General David Petraeus, the outgoing chief commander of the US-ISAF troops, referred to Pakistan army action long-overdue operation in Kurram and the trans-border movement by Afghan militants and their TTP affiliates as ‘North Waziristan in Reverse.’ He tossed the phrase, according to a diplomatic source,in the presence of other ISAF representatives, suggesting that North Waziristan would have to be Pakistani army next destination ´ a place that the US abhors for the presence of the Al-Qaeda-inspired militant conglomerate, presumably protected by the Afghan Haqqani Network. The entire American establishment believes this network exports terror to the Afghan soil and thus needs to be crushed by the Pakistan Army. But,the latter, sofar resisted and shunned American exhortations in this regard, stating multiple, at times incomprehensible reasons embedded in issues such as capacity and social milieu.
But, over ten weeks since the surprisebut shocking termination ofOsama bin Laden when the relations with the United States appear to have hit rock-bottom, the narrative on North Waziristan seems to be changing; the situation in Kurram as well as the cross-border attacks on security posts in Bajaur and Dir within the last two weeks necessitate a ‘geographical military activity’ in North Waziristan.’
Highly placed military officials now tell us the operation in the embattled and isolated Kurram agency was a move to ‘plug all the holes’ before taking on militants of all hues holed up in North Waziristan.’
The initial target of the ‘geographical operation’ ´ are the areas aroundmountains that separate North from South Waziristan. Initial targets include Shawaal and Makeen, where Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan, the avowed enemy number one of the state of Pakistan, took refuge after the army dislocated them from the Mehsud regions of Laddha, Makeen, Sararogha in October/November 2009. Other obvious targets includeMiranshah, the administrative headquarters of North Waziristan, Dattakhel and particularly Mir Ali, considered to be a bee-hive of TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Lashkare Jhangvi, usually referred to as the Punjabi Taliban but close associates of Al-Qaeda.
Apparently anathema to a full-scale military offensive in North Waziristan and prisoner of bloated ego, the military, under the burden of circumstances,has opted to call its activity in Shawaal ‘geographical operation, ‘ rather than a full-scale or selective operation.
But let us face the reality; whatever spin and name the army high command puts to the activity in the North, the American pressure and the country-wide censure of the militaryin the aftermath of the bin Laden affair, has finally done the trick; the much-awaited military movement against radical, al-Qaeda-linked militants, is now underway ´ albeit without a major declaration to the effect.
However selective, the military is now gradually on the move in North Waziristan to hunt the enemy, and this move deserves appreciation, rather than scorn and skepticism.But, based on the groundrealities on North Waziristan, which adjoins the entire greater Paktia Region ´ home to Haqqani Zadran tribe that is divided both sides of the border-the belated crackdown also requires national consensus, plenty of patience and understanding for several reasons.
Firstly, while the decision to embark on a selective offensive against Al Qaedamarks a clear attempt to mend the fractured relationship with the United States, it, hopefully, also underscores a new realism withinthe military establishment; the refusal to crackdown on all Arab-African- Afghan and Pakistani affiliates of the Haqqani-Network ´ in fact the Network itself ´ holds no water any more. The circumstances surrounding Pakistan simply demand a definite move against all those elements who ´ directly or otherwise ´ are either directly involved in or are a source of ´ attacks on the interests of the state of Pakistan.
Secondly, any direct assault on the Haqqanis and affiliates in North Waziristan, means stoking a bee-hive i.e. unruffling elements associated with Lashkare Jhangvi, TTP as well as several splinters of Lashkare Taiba and Jaishe Mohammad ´ all those who are filled with a sense of betrayal (by the erstwhile security institutions) and by implication have become foot-soldiers for AL Qaedaand are more than eager to peddle and promote the kind of terrorismthat bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri stand for.
In all likely-hood, any assault ´ or even limitedconfrontation with some or all of these militant outfits ´ will almost certainly triggera reaction in mainland Pakistan i.e. cities such as Peshawar, some southern districts of KPK such as D.I.Khan, Kohat, Mardan, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. By implication, we should all anticipate, and be ready for, the kind ofviolence that Pakistanis suffered in the aftermath of the JulyRed Mosque Operation in 2007, or the terror attacks in the last half of 2009.
Thirdly,and it flows from the second element which had held the army back from a crackdown in North Waziristan for quite some time,the ensuing violence is likely to herald a new wave of uncertainty and instability across the country . And, given the wobbly political landscape, the military establishment had sofar not been sure as to whether the civilian government would be able to absorb the shock-waves off the al-Qaeda inspired violence. And hence the reluctance to go after the terror networks. Security agencies fear that supporters of Al Qaeda and its Pakistani auxiliaries in Pakistan, particularly the 93 Million strong Punjab , might set off a new wave of terror across the province if their mentors in North Waziristan were attacked.
Fourthly, the Haqqanis enjoy the reputation of being ‘stratetegic assets’ of the Pakistani military establishment, and that is why the army reportedly would never like to antagonize an old ally.
Fifth, a peace accord, signed on February 17th, 2008, still holds true for North Waziristan, where people like Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Sadiq Noor ´ both close friends of the Haqqanis ´ act as guarantors and facilitators of the Peace Accord. Any unilateral action by the Army would amount to a breach of the agreement and thus might entail adverse reaction even from Bahadur and Noor.
As a whole, the advance on North Waziristan is fraught with multiple risks but what is obvious that sooner or later Pakistan shall have to face up these risks for its long-term interests. History suggests that short-term pains must be a preferred choiceto preempt long-termsocio-political disasters. The anti-dote for the conglomerate of religiously-driven Islamist militants is a conclusive official campaign ´ free of fear or favour. Therein lies the long-term salvation of this country and this is why a military advance on the groups holed up in North Waziristanis inevitable ´regardless of how the security establishment characterizes it.
Pak US Relations
Pakistan army ‘geographical operation’ is also likely to help repair some of the damage done to the Pakistan-US relations through mutual punitive steps; Pakistan annoyed the US by sending back 125 out of the 129 military trainers ´ who were here to train Pakistani commandos in counter-terror techniques and guerrilla warfare (Almost three dozen British trainers have also been relieved of their training duties ). The anger stemmed from the unauthorized raid on the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad early May. The US, already cross over Pakistan reluctance to go after terror networks in North Waziristan,reacted by issuing warnings and then suspending the 800 million dollars payments, 500 million of this was actually reimbursements that the Pakistan army , under a bilateral agreement, charges the US for deployment of almost 150,000 troops on the western border.
General Ahmed Shuja Pasha latest Washington visit, and General David Petraeus meeting with the Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, should also be seen as attempts to mend the strained bilateral , though largely need-based, relationship. CRSS was never under any illusion of the Pak-US relations breaking up beyond repair. Hopefully, the military meetings and diplomatic contacts eventually culminate in more rational and proactive approach towards common challenges, rather than conducting diplomacy mutual diatribes and deliberate leaks through the media.