The people of Balochistan always suspected the Chinese projects in the province. They alleged the government of Pakistan for disturbing the demographical balance merely in favour of Punjabi and Sindhi communities. The security of Chinese personnel working in Pakistan has been a matter of concern since the inauguration of Gwadar Sea port. Over 14,321 Chinese engineers/technicians working on 210 Chinese aided small and mega projects, particularly in Balochistan are not secured. This issue has triggered tension on both the sides. Consequently, Both Pakistan and China agreed on a four-layer security plan meant for over three thousand kilometer long trade route, connecting Xinjiang province to Gwadar sea port. Since the civilian government has assigned the task of protecting Chinese to Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) assured to protect the Chinese working in Pakistan. On the eve of Chinese New Year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif greeted the Chinese personnel working in Pakistan. The PM stressed upon the time tested friendship of both the countries. He underlined that the government is strongly committed to the fast economic development of Pakistan, hence various deferred projects have been completed. It would never step back in fear of opposition at any cost.

by Cameron Munter The ‘One-Belt-One-Road’ initiative has the potential to have significant impact on both China and Pakistan.  If general impressions are to be believed, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s One-Belt-One-Road project—at least as it plays out in Pakistan and its neighborhood—is either a major step toward Chinese projection of power outside its borders, or an example of the importance of domestic constituencies in Chinese foreign policy. The first camp believes that the hesitancy and inherent conservatism of China is finally giving way to a more muscular and confident role, and that Chinese claims that its investment in infrastructure to its west and south is “win-win” for everyone is actually cover for a new manifestation of its global role. The latter believes that the foreign implications of the plan are secondary to the real issue on the Chinese leadership’s mind: the domestic Chinese economic transformation that will see cheap labor producing mass exports replaced by higher value-added production that depends on technological savvy and education. On the other end of the One-Belt-One-Road project, in Pakistan for example, there is the prospect of an opening of an economy long stagnant, unleashing Pakistan’s potential in its labor force, accessibility of goods, and role in international trade. That, of course, is what the government of Prime Minister Sharif states, expecting that the 48 billion dollars expected to pour into infrastructure projects in Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Balochistan will transform the country, alleviating much of the poverty that has been increased by the violence and insecurity of recent decades. But it could in fact do no such thing.  The economy of Pakistan has become more autarkic over time, as political elites defend their roles in traditional sectors like agriculture, textiles, and basic manufacturing, resisting the changes that have brought neighboring areas like Southeast Asia in to the world economy. Some suspect that the 48...

by Cameron Munter The ‘One-Belt-One-Road’ initiative has the potential to have significant impact on both China and Pakistan.  If general impressions are to be believed, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s One-Belt-One-Road project—at least as it plays out in Pakistan and its neighborhood—is either a major step toward Chinese projection of power outside its borders, or an example of the importance of domestic constituencies in Chinese foreign policy. The first camp believes that the hesitancy and inherent conservatism of China is finally giving way to a more muscular and confident role, and that Chinese claims that its investment in infrastructure to its west and south is “win-win” for everyone is actually cover for a new manifestation of its global role. The latter believes that the foreign implications of the plan are secondary to the real issue on the Chinese leadership’s mind: the domestic Chinese economic transformation that will see cheap labor producing mass exports replaced by higher value-added production that depends on technological savvy and education. On the other end of the One-Belt-One-Road project, in Pakistan for example, there is the prospect of an opening of an economy long stagnant, unleashing Pakistan’s potential in its labor force, accessibility of goods, and role in international trade. That, of course, is what the government of Prime Minister Sharif states, expecting that the 48 billion dollars expected to pour into infrastructure projects in Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Balochistan will transform the country, alleviating much of the poverty that has been increased by the violence and insecurity of recent decades. But it could in fact do no such thing.  The economy of Pakistan has become more autarkic over time, as political elites defend their roles in traditional sectors like agriculture, textiles, and basic manufacturing, resisting the changes that have brought neighboring areas like Southeast Asia in to the world economy. Some suspect that the 48...

To manage the energy crisis in Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has decided to evaluate the progress of Sahiwal coal power plant project. This 132-MW project is a part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A 19-member delegation of the government and opposition from Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) Assembly had a meeting with the Chairman Parliamentary Committee on CPEC. In the meeting, they voiced their annoyance over not including GB in CPEC. They requested the committee on CPEC to visit GB in this regard. [1] Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Syed Tariq Fatemi had a meeting with the Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. They discussed the connotation of bilateral relationship and underlined the need of frequent exchange of personnel in academia.[2] [1] http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/02-Feb-2016/mps-show-concern-over-not-including-gb-in-cpec [2] http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/front-top/276447-fatemi-for-enhanced-china-pak-intellectual-exchanges-academics-linkages.html

To manage the energy crisis in Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has decided to evaluate the progress of Sahiwal coal power plant project. This 132-MW project is a part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A 19-member delegation of the government and opposition from Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) Assembly had a meeting with the Chairman Parliamentary Committee on CPEC. In the meeting, they voiced their annoyance over not including GB in CPEC. They requested the committee on CPEC to visit GB in this regard. [1] Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Syed Tariq Fatemi had a meeting with the Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. They discussed the connotation of bilateral relationship and underlined the need of frequent exchange of personnel in academia.[2] [1] http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/02-Feb-2016/mps-show-concern-over-not-including-gb-in-cpec [2] http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/front-top/276447-fatemi-for-enhanced-china-pak-intellectual-exchanges-academics-linkages.html

