Dr. Seema Khan is a lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University in Australia. She serves as a section editor of the Springer Global Encyclopedia of Territorial Rights and was a Jinnah Fellow at the London School of Economics. Beyond academia, Seema’s professional journey spans over two decades within the public sectors across Australia and Pakistan. When addressing militancy in KP and other regions of Pakistan, there is a need to develop a national consensus. A comprehensive and integrated strategy is required to combat militancy effectively, one that considers local realities and dynamics rather than relying solely on top-down decisions that often ignore ground-level complexities. A collaborative approach, involving experts who have demonstrated success in addressing such challenges, is essential. Some officers have previously undertaken remarkable work, and their insights should be leveraged. While preparing a report on the current situation in Pakistan, I read Azam Khan’s detailed Counter Terrorism Strategy duly approved by the provincial Cabinet in its 46th meeting on 02/05/2012. The officer was a former Principal Secretary to PM Imran Khan & Former Secretary Home KP in the ANP’s government. Astonishingly, the strategy is so relevant even today and unfortunately, a decade down the line we are back to square one- nothing has changed. The report sets a strong foundation and presents a template to counter this menace. Though issued over a decade ago even before the formation of the 20 Points National Action Plan (NAP-2014) outlined by NACTA that was approved on 24th of December, 2014 by the Parliament. Despite all this, the relevance of the Counter Terrorism Strategy still remains undiminished. It underscores the importance of local participation in understanding the socio-political dynamics at play and highlights the risks of excluding those with direct interaction with affected communities. It is crucial that LEAs, both...

It will take political commitment and sincerity on both sides to steer Pakistan and Afghanistan out of the current tensions and chart the way for a better future. This was the take-away from a day-long civil society dialogue involving representatives from both countries. Nearly two dozen participants drawn from the two countries, also underscored the need for easing restrictions on visas for Afghan citizens, which they agreed, are breeding animosity and negativity among Afghans. The participants of the dialogue, organized by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) pointed out the losses worth millions of dollars that farmers and traders have been enduring due to abrupt border closures and political tensions. These disruptions, coupled with the corruption of officials, hit traders and farmers of both countries. Robust mechanisms and consistent policies can help minimize such disruptions and the ensuing losses, the participants suggested. Intensive discussions centred on girls’ education, terrorism, obstructions in the way of transit and bilateral trade, and visas for Afghan nationals. They also called on both governments to keep politics and trade separate and engage in meaningful dialogue on issues that are of primary concern to both countries. The civil society dialogue took place to the context of a spike in TTP-led terrorist violence and the consequent bombing of the terrorist outfit’s camps in eastern Afghanistan in December. Special representative for Afghanistan, Mohammad Sadiq also attended the session and listened to presentations from both sides. He promised to look into the visa-related complaints and issues encountered by common Afghans, and also informed the audience of the multiple steps the government is taking to smoothen visa processes and facilitate traders on both sides of the border. “Only through mutual consultations can we overcome problems that are hindering peoples’ and goods movement between the two countries”, delegates...

The historical ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan have not always translated into harmonious state-level relations. In light of this, the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) has established the Afghan Studies Center (ASC) with the objective of facilitating people-to-people interactions, encouraging the participation of youth and promoting empowerment through various initiatives. ASC has undertaken various activities, projects, and research reports to engage youth in track III diplomacy.        

In this eye-opening research paper, Dr. Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan, a retired Group Captain of the Bangladesh Air Force, raises serious questions about the Indian role in the creation of Bangladesh. While Bengalis took credit of liberation, the Indians projected the event as a victory over Pakistan, and hence no senior Bengali army officer was invited to the ceremony where the surrender was signed. A Seemingly Intuitive Question? On the 54th Victory Day of Bangladesh, the Indian Prime Minister in his official X handle (formerly Twitter) posted: “today we honour the courage and sacrifices of the brave soldiers who contributed to India's historic victory in 1971.”1 Modiji’s message, seemingly undermining Bangladesh’s ownership of the 1971 Liberation War raised an intuitive question: whose victory was it anyway? The Bangladeshi polity reacted sharply. Ordinary citizens, politicians, and government executives condemned the Indian Prime Minister's misleading recollection of history and distortion of the truth, further fueling the strained bilateral relationship after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024 and her subsequent asylum in India. 2 Amidst the flurry of emotive reactions to Modiji’s Vijay Diwas message, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) response stands out as an evidence-based reminder of the historical truth of 16 December 1971—the day on which the Pakistani troops surrendered at Dhaka, marking the victory of Bangladesh's nine-month-long liberation struggle. Quoting J. N. Dixit – former Indian Foreign Secretary, diplomat and National Security Adviser - the MOFA in its social media account posted: “A major political mistake at the surrender ceremony [of Pakistani forces at Dhaka on 16 December 1971] was the Indian military high command’s failure to ensure the presence of General M.A.G. Osmani, Commander from the Bangladesh side on the Joint Command…This was an unfortunate aberration which India could have avoided. The event...