Countering Terrorism Effectively: Lessons from Italy

By Dr. Farhan Zahid

The global campaign against terrorism may have started after the tragic events on 9/11, but it was certainly not the first time the world community had to deal with this issue. Terrorism has for long affected many societies including several western democracies.

Starting in the mid-1970s, Italy, a highly industrialized, modern and developed European country, struggled for over a decade to curtail terrorism. Statistics show that between 1968-1985 the country experienced 15,000 terrorist incidents peaking in 1978 with 2,498 attacks. These figures could be compared with most affected countries of today like Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Italians initially found it difficult to deal with a variety of terrorist organizations of several ideologies at odds with one another, but eventually managed to outsmart them. These groups included ultra-right wing terrorist groups such as Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (ARN) as well as foreign groups operating from Italian soil such as the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA).

The most dangerous of these groups were the neo-fascist ARN and the Marxist-Leninist Red Brigades, or Brigate Rosse (BR). ARN conducted the biggest terrorist attack in Europe at the time by bombing the waiting area of Bologna Railway Station in Italy in 1980, killing 84 and wounding more than 180.

BR was formed by students at the University of Trento in 1970 who were inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ultimate goal of their activities was to turn Italy into a communist state. To achieve their objectives, the BR launched a terror campaign across Italy with bomb attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, arson and robberies during most of 1970s and early 1980s. The most notorious and highly publicized act was the kidnapping and murder of former Prime Minister and leader of the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), Aldo Moro, in 1978.

Italians had no previous experience of fighting home-grown insurgencies. It took them several years to fully comprehend the BRs’ modus operandi, areas of operations and potential members and sympathizers. One major obstacle for the law enforcement authorities was the Italian Communist Party (CPI). CPI had a huge following during 1970s, and was considered to be the largest communist party in Western Europe. With strong political constraints, the Italian police Carbonari (paramilitary) started a broad campaign to dismantle the BR. Since those were the heydays of the Cold War, the Italians sought help from the United States for tactical reasons. Supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Italians launched a covert operation (Operation Gladio) for bankrolling the CDP in order to curb the growing strength of Italian Communist Party. The policy worked quite well – and proved to be an effective counter-terrorism measure.

Gladio or the ‘stay behind’ operation was intended to provide support to anti-communist, non-military forces (mostly political) in their struggle against the growth of communist parties in both NATO member countries and non-NATO member countries in Western Europe.

The CDP had been struggling against PCI before the events known as Years of Lead in Italy. The Years of Lead cost Italy more than 2,000 lives (1969-1981). The PCI was able to poll 34% of the popular vote in 1976 general elections, showcasing an unprecedented level of popularity for a communist party in any non-communist state, worrisome for all NATO member countries. After the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 the PCI also wanted to shun its ties with the Soviet Union the main covert supporter of BR; and move towards Euro communism and joining Socialist International rather attending Communist International. Despite having these differences the PCI continued to receive funding from the Soviets up till 1984. Parallel to these developments the CIA continued to support the election campaign of CDP by persuading Catholic Church to issue statements in CDP support, by using scores of radio channels in Italy, letter campaigns in support of CDP and using Italian diaspora in the United States. According to an Italian Parliamentary Commission report made public in 2000 that the US government wanted to “stop the PCI, and to a certain degree also the PSI (Italian Socialist Party), from reaching executive power in the country”.

Another key event was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro which greatly changed the Italian CT policy. Counter terrorism, judicial, and legislative measures were taken. Moreover a new intelligence body was created to revamp the intelligence gathering mechanism. The repentance law in its earliest phase allowed 389 BR members to surrender to government authorities which led police and security services to thousands of BR members in a short period of time.

Building on the successes of Operation Gladio, the Italians improved their law enforcement infrastructure by amending the existing body of laws. A set of counter-terrorism laws were also enacted by the Italian parliament, coupled with witness protection programs to safeguard whistle-blowers and aid the prosecution efforts. The Italian government introduced special provisions such as reduced prison terms for terrorists/former combatants who voluntarily shared information with the state. The information obtained in this manner resulted in mass arrests of BR militants. These Pentito (repentance) laws were highly successful in rooting out and defeating BR by the end of 1980s.

Conclusion

According to renowned terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, a counter terrorism campaign has four elements: 1) an effective command and coordination structure, 2) anti-terrorist legislation and strengthening public support, 3) coordination within intelligence services, 4) foreign collaboration between governments and security forces. The Italian counter terrorism campaign included all four.

We must not forget that countering terrorism is a very expensive process. The Italians were in no position to finance their model of counter terrorism without U.S. support. On the other hand, the Italian model is a successful one as it is considered less expensive in terms of tactics employed by the state. Italian law enforcement agencies would not have been able to achieve a high level of success in a short span of time if the lawmakers did not equip them with sufficient tools. The Italian model of counter-terrorism should be studied and evaluated to see which aspects could be replicated to help counter terrorism in Pakistan.

Dr.  Farhan Zahid is a senior officer of the Police Service of Pakistan and senior CRSS research fellow. He earned his Ph.D.  in Terrorism  Studies  from  University  of  Brussels, Belgium.  Dr. Zahid has authored more than 50 research papers and articles , published in various national and international journals and magazines. He  writes  on  counter-terrorism,  al-Qaeda,  Pakistani  al- Qaeda-linked  groups,  Islamist  violent  non-state  actors  in  Pakistan, jihadi  ideologies  and the  Afghan Taliban. He has also authored three books Roots  of  Islamic  Violent  Activism  in  South  Asia”,  published  by Narratives  (2014), “The Al-Qaeda Network in Pakistan”, Published by Narratives (2015) and  co-authored ”, From Jihad to Al-Qaeda to Islamic State” with Imtiaz Gul and Abbas Ahmad), published by Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad 2015) .

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