

Insurgencies in South Asia: A Snapshot



Center for
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Rule of Law - Security - Governance

Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	4
PROLOGUE	6
Part I.....	7
PAKISTAN: PROFILES OF MAJOR MILITANT ORGANISATIONS.....	7
ORIGIN, OBJECTIVES, LEADERSHIP, AREAS OF OPERATIONS	7
Background	7
TEHREEK-E-TALIBAN (TTP).....	8
Origin	8
Ideology	8
Leadership	9
Areas of Occupation	12
ISLAMIC STATE-KHORASAN PROVINCE (ISKP)	12
Origin	12
Ideology	12
Leadership	13
Areas of Operation	14
AL QAEDA.....	15
Relationship between ISKP and Al-Qaeda?	15
JUNDULLAH.....	15
Origin	15
Ideology	15
Leadership	16
Areas of Operation	16
BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION FRONT (BLF).....	16
Origin	16
Ideology	17
Leadership	17
Areas of Operations	17
BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION ARMY (BLA).....	17
Origin	17
Ideology	17
Leadership	18
Areas of Operations	18
BLF and BLA- likely to Merge?	19

Impact on Pakistan and China	19
JAMAAT-UL-AHRAR (JUA).....	20
Origin	20
Ideology	20
Leadership	20
Areas of Operation	20
JAISHULADL.....	21
Origin	21
Ideology	21
Leadership	21
Areas of Operation	21
Conclusion	22
PART II	23
REVISITING ESCALATING CHALLENGE OF MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA	23
Abstract	23
INTRODUCTION.....	24
Tribal Phenomenon	24
Resource-Rich Areas	26
Ambition and Background of Maoists	27
Strength and Tactics	27
Organizational Structure	28
Notable Maoist Organizations	29
Leaders and Commanders at Large	31
Past Leaders	37
Current Leaders	38
Government Response	40
Conclusion and Way Forward	43

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. **ASWJ** - Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamat
2. **AuJ** - Ansarul Jihad
3. **BLA** - Balochistan Liberation Army
4. **BLF** - Baloch Liberation Front
5. **BNLF** - Balochistan National Liberation Front
6. **BRAS** – Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar
7. **BSO** - Baloch Student Organization
8. **CMC** - Central Military Commission
9. **CMIT** - Central Military Instructors Team
10. **CPEC** - China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
11. **CPI (Maoist)** - Communist Party of India (Maoist)
12. **CPI (ML)** - Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
13. **CPI-ML-Janashakti** - Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti
14. **CPI-ML-New Democracy** - Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) New Democracy
15. **CTC** - Central Technical Committee
16. **ETIM** - East Turkistan Islamic Movement
17. **FATA** - Federally Administered Tribal Areas
18. **FC** - Frontier Corps
19. **FTO** - Foreign Terrorist Organization
20. **HuA** - Harkat-ul-Ansar
21. **HuJI** - Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami
22. **IEDs** - Improvised Explosive Devices
23. **INDIA** - Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance
24. **ISIS/ISIL** - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
25. **ISKP/IS-K** - Islamic State-Khorasan Province
26. **JAMK** - Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan
27. **Ji** - Jamaat-i-Islami
28. **JJMP** - Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad
29. **JeM** - Jaish-e-Muhammad
30. **JSJMM** - Jharkhand Sangharsh Jan Mukti Morcha

31. **JuA** - Jamat-ul-Ahrar
32. **JUI-F** - Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl
33. **KP** - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
34. **LeT** - Lashkar-e-Taiba
35. **LWE** - Left Wing Extremism
36. **MCC** - Maoist Coordination Centre
37. **MI** - Military Intelligence
38. **NATGRID** - National Intelligence Grid
39. **PLFI** - People's Liberation Front of India
40. **PLGA** - Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army
41. **PSS** - Peoples Security Service
42. **PWG** - People's War Group
43. **RCs** - Regional Commands
44. **RPCs** - Revolutionary Peoples Committees
45. **RSS** - Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
46. **S.A.C.A.** - Special Area Committee Assistance
47. **SAC** - Special Area Committee
48. **SATP** - South Asia Terrorism Portal
49. **SATs** - Special Action Teams
50. **SCA** - Special Central Assistance
51. **SCs** - Scheduled Castes
52. **SDGT** - Specially Designated Global Terrorist
53. **SIS** - Special Infrastructure Scheme
54. **SRE** - Security Related Expenditure
55. **SSP** - Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
56. **STs** - Scheduled Tribes
57. **TCOC** - Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign
58. **TJP** - Tehreek-e-Jihad
59. **TPC** - Tiritiya Prastuti Committee
60. **TTP** - Tehreek-e-Taliban (or Pakistan Taliban Movement)
61. **VKA** - Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram

PROLOGUE

South Asia stands at a crossroads, beset by complex and enduring insurgencies that have profoundly shaped its socio-political landscape. The Maoist insurgency in India, the Baloch insurgency, and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency in Pakistan each represent unique yet interconnected challenges that threaten regional stability. This report provides a critical insight into these insurgencies, offering background of their origins, evolution, and the pervasive impacts they have on regional peace and stability, governance, security, and socio-economic conditions of the south asian nations.

The Maoist insurgency in India, commonly referred to as Left Wing Extremism (LWE) or Naxalism, has long been a blight on the nation's internal security. Despite significant efforts to curb its spread, the insurgency continues to thrive in the tribal heartlands, exploiting deep-rooted socio-economic disparities and governance failures. This insurgency lays bare the inadequacies of India's development policies, highlighting a persistent neglect of the marginalized communities. The loss of thousands of lives and the displacement of communities expose the fragility of India's development narrative and raise pressing questions about the state's capacity to address systemic inequalities. The persistence of Maoist violence testifies the gaps in the country's socio-economic fabric that remain unaddressed.

In Pakistan, the Baloch insurgency spearheaded by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) has escalated to unprecedented levels. High-profile attacks, particularly targeting Chinese interests linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), underscore the insurgents' evolving tactics and determination. The potential unification of BLA and BLF threatens to amplify the insurgency, posing significant challenges not only to Pakistan's internal security but also to regional stability and international economic interests. The Baloch insurgency highlights the enduring grievances over autonomy and resource distribution that the Pakistani state has failed to address effectively.

Compounding these issues is the relentless Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency. The TTP's violent campaign to impose its ideological vision has wreaked havoc across Pakistan, targeting both civilian and military entities. The group's resilience, despite numerous military operations aimed at dismantling it, reveals alarming weaknesses within Pakistan's security framework and governance structures. The TTP insurgency not only destabilizes the region but also has broader implications for global security, given its connections with other transnational jihadist networks.

This report invites readers to understand how these insurgencies define South Asia's contemporary security landscape. By dissecting the socio-economic and political underpinnings of these conflicts, this analysis aims to shed light on the root causes and offer pathways towards sustainable peace. In an era where regional stability is increasingly intertwined with global security, understanding and addressing these insurgencies is more crucial than ever. This document serves as a call to action for policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders to engage in a targeted and longterm efforts to resolve these enduring conflicts.

Part I

PAKISTAN: PROFILES OF MAJOR MILITANT ORGANISATIONS ORIGIN, OBJECTIVES, LEADERSHIP, AREAS OF OPERATIONS

Background

The militant landscape in Pakistan is evolving, marked by the emergence of multiple new, smaller, and highly adept militant groups. These groups operate ostensibly independently and express admiration for the Afghan Taliban's successful transition from insurgency to a governing entity. However, they assert that their focus is solely within Pakistan, where they aim to establish Sharia law.¹

U.S. officials have identified Pakistan as a key operational base and a potential target for several armed, non-state militant groups, some with origins dating back to the 1980s. These groups can be broadly categorized into five types: globally oriented, Afghanistan-focused, India and Kashmir-centric, domestically oriented, and sectarian (anti-Shia).

Out of the 15 listed groups, 12 are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under U.S. law, with most, though not all, driven by Islamist extremist ideologies. Pakistan has endured significant domestic terrorism since 2003, reaching its peak in 2009 in terms of related fatalities. Following the Afghan Taliban's takeover in 2021, many analysts anticipated a resurgence in regional terrorism and militancy. After a steady decline in terrorism-related deaths over five years, plummeting to 365 in 2019, fatalities have risen annually since then, surging fourfold to at least 1,438 in 2023 (see Figure 1). In November 2023, Pakistan's Prime Minister reported a 60% increase in militant attacks and a staggering 500% rise in suicide bombings since August 2021, resulting in the deaths of over 2,200 Pakistanis.

According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 (released in November 2023), *"In 2022, Pakistan took steps to counter terrorism financing and restrain some India-focused terrorist groups." However, it "has yet to complete its pledge to dismantle all terrorist organizations without delay or discrimination."* The report highlights Pakistan's effective prosecution and sentencing of a senior leader from Lashkar-e-Taiba in May 2022, along with ongoing counterterrorism operations led by military, paramilitary, and civilian security forces.

It also underscores concerns about certain religious schools, or madrassas, still propagating extremist ideologies. Despite Pakistan's 2014 National Action Plan aimed at eradicating terrorism and disallowing armed militias, several groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United Nations and the United States persist in operating within Pakistan.²

¹<https://jamestown.org/program/jabhat-ansar-al-mahdi-khorasan-emerges-as-prominent-faction-of-hafiz-gul-bahadur-in-pakistan/>

²<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11934>

TEHREEK-E-TALIBAN (TTP)

Origin

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistan Taliban Movement, emerged as a powerful entity in 2007 in the context of a series of military operations-U.S. led missile strikes on the one hand and an incursion by the Pakistan army into the Mehsud area of South Waziristan on the other. Until then, most of its component groups were loosely organized, with ties to the Afghan Taliban.

The TTP came into being when Abdullah Mehsud, who had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan, returned to Waziristan from the Guantanamo Bay camp. He briefly led the Taliban in Waziristan before blowing himself up in Pishin, Balochistan, during a siege by Pakistani security forces in 2006. After Abdullah Mehsud's death, Baitullah Mehsud, a leading member of the Afghan Taliban, who was no relation but from the same tribe, organized all the groups operating in the FATA region that professed similar ideologies and successfully knit them into what is now known as the TTP. The surrender of as many as 250 Pakistani troops to the militants during their incursion into South Waziristan in August and September 2007 shocked the country and was widely regarded as the worst humiliation suffered by the Pakistani army on its own national territory since it became an active ally in the U.S. led anti-terror war. Most of the captured soldiers were released in the first week of November in exchange for 25 Taliban prisoners.³

The TTP is predominantly comprised of Pashtun militants who united under the leadership of the late Baitullah Mehsud, formerly situated in the former FATA, drawing representatives from each of Pakistan's seven former tribal agencies. Following Pakistani military operations in 2014, TTP leadership reportedly sought refuge in the border regions of eastern Afghanistan. Experiencing a resurgence since 2021, led by Noor Wali Mehsud and maintaining connections with Al Qaeda, the TTP is estimated to consist of 3,000 to 6,000 fighters. They aim to topple the Pakistani government and institute Sharia law in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region. In late 2023, Pakistani government officials accused the Afghan Taliban of exerting direct control over the TTP.⁴

Ideology

- Enforce Sharia'h, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and perform "defensive jihad" against the Pakistan Army.
- React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and North Waziristan Agency of FATA.
- Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area.
- Demand the release of Lal Masjid Imam Abdul Aziz.

