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Analysis: Norwegian tragedy, Pakistani worries

Anders Behring Breivik was driven by a paranoia of Muslims, and of Pakistanis in particular. Of all the nations, he singled out Pakistan as responsible for the future problems of Europe. Most would run downBreivik as a sick young man, nurturing hatred and bias. But rejecting Breivik 'Manifesto 2083' ´ a projection of Europe in slightly over 70 years from now, hardly serves those dismissive of the Norwegian who plunged the country into a state of mourning after gunning down some 68 youngsters attending a summer camp. Of all Muslim societies, Pakistan seized Breivik imagination as a country typical for 'denial of justice, intrusive religiousity and denial of rights to non-Muslims.' This must be a matter of introspection. In essence, Pakistan, for him, represents an embodiment of contradictions and denials, injustice, misgovernance and disorder which, in the long run, he fears would go on to galvanise other countries across the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Breivik knowledge of Pakistan and Pakistan-origin Norwegians is based on his personal experiences, and extensive study of writings of people like Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, as well as prominent human rights activist Hina Jilani andDawn columnist Irfan Hussain. The image that Pakistani, Turk or Algerian Muslims have created for themselves is nothing new but people in Europe have started viewing them as inflexible members of the societies which are feeding them. For these Muslims, European values don–t matter. Breivik childhood best friend, a Pakistani Muslim immigrant to Norway, comes across as someone who despite having lived several years in Europe still resented Norwegian society because it 'represented the exact opposite of Islamic ways.' Through close ties with Muslim families, Breivik must have also observed the paradoxes that most Pakistanis, Arabs and Turks live in: treating sons different from the way they treat their daughters. The refusal of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into...

US and Pakistan Relations: Is agreement on Afghanistan possible?

The recent spat between Pakistan and the US over "security assistance" was brinkmanship at best. Whoever advised the Obama administration to suspend payments to Pakistan most probably lacked knowledge of the ground realities. The move, not entirely rooted in realism, ignored a fundamental reality - the relationship rests on mutual dependence and a permanent break-down in an extremely volatile environment is not possible. The strident mood in Washington and the intimidating rhetoric also overlooked the socio-cultural context in which both countries are vying to safeguard their "national interests". The US decision to withhold $800 million in security assistance or compensation annoyed a majority of Pakistanis and demoralised the armed forces. One indicator of the public disapproval of the latest American pressure campaign is a poll on Dawn newspaper's website. The bulk of the visitors to this website are well-educated. Asked if "the US decision to suspend military aid to Pakistan (is) poorly timed given the developments in the Afghan war", as of midday on July 17 nearly 3,100 of 5,830 voters (54%) had said "Yes". For the tens of millions of people exposed on to Urdu media, the percentage of "Yes" would be much higher. And that is what is being ignored in Washington's high-handed handling of Pakistan. It simply causes more animosity. This provides a telling context to the debate on US-Pakistan relations and is food for thought for the two countries that have been at loggerheads since Osama bin Laden's killing on May 2, engaged in offensive rhetoric and mutual administrative retribution. Pakistan sent back 125 of the 129 US military trainers and almost three dozen British ones. It also put restrictions on visas for American nationals, because the military establishment suspects most of them are intelligence officials or private CIA security contractors. The Pakistani military reportedly also snubbed an American request for permanent presence of its military personnel...

CRSS Hosts a Peace Consultation

On July 15, 2011 CRSS hosted a consultative meeting of thePeace Network Pakistan (PNP), at its office premises in Islamabad. PNP is an alliance of scores of civil society organizations: Bacha Khan Trust, Society for Protection of Rights of Children, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sudhaar, Center for Peace and Human Rights, Sahil (Islamabad), Bargad (Gujranwala), Insan Foundation, Swat Youth Foundation and Association of Integrated Development (Quetta) etc. It is an initiative of Peace Education and Development (PEAD) Foundation, Islamabad, and CRSS is also part of the PNP. The salient objectives of PNP include: provide platform to the different civil society organizations working on issues of peace promotion and peace building in different regions of Pakistan; To create awareness among the masses about the importance of peace, especially in contemporary era; To put pressure on the government to include peace education in the curriculum and get rid of portions of curriculum infusing the germs of radicalization and extremism among the students. PNP will also form and activate provincial chapters in coming days. CRSS serves as the Secretariat of the PNP. Addressing the meeting, Ms. Mossarat Qadeem, Executive Director, Paiman Alumni Trust said there is need to strive for sustainable peace, and promotion of quality and meaningful education can lead towards this goal. She said the primary objective of PNP is to stand together for building peace. Addressing the challenge of radicalization and extremism in Pakistan, renowned writer, columnist and social activist, Mr. Haris Khalique, a renowned writer and social activist, said the roots of radicalization and extremism in Pakistan lie in the foundations of the state, and one cannot address the issue without revisiting and restructuring the basic state structure. He said political expediency always prevailed over nation-state building in Pakistan and different rulers (be it progressives like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or religious...