To manage the energy crisis in Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has decided to evaluate the progress of Sahiwal coal power plant project. This 132-MW project is a part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A 19-member delegation of the government and opposition from Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) Assembly had a meeting with the Chairman Parliamentary Committee on CPEC. In the meeting, they voiced their annoyance over not including GB in CPEC. They requested the committee on CPEC to visit GB in this regard. [1] Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Syed Tariq Fatemi had a meeting with the Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. They discussed the connotation of bilateral relationship and underlined the need of frequent exchange of personnel in academia.[2] [1] http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/02-Feb-2016/mps-show-concern-over-not-including-gb-in-cpec [2] http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/front-top/276447-fatemi-for-enhanced-china-pak-intellectual-exchanges-academics-linkages.html

The Parliamentary Committee for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, looked over the CPEC projects in their three days visit to the Sindh province. Talking about the Thar coal power project, the senator specifically emphasized that no element of political or provincial preferences has been found in the project. The overt visit of MPs from all federating units makes their support to the project certain. The delegates from working committee of Thar coal project agreed that Thar is the energy future of Pakistan.[1] With the idea of fixing around 12 billion rupees against development budget, the Chief Minister of Gilgit Baltistan (GB) - while stressing the importance of CPEC- underlined that the project will bring economic and social development in the region.[2] In order to evaluate the level of advancement of developmental projects in the power and petroleum sectors initiated under the CPEC, the Federal Finance Minister called upon a meeting. It was a detailed meeting about the finance, timeline and development of the power and petroleum projects.[3] The Ukrainian ambassador claimed that the Multinational Companies (MNC’s) of Ukraine are aiming to build power plants, pipelines, bridges and railways in Pakistan. He claimed that making investments in the CPEC project would exploit the economic opportunities at regional level.[4] The Chairman Board of Investment declared that the CPEC has been a game changer for regional progress and development since it has uplifted the economy of Pakistan in the last two years.[5] [1] http://tribune.com.pk/story/1037850/mps-see-thar-as-energy-future-of-pakistan/ [2] http://www.radio.gov.pk/newsdetail/82347/1 [3] http://www.brecorder.com/market-data/stocks-a-bonds/0/12125/ [4] http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/30-Jan-2016/ukrainian-companies-keen-to-invest-in-cpec-project-says-envoy [5]...

As Iran celebrates the lifting of sanctions and cranks up its oil production, the biggest winner may be China, Iran’s new best friend. Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a visit to Tehran in January, meeting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and signing a 25-year economic, political and military cooperation pact. The two leaders announced the signing of 17 deals—including agreements on oil drilling, nuclear energy and a vast infrastructure project linking China to the Mediterranean, known as One Belt, One Road. Rouhani predicted the deals would boost bilateral trade tenfold to an annual $600 billion in the next decade. “The end of the sanctions will serve first and foremost to help Chinese energy firms—that is why President Xi Jinping is paying a sudden official visit to Tehran,” says Jean-Christophe Iseux, Baron von Pfetten, a French senior adviser to the Chinese government. (He convened a series of back-channel meetings among top Iranian, Chinese and Israeli officials in the run-up to July’s grand deal in Vienna, where Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.) “The [nuclear] deal would not have been possible without the active involvement of Iran’s sole trusted foreign friend—China,” von Pfetten says. Iran has been close to China for years—it has been Iran’s largest trading partner since 2009. During the last (and most draconian) sanctions period, China helped keep Tehran afloat by buying its oil, using Iranian banks in a way that did not technically violate sanctions. China also invested heavily in Iranian roads, factories and infrastructure at the time. High-profile Chinese projects include the 5-kilometer Niayesh tunnel in Tehran, one of the longest in the world, and the city’s Chinese-designed metro system. The two countries have also found common ground in their opposition to U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was China that helped Iran kick-start its nuclear weapons program back in the 1980s,...

As Iran celebrates the lifting of sanctions and cranks up its oil production, the biggest winner may be China, Iran’s new best friend. Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a visit to Tehran in January, meeting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and signing a 25-year economic, political and military cooperation pact. The two leaders announced the signing of 17 deals—including agreements on oil drilling, nuclear energy and a vast infrastructure project linking China to the Mediterranean, known as One Belt, One Road. Rouhani predicted the deals would boost bilateral trade tenfold to an annual $600 billion in the next decade. “The end of the sanctions will serve first and foremost to help Chinese energy firms—that is why President Xi Jinping is paying a sudden official visit to Tehran,” says Jean-Christophe Iseux, Baron von Pfetten, a French senior adviser to the Chinese government. (He convened a series of back-channel meetings among top Iranian, Chinese and Israeli officials in the run-up to July’s grand deal in Vienna, where Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.) “The [nuclear] deal would not have been possible without the active involvement of Iran’s sole trusted foreign friend—China,” von Pfetten says. Iran has been close to China for years—it has been Iran’s largest trading partner since 2009. During the last (and most draconian) sanctions period, China helped keep Tehran afloat by buying its oil, using Iranian banks in a way that did not technically violate sanctions. China also invested heavily in Iranian roads, factories and infrastructure at the time. High-profile Chinese projects include the 5-kilometer Niayesh tunnel in Tehran, one of the longest in the world, and the city’s Chinese-designed metro system. The two countries have also found common ground in their opposition to U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was China that helped Iran kick-start its nuclear weapons program back in the 1980s,...