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Is there a Hope for Pakistan?

A Reality Check on Pakistan Future: Pakistan has a population of around 180 million which has trebled over the past 50 years and is slated to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years, making it roughly 265 million ´ equivalent to adding five more Karachis! In another twenty years the population will be 335 million! With more than half of the population living in towns and cities imagine the lethal tensions over land, water, power, housing, jobs and services. Imagine the scale of investment and materials that will be required in infrastructure and services. The economy will need to grow at a minimum of six per cent per year over the next ten years to generate 36 million new productive jobs to meet the needs of the growing population. Currently, the growth rate is not even keeping pace with the population expansion rate. Moreover, with only 50 per cent of children going to primary school, 25 per cent to secondary school, and only 5 per cent receiving higher education the qualifications required for productive employment and self-employment are just not going to be there. In fact, taking into account the deplorable quality of education available to the overwhelming majority of our children the situation is in fact much worse than what the deplorable figures suggest. Plethora or Problems: The situation in other basic services sectors, indeed in social and gender protection systems and human resource development as a whole, is arguably even more dismal. Roughly 40 per cent of all households have no electricity and 80 per cent of all household energy use comes from firewood, dung and crop residue. Industrial and transport growth without assured energy supplies at affordable prices will be a pipe-dream. Pakistan is already one of the most water-stressed countries in the world as a result of its population growth. Rising consumption expectations in a globally connected world will exacerbate current frustrations. Climate change will further exacerbate water and food...

Afghan Peace and Pakistan’s Options

The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by NATO to Kabul for talks. Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration, has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus, commander-in-chief of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan, claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and "soften up" the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its Af-Pak policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then. The Taliban as well as the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. Pakistan has signaled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner by taking on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, and by permitting expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory. Washington also wants Pakistan to overcome its "obsession" with India's presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms. The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signaled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation,...

Afghan Peace and Pakistan's Options

The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by NATO to Kabul for talks. Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration, has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus, commander-in-chief of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan, claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and "soften up" the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its Af-Pak policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then. The Taliban as well as the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. Pakistan has signaled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner by taking on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, and by permitting expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory. Washington also wants Pakistan to overcome its "obsession" with India's presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms. The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signaled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation,...

Afghan Peace and Pakistan's Options

The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by NATO to Kabul for talks. Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration, has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus, commander-in-chief of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan, claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and "soften up" the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its Af-Pak policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then. The Taliban as well as the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. Pakistan has signaled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner by taking on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, and by permitting expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory. Washington also wants Pakistan to overcome its "obsession" with India's presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms. The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signaled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation,...

The Pakistan and US-NATO Tug of War

NATO Attack & Pakistan Response: Hundreds ofNATO cargo trucks and containers are back on the Pakistani roads, carrying vital military, fuel and food supplies destined for troops based in Afghanistan. These almost 2000 kilometers roads ´ between theKarachiport in the south and the northwestern and southwestern border towns Torkham and Chamman remain the key, shortest link in this crucial supply chain, comprising some 6,500 trucks. This supply chain had come to a grinding haltafter NATO Apache helicopters fired two missiles on a Pakistani security post in the Kurram tribal region on September 30, destroying the post and killing three soldiers on the spot. Pakistanreacted fiercely to the border incursion by closing down the border in the Northwest to protest both the killings and the border violation. Also, within the next few days, NATO lostalmost 130 NATO oil containers at various locations, apparently to Taliban militants, who, too,grounded their torching of the trucks and containers to NATO incursion in Pakistan. Death of the Soldiers ´ Kayani Took the Initial Stance: Background interviews with a few of the most influential and senior most military commanders reveal that the altercation triggered unusually stiff opposition by the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani,who took up the deaths of his soldiers with Prime Minister Yousuf Reza Gillani early October. The General Headquarter also conveyed its rejection of border infringement through the Office of the Defense Representative in the US embassy in Islamabad to Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Viewed against the hard-line that the army took on the issue of cargo supplies, it should be safe to conclude that the resumption ofthe traffic came at a relatively heavy cost, though, and quite a few ripples and ruptures in the US-Pakistan military-to-military relationship that had begun in July 2008 in theIndian Ocean. NATO Incursion: Gen. Petraeus Miscalculation or Just an Incident? At...

