Engineer Arshad H Abbasi Why should a labourer on a motorbike pay the same fuel price as the owner of a Toyota Land Cruiser 300? This piece exposes the hidden injustice in Pakistan’s fuel pricing system and makes the case for technology-led reform that protects the poor while holding luxury consumption accountable. Injustice often hides in ordinary policies. It rarely announces itself with loud slogans or dramatic speeches. Instead, it quietly settles into systems that people accept as normal. Pakistan’s fuel pricing structure is one such example. The same price per liter of petrol or diesel applies whether a citizen rides a small motorbike worth Rs 20,000 or drives a luxury vehicle such as the Toyota Land Cruiser 300 worth nearly Rs 9.40 crore. On paper, this flat-rate pricing appears simple. In reality, it creates a system that treats necessity and luxury as if they were identical. Fuel is not merely another commodity for most Pakistanis. It is a basic economic input that keeps daily life moving. Farmers rely on tractors to cultivate crops. Rickshaws and small transport vehicles provide affordable mobility in crowded cities. Buses carry thousands of workers who cannot afford private cars. Motorbikes allow students, shopkeepers, and laborers to travel long distances to work. When these essential vehicles pay the same fuel price as luxury automobiles such as the BMW X5, the BMW iX1, or high-end cars produced by Mercedes-Benz, the policy stops being neutral. It quietly transfers economic pressure onto those with the least capacity to absorb it. My understanding of this problem grew through years of personal interaction with Pakistan’s fuel regulator, the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority. What began as a technical curiosity gradually became a sobering lesson about how institutional resistance can prevent necessary reform. My journey began in 1996 when I owned a vehicle manufacturing company. I spent much of my time experimenting with engines and mechanical systems....

By Imtiaz Gul Kabul and Kandahar do not appear to be fully aligned on the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What initially seemed to be Kandahar’s position that the matter did not concern them has since shifted. There are now indications that the Taliban are open to engagement through Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, reportedly to prevent further attacks inside Pakistan. This change has drawn attention to internal dynamics within the Afghan leadership and raised questions about whether there is real policy coherence between Kabul’s administrative institutions and Kandahar’s supreme authority. Differences between Kabul and Kandahar over militant groups have added to the sharp decline in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, including Pakistan’s decision to conduct cross-border strikes. Islamabad maintains that Afghan authorities are responsible for preventing attacks launched from their territory and frames the issue as one of sovereign obligation. The Taliban, however, deny direct responsibility and point to the complex security environment they inherited. Competing narratives and growing mistrust continue to strain bilateral ties. Estimates suggest that roughly 23,000 national and foreign militants from various groups remain active in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, managing the TTP threat amid uncertain operational conditions and limited leverage over Afghan authorities has become a central security concern. As a result, the TTP now dominates the broader bilateral agenda. Since August 2021, Pakistan has sought to build confidence and has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to curb TTP activities. Diplomatic engagement has continued through bilateral channels, as well as meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh. In some discussions, it was suggested that violence attributed to the TTP may involve other actors operating behind the scenes. These differing assessments have complicated efforts to develop a shared understanding of the threat. The absence of a mutually...

Since the resurgence of Taliban-linked militancy in Pakistan after 2021, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Balochistan, the country’s counter-terrorism landscape has entered a familiar but more complex phase. Districts in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—including North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber (notably the Tirah Valley), Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram—have once again become frontline spaces where regional geopolitics, militancy, governance failures, and local livelihoods intersect. In response to rising violence attributed mainly to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani state has leaned heavily on kinetic military operations, stricter border management with Afghanistan, and diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Taliban. While these measures have produced episodic security gains, they have also generated deep humanitarian stress and exposed structural governance weaknesses in the merged districts. Within this constrained policy environment, the re-emergence of the Tribal Jirga as an informal but socially legitimate channel of engagement reflects an attempt to reconnect security policy with local realities rather than relying exclusively on coercion. The Tribal Jirga is an indigenous conflict-resolution institution deeply embedded in Pashtun society across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traditionally composed of respected elders and influential community figures, jirgas resolve disputes through mediation, consensus-building, and moral authority rather than formal legal enforcement. Their legitimacy is derived from social trust and cultural acceptance, allowing them to function in spaces where state institutions are weak, distrusted, or absent. In earlier decades, jirgas addressed land disputes, blood feuds, and inter-tribal conflicts; in the contemporary security context, however, they have increasingly been drawn into the realm of informal diplomacy. As violence escalated after the Taliban’s return to power in...