Initially, the TTP rejected peace negotiations with the Pakistani government. However, under the Nawaz Sharif-led administration, peace talks began on January 29, 2014. The government's representatives included Prime Minister's Advisor on National Affairs Irfan Siddiqui, Major (Retd.) Mohammed Amir, senior journalist Rahimullah Yousafzai, and former Ambassador to Afghanistan Rustam Shah Mohmand. The TTP delegation was led by Maulana Samiul Haq, Maulana Abdul Aziz, Professor Mohammad Ibrahim from Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), and Mufti Kifayatullah from Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F)⁵

³<https://imtiyazgul.com/the-most-dangerous-place/>

⁴<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11934/5>

⁵<https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/pakistan/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp>

Leadership

New Leadership announcement (last statement in 2024)

Chief Amir Mufti Noor Wali alias Abo Mansoor Asim

2nd Command. (Naib Amir) Maulana Salim Haqani

Chief of Defense, Mufti Mazahim

Chief of Finance Maulana Badri Mehsud

Chief of Political Mufti Tariq Mehmood

2nd Command for Political wing: Mufti Borjan Swati

Chief of Information Chohdri Munib ur Rehman Jat

Committee for Information: Mufti Ghufuran, Qari Muhammad Shoaib, Maulana Salim Haqqani. Shaikh Abdur Rehman Hamad.

Chief for Education: Maulana Abo Hamd Bajauri.

Chief For Welfare: Sarbakaf Mohmand

Chief For Accountability: Ustad Hanif Farooqi

Chairman Nizami Commission (North Zone) Maulana Shahidullah Bajauri, 2nd Command (Naib) Umar MukaranKhusani.

Administrative Maulana Saqib ul Islam Dirwi.

Chief (Amir) for : (North Zone) Maulana Qari Karwan , Usmani, Hafiz Assadullah

Systemtic Commissions: (Southern Zone) Maulana Noorullah, and his 2nd Command (Naib) Maulana Inamullah Wazir.

Administrative: Maulana Abdul Samad Haqani

Chief (Amir) (Southern Zone) Maulana Qazi Muhammad Amir, Qari Irfan Afridi, Naseeb Nawaz

Judiciary

- ✓ Supreme Council Judges; Qazi Mufti Nematullah, Qazi Arshad Iqbal, Qazi Mufti Tahir Mehmood, Maulana Qazi Abdul Hakim Sidiqi,
- ✓ North Zone: (From Chitral to Kohat)
 - Qazi Maulana Abdul Halim,
 - Qazi Maulana Shaikh Khalid
- ✓ Moharar: Maulana Rooh ul Amin
- ✓ Southern Zone: (from Kohat to DI Khan)
 - Maulana Qazi Muhammad Amir.
 - Qazir Mufti Shafiq

- ✓ Moharar: Maulana Haroon
- ✓ High Council Judges, North Zone from (Chitral to Kohat)
 - Qazi Mufti Mansoor
 - Qazi Maulana Hanzallah
 - Mufti Aminullah
- ✓ High Council Judges, Southern Zone
 - Qazi Mufti Abd ur Rehman
 - Qazi Mufti Hasham
 - Qazi Maulana Syed Ahmed

- ✓ Special Intelligence Force, Main Chief: Maulana Mokhlis
- ✓ Chief For North Zone, Ustad Samandar
- ✓ Chief for (Southern Zone), Hamza Sindhi

Malakand Division

- Governer: Maulana Azmatullah
- ✓ Assistant: Dr. Burhan
- ✓ Members of the District Commission
 - Maulana Farooq
 - Maulana Sibghatullah
 - Mufti Sajjad
 - Mubarak
 - Jan Fida
 - Qureshi Ustad

Peshawar Division

- ✓ Governor: Maulana Saiullah Haqani
- ✓ Assistant: Khalid Mansoor Afridi
- ✓ Members of the Peshawar Commission
 - Haji Ibrahim
 - Haji Kamran
 - Maulana Sabir
 - Qari Kamran
 - Abdur Rehman
- Chief of Intelligence, Qari Muawia
- Head of Finance, Inqilabi Ustad
- Head of Education, Maulana Hussain Ahmed
- Head Of Welfare, Mujahid Bacha

Kohat Division

- Governor: Ikramullah Turabi
- ✓ Assistant: Maulana Ahmed Kazim

Members of Commission

- ✓ Maulana Darwish
- ✓ Maulana Aajil
- ✓ Kashif,
- ✓ Hafiz Abibakar
- ✓ Intelligence Chief: Qari Ijaz
- ✓ Chief for Finance: Talha Afridi
- ✓ Chief for Education: Hafiz Khan Habib
- ✓ Chief for Welfare: Hamza Kohati.

Bannu Division

- ✓ Governor: Maulana Zulfiqar
- ✓ Assistant: Haider
- ✓ Committee: Shaukat Wazir, Ahmed Dawar, Ahmed Toori Khail, Zubair Marwat
- ✓ Chief for Intelligence: Asif
- ✓ Finance: Hafiz Ihsanullah
- ✓ Education: Maulana Mujib ur Rehman
- ✓ Welfare: Maulana Ahmed Shariati

D I Khan

- ✓ Governor: Haji Hussain
- ✓ Assistant: Abo Yasir
- ✓ Commission: Maulana Masroor, Maulana Daud Bitani, Zahid Ganda Pur, Malang Ustrani, Abdullah Shah, Maulana Abo Usman.
- ✓ Intelligence Chief: Abo Usman
- ✓ Finance Head: Maulana Ikhlas Yar
- ✓ Education: Maulana Sabir
- ✓ Welfare: Qari Shah Khalid

Zhobe District

- ✓ Governor: Dilawar (Haji LaLa)
- ✓ Assistant Governor: Syed Umar
- ✓ Commission: Maulana Khalid, Maulana Mehmood, Maulana Silah u ddin Shirani
- ✓ Intelligence Chief: Maulana Mehmood
- ✓ Finance Head: Maulana Silah u ddin Shirani
- ✓ Welfare: Maulana Khalid

Makran & Qalat

- Governor: Shaheen Baloch

Hazara Division

- ✓ Governor: Farman
- ✓ Head of Finance: Ihsan Ustad

Gilgit Baltistan

- ✓ Syed Ghazwan Ghazi
- ✓ Assistant: Izhar

South Punjab

- ✓ Umar Muawia

North Punjab

- ✓ Hilal Ghazi

Areas of Occupation

The organization comprises members from all seven tribal agencies of FATA, along with several districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Estimates suggest its total membership ranges between 30,000 and 35,000 operatives. Based in the South Waziristan Agency of FATA, the TTP has expanded its influence across all four provinces of Pakistan, establishing multiple chapters and groups led by local commanders sharing common organizational objectives.

The TTP shares membership with various sectarian terrorist groups operating nationwide, each pursuing its agendas. Former TTP spokesman Mullah Omer stated on November 23, 2008, that the Taliban had a presence in Karachi and connections with organizations like LeJ, SSP, and other banned religious groups. Additionally, the TTP has established links with other organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), HuM, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI).

Media reports on January 5, 2011, indicated that five terrorist groups had joined the TTP and were working under its umbrella TTP. With common aims and enemies, LeJ, SSP, JeM, HuM, and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) had 'merged' with TTP. TTP spokesman Azam Tariq declared, "*We have not forced anyone to join TTP, and the leaders and activists of the banned religious organisations have united themselves under the umbrella of the TTP on their own choice.*"⁶

ISLAMIC STATE-KHORASAN PROVINCE (ISKP)

Origin

Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP or IS-K) is a regional affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) that made inroads in Afghanistan in 2015 and was designated as an FTO in 2016. Its estimated 1,500-4,000 fighters are mostly former members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan who are based in Afghanistan but also operate in Pakistan, along with disaffected Afghan Taliban fighters.⁷

Ideology

ISKP is a wilayah (province) of the Islamic State, and Khorasan specifically refers to the historical region extending across parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. ISKP adheres to the broader Islamic State's ideology, which seeks to establish a global, transnational caliphate that is governed by Islamic jurisprudence. The Islamic State's motto, "baqiya wa tatamaddad" (remaining and expanding), calls on other Muslims to migrate to the group's fledgling caliphate. The caliphate, however, must be a "pure Islamic State" in which members must strictly observe sunna (the Prophet's traditions). In 2016, the Islamic State issued a list entitled "Aqidah wa

⁶<https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/pakistan/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp>

⁷<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11934/5>

Manhaj al-Dawlah al Islamiyah fi al-Takfir” (Islamic State Creed and Methodology of Takfir), which stated that anyone who rejects sharia law will be labelled as kafir (an apostate) and can be executed as a result.

The Islamic State formed as an offshoot of al Qaeda that diverged ideologically, including in its belief in violence against Shia civilians. Although both groups advocate a violent struggle against the “far enemy” (the West), the Islamic State also emphasizes fighting the “near enemy” (apostates in the region). The Islamic State operates under a global offensive jihad to rid its territory of both foreign infidels—nonbelievers of Islam—and apostates and endorses violence against the local community if they object to the adherence to sharia and do not conform to Islamic State dogma. For example, ISKP has launched numerous attacks on members of Afghanistan’s Hazara Shia minority.

The Islamic State’s—and subsequently, ISKP’s—commitment not to compromise with the West initially attracted some former Taliban members outraged with negotiations in Afghanistan. ISKP condemned the Taliban’s peace negotiations with the United States in its March 2020 newsletter al-Naba, stating that the Taliban and the [U.S.] “crusaders” are “allies.” In 2021, ISKP propaganda specifically vowed retaliation against the Taliban for their peace deal with the United States. Furthermore, ISKP subscribes to the concept of tawhid al-hakimiyyah (the unity of governance) and rejects a Muslim leader who does not rule by the entirety of Sharia law. ISKP refuses to acknowledge the Taliban as a legitimate Islamic leader and accuses the Taliban of being “filthy nationalists” for only appealing to a narrow ethnic and nationalistic base instead of committing to a universal Islamic jihad.⁸

Leadership

- Haji Daud Mehsud - former TTP commander
- He is now the chief of the ISKP Pakistan chapter. He was close to Baitullah Mehsud and then Hakimullah Mehsud – both founders of TTP (killed in drone attacks long ago)
- Commander Javid Wazir from South Waziristan - also a former TTP commander – recently joined ISKP. He belongs to the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan. Javid was the former TTP chief for Karachi as well when he lived there. However, currently, no one has any information about his whereabouts.
- Some militant sources say that Daud has some links in Baluchistan (with the Baloch National Army) and spends most of his time in Baluchistan.
- Other key persons of ISKP (mainly from Orakzai District) are
 - Qari Amjad.
 - Qari Farooq.
 - Mufti Ibrahim
 - Molvi Tufoon
 - Commander Waqar
 - Commander Sajid
 - Qari Zarar.

⁸<https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp>

- They are all former TTP commanders. (ISKP/Daesh was formed in November 2014 in Orakzai (when it was a FATA Agency). That is why most of ISKP commanders are from Orakzai and partially from Waziristan (Mehsud tribes)⁹

Areas of Operation

ISKP's "core" territory remains Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although ISKP first emerged as a Pakistani-dominated network, it soon focused on Afghanistan. It has switched its strategy there from controlling territory to conducting urban warfare. It posed a serious security threat to the former Afghan government and now seeks to disrupt the Taliban's efforts to govern. The Islamic State's presence in South Asia is not limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan but extends to include "periphery" territory, including India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka.

In these periphery states, however, the Islamic State faces a struggle for relevance in the face of competition with rival militant groups and strong counterterrorism pressure. ISKP poses a growing threat to the West and its South Asian partners, and ISKP's alarming potential calls for the West to take a variety of countermeasures, including even limited counterterrorism cooperation with the Taliban.¹⁰

Relationship between ISKP and other terrorist groups: Is the nature of this relationship between commonalities in ideology or political? ISKP and TTP – What do they underline?

As mentioned ISKP has a Salafi ideology while TTP has a mix of Deobandi and Salafi ideologies. TTP for that matter is limited to jihad in Pakistan but ISKP considers itself part of a global caliphate or Islamic Government. ISKP also believes in the invasion of India as part of the great Caliphate (Ghazwa-e-Hind).