Analysis: Is North Waziristan Operation Finally in Offing?

General David Petraeus, the outgoing chief commander of the US-ISAF troops, referred to Pakistan army action long-overdue operation in Kurram and the trans-border movement by Afghan militants and their TTP affiliates as 'North Waziristan in Reverse.' He tossed the phrase, according to a diplomatic source,in the presence of other ISAF representatives, suggesting that North Waziristan would have to be Pakistani army next destination ´ a place that the US abhors for the presence of the Al-Qaeda-inspired militant conglomerate, presumably protected by the Afghan Haqqani Network. The entire American establishment believes this network exports terror to the Afghan soil and thus needs to be crushed by the Pakistan Army. But,the latter, sofar resisted and shunned American exhortations in this regard, stating multiple, at times incomprehensible reasons embedded in issues such as capacity and social milieu. But, over ten weeks since the surprisebut shocking termination ofOsama bin Laden when the relations with the United States appear to have hit rock-bottom, the narrative on North Waziristan seems to be changing; the situation in Kurram as well as the cross-border attacks on security posts in Bajaur and Dir within the last two weeks necessitate a 'geographical military activity' in North Waziristan.' Highly placed military officials now tell us the operation in the embattled and isolated Kurram agency was a move to 'plug all the holes' before taking on militants of all hues holed up in North Waziristan.' The initial target of the 'geographical operation' ´ are the areas aroundmountains that separate North from South Waziristan. Initial targets include Shawaal and Makeen, where Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan, the avowed enemy number one of the state of Pakistan, took refuge after the army dislocated them from the Mehsud regions of Laddha, Makeen, Sararogha in October/November 2009. Other obvious targets includeMiranshah, the administrative headquarters of North Waziristan,...

Red Mosque Bloodbath: A Potent Reminder of the Fatal Flaws

On July 10th, 2007 Pakistan military stormed the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the heart of the federal capital, Islamabad. The operation named Operation Silence was aimed at neutralizing a group of armed militant men and women who had assumed the role of moral brigade to impose Shariah in the capital city.The operation left a trail of death and destruction; some 150 militants, led by Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, fell to the explosives and bullets of the storming troops. About a dozen army men including a colonel and some commandos also lost their lives in action. The bloody assault left deep scars on Pakistan political landscape and triggered a new debate on the impact of a questionable war that President Pervez Musharraf had joined a week after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States. The emergence of the Ghazi force in the aftermath of the Operation Silence and the sharp increase in suicide attacks (36 within five months that year) on security forces and innocent Pakistanis are a potent reminder that state policies against militancy and extremism have inherent weaknesses which persist without much change in the method and vision of fighting terrorism and militancy.Lal Masjid sagain fact was a microcosm of the inherent flaws and weaknesses of the broad national policy of battling terrorism and extremism in all parts of the country. The hue and cry before and after the Operation Silence requires a detailed scrutiny of the policies of some state institutions i.e., a) the military and the intelligence apparatus and its nexus with militants, b) the role of media, and c) the consequence of these policies and attitudes. Background While the Lal Masjid had made it to the headlines on several occasions prior to 2007, in January that year , it was in the news again with the Molly Campbell story. Campbell¶child of a Pakistani father and a Scottish mother¶had come to live with her father in Pakistan and was admitted to Jamia Hafsa. She refused to go back with her...