Conflicting interests

Imtiaz Gul Pakistan-US relations have once again hit a dead end. Confusion and conflict of interests appear to be at the heart of the latest round of tensions between an embattled Pakistani government and a desperate US administration. America philosopher general ´ David Petraeus ´ has upped the ante by dropping strong hints that troops under his command in Afghanistan will do all they can to intercept and kill or neutralize insurgents moving across the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The stated objective of America latest campaign is to destroy Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the border regions of Pakistan, and to stabilize Afghanistan. A more covert objective appears to be to trigger conditions that could be interpreted as tangible military success ahead of Congressional elections in November and the strategic review in December. That review will presumably focus on whether and how to gradually extricate the bulk of US forces from Afghanistan. Pitched against these short-term American objectives are the self-perceived long-term strategic interests of the Pakistani military establishment. So far, these include resisting American desires for an all-out operation against the militants in and around North Waziristan in Pakistan tribal area. No one contests the fact that North Waziristan, a mountainous terrain spread over roughly 5000 square kilometers, and the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktia and Paktika, offer huge swathes of uncontrolled territory for insurgents– of all shades ´ Afghans, Pakistanis, Arabs, Uzbeks ´ to move back and forth for their militant activities. The question is not what one would wish to see there, but what can in fact be done. North Waziristan currently serves as one of the major staging posts for attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated militants, including the Haqqani network. Several Pakistani militant groups ´ such as Lashkare Taiba and Lashkare Jhangvi ´ are also hiding there, under the protection of the Haqqani network....

Terrorism Dictates Indo-Pak Peace and Relations

Kashmir, Kashmir and Kashmir: Kashmir is in the news again. With over 100 deaths, the valley of Srinanagar has been in grip of protests, police violence and public unrest since May. This also seems to have prompted India to express interest for resuming dialogue with Pakistan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly some time next month. But will this change the substance of the bilateral relationship? Even a cursory look leads to the conclusion that terrorism sits deep at the heart of the Indo-Pak relations. India remains convinced, and therefore focused, on Lashkare Taiba, which it believes is the prime source of terrorism on the Indian soil including Kashmir. In fact, India gradually revised its characterization of the violence in Kashmir in early 1994, from militancy to Terrorism, after 'the guest organization' LeT unleashed their militant campaign in Kashmir, along-with other guest organizations such as Harkatul Mujahideen. Terror Attacks always Derail the Indo-Pak Peace Process: Theattack on the Indian parliament (13th December 2001) and the Mumbai carnage (Nov 26th, 2008) not only reinforced that characterization but also stands out today as the stumbling bloc in the way of resumption of formal talks between the two countries. A multitude of factors in fact bedevils the bilateral relationship, and thus obstructing almost every move to peace and joint counter-terrorism strategies, terrorism being the centrepiece of the Indian argument. The deadlock on the dialogue stems not only from the Indian conviction that Pakistan security establishment supports the LeT and Jaishe Mohammad; it also draws strength from New Delhi belief that the Pakistani establishment continues to back non-state actors against the Indian state, and thus remains a rogue army, a source of violence and instability in Kashmir and rest of India. And the US establishment in particular also views the Pakistani security apparatus through the Indian prism, a fact explained through the fact...

