In a rare interview with Times Now, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said it was hard to decide who to speak to about peace in Islamabad. “We want to live in harmony and peace,” he said, but asserted that it was hard to figure out who in Pakistan he should negotiate with – the elected government, or some other actors. Without naming it, he took a swipe at the Pakistani military: those entrusted with negotiating must go about their business, and those tasked with defending the borders must fulfil the responsibility entrusted to them, he said, assuming the tone and tenor that most US officials had adopted after the March 2008 elections in Pakistan. Modi implied that India had done its part in convincing the world and internationally isolating Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism, and the ball was now in Pakistan’s court. Russia’s interest in Pakistan is growing This probably is the dilemma that most Indian leaders and US officials have faced. Despite knowing Pakistan’s peculiar civil-military context, they keep wondering whether they should or shouldn’t talk to the military, even when they had the most pliant General Pervez Musharraf in charge in Islamabad. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh simply went into a “wait and see” mode when the General, infatuated with a sense of absolute power, threw the gauntlet of selected zonal “demilitarization” in Kashmir in 2006. During a conference at Stockholm in early 2008, Stephen Cohen, the renowned American expert on South Asia, had expressed his confusion over the “Indian dithering” in initiating a dialogue on Musharraf’s plan. Ironically, most Indian analysts at the time would describe General Musharraf as a “single window clearance” on all bilateral issues, but soon after his resignation, both the Indian officials and intelligentsia began questioning the “authority” of the civilian government. Eight years down the lane, another Indian premier is asking the same question, as if he is totally oblivious to...

Even though tensions between Islamabad and Kabul over the Torkham border crossing are yet to be settled, Pakistan has laid the foundation of “Pakistan Gate” near the Iranian border in Taftan. The gate is said to check any illegal trade occurring via Iran, and also help the border guards effectively manage and monitor the border crossing What makes this gate different from the one in Torkham is that it is not only built with mutual consent from both Pakistan and Iran – but also on special demand from Tehran, as it has already built a gate of its own inside its border at Mir Java, in Zahedan. Where one gate at Torkham has evoked sentiments of hatred, ultra nationalism and conflict creating an environment of hostility, the other gate at Taftan has largely remained a subtle and calm affair. On the face of it, the construction of the Pakistan Gate might appear to be business as usual – where the gate is aimed at promoting legal trade and tourism. Yet, the recent killing of Mullah Mansoor, who is said to have entered Balochistan via Iran, might have served as a chief catalyst for Pakistan’s urgency on the matter. Furthermore, the growing sectarian attacks on both sides also seem to have contributed towards the construction of these gates. Considering the length and porous nature of the border that both the countries share, initial prospects of the gates, as witnessed in case of Torkham, remain bleak. The stark contrast in how events unfolded on both the borders also symbolises the historical ties between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Where Iran and its Shah were the first countryto recognise and visit Pakistan after its partition, Afghanistan was the only country thatrefused to accept Pakistan as an independent state. This symbolic and amicable construction on the Pak-Iran border is a testament to strong and stable ties between both the countries. Yet, the Pakistani electronic and social media was abuzz with the recent opening of Chabahar port in Iran. Speculation was...

Battle lines in the Asia Pivot have probably never been more pronounced. The Obama Administration went out of its way to in its bid to get India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) confirmed. China and several other countries, on the other hand, stood in the way, urging a merit-based approach. Similarly, Beijing and Moscow facilitated the entry of both India and Pakistan into the security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Surprisingly, the US advocacy for India prompted Senator Ed Markey to warn the administration at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on US-India relations in May: “What you are doing is creating an action-reaction that is leading to a never-ending escalation cycle that ultimately leads to development of nuclear weapons, including battlefield nuclear weapons.” Markey stated this while addressing the Indian-origin US Assistant Secretary for South Asia Nisha Biswal. What should still be a cause for incessant pro-active Pakistani diplomacy is the statement by a senior US official who told the Press Trust of India that India would get full membership of the NSG by the end of the year, despite the majority of the 48 members supporting the Chinese-led opinion that intending members must first sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Almost at the same time, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olson delivered a near warning to all in the region. At the Atlantic Council he said that the strike that killed Mullah Mansoor “should make clear to all parties in the region that the US is fully prepared to protect its interests”, underlining that continued military presence and participation in combat operations in Afghanistan were tied to “US interests”. A couple of weeks earlier, the US administration had defaulted on its promise of providing eight “subsidised” F-16s to Pakistan because of Congressional refusal. The controversy around India’s NSG membership illustrates the new...