However, Deoband fighters of TTP are not fond of Jihad in India. They were mostly Afghan-centric and fought against Pakistani forces in tribal areas.

On the other hand, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – publicly – is looking and fighting for the Islamic Renaissance in Central Asia. But that is a cover for its activities against the Chinese interests in the region.

Al Qaeda is a global phenomenon and believes in global jihad against Western interests to weaken them and force them to leave Arab lands. On the other hand, ISIS/ISKP believes in having a piece of land, a country where they form a "Model City under Caliphate and Strict Sharia" for people under its influence and then expand its boundaries.

Empirical evidence including meetings or media statements to connect ISKP and TTP and prove their collusion if any (operational):

At different levels, different groups inside TTP have had informal meetings with ISKP leaders/fighters. But so far, no formal or informal meeting has taken place between TTP Central Shura under Mufti Noor Wali and ISKP Chief Dr Shahab Al Mohajir. However, a meeting did take place between TTP

⁹ CRSS archive notes

¹⁰<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/sr-520-growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-south-asia.pdf>

founding member and Chief of Jamaat ul Ahrar with delegates of ISKP in Kunar before he was killed in Birmal in April 2022 near Asad Abad, a city of Kunar in eastern Afghanistan.¹¹

AL QAEDA

Relationship between ISKP and Al-Qaeda?

Afghan Taliban – Connection with IMU, ETIM, or these groups are aligned with ISKP. It is said that there are different attitudes between the upper and lower levels about the relationship between ISKP and Taliban: The lower levels in these two groups cooperate while the upper levels are against it, in this situation, to what extent are the two sides in collusion/ Any proof on this (provision of training camps, funding of weapons, facilitation of terrorist attacks, etc.)

There isn't any relationship between Al-Qaeda and ISKP. However, there are reports that ISKP Chief Dr Shahab Al Mohajir was once part of Al-Qaeda but so far no one has confirmed that. If it is true then it must be like ISIS founder Abu Masaab Al Zarqawi, who remained part of Al Qaeda but later on left Al-Qaeda and fought against them. In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda is supporting the Taliban. Al-Qaeda Chief Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri was killed under their umbrella. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are fighting against ISKP and so it is obvious that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are partners against ISKP.

As far as low or middle-ranked commanders are fighters are concerned there are instances in which many former Taliban have joined ISKP. We have Qari Kikmat in Northern Afghanistan who was with the Afghan Taliban but later on defected to ISKP. He captured spaces in Jawjzan province and built ISKP there. In January 2022, the Afghan Taliban arrested the Uzbek Afghan Taliban Commander

Makhdum Aleem from Faryab. He was charged with kidnapping but the close circle confirmed that he was suspected of having contacts with ISKP in Northern Afghanistan.¹²

JUNDULLAH

Origin

Jaysh al-Adl (aka Jundallah), designated as an FTO in 2010, is an ethnic Baloch separatist group operating in and from Pakistan's Balochistan province, oriented primarily toward Iran and its ethnic Baloch regions.¹³

Ideology

Jundallah pledged support to the Islamic State in November 2014 following a reported meeting in Saudi Arabia with an Islamic State delegation led by Zubair al-Kuwaiti (Express Tribune, November 18, 2014). This high-profile delegation also included Islamic State members Fahim Ansari and Shaykh Yusuf, from Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia respectively.

Jundallah is likely to be partly comprised of cadres from banned sectarian Deobandi takfiri groups like LeJ or Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamat (ASWJ), which consider Shi'a Muslims to be kafirs, underlining that the group already had strong sectarian leanings even before the advent of the Islamic State. Indeed, in the past, ASWJ, which is a front group of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), openly

¹¹CRSS archive notes

¹²CRSS archive notes

¹³<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11934/5>

declared war against Shi'as and Sunni Barelvis (Sufis), both of whom it has regularly described as being non-Muslim, as well as also targeting other "non-Islamic" entities such as the Pakistani Army, media outlets and the country's Christian community.

Like ASWJ, the TTP has also previously declared war against Shi'as. As a result of these factors, it was natural that the Islamic State's campaign against Shi'as would easily find sympathizers or supporters among groups such as Jundallah and the TPP.¹⁴

Leadership

Following the February 2010 capture by Iranian authorities of Jundallah's ex-leader, Abdul Malik Rigi, the group selected a new leader, al-Hajj Mohammed Dahir Baluch, and confirmed its commitment to continue its terrorist activities.

Areas of Operation

Since its inception in 2003, Jundallah has engaged in numerous attacks resulting in the death and maiming of scores of Iranian civilians and government officials, primarily in Iran's Sistan va Balochistan province. Jundallah uses a variety of terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings, ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. In May 2009, Jundallah attacked the crowded Shiite Amir al-Mo'menin mosque in Zahedan, destroying the mosque and killing and wounding numerous worshippers. An October 2009 bomb attack that killed more than 40 people was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s. In July 2010, Jundallah attacked the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing approximately 30 and injuring hundreds.¹⁵

BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION FRONT (BLF)

Origin

In 1964, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) was formed by Juma Khan Mari. Till 2004 the group remained dormant until revived by Dr Allah Nazar Baloch when he took over the leadership in 2003. ¹⁶The BLF is a banned militant group led by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch, a former physician-turned-guerrilla leader that gained popularity after a car bomb attack in 2004. The bombing killed three Chinese engineers and injured 11 others in Gwadar (Dawn, May 5, 2004).

The BLF has maintained a militant presence in the coastal Makran Division and Awaran District for two decades. Dr. Allah Nazar initially founded the Baloch Student Organization (BSO Azad) in 2002. It was a radical youth organization, but was banned in Pakistan in 2013 on charges of supporting Baloch armed groups. In 2004, Dr. Allah Nazar departed from student politics and co-founded the BLF with other like-minded people.¹⁷

¹⁴<https://jamestown.org/program/growing-islamic-state-influence-in-pakistan-fuels-sectarian-violence/>

¹⁵<https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/11/150332.htm>

¹⁶"Special Report 2016," PIPS, 2017.

¹⁷<https://jamestown.org/program/possible-merger-of-baloch-militant-groups-threatens-pakistani-and-chinese-interests>.

Ideology

The BLF is an ethno-national insurgent group working for an independent Balochistan. In an interview, Dr. Allah Nazar characterized the group movement as a quest for autonomy as opposed to a separatist agenda.¹⁸

BLF experienced a similar division. Mohammed Bux, also known as Jagoo, initially joined the BLF but later formed his group, the Balochistan National Liberation Front (BNLF) after being dismissed from BLF for violating internal BLF discipline. Despite facing personal losses, Jagoo surrendered to authorities and was subsequently killed by another Baloch armed group (criticallegalthinking.com, November 14, 2013).

Leadership

As per reports, prominent BLF leaders are Allah Nizar, Akhtar Nadeem (Senior BLF commander), Wahid Qambar (Late Dr. Khalid BLF commander's brother), and Gohram Baloch. (affiliated with the BLF media cell. His name is fictional)¹⁹

Areas of Operations

- The BLF targets security forces personnel, CPEC/Chinese and other foreign country workers, non-Baloch settlers, civilians, and former insurgents.²⁰

BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION ARMY (BLA)

Origin

Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which the State Department named as Specially Designated Global Terrorists in 2019, is an ethnic-based separatist group of up to 1,000 armed militants operating mainly in ethnic Baloch areas of Pakistan.

Baloch Liberation Army was founded in 2000 by Baloch leaders of Marri, and Bugti tribes. The BLA traces its origins to the Baloch nationalist uprising of the 1970s, which sought to establish an independent Balochistan through an armed struggle against Pakistan's government.⁸¹ In 2006, Pakistan and the United Kingdom both proscribed the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist outfit. The group has been designated as a global terrorist outfit by the United States in 2019,⁸² citing the group's alleged involvement in a series of terrorist attacks in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan.²¹

Ideology

Baloch Liberation Army is an ethno-national militant outfit. The group seeks to create an independent Balochistan that will be a "secular and democratic" state. Drawing its narrative from the third wave of Baloch insurgency, the group seeks the creation of Greater Balochistan comprising areas of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The BLA demands greater investment from the Pakistani government in the region, as well as an end to foreign exploitation and intervention.

¹⁸Abhinandan Mishra, "Baloch armed resistance has stopped CPEC from becoming operational", The Sunday Guardian, September 2022.

¹⁹CRSS archive notes

²⁰Fraaz, "BLF kills seven labourers in Kechh," Pakistan Today, February 2015.

²¹<https://cgr.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Breif-Profiles-of-Terrorist-Organisations-in-Pakistan.pdf>

Leadership

Since 2000, tribal leaders have traditionally held leadership within the Baloch Liberation Army; however, with the emergence of educated, marginalized youth and the middle class of Balochistan, this influence has become increasingly weakened. This has led to two key differences: the absence of inter-tribal clashes, and a shift of the movement from rural areas to urban and from the northeast to the southwest.

2000-2022: Hyrbyair Marri was the first leader of the BLA and was instrumental in establishing the group as a significant force in the Balochistan independence movement.

He was succeeded by Balach Marri, who took over the reins in 2004 and led the group until his death in 2007. After Marri's death, Dr Allah Nazar Baloch took over as the leader of the BLA and led the group until his arrest in 2010. He was succeeded by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch's brother, Aslam Baloch, who was the leader of the BLA until his death in 2018, in Kandahar province of Afghanistan. Since 2018, Bashir Zeb Baloch has assumed command of the Baloch Liberation Army, resulting in a surge of attacks specifically against the Chinese.²²

Areas of Operations

The most prominent of the Baloch groups active in this insurgency is the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA,) responsible for high-profile attacks such as the storming of the Karachi Stock Exchange (June 2020) and the Pearl Continental Hotel attack (May 2019).

The numerical strength of the BLA is not clear, with estimates claiming that in the early 2000s, after the group formed, there were approximately 6,000 fighters in the BLA. More recent estimates have suggested the total number of fighters is closer to 600. Within the BLA exists a sub-group, often referred to as the Majeed Brigades which carries out the majority of the BLA's high profile attacks.

BLA activity is mostly carried out in Balochistan Province or the port city of Karachi, but the group also maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan's Kandahar Province across the border. Afghanistan provides a relatively safe haven for BLA commanders, with Afghan security forces being faced with an emboldened Taliban insurgency and struggling to maintain security in rural areas. Despite this, Kandahar City has still hosted a number of assassination attempts targeting BLA commanders, such as a suicide bombing in 2018 that killed Aslam Baloch, a group commander.

BLA attacks are often the cause of civilian casualties, with the group actively targeting civilians working with the Pakistani government or on economic projects that are seen as exploitative (such as CPEC-related projects.)

Despite the leadership having a strong presence in Kandahar, the BLA carries out its attacks in Pakistan. The attacks are generally low-level, consisting of ambushes and IED attacks targeting convoys of security forces in remote parts of Balochistan. The BLA has not shied from carrying out major attacks in population centers. The BLA's coordinated attacks involved shooting at the local paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters, firing rockets at the central jail, ambushing police centers, bombing a railway track, and setting fire to a hotel as well as several shops and oil tankers. The operation reportedly resulted in the deaths of four security personnel, two civilians, and more than 20 militants. However, the BLA disputes these numbers and claims a higher number of casualties on the government side.²³

²²<https://cgr.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Breif-Profiles-of-Terrorist-Organisations-in-Pakistan.pdf>

²³<https://jamestown.org/program/baloch-separatists-continue-to-launch-more-sophisticated-coordinated-attacks-against-pakistan/>

These attacks have mostly been carried out by the BLA's 'Majeed Brigade,' and prevent the group from being regarded as a minor threat restricted to rural areas. The Majeed Brigade acts as a shock troop unit for the BLA, and claims to have carried out its first suicide attack in December 2011, marking the introduction of a new level of violence into the Balochistan insurgency. Since then, the Majeed Brigade has been linked to several attacks, including the Chinese Consulate attack in 2018, the Gwadar attack in 2019, and the stock exchange attack in 2020.²⁴

The first three quarters of 2023 witnessed an alarming rise in terrorist attacks. More than 1,000 people were killed, with security personnel constituting 36 percent of the fatalities. Moreover, more than 90 percent of the attacks took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (CRSS Annual Security Report, September 2023). These incidents underscore the growing instability in Balochistan and a marked escalation in separatist violence. Likewise, the statistics highlight the evolving dynamics of the Baloch insurgency in terms of sophistication, adoption of new tactics, and the selection of diverse, high-value targets.

