

# CRSS Annual Security Report

Special Edition

2013 - 2018



Center for  
Research &  
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*Rule of Law - Security - Governance*



# CRSS Annual Security Report

Special Edition

2013 - 2018

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## Acronyms

<b>ACS</b>	Additional Chief Secretary
<b>ADP</b>	Annual Development Programme
<b>ADR</b>	Alternative Dispute Resolution
<b>AI</b>	Ansarul Islam
<b>AJK</b>	Azad Jammu Kashmir
<b>ANF</b>	Anti-Narcotics Force
<b>ANP</b>	Awami National Party
<b>APC</b>	All Parties Conference
<b>APIS</b>	Advance Passenger Information System
<b>APS</b>	Army Public School
<b>AQ</b>	Al Qaida
<b>AQIS</b>	Al Qaida Indian Subcontinent
<b>ASF</b>	Airports Security Force
<b>ASP</b>	Ansarul Sharia Pakistan
<b>ASWJ</b>	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
<b>BLA</b>	Balochistan Liberation Army
<b>BLF</b>	Baloch Liberation Front
<b>BLT</b>	Balochistan Liberation Tigers
<b>BMDA</b>	Balochistan Musalla Defa Army
<b>BNP</b>	Balochistan National Party
<b>BRA</b>	Baloch Republican Army
<b>BRP</b>	Baloch Republican Party
<b>BSNM</b>	Balochistan Sub-Nationalist Movement
<b>BSO</b>	Baloch Students Organization
<b>CFT</b>	Countering Financing of Terrorism
<b>CID</b>	Criminal Investigations Department
<b>CJS</b>	Criminal Justice System
<b>CPC</b>	Civil Procedures Code
<b>CPEC</b>	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
<b>CrPC</b>	Criminal Procedures Code
<b>CTD</b>	Counter Terrorism Departments
<b>CTF</b>	Counter Terrorism Force


<b>DHQs</b>	District Head Quarters
<b>DRCs</b>	Dispute Resolution Councils
<b>FATA</b>	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
<b>FC</b>	Frontier Constabulary
<b>FCR</b>	Frontier Crimes Regulation
<b>FDMA</b>	FATA Disaster Management Authority
<b>FIA</b>	Federal Investigations Agency
<b>FMU</b>	Financial Monitoring Unit
<b>GB</b>	Gilgit Baltistan
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terror
<b>ICT</b>	Islamabad Capital Territory
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IMU</b>	Independent Monitoring Unit
<b>IS</b>	Islamic State
<b>IS-K</b>	Islamic State-Khurassan
<b>ITMP</b>	Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan
<b>JA</b>	Jundullah
<b>JeM</b>	Jaish-e-Mohammad
<b>JI</b>	Jamaat-e-Islami
<b>JI</b>	Jaishul Islam
<b>JID</b>	Joint Intelligence Directorate
<b>JSMM</b>	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz
<b>JST</b>	Jeay Sindh Tehreek
<b>JUI-F</b>	Jamiat Ulema-e Islam
<b>JUI-S</b>	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Sami
<b>KP</b>	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
<b>LEA</b>	Law Enforcement Agency
<b>LeB</b>	Lashkar-e-Balochistan
<b>Lel</b>	Lashker-e-Islami
<b>LeJ</b>	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
<b>LeJ-AA</b>	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
<b>LeT</b>	Lashkar-e-Taiba
<b>LI</b>	Lashkhar-e-Islami
<b>MMA</b>	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

<b>MQM</b>	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
<b>MQM-H</b>	Muttahida Qaumi Movement – Haqiqi
<b>MWM</b>	Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen
<b>NAB</b>	National Accountability Bureau
<b>NACTA</b>	National Counter Terrorism Authority
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plan
<b>NCEPG</b>	National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines
<b>NFC</b>	National Finance Commission
<b>NISP</b>	National Internal Security Policy
<b>NP</b>	National Party
<b>NRA</b>	National Risk Assessment
<b>PAF</b>	Pakistan Air Force
<b>PCP</b>	Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy
<b>PHC</b>	Peshawar High Court
<b>PMLF</b>	Pakistan Muslim League Functional
<b>PMLN</b>	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
<b>PN</b>	Pakistan Navy
<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan People’s Party
<b>PSP</b>	Pak Sarzameen Party
<b>PTI</b>	Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf
<b>SCU</b>	Special Combat Unit
<b>SMM</b>	Sindh Muttahida Mahaz
<b>SPU</b>	Special Protection Unit
<b>SSU</b>	Special Security Unit
<b>ST</b>	Sunni Tehrik
<b>TNSM</b>	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
<b>TTP</b>	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UBA</b>	United Baloch Army
<b>UBF</b>	United Baloch Front
<b>USA</b>	The United States of America
<b>YBT</b>	Young Baloch Tiger