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has re-emerged as a central security concern due to a sustained increase in terrorist activity across Pakistan. A key aspect of TTP’s operational resilience lies in its structured reorganization process, which reportedly takes place annually. This mechanism resembles institutional appointment and transfer systems, allowing the group to maintain operational continuity despite counterterrorism pressure. According to available insights, TTP follows a centralized command structure influenced by the governance model of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The group has established functional bodies—such as intelligence, media, and finance—across multiple provinces of Pakistan, and unlike earlier phases when TTP operated directly from Afghan territory, these wings are now embedded within designated operational zones inside Pakistan. Operational directives, including personnel deployment and rotation periods ranging from one to four months, are reportedly issued from Kabul, with facilitators acting as intermediaries between field commanders and the central leadership, ensuring coordination and compliance with strategic objectives. In contrast, Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K) operates under a more rigid command model. Fighters are reorganized in Afghanistan and deployed directly to specific locations. Haji Dawood, as the head of IS-K’s central cabinet for Pakistan, is believed to operate from Kunar province, Afghanistan, while IS-K’s operational footprint remains comparatively limited when measured against TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. The differences in organizational structure have implications for both groups’ operational flexibility and their ability to respond to counterterrorism measures, which in turn affects Pakistan’s security calculus. TTP leadership, particularly under Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, has pursued consolidation of jihadist factions under a single umbrella, marking a departure from earlier periods of fragmentation...

By Mohammad Nafees Balochistan continues to reel from violence. It also suffers not only because of a crisis of governance but of credibility. And that is rooted in the maze of conflicting claims and inconsistent figures The coordinated attacks across Balochistan that left dozens of civilians and security personnel dead have once again exposed the fragility of the province’s security architecture. In just three days — from 31 January to 3 February — militant fatalities alone reportedly crossed 197, compared to 84 total fatalities recorded during the previous thirty days of January. The spike is not incremental; it is exponential. But beyond the headline numbers lies a deeper problem: kidnappings are rising, and official reporting is inconsistent at a moment when clarity is essential. The casualty figures themselves reveal the confusion. The ISPR reported 41 militants killed on January 30 and 92 more on January 31, alongside 15 security personnel and 18 civilians. That placed the militant total at 133 after roughly 40 hours of operations. Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti then announced “145 killed in 40 hours,” along with 17 security personnel and 31 civilians. Yet his own breakdown reportedly included 41 militants (pre-operations), 92 during the principal operations, 15 security personnel, and 18 civilians, a sum of 166, not 145. If 145 was meant to represent militants only, the correct militant figure at that stage was 133 (41 + 92). The ambiguity created the first fault line. The following day, 22 additional militants were reported killed. If 145 were treated as the base, the total should have risen to 167. Instead, Tribune and Dawn carried a cumulative militant toll of 177. If, however, the correct base was 133, then adding 22 yields 155, not 177. The confusion deepened further on 3 February when print media, quoting state media, reported 197 militants killed, alongside 22 security personnel and 36 civilians. Reconstructed from a corrected militant base of 133,...

Decades of marginalization, unfulfilled rights, and exclusion from political and economic opportunity have made armed struggle an appealing, if tragic, path for the Baloch generation seeking justice and recognition. A spate of coordinated attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army across the province claimed dozens of lives over the past weekend, marking one of the deadliest outbreaks of violence in recent memory. Security forces responded with exceptional rapidity, and within 40 hours, at least 145 insurgents were reported killed. In a bid to contain the fallout, the provincial government imposed a one-month ban on gatherings, processions, and sit-ins of five or more individuals. Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti, speaking at a press conference in Quetta, pledged to eliminate the militants, noting that the bodies of the insurgents were in the custody of authorities. “This is the highest number since Pakistan has confronted this war on terror,” he stated, while confirming that 17 law enforcement personnel, including members of the police, Frontier Corps, and the Navy, had lost their lives. Civilian casualties amounted to 31, including those injured. What has stood out again this time is the BLA’s use of a female suicide bomber in the recent attack. Hawa Baloch from Gwadar is reportedly the sixth known female suicide bomber in the Baloch insurgency. Previous female operatives include Shari Baloch, Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch, Mahal Baloch, Mahikan Baloch, and Zareena Rafiq. In a video message prior to the attack, Hawa exhorted Baloch women to join the armed struggle, asserting that the Pakistani state had “oppressed Baloch women as well as men,” and emphasising that they were “neither intellectually nor practically weak.” Hawa’s message indicated that insurgency can cross traditional societal divides. The BLA social media channels reported that Hawa Baloch was a writer. Similarly, other female fighters, as well as males, are known to have come from educated...