BLF and BLA- likely to Merge?

The two Baluch separatist groups involved in 20 years of violent insurgency are reportedly in talks to merge and establish a unified militant group. (BBC Urdu, November 16). Despite already being part of the Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS, or "Baloch National Freedom Front"; an umbrella organization for Baluch insurgent groups), this announcement signals a potential escalation of insurgent activities in Pakistan's troubled southwestern region of Balochistan.

Impact on Pakistan and China

The new post-merger movement's name and leadership have not yet been decided, but the unification could enhance Baloch militants' presence in areas that are currently less affected by the insurgency. The merger may further increase the occurrence of activities against China-led projects, particularly those linked to the \$65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). If the merger materializes, the two most influential and deadliest Baloch militant groups are likely to escalate attacks on law enforcement agencies and Chinese interests along the Makran coast. Makran has been a geographic center of CPEC activity, along with Karachi.

The BLA and BLF merger would also enable them to leverage one another's sanctuaries, resources, and manpower, which they can use to intensify pressure on the Pakistani government. Additionally, the merger could more closely align other militant groups operating from Balochistan, where at least nine such groups currently exist under different leadership. Some lesser-known insurgent groups lack organization and centralized direction, but there is now widespread recognition among Baloch armed group leaders that their collective lack of unity has significantly hampered their movement.²⁵

²⁴<https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/insights/resources/intelligence-reports/balochistan-liberation-army-and-insurgency-in-pakistan/>

²⁵<https://jamestown.org/program/possible-merger-of-baloch-militant-groups-threatens-pakistani-and-chinese-interests/>

JAMAAT-UL-AHRAR (JUA)

Origin

Formerly known as Ahrar ul Hind, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), listed as an associated group of the TTP, emerged in August 2014 through the merger of a TTP faction in the Mohmand District and Ahrar-ul-Hind. JuA is primarily based in Lal Pur District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Its commanders and operatives largely hail from the Mohmand Agency, dispersed after Pakistan's military operation Zarb-e-Azb, and continue to launch terrorist attacks within Pakistan.

Ideology

In September 2014, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan leader Fazlullah removed Omar Khalid Khorasani, the chief of Mohmand Agency and former leader of Ahrar-ul-Hind. Khorasani and his associates in Mohmand Agency had criticized the TTP leadership for straying from the organization's ideology, prompting the creation of the splinter group TTP Jamaat-ul-Ahrar.

Leadership

Established in August 2014 by former TTP leader Abdul Wali, JuA has orchestrated numerous attacks in Pakistan, specifically targeting civilians, religious minorities, military personnel, and law enforcement. Its commanders and operatives largely hail from the Mohmand Agency, dispersed after Pakistan's military operation Zarb-e-Azb, and continue to launch terrorist attacks within Pakistan.

Areas of Operation

In August 2015, JuA claimed accountability for a suicide bombing in Punjab, resulting in the death of Punjab Home Minister Shuja Khanzada and 18 of his supporters. JuA handled the murder of two Pakistani employees from the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in early March 2016.

Later that same month, JuA conducted a suicide attack at Lahore's Gulshan-e-Iqbal amusement park, claiming the lives of over 70 individuals, with nearly half of them being women and children. The attack also left hundreds injured.²⁶

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), once a disgruntled breakaway faction of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has been behind a series of deadly attacks across Pakistan since March 2016, apparently contradicting the Pakistani Army's claim to have eliminated terrorism from North Waziristan and the Khyber Agency through years of its counter-terrorism operation Zarb-e-Azb (Daily Times, September 01).

Led by Omar Khalid Khorasani (a.k.a. Abdul Wali), a firebrand Taliban commander from Mohmand agency, JuA has been behind at least six major terrorist incidents this year, primarily targeting minorities, Christians in particular, and in August was named a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) group by the United States.

Khorasani has in the past called for the establishment of a global caliphate and expressed the intention of seizing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to defend Islam. While he has more recently disavowed some of his group's more international pretensions, JuA's many grisly strikes on Pakistani soil have brought immense notoriety to the group of late.²⁷

²⁶<https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/07/17/jamaat-ul-ahrar-afpak-terrorism/>

²⁷<https://jamestown.org/program/pakistans-jamaat-ul-ahrar-a-violent-domestic-threat/>

JAISHULADL

Origin

JuA emerged from Jundullah (Army of God) following the capture, trial, and execution of Jundullah's founder and leader, Abdul Malik Riggi, in 2010 by Iranian security forces. Jaish al-Adl is the new iteration of Jundullah. This latter group was an ultra-orthodox Sunni Deobandi terrorist group that was disbanded after the 2010 arrest and subsequent execution of its emir, Abdul Malik Riggi, in Iran (BBC Asia, June 20, 2010).

It is an Islamist militant group that has engaged in terrorist activities in Iran over the past decade and has become a bone of contention in Iran–Pakistan relations. The two countries share a porous, 900-kilometer-long border, and both accuse the other of allowing or enabling cross-border interference.²⁸

Ideology

The group adheres to ultra-orthodox Sunni-Deobandi ideology. Although relatively little information is available about the group's ambitions, its parent organization aimed to fight for Sunni-Baluch rights inside Iran. In that regard, it is notable that Riggi never called for the separation of Balochistan from Iran.²⁹

Leadership

Currently, the group is led by AbdolrahimMullahzadeh (also known as Salahuddin Farooqi) (DNI, October 2022).

Areas of Operation

The group has also perpetrated scores of terrorist attacks in Iran since 2014, including in Saravan, Qasre Qand, Mehrestan, Negur, Rask, and Zabol inside Iran's Sistan and Balochistan Province. Jaish al-Adl has mostly targeted Iran's security forces (see Terrorism Monitor, July 14, 2017). Such attacks have involved the abduction or killings of Iranian border guards, suicide bombings, and the planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near the Iran–Pakistan border in areas where Iranian police personnel are expected to patrol. Iranian security forces have made incursions into Pakistani territory after these attacks, drawing strong protests from Islamabad (Dawn, January 19).

The most recent incident that provoked a response from Iran was the December 2023 attack on a police station in the city of Rask, Sistan, and Balochistan Province. 11 individuals were killed, and the attack was claimed by Jaish al-Adl. Prior to this, several other terrorist attacks were claimed by Jaish al-Adl in 2023 on Iranian police and border guards, which resulted in the deaths of at least 11 Iranian security forces personnel (Dawn, December 15, 2023). Iran's response to this was to conduct the January 16 strikes inside Pakistan, drawing international attention to the two countries' conflict (Al Jazeera, January 17).

Both the Pakistani and Iranian sides have claimed to have eliminated terrorists in their operations. Pakistan, for example, has claimed to have killed several BLA and BLF militants in the air strikes (Daily Times, January 19). Iran claimed its cross-border strikes killed Jaish al-Adl members. While the

²⁸<https://jamestown.org/program/jaish-al-adl-and-the-persistent-hostilities-between-iran-and-pakistan/>

²⁹<https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230519221624/https://www.refworld.org/docid/596c93364.html>

situation appears to have de-escalated for now, Jaish al-Adl will remain a thorn in the side of regional peace and Iran–Pakistan relations.³⁰

Conclusion

Some of the instruments of this cold-blooded proxy terrorism include the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Ahrarul-Hind, Ansarul Jihad (AuJ), Majlis-e-Askari, Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad, Jabhat al-Junud al-Mahdi (headed by Amir Sufiyan) and Hafiz Gul Bahdaur’s Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK), besides Jundullah, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Sindhudesh People’s Army.

They all claim to be vying for a caliphate, using Islam/sharia as a justification for their violent actions. But in reality, they are agents of terrorism, instability, and uncertainty. Franchises with different names on the same mission – of destabilizing the region – threaten Pakistani interests, demoralize the security apparatus by pricking it here and there, and scare Chinese economic engagement away from the region.³¹

³⁰<https://jamestown.org/program/jaish-al-adl-and-the-persistent-hostilities-between-iran-and-pakistan/>

³¹<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2461007/sino-pak-interests-and-proxy-terrorism>

PART II

REVISITING ESCALATING CHALLENGE OF MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA

By Iftikhar Gilani

Abstract

This section of the report provides an extensive overview of the Maoist insurgency in India, tracing its origins, development, key figures, and government responses. It begins with a historical background, highlighting the ideological roots and significant events that shaped the movement, including the Naxalbari uprising. The article profiles past and present leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), detailing their contributions, activities, and eventual fates. Prominent figures such as Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Kishenji are discussed, emphasizing their roles in the insurgency and their impact on the movement.

The government's multifaceted response to the insurgency is thoroughly examined, including the National Policy and Action Plan, Operation Green Hunt, and the controversial Salwa Judum militia. The article outlines various schemes and initiatives aimed at combating Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), such as the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, Special Central Assistance (SCA), and Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS). These efforts have significantly weakened the insurgency, reducing its presence to specific regions.

However, the report underscores the persistent underlying issues that fuel the insurgency, such as extreme poverty, socio-economic disparities, and the exploitation of tribal communities. It highlights the need for a holistic approach that addresses these root causes to achieve sustainable peace. The suppression of dissent and the arrest of human rights activists under laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are also discussed, pointing to the challenges in balancing security and civil liberties.

In conclusion, the report argues that while aggressive state responses have curtailed the Maoist insurgency, addressing the fundamental grievances of the affected communities is crucial for a lasting resolution. The emphasis on socio-economic reforms and the inclusion of tribal populations in development narratives are presented as essential components for achieving long-term peace and stability.

INTRODUCTION

In October 2009, while campaigning for the general elections in Mumbai, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly known as Naxalism or the Maoist insurgency, as the biggest threat to national security³². This assertion came nearly a year after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 (known as 26/11), during which 10 terrorists from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out coordinated shootings and bombings in the city over four days.

Experts argue that due to the complexity and geographical spread of LWE violence across many states, it poses a greater overall threat than separatist movements in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, or the restive northeastern states. LWE violence also underscores fundamental weaknesses in India's governance, political institutions, and socio-economic structure.

Over the past decade, Maoist activities have declined significantly due to intensified operations by security forces. However, between 2000 and 2024, Maoist violence claimed 11,399 lives in India, including 4,033 civilians, 2,682 security personnel, and 4,432 insurgents³³. Only Jammu and Kashmir experienced higher levels of violence, with 22,260 deaths during the same period.

In 2023, Maoist violence resulted in 148 deaths compared to 134 in Jammu and Kashmir. These included 61 civilians, 31 security personnel, and 56 rebels. In Kashmir, 12 civilians and 33 security personnel were killed in 2023. From January to June 2024, 218 people were killed in 87 incidents of Maoist violence, including 18 security personnel and 162 insurgents. In the same period, Jammu and Kashmir saw 40 deaths, including 21 insurgents, 17 civilians, and two security personnel³⁴.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Maoist activities were reported from 10 states in 2022, down from 11 states in 2021. Of India's 797 districts in 29 states and nine Union Territories, 310 districts across 10 states recorded Maoist presence. Of these, 58 districts reported Maoist activity, with three categorized as 'severely affected,' 27 as 'moderately affected,' and 28 as 'marginally affected.'

