At a time of rising fuel import dependence and fertilizer supply uncertainty, this policy letter by engineers Arshad Abbasi and Musa Abbasi highlights how Pakistan’s sugar industry can play a transformative role in strengthening national energy and agricultural security. By leveraging ethanol blending (E10–E20) and utilizing press mud as organic fertilizer, the proposal presents a practical, immediately implementable pathway to reduce foreign exchange pressures, improve fuel quality, enhance soil health, and build long-term economic resilience through domestic resources. To: His Excellency Asif Ali Zardari President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Respected Mr. President, We write to draw your attention to an urgent and strategic opportunity for Pakistan at a time when global energy markets are increasingly volatile and the country faces heightened vulnerability due to its dependence on imported fuel and fertilizers. The recent geopolitical tensions in the Gulf region and the resulting disruptions in oil and gas supplies, have reinforced the need for immediate, forward-looking policy interventions to safeguard Pakistan’s energy and agricultural security. In this context, the role of the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and the broader sugar industry assumes critical importance. On 29th March 2026, PSMA urged the government to allow the export of surplus sugar and move toward deregulation, highlighting the financial strain faced by millers despite a bumper production year. However, beyond the immediate issue of exports lies a far more significant opportunity: the transformation of Pakistan’s sugar sector into a cornerstone of energy resilience and agricultural sustainability. Sugar mills in Pakistan primarily produce refined sugar from sugarcane while simultaneously processing molasses, a byproduct, into high-value ethanol for export. In the domestic context, ethanol is increasingly recognised as a clean-burning biofuel suitable for blending with petrol...

By Sohaib Syed Around 3 weeks into the war with Iran, the United States seems to have settled on four primary objectives: (1) destroying Iran’s navy; (2) destroying Iran’s missile capabilities; (3) preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons; and (4) preventing Iran from supporting proxy groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. Administration officials—notably President Trump in his initial remarks regarding the war—have hinted that regime change is also among their goals, but have consistently excluded this message in recent days. I give you a perspective that is distinct because it moves away from traditional Western-centric military metrics like air superiority or raw firepower and focuses on the geopolitical shift toward 21st-century warfare, specifically the domains of space, electronic warfare, and “system survival.” West is misjudging the nature of the conflict. For the United States and Israel, this is a war of choice, a political decision to seek regime change or regional dominance. For Iran, however, it is a war of survival. the primary reason for Iran’s confidence is the nature of the conflict itself. For Iran, which finds itself pitted against a global superpower like America, this is a war of survival rather than a war of choice. the definition of victory is simplified: if Iran can emerge with its sovereignty and territorial integrity intact, it has won. As a 5,000-year-old civilization, Iran is not a mere “artificial construct”; like many of the kingdoms and sheikhdoms in the Middle East, it is a nation-state with a deep-rooted identity that stands by itself. This civilizational resilience provides a baseline of resistance that the West continually underestimates. Iran meticulously learned the lessons from the 12-day war that occurred last year, leading to a massive organizational restructuring of its military framework. Central to this shift was the implementation of decentralized command and control. While critics argue...

Engineer Arshad H Abbasi Why should a labourer on a motorbike pay the same fuel price as the owner of a Toyota Land Cruiser 300? This piece exposes the hidden injustice in Pakistan’s fuel pricing system and makes the case for technology-led reform that protects the poor while holding luxury consumption accountable. Injustice often hides in ordinary policies. It rarely announces itself with loud slogans or dramatic speeches. Instead, it quietly settles into systems that people accept as normal. Pakistan’s fuel pricing structure is one such example. The same price per liter of petrol or diesel applies whether a citizen rides a small motorbike worth Rs 20,000 or drives a luxury vehicle such as the Toyota Land Cruiser 300 worth nearly Rs 9.40 crore. On paper, this flat-rate pricing appears simple. In reality, it creates a system that treats necessity and luxury as if they were identical. Fuel is not merely another commodity for most Pakistanis. It is a basic economic input that keeps daily life moving. Farmers rely on tractors to cultivate crops. Rickshaws and small transport vehicles provide affordable mobility in crowded cities. Buses carry thousands of workers who cannot afford private cars. Motorbikes allow students, shopkeepers, and laborers to travel long distances to work. When these essential vehicles pay the same fuel price as luxury automobiles such as the BMW X5, the BMW iX1, or high-end cars produced by Mercedes-Benz, the policy stops being neutral. It quietly transfers economic pressure onto those with the least capacity to absorb it. My understanding of this problem grew through years of personal interaction with Pakistan’s fuel regulator, the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority. What began as a technical curiosity gradually became a sobering lesson about how institutional resistance can prevent necessary reform. My journey began in 1996 when I owned a vehicle manufacturing company. I spent much of my time experimenting with engines and mechanical systems....