## Executive Summary

Across Pakistan, and across all metrics, violence-related casualties continued to decline in 2018, registering a 45% drop from the previous year, and 86% drop since 2013. If we look purely at fatalities from terror attacks and incidents, the number dropped 83% from 4,643 in 2013 to 754 in 2018. This an unprecedented drop in violence across the country. The bulk of the success is owed to the extensive kinetic operations conducted across the country. However, while the progress on eliminating terrorism is exceptional, the progress on eliminating its root cause of extremism remains woeful at best.




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
Two major incidents in 2014 precipitated this decline. The first was a brazen attack on Karachi airport in May, 2014. This resulted in Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a military response to rid the tribal region of FATA of militants, the province of

Balochistan of insurgents, and the city of Karachi of urban crime. Second, terrorist attacked a school in December, in an incident that would leave a permanent mark on the country, killing 135 children and school staff members. In response, the Pakistan government enacted the National Action Plan (NAP), designed to root out terrorism and extremism from the country. This document and subsequent actions provided further impetus to the ongoing operation, and fueled policy changes aimed at improving security.

Between 2013 and 2018, a total of 23,754 people died from violence-related incidents. Of these, 13,428 perished in terror/insurgent attacks, 8,976 in counterterror/counterinsurgency operations, and 1,350 from robberies, drone attacks, and other forms of criminal activities. Sindh suffered the highest number of fatalities, and Balochistan the highest number of injuries, despite FATA being the primary theater of militant activity and counterterror operations. Sindh casualties are concentrated in the port city of Karachi by a very large margin; in fact, suicide attack and other forms of terrorism combined is a lower number than the number of target killing conducted by gangs and political militants in the city. Overall there has been a 97% reduction in terror attack deaths in Sindh, 86% in KP, 82% in FATA and 60% in Balochistan.




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
Broadly speaking, victims can be classified into three categories: civilians, security/government officials and militants/insurgents/criminals. All three groups have witnessed a decline in casualties. However, while the civilians have seen a drop from 72.4% of the total in 2013 to 68.2% in 2018, security officials have seen a steady rise from 14.9% in 2013 to 26.9% in 2018, showcasing the continued sacrificed by the law enforcement agencies. Militants have seen a steady decline as kinetic operations have tightened the noose, dropping from 12.7% in 2013 to 4.9% in 2018.

### Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Civilians




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### Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Security/Govt Officials



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## Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Militants/Insurgents



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Purely in terms of kinetics, Pakistan is on a positive trajectory to a secure future, provided the government takes some necessary steps, including strengthening the civilian law enforcement sector, dramatically improving the justice sector and justice delivery, as well as enhanced governance across the board. Pakistan has tremendous momentum and an opportunity to capitalize on its many successes, learn from its many mistakes, and plot a course for a peaceful, prosperous, positive future.

This report is thus divided into five chapters that include terror attacks, counter-terror operations, comparison of terror and counter-terror operations, drone attacks, and sectarian violence.


Readers can approach CRSS for information related to this report. Alternately, you may send your queries to [mailto:mail@crss.pk], directly to Mohammad Nafees, Senior Research Fellow, CRSS – the author [mailto:mohammad.nafees@yahoo.com], or Zeeshan Salahuddin, Senior Research Fellow and Syeda Uruba Nisar, Social Media Associate - the editors.

## 2018 - Violence in Pakistan

Upending the trend from the last several years, Balochistan, not Sindh, emerged as the most troubled province in terms of casualties from violence. Balochistan is followed by KP, Sindh, FATA and Punjab (table 01).