On 28 March 2023, Union Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai informed the Lok Sabha that the number of districts most affected by LWE decreased from 35 in 2017 to 25 in July 2021³⁵. Additionally, the geographical spread of violence has significantly reduced, with only 176 police stations in 45 districts reporting LWE violence in 2022, down from 465 police stations in 96 districts in 2010. In the southern region, LWE-related incidents dropped by 87%, from 104 incidents in 2010 to 13 in 2022 in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

The overall security situation has improved in all major LWE-affected states, including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana. While the Maoist threat has considerably reduced, there remains a tendency among insurgents to fight back.

Tribal Phenomenon

A unique aspect of the Maoist threat is its concentration in tribal areas, locally known as the Adivasi belt. India has 177 tribal-dominated districts, home to 104.2 million people or 8.6% of the

³²<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/naxalism-is-indias-greatest-internal-threat-pm-402995>

³³<https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-maoistinsurgency>

³⁴<https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-maoistinsurgency>

³⁵<https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/1711/AU4593.pdf?source=pqals>

population³⁶. The major tribes in central India include the Bhils and Gonds (6 million), Santhals (4 million), and Oraons (3 million).

The Maoist also receive support from Dalits, who are at the lowest pedestal in the Hindu society. Together with tribals, they amount for one fourth of India's population; most of them live in rural India.

The Maoists claim to fight the oppression and exploitation of these indigenous people, known as Scheduled Tribes (STs) and lower caste Hindus or Dalits aiming to create a classless society. India does not officially recognize STs as indigenous peoples, asserting that all Indians are indigenous, a view reinforced by Hindu nationalists.

While tribals often serve as foot soldiers for the Maoists, many educated individuals from higher castes and prestigious backgrounds have joined the insurgents, abandoning families and careers to fight for the marginalized.

The Indian Constitution provides numerous provisions to protect and promote tribal interests and Dalits, including reserved seats in Parliament, government jobs, and educational opportunities. However, their integration into the mainstream remains weak.

Rapid economic development and social change post-independence led to large-scale displacement of tribals due to projects like dams, mines, and industrial units³⁷. Between 1951 and 1990, over 21 million people were displaced, including 8.54 million tribals, who make up 40% of the displaced population despite constituting less than 8% of the total population.

At least 52 per cent were displaced by the construction of mines, 75 per cent by the establishment of wildlife sanctuaries and 38 per cent by the construction of dams. Only industrial and other unspecified projects do not exceed 25 per cent³⁸.

When construction commenced in 2011 on the 330 MW Kishanganga hydropower project in the remote Gurez region of Jammu and Kashmir, it precipitated the displacement of several families from the Dard-Shina tribe, believed to be among the last of the original Aryans. Facing a lack of available land in this heavily militarized area near the Line of Control, the government opted to relocate them far from their homes, near the city of Srinagar³⁹.

Notably, non-tribal residents displaced by the power project were compensated at a rate of 2.25 lakh rupees per kanal (a local land unit), while the tribespeople received 5.75 lakh rupees per kanal. When questioned about this disparity during a chance encounter with Asghar Samoon, then divisional commissioner of Kashmir, he explained that the higher compensation for the Gurez tribes reflected not only their loss of land but also their endangered cultural heritage. He said way of life of this people could vanish within the bustling Srinagar city in the coming decades and the additional amount was to compensate their civilisational and cultural loss.

The identity crisis among tribals has deepened amidst the ascent of Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalists often classify Adivasis separately from mainstream Hindus, viewing them as backward and sometimes equating them with Dalits or Scheduled Castes (SCs), who occupy the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy. Despite many Adivasis retaining some access to land, Dalits engaged in

³⁶<https://swasthya.tribal.gov.in/dashboard>

³⁷<https://insoso-website.glueup.com/sites/default/files/2023-07/Vol.%202%20%282%29%2C%20October%202018.pdf>

³⁸https://cssscal.org/pdf/unicef/OP_Virginus_Xaxa.pdf

³⁹https://cssscal.org/pdf/unicef/OP_Virginus_Xaxa.pdf

professions like sweeping, scavenging, leather work, cremation, and prostitution often lack such resources. Since 2014, numerous NGOs dedicated to Adivasi welfare have faced restrictions or funding cuts⁴⁰.

Unlike Dalits, who have produced prominent national leaders such as Ambedkar, Kanshiram, Jagjivanram, and Mayawati, the tribal community has seen few charismatic figures emerge. This dearth of political mobilization has created an opening for Maoist influences to gain traction among tribal populations

Resource-Rich Areas

In 2005, U.S. Ambassador to India David C. Mulford expressed concern about Maoist violence in South India⁴¹. The resource-rich states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu form the economic backbone of India. Kerala, while not as resource-rich, boasts the highest human development index in South Asia and significantly contributes to foreign exchange through remittances, as many of its residents work in the oil-rich Gulf states.

Bangalore and Hyderabad, two major cities in this region, have emerged as India's science and software production capitals. At its peak, the Maoist insurgency affected 110 districts across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala. While experts do not see it posing a political challenge to New Delhi, they acknowledge its economic impact, which could hinder India's progress toward becoming a global economic power.

The affected regions, though small in geographical terms, hold a disproportionate amount of India's natural resources crucial for growth and development. Over 85% of India's coal reserves are located in Naxals/Maoist-affected states⁴². The insurgents have repeatedly targeted mines and distribution centers. Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha contain most of India's iron ore deposits, while Andhra Pradesh has significant bauxite reserves essential for industrialization.

Odisha alone holds 28% of India's iron ore, 24% of its coal, 59% of its bauxite, and 98% of its chromite reserves⁴³. The Maoist stronghold in Chhattisgarh's Bastar division comprises seven densely forested districts—Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma—spanning 40,000 square kilometers. Although civilian killings in Bastar have decreased, the region remains a significant concern.

On January 30, 2024, three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed and 15 injured in a gunfight with Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres on the Sukma-Bijapur border. The CRPF was establishing a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in the area. The next day, security forces discovered a 130-meter-long tunnel built by Maoists in Tadopot, Bijapur district, highlighting their tactical ingenuity.

The Maoists, including 200 fighters from the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion 1, led by Barse Deva, used advanced weaponry and guerrilla tactics in the January 30 attack. Despite valiant efforts by the CoBRA battalion, the Maoists' use of snipers and coordinated attacks inflicted significant casualties.

⁴⁰<https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/authorities-harass-and-squeeze-funding-ngos-while-activists-journalists-targeted-india/>

⁴¹ "Indo-US Ties at All-Time High: David Mulford," Economic Times (Delhi), Jan. 29, 2005.

⁴²<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36703758.pdf>

⁴³<https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/insights/resources/intelligence-reports/indias-left-wing-extremist-problem-a-maoist-naxalite-insurgency/>

The instability in these resource-rich regions undermines India's image as a successful, functioning democracy and hinders its strategic partnership with the United States, aimed at countering China's influence.

Ambition and Background of Maoists

According to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) strategy document adopted in 2004⁴⁴, India is described as a semi-colonial state and a stronghold of international counter-revolution. The document highlights the fundamental contradiction between imperialism and the masses of Indian people.

The CPI (Maoist) claims to conduct a "people's war," inspired by Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare strategy, aiming to establish a "people's government" through a New Democratic Revolution. Their objectives include:

1. Overthrowing feudal authority and establishing people's political power.
2. Redistributing land from landlords and the government to poor and landless peasants.
3. Building armed people's militias.
4. Halting debt repayments to landlords and moneylenders.
5. Stopping tax payments to the government.
6. Asserting Adivasi rights over forests and stopping the plunder of forest wealth.
7. Developing agriculture and cooperatives to achieve self-reliance.

The Maoist movement began as an agrarian revolt in 1967 by Santhal peasants in Naxalbari, West Bengal, led by Communist leaders Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal. Initially hailed by Chinese media, the movement formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI (ML)]. Despite police crackdowns, the movement resurfaced in the 1980s as the People's War Group (PWG), shifting focus to forested tribal areas in Adilabad, Andhra Pradesh. By 1991, it had spread to Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Odisha.

In 2004, the CPI (ML), PWG, and Maoist Coordination Centre (MCC) merged to form the CPI (Maoist), giving the insurgency a pan-India orientation. The spread of Maoist influence in tribal belts has been dramatic, driven by socio-economic grievances and lack of political mobilization within these communities⁴⁵.

Strength and Tactics

According to Ashok Patnaik, former chairman of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Maoists and associated splinter groups maintain approximately 10,000 armed cadres. Additionally, they are supported by around 45,000-50,000 overground workers and possess a combined arsenal of about 15,000 assorted weapons⁴⁶. Despite having access to sophisticated arms like AK-47/AK-56 rifles, light machine guns (LMGs), and mortars/grenade launchers, their most devastating weapon has been the

⁴⁴[https://www.satp.org/document/paper-acts-and-oridnances/strategy--tactics-of-the-indian-revolution--central-committee-\(p-cpi-\(maoist](https://www.satp.org/document/paper-acts-and-oridnances/strategy--tactics-of-the-indian-revolution--central-committee-(p-cpi-(maoist)

⁴⁵https://www.claws.in/static/MP9_Left-Wing-Extremism-in-India-Context-Implications-and-Response-Options.pdf

⁴⁶https://www.claws.in/static/MP9_Left-Wing-Extremism-in-India-Context-Implications-and-Response-Options.pdf

extensive use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and landmines, causing significant casualties among security forces.

The prevalence of mining activities in tribal areas has inadvertently facilitated the Maoists' access to industrial explosives, as many local youths familiar with mining processes have joined their ranks. Noteworthy incidents that underscored the severity of the Maoist threat include the Chintalnar massacre in April 2010, where 76 soldiers were killed, and the assassination of top Congress leaders in the Jeeram Ghati area in May 2013.

In a 2009 research paper, Maj. Gen. G. D Bakshi highlighted the significant growth of the Maoist movement's financial base, estimating that by the late 2000s, the Naxalites had amassed around 15 billion rupees (approximately \$350 million). This financial prowess enabled them to procure weapons, recruit new members, and enhance their communication warfare capabilities, including the use of advanced information and communication technology.

Organizational Structure

The Maoist insurgency is not a monolithic entity but comprises at least 28 different organizations actively engaging in military combat against security forces⁴⁷. Despite some major mergers in 2004, many groups continue to operate independently. Their organizational structure typically includes:

Level	Entity
Central Level	- Central Committee (CC)
	- Polit Bureau (PB)
	- Central Military Commission (CMC)
Departments under CMC	- Central Technical Committee (CTC)
	- Regional Commands (RCs)
	- Special Action Teams (SATs) - Assassination Squads
	- Military Intelligence (MI)
	- Central Military Instructors Team (CMIT)
	- Communications
	- Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC)
	- Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA)
	- Peoples Security Service (PSS) - Intelligence
	State Level

⁴⁷https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-05/faqLWEDIVISION_06052024.pdf

	- State Military Commission
	- Zonal Committees
	- Area Committees
PLGA Divisions	Main Force
	- Companies
	- Platoons
	- Special Action Teams
	- Intelligence Units
Secondary Force	- Special Guerrilla Squads
	- Local Guerrilla Squads
	- Platoons
	- District/Divisional level action teams
Base Force	- Peoples Militia
	- Gram Rakshak Dal
	- Aatma Rakshak Dal
	- Self-defense Squads

In areas under their control, the Maoists establish Revolutionary Peoples Committees (RPCs), which serve as rudimentary administrative units providing logistics support to armed formations⁴⁸.