By Imtiaz Gul Kabul and Kandahar do not appear to be fully aligned on the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What initially seemed to be Kandahar’s position that the matter did not concern them has since shifted. There are now indications that the Taliban are open to engagement through Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, reportedly to prevent further attacks inside Pakistan. This change has drawn attention to internal dynamics within the Afghan leadership and raised questions about whether there is real policy coherence between Kabul’s administrative institutions and Kandahar’s supreme authority. Differences between Kabul and Kandahar over militant groups have added to the sharp decline in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, including Pakistan’s decision to conduct cross-border strikes. Islamabad maintains that Afghan authorities are responsible for preventing attacks launched from their territory and frames the issue as one of sovereign obligation. The Taliban, however, deny direct responsibility and point to the complex security environment they inherited. Competing narratives and growing mistrust continue to strain bilateral ties. Estimates suggest that roughly 23,000 national and foreign militants from various groups remain active in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, managing the TTP threat amid uncertain operational conditions and limited leverage over Afghan authorities has become a central security concern. As a result, the TTP now dominates the broader bilateral agenda. Since August 2021, Pakistan has sought to build confidence and has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to curb TTP activities. Diplomatic engagement has continued through bilateral channels, as well as meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh. In some discussions, it was suggested that violence attributed to the TTP may involve other actors operating behind the scenes. These differing assessments have complicated efforts to develop a shared understanding of the threat. The absence of a mutually...

Since the resurgence of Taliban-linked militancy in Pakistan after 2021, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Balochistan, the country’s counter-terrorism landscape has entered a familiar but more complex phase. Districts in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—including North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber (notably the Tirah Valley), Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram—have once again become frontline spaces where regional geopolitics, militancy, governance failures, and local livelihoods intersect. In response to rising violence attributed mainly to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani state has leaned heavily on kinetic military operations, stricter border management with Afghanistan, and diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Taliban. While these measures have produced episodic security gains, they have also generated deep humanitarian stress and exposed structural governance weaknesses in the merged districts. Within this constrained policy environment, the re-emergence of the Tribal Jirga as an informal but socially legitimate channel of engagement reflects an attempt to reconnect security policy with local realities rather than relying exclusively on coercion. The Tribal Jirga is an indigenous conflict-resolution institution deeply embedded in Pashtun society across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traditionally composed of respected elders and influential community figures, jirgas resolve disputes through mediation, consensus-building, and moral authority rather than formal legal enforcement. Their legitimacy is derived from social trust and cultural acceptance, allowing them to function in spaces where state institutions are weak, distrusted, or absent. In earlier decades, jirgas addressed land disputes, blood feuds, and inter-tribal conflicts; in the contemporary security context, however, they have increasingly been drawn into the realm of informal diplomacy. As violence escalated after the Taliban’s return to power in...

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has re-emerged as a central security concern due to a sustained increase in terrorist activity across Pakistan. A key aspect of TTP’s operational resilience lies in its structured reorganization process, which reportedly takes place annually. This mechanism resembles institutional appointment and transfer systems, allowing the group to maintain operational continuity despite counterterrorism pressure. According to available insights, TTP follows a centralized command structure influenced by the governance model of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The group has established functional bodies—such as intelligence, media, and finance—across multiple provinces of Pakistan, and unlike earlier phases when TTP operated directly from Afghan territory, these wings are now embedded within designated operational zones inside Pakistan. Operational directives, including personnel deployment and rotation periods ranging from one to four months, are reportedly issued from Kabul, with facilitators acting as intermediaries between field commanders and the central leadership, ensuring coordination and compliance with strategic objectives. In contrast, Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K) operates under a more rigid command model. Fighters are reorganized in Afghanistan and deployed directly to specific locations. Haji Dawood, as the head of IS-K’s central cabinet for Pakistan, is believed to operate from Kunar province, Afghanistan, while IS-K’s operational footprint remains comparatively limited when measured against TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. The differences in organizational structure have implications for both groups’ operational flexibility and their ability to respond to counterterrorism measures, which in turn affects Pakistan’s security calculus. TTP leadership, particularly under Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, has pursued consolidation of jihadist factions under a single umbrella, marking a departure from earlier periods of fragmentation...

