By Javed Hassan The IMF’s Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment (GCDA) for Pakistan released by the Ministry of Finance on November 19, 2025, as a prior action for the next tranche, is a remarkably blunt document for an institution not known for pulling punches only when absolutely necessary. In the measured but unsparing language that only the Fund can deploy with impunity, it lays bare a familiar yet still staggering reality: governance failures and corruption are not marginal frictions in Pakistan; they are a central macroeconomic constraint, draining something on the order of 6–6.5 percent of GDP every year. The diagnostic’s core findings can be summarized without much sugar-coating: • Fiscal and tax systems remain riddled with discretionary exemptions, off-budget spending, and elite capture. Illicit financial flows and tax avoidance together siphon off roughly the same share of potential revenue as the entire reported tax-to-GDP ratio manages to collect. • Public procurement and state-owned enterprises operate as a parallel economy of patronage. Even the Rs 5.3 trillion in recoveries proudly touted by the National Accountability Bureau over the past two years represent only a tiny fraction of the systemic haemorrhag• An overburdened, under-modernized judiciary – plagued by case backlogs, outdated procedures, and integrity deficits – has become one of the binding constraints on investment. Contract enforcement and property rights remain precarious, feeding a pervasive bribe culture. • The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), originally created to cut red tape for foreign investors, is flagged for its opaque tax concessions, extra-legal immunities, and lack of accountability – in effect, a new institutional channel for the very elite capture the report elsewhere condemns. • Anti-corruption institutions are fragmented, under-resourced, and lacking elementary whistle-blower protection. The report quietly recommends what many have long called...

Policy Brief Most democracies recognise temporary immunity for sitting leaders to ensure uninterrupted governance and prevent politically motivated litigation. Countries such as France (Article 67 of the Constitution), Pakistan (Article 248(2) of the Constitution), and the United States (through Department of Justice policy) provide such safeguards. While some countries grant former presidents extended immunity, in most democracies, protection ends once a leader’s term expires, making them accountable under the law like any other citizen. 27th Amendment: What’s at stake for Pakistan? Pakistan’s future democratic landscape could face profound repercussions from the newly proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which seeks to embed lifetime immunity for the President while restructuring key military and judicial institutions. The amendment inserts the phrase “Notwithstanding any judgment of any court” into Article 248, bars any criminal proceedings against the President for life, and against a governor only during their term, and prevents courts from issuing arrest or imprisonment orders against the officeholder. Beyond the presidency, the amendment establishes a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) with original jurisdiction over constitutional disputes, abolishes the post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, consolidates military command under a new Chief of the Defence Forces, and extends equivalent immunity to top military officers promoted to ranks such as Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force, or Admiral of the Fleet. The Risks of Lifetime Immunity Lifetime immunity extends legal protection indefinitely, including for acts unrelated to official duties. Proponents argue it preserves respect for office and shields leaders from political harassment. Yet in practice such provisions undermine constitutional accountability, weaken judicial oversight, and insulate public officeholders from scrutiny – especially in countries where democratic institutions are...

Don’t Give Up Rational Engagement By Imtiaz Gul In this piece, CRSS Executive Director Imtiaz Gul argues that Pakistan and Afghanistan’s ongoing mistrust and tit-for-tat posturing come at the expense of ordinary citizens, traders, and refugees. A lasting solution will demand moving past blame and coercion toward pragmatic, accountable dialogue. The battle lines are drawn. Pakistan has removed any distinction between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA), and portrays them as two sides of the same coin - both working in the service of arch-rival India. The stand-off has brought Afghans together like never before, both at home and abroad. The Afghan diaspora is celebrating the collapse of the third round of the talks in Istanbul, setting aside their long-standing criticism of the Taliban regime for excluding women from work and education. Once ardent haters of the Taliban, they are celebrating the TTA’s “defiance” vis-à-vis Pakistan. Friends in Afghanistan believe the talks were doomed to fail because of the structure: when two intelligence chiefs sit across the table, the best they can do is try to checkmate each other rather than engage in an out-of-the-box conversation. Let us dissect this conundrum from four angles. Firstly, many Pakistani friends familiar with the Afghan issue and its accompanying intricacies had foretold the outcome; the fate of talks is largely predictable when spymasters discuss political relationships, trade, and business. Propagandist accusations, threats, and planted “leaks” from the talks appearing on official as well as dubious platforms further vitiated an already toxic air. Secondly, one wondered why even dozens of hours of parleys failed in producing a mutually favourable result, particularly if the entire process centres on the TTP and its shelters in Afghanistan. Pakistan demanded an end to terrorism in Pakistan via the TTP’s sanctuaries in Afghanistan. “In the aftermath of Pakistan’s ‘Operation...