**Table 01: Casualties from violence by province/region - 2018**

Province/Region	Fatalities	Injuries	Casualties
Balochistan	407	530	937
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	161	247	408
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	208	194	402
Punjab	148	140	288
Sindh	192	86	278
Islamabad	10	4	14
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0	0	0
Gilgit Baltistan	7	1	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,133</b>	<b>1,202</b>	<b>2,335</b>




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## 2013-2018 - Violence in Pakistan

The combined human loss of life between 2013 and 2018, due to violence and counter-violence operations, is 23,754 persons. Of these 56.53% are a result of terror attacks and 37.79% of law enforcement operations. The incidents of robberies, drone attacks, and other minor crimes left 1,350 people dead, accounting for 5.68% (table 02).


Table 02: Fatalities from all forms of violence in Pakistan - 2013-2018	
Category of violence	Fatalities
Terror attacks	13,428
Counter-terror security operations	8,976
Robberies, drone attacks and other crimes	1,350
<b>Total</b>	<b>23,754</b>



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Terror attacks include suicide bombings, armed attacks, target killings, and planted explosions. Between 2013 and 2018, 13,428 people lost their lives, while 14,793 suffered injuries. The highest number of fatalities from these attacks were recorded in the province of Sindh, followed by Balochistan, FATA, KP, Punjab, Islamabad, AJK and GB (table 03).

Table 03: Casualties from terror attacks by province/region - 2013-2018			
Province/Region	Fatalities	Injuries	Casualties
Sindh	4,416	2,588	7,004
Balochistan	2,991	4,273	7,264
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	2,657	2,676	5,333
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	2,553	3,826	6,379
Punjab	694	1,177	1,871
Islamabad Capital Territory	85	221	306
Gilgit Baltistan	29	26	55
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	3	6	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,428</b>	<b>14,793</b>	<b>28,221</b>






The highest number of terror fatalities were from target killings (6,479) followed by suicide attacks (2,148), other acts of terrorism<sup>1</sup> (1,946), and armed attacks<sup>2</sup> (1,895) (table 04).


<b>Table 04: Fatalities from terror attacks in Pakistan - 2013-2018</b>							
<b>Sources of attacks</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Total</b>
Target killings	2,370	2,127	803	600	352	227	6,479
Suicide attacks	718	195	238	377	323	297	2,148
Other terrorism	810	515	186	142	212	81	1,946
Armed attacks	460	790	304	121	136	84	1,895
Infighting	273	174	102	9	7	2	567
Cross-border attacks	0	29	29	16	88	37	199
Others	10	15	18	20	25	22	110
Killed after kidnapping	2	8	30	22	18	4	84
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,643</b>	<b>3,853</b>	<b>1,710</b>	<b>1,307</b>	<b>1,161</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>13,428</b>
<b>Percentage drop in fatalities since 2013:</b>		<b>17.01%</b>	<b>63.17%</b>	<b>71.85%</b>	<b>74.99%</b>	<b>83.76%</b>	

1 Terrorism: bomb explosions, IED explosions, landmines explosions, etc.


2 Armed attacks: Indiscriminate firings, hurling of hand grenade, rocket/mortar attacks, etc.




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

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
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The percentage drop in violence-related fatalities took a dive in 2014, and has been steadily declining since. The highest reduction in violence was observed in Sindh (97%), followed by KP (86%), FATA (82%), Balochistan (60%), Punjab (36%), while Islamabad-AJK-GB combined have 79% drop (table 05).