Strained Pakistani Security Apparatus

Never before has Pakistan security apparatus been stretched , and under strain. From Karachi to Peshawar and further north it is constantly under attack. The army has lost more than 3,300 soldiers and officers, the ISI and the Military Intelligence have alsolost more than 100operatives in the last six years. It is nothing less than an open war on the interests of the state of Pakistan. Stunned and embarrassed by the American Navy Seals– unauthorised intrusion to get Osama bin Laden on May 2, the entire military and intelligence establishment today faces another unprecedented situation on the political front; following years of almost unchallenged direct or indirect authority, the security apparatus, for the first time, appears under strain, and confronted with an ever-growing chorus of accountability, including questions on its credibility and competence as the guardian of this country ideological frontiers. One of the questions arising out of these volatile circumstances is whether Pakistan intelligence establishment is professionally in sync with the unusual threat levels confronting the country today. Historically, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Military Intelligence (MI), Special Branch, Crime Investigation Department (CID) ´ have had their share of failures or oversights ´ advertent or otherwise. But rarely have they faced accountability. Mostly they have stayed above the performance audit. The primary reason: the intelligence apparatus serves as the bedrock for the state notions of security, which flow from the military continued obsession with the 'geo-strategic relevance of Pakistan.'This combination ´ the state notions of security and its obsession with the country geo-strategic relevance ´ therefore essentially rules out real censure of the intelligence outfits, which has thus far acted as a supreme authority that can be, at times, intrusive, vindictive and destructive as well.Recently, the Supreme Court did confront...

CRSS Policy Dialogue on Balochistan: Demands for Implementation of Rights’ Package growing Stronger

Almost all speakers at a policy dialogue titled¿Aghaz-e Haqooq-e Balochistan Package (AHBP): Status and Way Forward– organized jointly by the Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] and ActionAid Pakistan on June 30th, demanded quick and sincere implementation of the rights– package that the prime minister Yousuf Reza Gilani had announced for Balochistan in November 2009. A former federal minister from Balochistan, Ayatullah Durrani, as well as a Senator Haji Adeel Khan from the Awami National Party (ANP), agreed that the implementation of the 39-point package, which was a response to the long-standing demands of Baloch nationalists, was slow and insufficient at the moment. But both also emphasized that rather than looking at the 'glass being half empty,' critics should look at the 'glass being half full ' which had become possible under a political government and through a grand political consensus in and outside the parliament. BothMr. Durrani and Haji Adeel pointed out that the tripling of federal financial resources for Balochistan for the fiscal 2011-2012 beginning first of July would not have been possible without the AHB Package. Holding the Balochi Sardars / tribal chieftainsresponsible for the injustices to the Balochi people, Ayatullah Durrani, who represents the Pakistan Peoples Party in the federal parliament, questioned as to ¿why not a single educational institution has been constructed by Jogezai, Jamali, Achakzai, Bugti and Raisani ? (names of big Balochi and Pashtoon tribes in Balochistan). For more details on the socio-political structures of Balochistan, please see the CRSS publication ' Pakistan Security Challenges'- available on the CRSS website in PDF Format). Mr Durrani said that getting involved in subversive activities is not the way to get rights but to engage with the Centre and press it for fulfilling its promises to the Balochi people.He said that the present government believes in dialogue with the Baloch dissidents but there...

CRSS Policy Dialogue on Balochistan: Demands for Implementation of Rights' Package growing Stronger

Almost all speakers at a policy dialogue titled¿Aghaz-e Haqooq-e Balochistan Package (AHBP): Status and Way Forward– organized jointly by the Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] and ActionAid Pakistan on June 30th, demanded quick and sincere implementation of the rights– package that the prime minister Yousuf Reza Gilani had announced for Balochistan in November 2009. A former federal minister from Balochistan, Ayatullah Durrani, as well as a Senator Haji Adeel Khan from the Awami National Party (ANP), agreed that the implementation of the 39-point package, which was a response to the long-standing demands of Baloch nationalists, was slow and insufficient at the moment. But both also emphasized that rather than looking at the 'glass being half empty,' critics should look at the 'glass being half full ' which had become possible under a political government and through a grand political consensus in and outside the parliament. BothMr. Durrani and Haji Adeel pointed out that the tripling of federal financial resources for Balochistan for the fiscal 2011-2012 beginning first of July would not have been possible without the AHB Package. Holding the Balochi Sardars / tribal chieftainsresponsible for the injustices to the Balochi people, Ayatullah Durrani, who represents the Pakistan Peoples Party in the federal parliament, questioned as to ¿why not a single educational institution has been constructed by Jogezai, Jamali, Achakzai, Bugti and Raisani ? (names of big Balochi and Pashtoon tribes in Balochistan). For more details on the socio-political structures of Balochistan, please see the CRSS publication ' Pakistan Security Challenges'- available on the CRSS website in PDF Format). Mr Durrani said that getting involved in subversive activities is not the way to get rights but to engage with the Centre and press it for fulfilling its promises to the Balochi people.He said that the present government believes in dialogue with the Baloch dissidents but there...