By Abdul Waheed Waheed Afghanistan’s strategic diversification of trade routes through Central Asia and Iran has reduced its economic reliance on Pakistan, lessening the impact of repeated border closures. This analysis explores how these shifts are strengthening Afghanistan’s resilience, reshaping cross-border trade dynamics, and highlighting the need for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to move from coercion toward cooperative, predictable engagement. A courageous step taken a decade ago to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan and to explore alternative trade corridors is now bearing fruit. Those forward-looking policies, once underestimated, have today resulted in Afghanistan’s calm indifference toward Pakistan’s closure of the Durand Line gates. The bold decisions to diversify trade routes and strengthen regional connectivity, particularly through Central Asia and Iran, have gradually freed Afghanistan from the economic stranglehold once exerted by its southern neighbor. The era when a single day of Durand Line gates closure could trigger panic and inflation across Afghan markets is gone. What we now witness is a quiet but profound shift: the transformation of vulnerability into resilience, born out of strategic foresight and hard-earned lessons from history. It has already been three weeks since the gates along the Durand Line were closed, yet prices inside Afghanistan have remained relatively stable. The closures no longer exert significant economic pressure on the country. This newfound stability reflects Afghanistan’s growing economic resilience and its gradual shift away from over-dependence on Pakistan for trade and transit, while also demonstrating a measured response to Pakistan’s unilateral imposition of restrictions on Afghan trade and movement. However, the closures have taken a toll on Afghan exports, particularly perishable goods such as fresh fruits and vegetables. Thousands of tons of these products, destined for Pakistani markets, have...

By Imtiaz Gul & Engineer Arshad H Abbasi The authors dissect Pakistan’s decade-long descent into energy dependency. Drawing on policy data and comparative analysis, the authors trace how the neglect of public-sector power plants, misplaced investment in imported fuels, and rent-seeking governance transformed a manageable shortfall into a structural crisis. In 2013, Pakistan’s energy crisis reached its darkest point. Cities fell silent under endless load-shedding, factories stood shuttered, and families endured darkness for as long as 18 hours a day. This collapse was not the result of absent infrastructure but of something far more serious: public-sector power plants, once the backbone of national energy, corroded by neglect, starved of maintenance, and left to decay. A nation of two hundred million stood at a crossroads, and the path chosen sealed a decade of hardship. One option was straightforward: rehabilitate the thermal plants inherited under the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO). Though battered by decades of misuse, their structures remained sound. Feasibility studies laid out a rehabilitation program costing just USD 215–400 million. In return, Pakistan could have restored 1,200 MW, reduced fuel consumption, cut emissions, and bought precious time for structural reforms. Instead, policymakers embraced imported fuels under the 2015 National Power Policy. LNG terminals rose on the coasts, coal plants in Sahiwal and Port Qasim began to burn foreign coal, and independent power producers (IPPs) signed contracts with binding take-or-pay clauses. The consequences were severe. Circular debt spiralled past Rs. 5 trillion. As a result, Pakistan’s tariffs ranked among the highest in South Asia. Ordinary households were forced to spend half their incomes on electricity. Industries shuttered, exports shrank, unemployment deepened, and every ribbon-cutting ceremony became less a promise of light than a symbol of financial strain. Across the border, India...

By Engineer Arshad H Abbasi, International Water & Energy Expert As an independent expert in water and energy issues, with long-standing professional experience on transboundary rivers, I have followed with close attention the recent inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. At a cost of $5 billion, the GERD is Africa’s largest hydroelectric project and a symbol of Ethiopia’s ambition to electrify its economy and reduce energy poverty. For Ethiopia, it represents not only energy security but also national pride, as the project was built without foreign aid and funded largely by the sacrifices of its own citizens. But for its downstream neighbors, Sudan and especially Egypt, the dam raises profound anxieties about water security and survival. The concerns of Egypt are not difficult to understand. More than 95 percent of Egypt’s water supply comes from the Nile. Few nations in the world are as dependent on a single river as Egypt, which obtains 93 to 97 percent of its freshwater from the Nile. This level of reliance transforms the river from a resource into an existential necessity. Historical use of the Nile has sustained Egypt’s civilization for millennia, providing fertile soil, drinking water, and the irrigation on which agriculture has depended since the age of the pharaohs. Today, the Nile continues to be the backbone of Egypt’s food, water, and energy systems. In international water governance, historical use and dependence are not abstract arguments. They constitute real, legally relevant grounds for priority of use, especially when more than 100 million people live in a nation where the river is virtually the sole water source. The construction and operation of the GERD must also be viewed through the framework of international transboundary water law. The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses enshrines two guiding principles: the principle of equitable and reasonable...

by Islomkhon Gafarov Afghanistan’s education system faces a critical crossroads under Taliban rule. With religious studies prioritized over secular and scientific learning, limited opportunities for girls, and chronic underfunding, the country risks long-term setbacks in innovation and development. Yet, regional partnerships, progressive Afghan institutions, and emerging online education initiatives offer avenues to preserve learning, empower communities, and bridge the gap between tradition and modernity. The Taliban’s assumption of power in August 2021 exerted a profound impact on the socio-cultural and political fabric of Afghanistan. The ensuing politico-spiritual transformations reverberated across the country’s economic sphere and the of its social life. The system of primary, higher, and postgraduate education found itself in a precarious position, shaped by the abrupt shift in political and ideological orientation following two decades of American presence. In effect, instability in the educational sector emerged as a direct consequence of the transition from a Western-oriented model to an Islamic conception of education. This transformation is poised, in the long term, to generate a complex set of socio-political and economic challenges for Afghan society. Current Situation and Challenges The contemporary education system in Afghanistan faces a range of profound structural and institutional deficiencies. The Taliban administration in Afghanistan has placed a clear priority on the religious dimensions of education over secular and scientific disciplines. Consequently, theological subjects occupy a central position in curricula – often as compulsory components – while the development of natural sciences and technical fields remains severely constrained. This imbalance impedes the formation of an innovative environment and hampers progress in strategically significant domains such as information technology. Over the long term, in an era defined by global...