Notable Maoist Organizations

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti (CPI-ML-Janashakti)

The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti, commonly known as CPI-ML-Janashakti, was formed on July 30, 1992, through the merger of seven communist groups. However, in 1996, a faction split to form the CPI-ML Unity Initiative, which is now part of the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) Kanu Sanyal faction. The main body of CPI-ML-Janashakti experienced further fragmentation, resulting in seven more factions, including the K. Rajanna faction. This faction adopted guerrilla warfare tactics similar to the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG) and is now the second most dominant and violent group in Andhra Pradesh, following the CPI-Maoist. Notably, the CPI-ML Janashakti is not banned in Andhra Pradesh, unlike the CPI-Maoist, and it operates primarily in Telangana with some presence in Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh. Key leaders include Jagadish (state secretary), Sagar (state executive member), and Amar (state committee secretary).

⁴⁸https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-05/faqLWEDIVISION_06052024.pdf

Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC)

The Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC), meaning the Third Preparatory Committee, was established in 2002 by former cadres of the CPI-Maoist in Jharkhand. These members left their parent organization, citing caste-based domination in decision-making. Comprising mainly Dalit communities, the TPC has evolved from a revolutionary group to a mercenary outfit allegedly supported by the state. It has been involved in numerous clashes with CPI-Maoist and other Maoist groups in Jharkhand.

People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI)

The People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI) was formed in 2007 in Jharkhand, initially known as the Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT). Under the leadership of Dinesh Gope, the PLFI emerged as a significant militant Maoist outfit responsible for nearly half of the Maoist incidents in Jharkhand. It is frequently used by security forces to counter CPI-Maoist activities. Despite its militant operations, the PLFI remains a formidable force in the region.

Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad (JJMP)

The Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad (JJMP) operates in the forests of Jharkhand, although many of its cadres have surrendered over time. Notable surrenders include its zonal commander Manohar Parhia and area commander Deepak Kumar Bhuiyyan, along with other leaders like Kamlesh Singh, Ragunath Singh Kherwar, Satyendra Oroan, and Sanjay Prajapati.

Jharkhand Sangharsh Jan Mukti Morcha (JSJMM)

The Jharkhand Sangharsh Jan Mukti Morcha (JSJMM) has significantly weakened since the death of its leader, Diwalee Ganjhu, in 2016. This has led to a considerable loss of influence and operational capability.

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) New Democracy (CPI-ML-New Democracy) Chandranna faction

Formed in 1988, the CPI-ML-New Democracy Chandranna faction broke away from CPI (Marxist-Leninist) (Chandra Pulla Reddy). This party employs both parliamentary and non-parliamentary methods in its class struggle, participating in elections while maintaining an underground guerrilla army. The party is known for its open mass organizations, including the Indian Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) for industrial workers and the All India Kisan-Mazdoor Sabha for farmers and agricultural workers.

Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP)

The Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP) is a splinter group of the CPI-Maoist, led by Sabyasachi Panda. Both Panda and his wife, Mili Panda, have been arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in Odisha.

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Mahadev Mukherjee Faction

The CPI (Marxist-Leninist) Mahadev Mukherjee faction has a presence in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, West Bengal, New Delhi, and Tamil Nadu. The party, which urges armed struggle and boycotts parliamentary polls, operates underground and is currently led by peasant leader Manik after the death of Mahadev Mukherjee in 2009.

Communist Party of United States of India (CPUSI)

The Communist Party of United States of India (CPUSI) was founded on May 17, 1997, as a result of factional infighting in CPI (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti. Initially led by M. Veeranna, who was later killed by police forces, the party is now headed by Sadhu MalyadriJambhav.

Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-Maoist)

The CPI-Maoist was formed on September 21, 2004, by merging the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC) and CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People's War (PWG). The new entity operates in at least 15 states with a structured hierarchy that includes a Central Committee and guerrilla armies. Known for high-profile attacks, including those in Dantewada (2010) and Chhattisgarh (2013 and 2021), the CPI-Maoist is a significant militant force in India.

People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)

The People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) is the armed wing of CPI (Maoist), formed by merging the People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) and the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army in 2000. With approximately 45% female cadres and significant leadership roles for women, the PLGA is known for major attacks, such as the 2010 Dantewada massacre and the 2013 attack on Congress leaders in Chhattisgarh.

Dakshin Desh

Dakshin Desh emerged separately from CPI (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969. Led by Amulaya Sen and Kanai Chatterjee, the group conducted armed activities in the Jangal Mahal area, West Bengal, mobilizing local peasants for guerrilla warfare.

Maoist Communist Center (MCC)

Active in Bihar, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) mobilized lower-caste Biharis and frequently clashed with upper-caste militias and other Naxalite groups. In January 2003, MCC merged with the Punjab-based Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) to form the Maoist Communist Centre of India.

Leaders and Commanders at Large				
Address	Name	Organization	Post	Reward
Misir Besra alias Bhaskar alias Sunirmal ji alias Sagar, Father: Darpan Bhaskar, Village Madandih, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Misir Besra	CPI (Mao)	Politburo Member (PBM)	₹1 Crore
Seema Mandal alias Akash alias Timir, Father: Kartik Mandal, Village Uttar Phulchak, Police Station: Chandrakona, District: West Midnapore (West Bengal)	Seema Mandal	CPI (Mao)	Central Committee Member (CCM)	₹1 Crore
Anil da alias Tufan alias Patiram Manjhi alias Patiram Marandi alias Ramesh, Father: Toto Marandi alias Taru Manjhi, Village Jharhabale, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Anil da	CPI (Mao)	CCM	₹1 Crore
Prayag Manjhi alias Vivek alias Phuchna alias Nago Manjhi alias Karan Da alias Letra, Father: Late Charkumurmu, Village Dalubudha, Police Station: Tundi, District: Dhanbad	Prayag Manjhi	CPI (Mao)	CCM	₹1 Crore

Chaman alias Lambu alias Karamchand Hansda, Father: Marang Da, Village Belatand (Jonrabeda), Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Chaman	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Lalchand Hembram alias Anmol Da, Father: Dhanu Hembram, Village Banshi Tola, Police Station: Nawadih, District: Bokaro	Lalchand Hembram	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Raghunath Hembram alias Nirbhay ji alias Chanchal alias Birsan ji, Father: Bishu Hembram, Village Jaridih, Police Station: Dumri, District: Giridih	Raghunath Hembram	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Ajay alias Ajay Mahato alias Tiger alias Basudev, Father: Chando Mahato alias Premchand Mahato, Village Navadih, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Ajay	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Santosh alias Vishwanath alias Silai alias Donga Gangadhar Rao alias Narsanna, S: Narendrapuram, Police Station: P Gannavaram, District: East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh	Santosh	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Prakash Mahato alias Atul alias Pintu Mahato, Father: Keshav Mahato, Village Amal Basti, Police Station: Gomia, District: Bokaro	Prakash Mahato	CPI (Mao)	S.A.C.A.	₹25 Lakhs
Brajesh Singh Ganjhu alias Gopal Singh Bhokta alias Sarkar, Father: Pachhu Ganjhu, Village Lutusohawan, Police Station: Lavalong, District: Chatra	Brajesh Singh Ganjhu	TPC	Supreme	₹25 Lakhs
Anuj alias Sahdev Soren alias Pravesh alias Amlesh, Father: Late Babulal Soren, Village Manderi, Police Station: Bishnugarh, District: Hazaribagh	Anuj	CPI (Mao)	SAC Special Area Committee	₹25 Lakhs
Mochu alias Mehnat alias Vibhishan alias Kumbha Murmu, Father: Baijan Murmu, Village Ghorabandha, Police Station: Barwaadda, District: Dhanbad	Mochu	CPI (Mao)	RCM Regional Committee Member	₹15 Lakhs
Sanjay Mahato alias Santosh alias Basudev Mahato alias Basuko, Father: Late Madho Mahato alias Lodha Mahato, Village Gamhra, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Sanjay Mahato	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Chhotu ji alias Chhote Singh alias Chhotu Kherwar, Father: Nanka Pahan alias Naresh Singh Kherwar, Village Sikid, Police Station: Herhanj, District: Latehar	Chhotu ji	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Martin Kerketta, Father: Late Johan Kerketta, Village RedwaChunwatoli, Police Station: Kamdara, District: Gumla	Martin Kerketta	PLFI	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Akram Ganjhu alias Akram ji alias Ravindra Ganjhu, Father: Ramdev Ganjhu, Village Sildag, Police Station: Lavalong, District: Chatra	Akram Ganjhu	TPC	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Ram Prasad Mardi alias Sachin Mardi, Father: Sanatan Mardi, Village Jhujhka, Police Station: Patmda, District: Jamshedpur	Ram Prasad Mardi	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Nitesh Yadav alias Irfan alias Nandu alias Kirani O Bogha Yadav, Village Tarawadih, Police Station Dumaria, District Gaya (Bihar)	Nitesh Yadav	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Ravindra Ganjhu alias Surendra Ganjhu, Father: Late Ramavatar alias Ramnath Ganjhu, Village Hesla Banjhitola, Police Station: Chandwa, District: Latehar	Ravindra Ganjhu	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs

Amit Munda alias Sukhlal Munda alias Chukka Munda, Father: Sukhram Munda, Father: Tamarana, Police Station: Tamar, District: Ranchi	Amit Munda	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Poonam alias Jova alias Bhavani alias Sujatha, Husband: Santosh alias Vishwanath, Father: Boka Lakshman Rao, S/o Gutandevi, Police Station: Polavaram, District: East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh	Poonam	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Ranvijay Mahato alias Ranjay alias Nepal Mahato, Father: Hubalal Mahato, Village Behratand, Police Station: Chandrapura, District: Bokaro	Ranvijay Mahato	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Madan Mahato alias Shankar, Father: Late Bankim Mahato, Village Karmasol, Police Station: Salbani, District: Paschim Midnapore (West Bengal)	Madan Mahato	CPI (Mao)	RCM	₹15 Lakhs
Arif ji alias Shashikant alias Sudesh ji alias Suresh ji, Father: Hira Singh, Village Kedal, Police Station: Manatu, District: Palamu	Arif ji	TPC	ZCM Zonal Committee Member	₹10 Lakhs
Ramdayal Mahato alias Bachchan Da, Father: Gulab Mahato, Village Pipradih, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Ramdayal Mahato	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Mrityunjay alias Fresh Bhuiyan alias Awadhesh, Father: Babulal Bhuiyan, Village NawadihChotkatola, Police Station: Barwadih, District: Latehar	Mrityunjay	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Pappu Lohara alias Somed Lohara, Father: Birju alias Garju Lohara, Father: Ludi Kone, Police Station: Latehar, District: Latehar	Pappu Lohara	JJMP	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Manohar Ganjhu alias Sohan Ganjhu alias Dinesh Ganjhu, Father: Brihaspat Ganjhu alias Ramesh alias Bilashpati alias Dohan Ganjhu, Village NagaratolaHembarwar, Police Station: Balumath, District: Latehar	Manohar Ganjhu	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Niraj Singh Kherwar alias Sanjay Kherwar, Father: PuchuKherwar, Father: Abun, Police Station: Panki, District: Palamu	Niraj Singh Kherwar	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Saheb Ram Manjhi, Father: Pandu Manjhi, Village Karando, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Saheb Ram Manjhi	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Vivek Yadav alias Sunil Yadav alias Kora alias Rajendra Yadav alias Birek ji alias Break ji, Pe: Butali alias Buti Yadav, S/o Bhattbigha, Police Station: Nardiganj, District: Nawada (Bihar)	Vivek Yadav	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Jaiprakash Yadav alias Sanjay Yadav, Father: Rewati Yadav, Village Goidhan, Police Station: Panki, District: Palamu	Jaiprakash Yadav	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Mangar Ram alias Mangra Ram alias Nehal alias Niranjan, Father: Dwarika Ram, Village Pipradih, Police Station: Chandwara, District: Koderma	Mangar Ram	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Shambu Mahato alias Ajit alias Bhavishali alias Kamlesh Mahato, Father: Atal Mahato, Village Murkar, Police Station: Gola, District: Ramgarh	Shambu Mahato	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Mangal Ram alias Mangal Bhokta alias Govind Ram, Father: Late Parmanand Ram, Village Sarheta, Police Station: Chitarpur, District: Ramgarh	Mangal Ram	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs

Raghubir alias Gubir alias Gubar Ganjhu, Father: Brikhho Ram Ganjhu, Village Morwe, Police Station: Kunda, District: Chatra	Raghubir	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Roshan alias Vishal alias Ranjan alias Sanjay alias Arun Kumar Singh alias Prahar ji, Father: Tulsi Ram Singh, Village Padma, Police Station: Padma, District: Hazaribagh	Roshan	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Pintu alias Kunal alias Vinit alias Ajay Yadav, Father: Shyamdhara Yadav, Village Vishnapur, Police Station: Vishnugarh, District: Hazaribagh	Pintu	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Sumesh alias Sunil Bhuyan, Father: Arjun Bhuyan, Village Anigara, Police Station: Chhatarpur, District: Palamu	Sumesh	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Manmohan alias Satyendra alias Amit Yadav, Father: Jagannath Yadav, Village Bhuipur, Police Station: Baniadih, District: Koderma	Manmohan	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Amit alias Sandeep alias Vikas alias Suraj alias Nitesh alias Nilesh alias Mukesh alias Pawan Sahu alias Mahendra Yadav, Father: Bandhu Yadav, Village Nirakhpur, Police Station: Vishnugarh, District: Hazaribagh	Amit	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Satish Ganjhu alias Surendra, Father: Ram Dayal Ganjhu, Village Salgi, Police Station: Murhu, District: Khunti	Satish Ganjhu	JJMP	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Uday Yadav alias Abhinav ji alias Umesh alias Tiwary, Father: Mohan Yadav, Village Belhara, Police Station: Chhatarpur, District: Palamu	Uday Yadav	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Sunil Kherwar alias Kanhai Kherwar alias Budh Singh Kherwar, Father: Deva Kherwar, Village Sirka, Police Station: Panki, District: Palamu	Sunil Kherwar	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Abhishek Yadav alias Vivek ji, Father: Pradeep Yadav, Village Bhagwatipur, Police Station: Chhatarpur, District: Palamu	Abhishek Yadav	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Vinod Manjhi alias Vikas Manjhi alias Amit alias Pankaj alias Shanker, Father: Late Kewal Manjhi, Village Parsa, Police Station: Panki, District: Palamu	Vinod Manjhi	TPC	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs
Sandeep Soren alias Madhav alias Chotu alias Mithun, Father: Tarun Soren, Village Sagma, Police Station: Pirtand, District: Giridih	Sandeep Soren	CPI (Mao)	ZCM	₹10 Lakhs

Extremists Arrested

Sr. No.	Name	Organization	Rank
1	Azad alias Bhaskar alias Bisram Pahan	CPI (Maoist)	DVCM
2	Ramlal Yadav alias Bhola Yadav	CPI (Maoist)	DVCM
3	Ramchandra alias Matin Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	DVCM
4	Basudev alias Gunjan Ganjhu	TPC	Zonal Commander
5	Ramesh Ganjhu alias Gora	TPC	Zonal Commander
6	Suraj Bhuiyan alias Dayanand	JJMP	Zonal Commander
7	Durga Bhuiyan alias Vikas alias Buntty	JJMP	Area Commander
8	Rajesh Ganjhu alias Karan	TPC	Zonal Commander
9	Viru Yadav alias Santosh alias Sadhu	TPC	Zonal Commander
10	Shanker Ram alias Shanker Ji	TPC	Zonal Commander
11	Arvind Bhuiyan alias Shambhu Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	Zonal Commander
12	Jayanti Ganjhu	JJMP	Area Commander
13	Ritesh Ganjhu	JJMP	Zonal Commander
14	Akash Ganjhu	TPC	Area Commander
15	Santosh Ganjhu alias Kamlesh	JJMP	Area Commander
16	Sarbavaran Ganjhu alias Deepak	TPC	Area Commander
17	Gopal Singh alias Govind alias Balchand Singh	TPC	Zonal Commander
18	Radha Krishna Bhuiyan	TPC	Area Commander
19	Pramod Ganjhu	JJMP	Zonal Commander
20	Shashi Bhushan Bhuiyan	JJMP	Zonal Commander

Extremists Killed in Encounters	
1	Meena Krishi, Area Commander of Maoist
2	Bhima Chandra Hembrom, Area Commander of Maoist
3	Jitan Gorai, Sub-Zonal Commander, TPC
4	Pradeep Kherwar, Area Commander, TPC
5	Budhan Sai Ganjhu, Zonal Commander, TPC
6	Amit Yadav, Area Commander, TPC

Extremists Who Surrendered			
Sr. No.	Name	Organization	Rank
1	Sanjay Munda	JJMP	Zonal Commander
2	Sushil Ganjhu	JJMP	Area Commander
3	Binod Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	Area Commander
4	Lalbabu Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	Section Commander
5	Radha Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	Section Commander
6	Rakesh Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	SQC Member
7	Mahadev Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	DVC Member
8	Uma Dhan	CPI (Maoist)	ACM
9	Jayant Singh alias Bipul	CPI (Maoist)	S.Q.C. Member
10	Sunita Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	ACM
11	Sushila Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	ACM
12	Sujit Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	ACM
13	Manbhadra Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	S.Q.C. Member
14	Amar Yadav	CPI (Maoist)	DVCM
15	Umesh Bhuiyan	JJMP	Zonal Commander

16	Suresh Bhuiyan	JJMP	Area Commander
17	Mahendra Bhuiyan	JJMP	Area Commander
18	Sunil Bhuiyan	JJMP	Area Commander
19	Ravi Bhuiyan	JJMP	Area Commander
20	Nagendra Bhuiyan	CPI (Maoist)	Zonal Commander

Past Leaders

Cherukuri Rajkumar

Cherukuri Rajkumar, commonly known as Azad, was a senior member of the Central Politburo of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A graduate of the Regional Engineering College in Warangal and an M.Tech holder from Andhra University College of Engineering in Visakhapatnam, he became a leader in the Radical Students Union. Rajkumar later joined the People's War Group, negotiating arms deals and training in weapons and explosives before going underground. He was killed in an encounter with Andhra Pradesh Police on 1 July 2010.

Katakam Sudarshan

Known by his nom de guerre Anand, Katakam Sudarshan was a Politburo member of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). He married Sadhana, the Adilabad district secretary of CPI (Maoist), who was later killed by the police. Anand was believed to be heading the Eastern Regional Bureau of the party after Kishenji's elimination. He also served as the chief of the Central Regional Bureau. He died on 31 May 2023.

Kadari Satyanarayan Reddy

Known as Kosa, Kadari Satyanarayan Reddy and his wife Radha were active members of the movement. Kosa served as the chief of the Central Regional Bureau before being promoted to the Central Committee of the party. Ramanna replaced him as the head of the Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee.

MallojulaKoteswara Rao

Known as Kishenji, MallojulaKoteswara Rao was a Politburo and Central Military Commission member of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A law graduate from Osmania University, Hyderabad, he became a full-time member of the People's War Group in 1974. Kishenji was killed on 24 November 2011, in an operation by Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), marking a significant setback for the Maoist movement.

Charu Mazumdar

Charu Mazumdar, often referred to as CM, was born into a progressive landlord family in Siliguri in 1918. He founded the militant Naxalite movement, and his writings, particularly

the Historic Eight Documents, have become central to Maoist ideology. Mazumdar died of a heart attack after being apprehended by police.

Kanu Sanyal

Kanu Sanyal, along with Mazumdar, initiated the Naxalbari uprising and was a founding leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)) in 1969. After the failed Naxalite uprising, he went into hiding and later accepted parliamentary practices as a form of revolutionary activity. Sanyal was imprisoned for seven years in a case known as the Parvatipuram Naxalite Conspiracy. He was found hanging at his residence on 23 March 2010.

Jangal Santhal

Jangal Santhal began his political life in 1949 in Nepal and was a respected figure among Adivasi sharecroppers, peasants, and tea laborers in Darjeeling. He was a primary organizer of the Naxalbari uprising and the subsequent Naxalite movement that spread throughout India.

Sabyasachi Panda

Sabyasachi Panda was captured by Indian security forces on 18 July 2014 in Ganjam District, Odisha. A mathematics graduate, he was implicated in the 2008 murder of Swami Lakshmanananda Saraswati and his followers. Panda was captured in Berhampur, where he had been hiding.

Yalavarthi Naveen Babu

Yalavarthi Naveen Babu, an alumnus of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, was killed on 18 February 2000 in a firefight with police near Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh.

Narmada

Narmada was a senior female cadre of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and a Central Committee member. She was responsible for framing policies for the female cadre of Maoists.

Known as Ganapathy, Muppala Lakshmana Rao was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A science graduate with a B.Ed. degree, he was replaced by Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraj in November 2018 due to ill health. Ganapathy was suspected to have fled to the Philippines through Nepal.

Current Leaders⁴⁹

Deo Kumar Singh

Known as Arvind Ji, Deo Kumar Singh was a member of the Central Committee and Central Military Commission. He died on 21 March 2018, from respiratory arrest and a heart attack at Burha Pahar, Latehar, Jharkhand.

Milind Baburao Teltumbde

⁴⁹Data from Jharkhand Police

Milind Baburao Teltumbde was a Central Committee member and the head of the Maharashtra-Madhya Pradesh-Chhattisgarh zone. He was killed in an encounter with Maharashtra Police in the Mardintola forest area of Gadchiroli district on 13 November 2021.

Muppala Lakshmana Rao

Misir Besra

He is current the senior most politburo member of CPI (Maoist). He is resident of Girdhi district of Jharkhand. He has made Kolhan- Saranda forest area of Chaibasa district as his base.

Prayag Manjhi

He is member of the central committee and is the second senior most Maoist insurgent leader in the state of Jharkhand. He is resident of coal-rich region of Dhanbad and is currently active in Parsanath Hills in Girdhi district.

Patiram Manjhi

He is also a central committee member and second most senior maoist leader in Saranda forest area (Chaibasa district). He is a resident of Giridih district and is active in Kolhan-Saranda forest area of Chaibasa district.

Ajay Mahto @ Tiger

He is special area committee member and a resident of Girdhi district and is active in Kolhan- Saranda forest area of Chaibasa district of Jharkhand state.

Raghunath Hembram

He is special area committee member and in charge of Lugu-Jhumra area (Bokaro district). He is also resident of Giridih district and is active in Lugu- Jhumra forest area of Bokaro district.

Chhotu Kherwa

He is resident of Latehar district and is active in Latehar-Garhwa areas in Jharkhand.

Government Response

The Indian government has implemented a comprehensive approach to address the problem of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), encapsulated in the National Policy and Action Plan. This strategy calls for an integrated approach focusing on security, development, enforcing rights and entitlements of local communities, public perception management, and good governance⁵⁰. This multifaceted response aims to mitigate the insurgency's impact and address its root causes simultaneously.

In September 2009, the government launched a significant offensive, codenamed "Operation Green Hunt," involving paramilitary forces and state police. The operation continues 15 years later, deploying around 100,000 personnel, including security forces, reserve battalions, and state armed forces from Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, along with specialized units like the Greyhound commandos. The operation also utilizes Indian Air Force assets, including MI-17 and MI-17V5 helicopters and drones⁵¹. This extensive campaign has resulted in the elimination of 2,266 Maoist fighters, the arrest of 10,181, and the surrender of 9,714⁵². However, the conflict has also claimed the lives of 1,435 security personnel and resulted in 2,319 civilian casualties.