By Mohammad Nafees Balochistan continues to reel from violence. It also suffers not only because of a crisis of governance but of credibility. And that is rooted in the maze of conflicting claims and inconsistent figures The coordinated attacks across Balochistan that left dozens of civilians and security personnel dead have once again exposed the fragility of the province’s security architecture. In just three days — from 31 January to 3 February — militant fatalities alone reportedly crossed 197, compared to 84 total fatalities recorded during the previous thirty days of January. The spike is not incremental; it is exponential. But beyond the headline numbers lies a deeper problem: kidnappings are rising, and official reporting is inconsistent at a moment when clarity is essential. The casualty figures themselves reveal the confusion. The ISPR reported 41 militants killed on January 30 and 92 more on January 31, alongside 15 security personnel and 18 civilians. That placed the militant total at 133 after roughly 40 hours of operations. Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti then announced “145 killed in 40 hours,” along with 17 security personnel and 31 civilians. Yet his own breakdown reportedly included 41 militants (pre-operations), 92 during the principal operations, 15 security personnel, and 18 civilians, a sum of 166, not 145. If 145 was meant to represent militants only, the correct militant figure at that stage was 133 (41 + 92). The ambiguity created the first fault line. The following day, 22 additional militants were reported killed. If 145 were treated as the base, the total should have risen to 167. Instead, Tribune and Dawn carried a cumulative militant toll of 177. If, however, the correct base was 133, then adding 22 yields 155, not 177. The confusion deepened further on 3 February when print media, quoting state media, reported 197 militants killed, alongside 22 security personnel and 36 civilians. Reconstructed from a corrected militant base of 133,...

Decades of marginalization, unfulfilled rights, and exclusion from political and economic opportunity have made armed struggle an appealing, if tragic, path for the Baloch generation seeking justice and recognition. A spate of coordinated attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army across the province claimed dozens of lives over the past weekend, marking one of the deadliest outbreaks of violence in recent memory. Security forces responded with exceptional rapidity, and within 40 hours, at least 145 insurgents were reported killed. In a bid to contain the fallout, the provincial government imposed a one-month ban on gatherings, processions, and sit-ins of five or more individuals. Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti, speaking at a press conference in Quetta, pledged to eliminate the militants, noting that the bodies of the insurgents were in the custody of authorities. “This is the highest number since Pakistan has confronted this war on terror,” he stated, while confirming that 17 law enforcement personnel, including members of the police, Frontier Corps, and the Navy, had lost their lives. Civilian casualties amounted to 31, including those injured. What has stood out again this time is the BLA’s use of a female suicide bomber in the recent attack. Hawa Baloch from Gwadar is reportedly the sixth known female suicide bomber in the Baloch insurgency. Previous female operatives include Shari Baloch, Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch, Mahal Baloch, Mahikan Baloch, and Zareena Rafiq. In a video message prior to the attack, Hawa exhorted Baloch women to join the armed struggle, asserting that the Pakistani state had “oppressed Baloch women as well as men,” and emphasising that they were “neither intellectually nor practically weak.” Hawa’s message indicated that insurgency can cross traditional societal divides. The BLA social media channels reported that Hawa Baloch was a writer. Similarly, other female fighters, as well as males, are known to have come from educated...

Coordinated and uniform action and a comprehensive policy framework, along with the inclusion of local stakeholders and Track 2 actors, are required to restore the deteriorated Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, regulate cross-border trade, protect civilians, and ensure sustainable governance. Unilateral measures and purely militarized interventions cannot resolve the region’s complex security, humanitarian, and economic challenges. This was the recurring message at Beyond Boundaries VI: Dialogue on Regional Stability and Economic Connectivity, recently held in Islamabad. Organized by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the three-day dialogue brought together tribal elders, religious scholars, thought leaders, and policy and security experts from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Islamabad. Dr. Shoaib Suddle, Chairman of the One-Man Commission on Minority Rights, emphasized that tribal and religious leaders have historically acted as bridges between communities and the state, and that their engagement is essential for lasting peace. He stressed that terrorism is neither rooted in Islam nor tribal culture, and that justice, dialogue, economic empowerment, and regional connectivity form the foundation for sustainable stability. Peace and stability in the Pak-Afghan and the broader region cannot be achieved with power alone, but instead fostered through mutual respect, security cooperation, and good governance. The tribal leadership has a proven history of successfully mediating conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan during some of the most testing times in the two nations’ bilateral histories, and the efforts to achieve peace in the region cannot succeed in isolation from their participation. Thus, the wisdom, experience, expertise and relevant understanding of the Pak-Afgan tribal and religious fraternity must be leveraged to promote peaceful coexistence between the two sides, at a time when the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have...