking the US officiallyfor the drone technology as a diplomatic effort to placate the people of the tribal areas as well resolve the prevailing legal issues connected with the CIA-led drone attacks. As interesting as this may sound, the probability for such an occurrence is highly unlikely. But the real question however remains, will the United States be willing to transfer the drone technology to Pakistan, and even if it does, would the use of drones by Pakistan instead of the US lower anti-US sentiment? For both these questions, I can only guess the answer to be a negative and there are a numerous reasons as to why this is so. Pakistan will not target all militants. First and foremost, the United States enjoys virtual monopoly over drone technology; the US and Israel are known to be the most successful manufacturers of predator drones to date. Although countries like Russia, China, India, and even Pakistan are trying to make combat-capable drones, and even claim to possess them, their effectiveness if yet to be seen. For that reason, the US may not be willing to risk imparting crucial information regarding its sophisticated technology. Another reason ´ which is one of the major hindrances for Pakistan...

A comparison of statistics for the months of May and June makes it abundantly clear that violence under various covers continues to ake lives ´ regardless of who governs the country. The number of deaths off violence during the month of May was as high as 634. In June these casualties declined slightly to 619 ( compared to roughly 500 deaths off violence in April). The surge in casualties of various acts of terror in May and June also disproves the widely-held notion that the terrorist syndicates led by Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were soft on the Pakistan Muslim League-N and the Pakistan Tehreeke Insaf (PTI). Much before the May 11 general elections, various socio-political segments of the society ´ led by PPP and ANP - pilloried these two parties for being pro Taliban for the simple reason that these two parties favoured dialogue with militants. But the painstakingly collected data compiled by the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) clearly belies these notions and point to an altogether different reality i.e. subversion and terrorism disguised in ethnicity, nationalism and religiosity continues to consume precious lives and piling socio-economic misery on multiple flashpoints inside Pakistan. Karachi, for instance, topped the list of incidents and deaths in May and June, with 210 and 222 casualties in the two months respectively. Fata lost 182 and 101 people in the two months respectively, while for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa these figures stood at 134 and 146 respectively. Cumulatively, the human loss in FATA and KP (northwestern regions) in May recorded 283 deaths and 280 in June ´ a whopping 563 for the two months. This also included the cold-blooded execution of ten foreign tourists at the Nanga Parbat heights on June 21st, an attack that hurt Pakistan interests and image like never before. The story of Balochistan is not different either; at least 88 deaths in May and 126 in June ´ mostly in suicide attacks targeting shia Muslims, civilian and...

Thiscomment originally appeared in the Express Tribune on July 4,2013. The July 2 drone strike on a target 50 kms off Miranshah -14th this year ´ evoked another strong protest from the ministry of foreign affairs. This 'outrage' came less than four weeks after the Foreign Office summoned US Charge d– Affaires (CdA), Deputy Ambassador Richard Hoagland, on June 8 to lodge a similar 'strong protest' against a strike that had killed seven people in a North Waziristan village. Do these expressions of rejection and demands for cessation in strikes count? Apparently little because of the US-UK understanding that drones represent an important tool in hunting down terrorists. This issue merits scrutiny in the context of two major geo-political factors to explain as to why these strikes, though on the wane, are likely to continue i) The broad US-NATO agreement on the use of drones against common 'enemies', ii) Increasingly wobbly leadership of a volatile Afghanistan Speaking in Los Angeles on June 25, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said about the UK policy on intelligence-sharing with the United States: 'We operate under the rule of law and are accountable for it. In some countries secret intelligence is used to control their people. In ours, it only exists to protect their freedoms.' Allegations that Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) used a US programme to circumvent the law and spy on British citizens have led to renewed calls for the agency to disclose what its policy is on providing intelligence to support CIA drone strikes. Anti-drone campaigners claim that by sharing intelligence in support of the campaign, GCHQ may have broken both domestic and international law. As for Afghanistan, the pressures from across the border are mounting; the Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammad Karimi who, in a BBC interview broadcast July 3, claimed that Pakistan was complicit in drone attacks because Islamabad had 'given the lists' of militants it wants taken out. He...

Thiscomment originally appeared in the Friday Times on June 28,2013 Pakistan denied its purported contacts with and influence over key Taliban leaders for years. Civil and military officials would reject out of hand any link whatsoever with any Taliban leaders. They also expressed ignorance of the whereabouts of the militant leadership. Beginning early this year, they forgot all those denials and turned over 26 Taliban prisoners in two installments, saying the rest - about a dozen or so - would be set free as and when necessary. By doing so, the Pakistani leadership essentially began admitting what they had been brushing aside as allegations and propaganda. But the bait by American interlocutors (Pakistan is being made relevant to the Afghan reconciliation process) worked, and one after the other, Islamabad and Rawalpindi pulled out cards - first the Taliban prisoners, then linking up the most hunted and condemned terrorists Haqqanis with the Americans, and now claiming credit for what turned out to be, at least for the time being, a big faux pax at Doha ie the Taliban office and the ensuing controversy over the flag of "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan". Then, by taking credit for the Taliban office formally launched on June 18 amid great fanfare, Pakistan again displayed the usual indecent haste. Only a day later, Afghan President Hamid Karzai stunned his western backers by announcing a suspension of talks on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States. Ironically, Pakistani officials went the Karzai way, and during special envoy James Dobbins' Islamabad visit, they expressed fears that the initiative might break down due to the 'contradictory approach' of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration. Before that, for two days, newspapers in Pakistan were awash with official chest-thumping for "Pakistan's instrumental role in the reconciliation." Even Foreign Ministry officials went public with a credit-taking, self-adulatory statement,...