Review Needed on Afghanistan Policy

Much Activity, Less Delivery: Late last week Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the US commander General David Petraeus, the American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio. Officials touted theirmeetings with Gen.Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials as well as the civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet, the surge in violence and an extremely low turn out in the Afghan parliamentary election two days lateron Saturday, betray the bitter ground reality; Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated for failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of the US high-handed approach andPakistanitself is struggling with the consequences ofan over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Getting nowhere is the sense from all stakeholders, and it also suggests things for them all have gone from bad to worse. This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the day centered more on money and military muscle and less on long-term strategies. Pakistan and the US do not Trust Each Other: Interestingly, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad,the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several, previously secret documents (Sept.13) which shed considerable light on the ups and downs of the US-Pakistan relationship since the 9/11 attacks as well. Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistanin the aftermath of the tragic terror events of 9/11, bothWashingtonand Islamabad hardly trusted each other. Equally revealing are some remarks and warnings contained in discussions between former ambassador Wendy Chemberlin, Richard Haas, Pakistani intelligence officials and (unnamed) sources. 'We will not flinch from a military victoryÎ“Ã‡Âªbut a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an...

US Banning TTP – Is this a Favor to Pakistan?

When was TTP Banned? Under the Executive Order 13224,signed by President Bush on September 23, 2001, the United States on Sept 1st formally designated the Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP) as a foreign terrorist organization.Daniel Benjamin, the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism formally announced it at a press briefing, thereby making the TTP the latest addition to a list of 47 such banned organizations. TheExecutive Order 13224 provides the governmenta means by which to disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. government to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. Earlier,secretary of State Hillary Clinton had cleared the way for TTPs designation as a foreign terrorist organization on August 12.'I conclude that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that the relevant circumstances described in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act exists with respect to the group,' she wrote. 'Therefore, I hereby designate the aforementioned organization and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the INA,'according to an email distributed by the State Department. Mesh of Militancy: Tehreek-e Taliban, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, was founded in December 2007, consisting of a number of militant groups operating in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Formed under the direction of militant leader Baitullah Mehsud, TTP went on to become the most lethal outfit, publicly stating the Pakistani army as its enemy number one. Hekimullah Mehsud became the group leader when Baitullah Mehsud died in a US drone attack on August 5th, 2009. Wali Ur Rehman Mehsud is the TTP amir in the Mehsud region of South Waziristan. Several militant Organizations, largely relevant to both Pakistan andAfghanistan,such as al Qaeda, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM),Islamic Movement...

Different Pakistans for the Rich and Poor

Pakistan Ruling Elite: Garhi Khuda Bux (Sindh) - Once again, the tide of goodwill in the aftermath of the super-flood favors Pakistan. By himself flying over the affected areas and later giving a graphic description of the devastation, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moonpersuaded members of his organization to step forward and help Pakistan cope with the consequences of what he described as the 'slow-motion tsunami.' And rightly so. It is indeed a'slow-motion Tsunami' because it will now amplify the consequences ofa system that rests on a morally bankrupt, intellectually poor, politically self-serving, culturally bigoted and financially corrupt ruling elite comprising politicians, bureaucracy, feudal lords, generals and their apologists in all spheres of life. Towering Grand Tomb and Low Lives at Garhi Khuda Bux: And the Garhi Khuda Bux ´ the ancestral town the Bhuttos ´ exemplifies the disconnect between this ruling elite and the hapless masses on the one hand, and the misplaced priorities on the other; a huge domed complex now stands over the old graveyard where all the Bhuttos are resting. The three-domed marble complex is now called the Mazar- the mausoleum, built with public money ´ drawn from the provincial and the federal kitties. A huge boundary wall, running into hundreds of meters, is being built as the foreyard ofthe mausoleum, all with expensive holed-blocs, imported from Karachi. That too, of course, with the public money. Both and inside the mausoleum, dozens of half-naked children and elderly locals are idling around. Some barefoot, some without shirts, you can count the rib-cage of these emaciated figures. Their faces betray the story of poverty and the miserable life they live under the shadow of this towering complex. Looking at the physical expense and the financial expense incurred on it, it appears as if poverty, education and health facilities for the thousands living by the mausoleum have been taken care of. Politics ´ Even After Death: The...