⁵⁰<https://www.mha.gov.in/en/divisionofmha/left-wing-extremism-division>

⁵¹<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/air-force-to-lend-support-for-antinaxal-operations/article4763722.ece>

⁵²<https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/surrender/india-maoistinsurgency>

Salwa Judum

One of the most controversial and effective initiatives was the creation of local government-backed militias to combat Maoist insurgents, a strategy previously successful in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. Salwa Judum, meaning "peace march" in the Gondi language, was a militia mobilized and deployed as part of counterinsurgency operations in Chhattisgarh. Consisting of local tribal youth, this militia received support and training from the Chhattisgarh state government.

Salwa Judum, formed in 2005, initially succeeded in driving back Naxalite influence. However, it soon faced severe criticism for human rights abuses⁵³. The movement, which began with local traders and businesspeople under the leadership of tribal leader Mahendra Karma, saw police and military backing for its operations. The group became notorious for burning over 600 villages and displacing 300,000 people, leading to widespread allegations of human rights violations. A primary survey by the Forum for Fact-finding Documentation and Advocacy found that over 12,000 minors were used by Salwa Judum.

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court of India declared Salwa Judum illegal and unconstitutional, ordering its disbanding and the recovery of all firearms, ammunition, and accessories. Despite this, the Chhattisgarh state police continued to employ tribal youths as Special Police Officers (SPOs), effectively maintaining a militia force against Naxalism.

Other Important Initiatives

Beyond the National Policy and Action Plan, the government has introduced several schemes and initiatives to address LWE. These include:

1. **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:** Implemented under the 'Modernization of Police Forces' umbrella, this scheme reimburses security-related expenses for LWE-affected districts. It covers training and operational needs of security forces, ex-gratia payments to families of civilians and security forces killed or injured in LWE violence, rehabilitation of surrendered LWE cadres, community policing, village defense committees, and publicity materials.
2. **Special Central Assistance (SCA) for Most LWE Affected Districts:** Approved in 2017, this scheme aims to fill critical gaps in public infrastructure and services in the most affected districts. Since 2017-18, Rs. 3449.98 crore have been released to states under this scheme.
3. **Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS):** Also part of the 'Modernization of Police Forces' umbrella, this scheme funds the strengthening of security infrastructure. Projects worth Rs. 1741 crore have been sanctioned, including 306 Fortified Police Stations, of which 206 have been constructed.
4. **Media Plan:** This scheme addresses the Maoists' propaganda and aims to counteract their influence in LWE-affected areas. Activities include Tribal Youth Exchange programs, radio jingles, documentaries, and pamphlets. Since 2017-18, Rs. 44.61 crore have been allocated for these efforts.

⁵³<https://www.thriftbooks.com/w/the-burning-forest--indias-war-in-bastar/18969532/#edition=20223091&idq=32255669>

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007:⁵⁴

The primary aim of this policy is to minimise the displacement of people and promote alternatives that cause minimal or no displacement. The government issued this rehabilitation policy on 11 October 2007 to facilitate the relocation of individuals who lose their land to industrial development. Key provisions of this policy include:

- Land-for-land compensation.
- Employment opportunities for at least one family member.
- Vocational training.
- Housing benefits, including provision of houses in both rural and urban areas.

Forest Rights Act, 2006:

The Scheduled Tribe and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, also known as the Forest Rights Act, recognises the rights of scheduled tribes and forest dwellers who have lived in the forests for generations without having their rights formally acknowledged. The Ministry of Environment and Forests has allowed the use of one hectare of land for non-forest purposes and the conversion of katcha (temporary) roads into pakka (permanent) roads.

Chhattisgarh Special Public Securities Act, 2006:

This act defines unlawful activities, outlines the process for declaring an organisation unlawful, and establishes the formation and function of an advisory board when deemed necessary by the state government. It includes penalties even for non-criminal activities, the power to designate places used for unlawful activities, and the occupation of such places. It also restricts court intervention in these matters.

Impact on Tribal and Scheduled Castes:

These laws have often caused significant problems for tribal and scheduled caste communities, undermining various constitutional safeguards meant to protect them. The land-for-land provision has become particularly problematic, obstructing even industrialisation efforts.

Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act:

This law grants the District Magistrate unconditional authority to designate places suspected of being used for unlawful activities without prior notification or evidence. This undermines principles of natural justice, as affected parties are denied a fair hearing. The law mandates that any revision application be filed with the High Court within 30 days, barring any lower court or officer from intervening. This bill appears to be an unnecessary measure, perceived as an attempt to appease certain groups.

⁵⁴https://www.rmlnl.u.ac.in/pdf/6-NAXALITE_100620.pdf

Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA) and Hindu Nationalism:

The current Hindu nationalist government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has utilised the services of Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA), an affiliate of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the patron organisation of Hindu nationalists.

VKA's tribal outreach efforts aim to integrate tribal communities into mainstream Hinduism. Tribal women are likened to Shabri, and men to Hanuman, characters from the Hindu epic Ramayana.

An article in the RSS weekly Organiser states that VKA was established to reconvert tribals who had been converted to Christianity through various means or who had joined Maoist groups, and to instil a strong sense of belonging to Indian culture and religion.

This results in an additional red herring that has the potential to cause further combustion. The tribes worship their own gods and have their own customs. Forcing them to accept the gods of mainstream Hinduism creates further problems. Diversity must be celebrated rather than trampled upon.

Conclusion and Way Forward

After decades of existence and periods of dominance, the left-wing radical movement in India now seems significantly weakened, largely confined to specific regions. This decline can be attributed to aggressive state responses, shifts in the political economy, and internal strife within the movement. Loss of traditional strongholds, waning ideological appeal, and leadership crises have undermined the insurgency's capacity.

The decline and loss of appeal has a cross-border connection also. Maoists who came to power in Nepal were unable to form a proper and stable government, which has affected the ideological backbone of the Maoist insurgents in India.

Enhanced socio-economic efforts by states previously affected by unrest have collectively diminished the likelihood of the insurgency regaining its past strength.

The movement may have been weakened, but it has not vanished and has potential to raise its head once again.

The causes of the Maoist movement in India are deeply structural, interlinking economic, political, and cultural dimensions. The first notable factor is the economic situation.⁵⁵

On one hand, India has witnessed relatively rapid economic growth, increasing national wealth and necessitating more land and natural resources for ongoing development. On the other hand, this growth has been uneven across regions, widening the disparity between the rich and the poor.

The conflict between economic progress and aboriginal land rights continues to fuel Maoist activities, with their strongest bases in India's poorest areas.

It is also a battle between India's most neglected people and the nation's most powerful industrial businesses. Gautam Navlakha, a writer jailed for being a Maoist sympathizer,

⁵⁵https://www.rmlnl.ac.in/pdf/6-NAXALITE_100620.pdf

noted that portraying Maoists as a "menace" and detaching the movement from its socio-economic causes exacerbates the divide between rich and poor within a formal democratic structure.

Navlakha cites Bihar as an example where Naxalite groups are banned, yet landlord armies committing massacres are not considered terrorists under the law. Such selective treatment threatens the rule of law, state legitimacy, and democracy.

To comprehensively address the Naxalite threat, the government must tackle its root causes. Socio-economic alienation and dissatisfaction with widening economic and political inequality cannot be resolved by military force alone, which has been the government's primary approach. Although the government has been mentioning combining development, building infrastructure along with military solution. But experience shows it continues to rely on the military solution with little headway towards development activities.

A three-pronged strategy is necessary: socio-economic development, multilateral dialogue, and tactical use of military force.

1. **Socio-economic Development:** The discontent among the marginalized and poor fuels the Naxalite movement. A larger percentage of the national budget must be allocated to address the needs of these regions. More national expenditure should focus on health, education, social welfare, and rural and urban development. Government service delivery must improve in tribal areas, ensuring statutory minimum wages, access to land, and water sources initiatives. Strategies for national economic growth should consider the potential impact on all socio-economic groups in India's diverse landscape. Addressing social needs will reduce discontent and weaken the Naxalite movement's appeal.
2. **Dialogue:** The government should initiate sincere dialogue with marginalized groups, Naxalites, and state leaders. The popularity of Naxalites among the tribals reflects the government's unawareness or indifference to their plight. Effective communication and dialogue will help these groups feel heard. By opening dialogue, the government can encourage rebels to join the mainstream political system, showing them that collaborative solutions are possible.

For example, the former Director-General of Andhra Pradesh concluded that the ceasefire and dialogue with Maoists in 2004 reduced violence by 80-90 percent in the region. As David Pilling noted, India's leaders must balance necessary development in impoverished areas with recognizing the rights of neglected indigenous groups.

3. **Accommodation in Politics:** A breakaway group of Maoists known as Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation) - CPI(ML)(L) won two seats in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections from Bihar from Arrah and Karakat. The opposition INDIA (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance), which at national level was led by

Congress party accommodated the CPI (ML) (L) in the alliance. They were given three seats to contest and out of them they won in two seats.

4. **Military:** While some tactical military force is necessary to combat Maoist guerrillas, it should not be the sole solution. Relying solely on brute force risks alienating civilians caught in the crossfire. Coercive state actions will only drive more people to rally against it.
5. **Governance:** The growing Naxalite insurgency highlights flaws in the federal structure. The central government and states must collaborate to coordinate a multi-dimensional approach. Both entities should complement and support each other's initiatives and strategies.

It is crucial to recognize that the fundamental drivers of this armed struggle—extreme poverty, socio-economic disparities, forced migration of tribal communities, and the exploitative expropriation of their resources—remain largely unaddressed. The focus of countermeasures has predominantly been on security rather than resolving these deep-rooted issues.

Highlighting the suppression of critical voices, Alpha Shah notes in her book "Nightmarch: Among India's Revolutionary Guerrillas" that journalists have increasingly been barred from accessing guerrilla zones unless reporting on controlled narratives of terrorist encounters. Some journalists have even reported being paid to avoid writing about the movement.

The government has taken a firm stance against anyone perceived as supporting the Maoists, exemplified by the application of Section 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Since 2008, this legislation has led to the prosecution of those accused of sympathising or even those urging a dialogue the insurgents to bring back them to the mainstrea.

Several human rights activists have been arrested under this act, including notable figures such as Binayak Sen, a pediatrician and activist; Arun Ferreira and Sudha Bharadwaj, both lawyers and activists; P Varavara Rao, a poet and critic; Vernon Gonsalves and Kobad Gandhi, social activists; and V. Gautam Navlakha and Prof. G. N Saibaba, an academic. These arrests have drawn attention to the term "urban Naxals," coined by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, targeting intellectuals and activists who advocate for human rights and the welfare of tribal communities.

In light of these developments, the ultimate resolution of this conflict requires more than just military or security-based interventions. It necessitates a comprehensive strategy that includes socio-economic reforms aimed at integrating, rather than displacing, the tribal populations from their ancestral lands. Ensuring their inclusion in India's development narrative is crucial for achieving sustainable peace. Without addressing the fundamental causes of dissatisfaction and displacement, the cycle of insurgency and suppression is likely to continue, underscoring the need for a holistic approach to resolve these longstanding issues.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records in a laboratory setting. It emphasizes the need for clear labeling and organization of samples and equipment. The second part details the procedures for conducting experiments, including safety protocols and data collection methods. The final section provides a summary of the findings and conclusions drawn from the study.

In the first section, we explore the various factors that can affect the accuracy of our measurements. These include environmental conditions, instrument calibration, and human error. We discuss strategies to minimize these errors and ensure the reliability of our data.

The second section describes the experimental setup and the steps involved in performing the tests. We provide a detailed account of the materials used, the equipment required, and the specific procedures followed. This section is intended to serve as a guide for other researchers who may wish to replicate our work.

Finally, we present the results of our experiments and analyze the data to draw meaningful conclusions. We compare our findings with existing literature and discuss the implications of our work for the field of study.