CRSS Policy Dialogue on Balochistan: Demands for Implementation of Rights' Package growing Stronger

Almost all speakers at a policy dialogue titled¿Aghaz-e Haqooq-e Balochistan Package (AHBP): Status and Way Forward– organized jointly by the Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] and ActionAid Pakistan on June 30th, demanded quick and sincere implementation of the rights– package that the prime minister Yousuf Reza Gilani had announced for Balochistan in November 2009. A former federal minister from Balochistan, Ayatullah Durrani, as well as a Senator Haji Adeel Khan from the Awami National Party (ANP), agreed that the implementation of the 39-point package, which was a response to the long-standing demands of Baloch nationalists, was slow and insufficient at the moment. But both also emphasized that rather than looking at the 'glass being half empty,' critics should look at the 'glass being half full ' which had become possible under a political government and through a grand political consensus in and outside the parliament. BothMr. Durrani and Haji Adeel pointed out that the tripling of federal financial resources for Balochistan for the fiscal 2011-2012 beginning first of July would not have been possible without the AHB Package. Holding the Balochi Sardars / tribal chieftainsresponsible for the injustices to the Balochi people, Ayatullah Durrani, who represents the Pakistan Peoples Party in the federal parliament, questioned as to ¿why not a single educational institution has been constructed by Jogezai, Jamali, Achakzai, Bugti and Raisani ? (names of big Balochi and Pashtoon tribes in Balochistan). For more details on the socio-political structures of Balochistan, please see the CRSS publication ' Pakistan Security Challenges'- available on the CRSS website in PDF Format). Mr Durrani said that getting involved in subversive activities is not the way to get rights but to engage with the Centre and press it for fulfilling its promises to the Balochi people.He said that the present government believes in dialogue with the Baloch dissidents but there...

Drawdown in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan

Amid criticism from various quarters¶including the U.S. military leadership¶on June 22nd, U.S. President, Barack Obama, announced pulling out 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by September 2012, with 10,000¶mostly non-combat¶troops starting to leave in July. The cost of the nearly decade-long war in Afghanistan will touch the trillion dollar mark by the end of this year. In the backdrop of domestic financial crunch that is forcing President Obama to cut costs, the draw-down in troops in Afghanistan was inevitable. The logistics alone cost the U.S. and other NATO countries a whopping four billion dollars a year (CRSS Report). Afghanistan landlocked location has posed huge logistical challenges for the United States, requiring hundreds of shipping containers and fuel trucks ply every day from Pakistan and from the north to sustain the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied forces stationed in Afghanistan, about half the total number of Afghan security forces. Supplying a single gallon of gasoline in Afghanistan reportedly costs the U.S. military an average of $400, while sustaining a single U.S. soldier runs around $1 million a year (by contrast, sustaining an Afghan soldier costs about $12,000 a year), reckons STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting Inc., a global intelligence company). Two-thirds of this cargo¶about 50,000 containers¶transit through Pakistan every month, compared to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which runs through Central Asia and Russia (Moscow has agreed to continue to expand it) and entails a more than 5,000 kilometer, expensive rail route to the Baltic Sea and ports in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Obama speech, therefore, comes across as a mix of multiple considerations and compulsions, triggered by the window of opportunity provided with the death of Osama Bin Laden (OBL)¶one of the stated objectives of the Operation Enduring Freedom. One of the motivating factors behind the decision was the mounting domestic opposition to the war in Afghanistan...