Shock and awe for the Pentagon:
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal exit shocked almost everybody, particularly those within the Pentagon and the mighty defense establishment who still advocate and believe in the military surge. Yet, his ignominious departure was not unexpected. The Rolling Stone magazine profile only precipitated the ouster of a person who faced severe challenges to his position following the setback to the hyped-up Marja offensive. The IPS News had already forecast ‘the specter of a collapse of U.S. political support,’ and ‘massive failure’ on June 13, quoting various sources.
McChrystal: a general in the field or a workman quarrelling with his tools?
Picking up on McChrystal announcement on the delay until September of the military operation in Kandahar (in the context of failure in Marja), the IPS said this decision meant a serious blow to the general earlier chest-thumping statements. McChrystal and his staff hadtouted the Kandahar operation as the ‘pivotal campaign of the war,’ that would begin in June. But it is now clear that McChrystal had realized for weeks that the most basic premise of the operation turned out to be false. ‘Equally damaging to the credibility of McChrystal’s strategy was the Washington Post report published Thursday documenting in depth the failure of February’s offensive in Marja.’ the IPS report said, addingthat events since the launch of Marja operation in February had made abundantly clear that that the US-led coalition forces lacked the Afghan population support in what is known as the Taliban heartland.
“When you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them,” said McChrystal, told a NATO conference in London 11 days before his ouster, underlining the difficulties his mission could face in Kandahar.
Marja operation ´ Failure, failure, failure:
The Washington Post story had spoken of “U.S. officials complaints’ that ‘the support from Kandaharis that the United States was counting on (Afghan President Hamid) Karzai to deliver has not materialised.’ The Post also provided the first detailed evidence of the systematic non-cooperation of the population of the district-sized area called Marja with U.S. troops. In one instance, female U.S. Marines tried to get Afghan women to come to a meeting last week, but not a single woman showed up. And despite a NATO offer to hire as many as 10,000 residents for labor projects on irrigation projects, only about 1,200 have signed up.
This also fueled frustration within the McChrystal camp and the swipes they took at Obama, Joe Biden and others (as reported in the Rolling Stone report) underscored those frustrations as well as exposed the disconnect between Washington and those sitting in Kabul. The view from Kabul markedly differs from the one you get in Washington, where vice President Joe Biden, who advocatesa defined time-line for disengagement from Afghanistan.
Afghan war is also about money for the defense sub-contractors:
It was also evident from President Karzai support for McChystal once it had become obvious the Rolling Stone profile had spelt doom for him. One also has to bear in mind the strong lobbies associated with Pentagon, and also interested in the continuation of the status quo ´ if not a further surge. At the moment as many as 150,000 defense contractors must be serving the nearly 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan. A number of leading members of the Karzai administration are directly or indirectly also working as sub-contractors, largely involved in cargo supplies for the coalition troops.
Lessons for White House to learn:

1. Although President Obama insists the Afghan strategy will remain in-tact, yet he is unmistakably anxious for a phased withdrawal. (Gen. David Petraeus told CNN (June 24, 2010) he supports President Barack Obama’s July 2011 deadline to start withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan).
2. To facilitate the gradual pullout, Obama and aides, will have to mix-and-match the desire for an honorable exit and the compulsion of keeping the post-Taliban system in tact and thereby denying Taliban and al Qaeda any chance to overrun Kabul.
3. The US strategy will now most probably be a combination of Mr. Biden ‘stripped-down counterterrorism strategy ¶ including a hard deadline for American withdrawal ¶ and an accelerated effort by Mr. Karzai government to reconcile with the leaders of the Taliban insurgency,’ as reported by the New York Times( June 24^th).
4. Pakistan will ´ once again ´ weigh heavily on the US strategy; given Islamabad criticality for even a face-saver for the coalition, the Obama administration shall have to by-pass those hardliners within the establishment and many Republicans, who want to tie any future aid cooperation to an all-out offensive in North Waziristan by Pakistan.
5. Any US strategy shall also have to take into account Pakistan politico-strategiclong-term interests as well its quest for energy from countries such as Iran.Expecting Pakistan to jeopardize its long-term national interest (by antagonizing the entire tribal region by applying force all over on the one hand, and by giving up on the gas import plans from Iran on the other) for the sake of American interests is loaded with selfishness and contradiction. USA should not deny Pakistan what it itself is trying to protect i.e. national interest.

In this context, it is imperative for Pakistan also to come out of the defensive; while remaining firm in its resolve to staythe course against all shades and forms of terror and violence, Pakistan must press for its legitimateobjectives such as import of energy from other countries.

6. Since General David Petraeus enjoys good personal rapport with Pakistan army high command, the US civilian authorities would do good to their stated and covert objectives if they let the new commander-in-charge in Afghanistan build more trust with his Pakistani counter-parts. That would create much more space for the US to honorablyand gradually extricate itself from Afghanistan. Continued aspersions on Pakistan intentions and doubts about its strategies will only keep muddying waters. That mayalso not help its cause in Afghanistan and even vitiate the atmosphere in Pakistan as well.
7. More importantly, blaming others for divisions within, is not the recipe for success in Afghanistan. Obama and Petraeus mustfirst synergizetheir strategies before exhorting others for cooperation.

If the political-defense establishment in the US fails to understand the lessons that it must learn, the situation will worsen and keep slipping out of the hands. In that case, the situation cannot be better described than what a Taliban commander reportedly once said: ‘The Americans might have the watch but we have the time!’