Coordinated and uniform action and a comprehensive policy framework, along with the inclusion of local stakeholders and Track 2 actors, are required to restore the deteriorated Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, regulate cross-border trade, protect civilians, and ensure sustainable governance. Unilateral measures and purely militarized interventions cannot resolve the region’s complex security, humanitarian, and economic challenges. This was the recurring message at Beyond Boundaries VI: Dialogue on Regional Stability and Economic Connectivity, recently held in Islamabad. Organized by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the three-day dialogue brought together tribal elders, religious scholars, thought leaders, and policy and security experts from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Islamabad. Dr. Shoaib Suddle, Chairman of the One-Man Commission on Minority Rights, emphasized that tribal and religious leaders have historically acted as bridges between communities and the state, and that their engagement is essential for lasting peace. He stressed that terrorism is neither rooted in Islam nor tribal culture, and that justice, dialogue, economic empowerment, and regional connectivity form the foundation for sustainable stability. Peace and stability in the Pak-Afghan and the broader region cannot be achieved with power alone, but instead fostered through mutual respect, security cooperation, and good governance. The tribal leadership has a proven history of successfully mediating conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan during some of the most testing times in the two nations’ bilateral histories, and the efforts to achieve peace in the region cannot succeed in isolation from their participation. Thus, the wisdom, experience, expertise and relevant understanding of the Pak-Afgan tribal and religious fraternity must be leveraged to promote peaceful coexistence between the two sides, at a time when the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have...

Date: 16, Jan ,2026 By freezing cross-border trade while managing a refugee influx, Pakistan and Afghanistan have created a perfect storm of economic pressure and humanitarian quandaries. This piece explores how short-term political choices are inflicting long-term damage. For two neighbours that routinely endorse connectivity, stability, and shared prosperity, Pakistan and Afghanistan have taken a rather unconventional route: freezing the very trade corridors that make those aspirations even remotely attainable. Both countries share one of the most economically interdependent borders in South and Central Asia. For decades, bilateral trade and Afghan transit trade have supported millions of livelihoods—from farmers and transporters to port workers, exporters, and small traders. Today, that lifeline stands severely constricted at a time when both economies are already under intense strain. The costs are high and grave. Pakistan’s annual exports to Afghanistan are valued at approximately USD 1.5 billion. A three-month disruption has translated into losses of nearly USD 375 million for Pakistani exporters. Exports routed via Afghanistan to Central Asia, worth around USD 900 million annually, have suffered an additional USD 225 million loss over the same period. Afghanistan, meanwhile, has incurred losses of roughly USD 200 million in exports to Pakistan and USD 75 million in exports to India via Wagah. Ports and logistics infrastructure have also been directly affected. Afghan transit trade through Karachi typically involves 40,000 to 45,000 containers annually, generating close to USD 160 million each year for Pakistan through transport, insurance, port handling, and allied services. The current closure has already resulted in an estimated USD 40 million loss in just three months. More than 10,000 containers of Afghan transit cargo remain stranded inside Pakistan, exposed to demurrage and detention charges of around USD 120 per container per day. For Afghan...

America’s disinvestment in proven peacebuilding is a global liability, undermining stability, alliances, and a more secure future for all. It is often easier to dismantle policies when they concern women. They are more readily dismissed as optional, ideological, or symbolic rather than as core instruments of national security. That assumption helps explain how the United States has been able to quietly hollow out its own Women, Peace and Security framework without formally repealing it. In 2017, the Women, Peace and Security Act was passed with rare bipartisan support. It recognised a hard truth backed by decades of evidence: peace processes that include women last longer, cost less, and are more resilient. The law required the US government to integrate this framework across diplomacy, defence, and development. Eight years later, the law still exists, but the capacity to implement it does not. According to The Elimination of the U.S. Women, Peace and Security Capacity at the Department of State, a January 2026 policy report by Kayla McGill and Rachel Wein at New Lines Institute, the State Department dismantled the Office of Global Women’s Issues between January and July 2025. More than 65 expert staff were dismissed, and active programmes operating in over 50 countries were suspended. The annual savings were roughly $15 million. The long-term costs will almost certainly run into the billions. This matters because prevention is cheaper than reaction. Research consistently shows that peace agreements with women’s participation are around 35 percent more likely to endure beyond 15 years. Early warning systems that track gender-based violence often detect instability before traditional security indicators do. Removing this expertise does not make the system leaner. It makes it blind. McGill and Wein describe this strategy as “impoundment by elimination. Congress has not repealed the law. Funds have not been explicitly refused. Instead, the offices and staff required...