Table 05: Fatalities from terror attacks by year and province/region							
Year	Baloc.	FATA	KP	Punjab	Sindh	I S B / AJK/GB	Total
2013	840	809	921	83	1,934	42	4,629
2014	522	834	788	187	1,467	50	3,848
2015	390	346	303	109	560	10	1,718
2016	540	175	283	108	196	0	1,302
2017	361	346	131	154	194	6	1,192
2018	338	147	127	53	65	9	739
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,991</b>	<b>2,657</b>	<b>2,553</b>	<b>694</b>	<b>4,416</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>13,428</b>
<b>Percentage drop since 2013:</b>	<b>59.76%</b>	<b>81.83%</b>	<b>86.21%</b>	<b>36.14%</b>	<b>96.64%</b>	<b>78.57%</b>	<b>84.04%</b>

Fatalities from terror attacks by year and province/region - 2013-2018




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## Victims of Terror Attacks


Nearly 70% of the victims of terror attacks were civilians. Irrespective of the security operations, the percentage of civilian fatalities has fluctuated around the 70% marker for the last six years. Security personnel witnessed a rise in percentage of fatalities, but like all other metrics, an overall drop. Conversely, militants, insurgents and criminals saw a marked decline in the percentage of fatalities, as seen in the table and graph below.

Table 06: Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018							
Year	Civilians		Sec./Gov. persons		Militants/ Criminals		Total
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	
2013	3,353	72.43%	690	14.91%	586	12.66%	4,629
2014	2,590	67.27%	647	16.81%	613	15.92%	3,850
2015	1,146	66.71%	344	20.02%	228	13.27%	1,718
2016	895	68.74%	334	25.65%	73	5.61%	1,302
2017	828	69.58%	275	23.11%	87	7.31%	1,190
2018	505	68.24%	198	26.76%	36	4.86%	740
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,317</b>	<b>69.38%</b>	<b>2,489</b>	<b>18.53%</b>	<b>1,623</b>	<b>12.09%</b>	<b>13,428</b>

Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Civilians




### Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Security/Govt Officials



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### Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018: Militants/Insurgents




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### Districts/agencies with highest fatalities

The provincial capital of Sindh, Karachi, tops the list of districts or agencies with the most fatalities between 2013 and 2018, followed by the provincial capitals of Balochistan and KP. The provincial capital of Punjab, Lahore, is 7<sup>th</sup> on the list.

<b>Table 07: Districts/agencies with highest fatalities - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>District/Agency</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Karachi	4,033
Quetta	1,139
Peshawar	1,065
Khyber Agency	903
North Waziristan Agency	537
Kurram Agency	419
Lahore	334
Mastung	288
Kech	217
Mohmand Agency	201
<b>Total for top 10</b>	<b>9,136 (67%)</b>
<b>Other districts</b>	<b>4,293</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>13,428</b>





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## Affiliation of the victims of terror attacks 2013-18

The victims of terror attacks are divided in three main categories: civilians, security personnel, and outlaws (militants/insurgents/criminals). While militants, insurgents, and criminals target civilian and security personnel, the targets of the security operations are always outlaws (militants, criminals, and insurgents).


The following information details the affiliations of the victims of terror attacks in last six years including members of political parties, religious parties, religious persons, polio teams, and others.

### Political party member fatalities

Most political parties active in the country have suffered casualties from terror attacks or violence. MQM tops that list by a large margin, followed by ANP, BNP, PPP, PMLN and PTI (table 08).

<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Total</b>
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)	210	90	23	15	6	2	<b>346</b>
Awami National Party (ANP)	96	17	7	6	2	24	<b>152</b>
Balochistan Awami Party (BNP)	0	0	0	0	0	149	<b>149</b>
Other	62	25	24	12	11	14	<b>148</b>
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)	34	21	12	4	2	0	<b>73</b>
Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PMLN)	15	11	20	0	1	3	<b>50</b>
Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI)	19	5	9	4	2	6	<b>45</b>
Independent	30	1	11	0	0	0	<b>42</b>
Pakistan Muslim League - Functional (PMLF)	3	2	12	0	0	0	<b>17</b>
Muttahida Qaumi Movement - Haqiqi (MQMH)	7	1	2	0	1	1	<b>12</b>

Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP)	0	0	0	1	3	3	7
National Party (NP)	0	0	0	2	2	0	4
Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (SMM)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Jeay Sindh Tehreek (JST)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>1,047</b>




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### Religious party member fatalities

Among the religious parties, ASWJ appears to have had the largest number of victims of terror attacks (135) in the last six years, and the majority of them were targeted between 2013 and 2015. This is followed by JUIF, ST, and JI (table 09).

Affiliation	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)	55	56	15	6	0	3	135
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Fazl (JUIF)	38	9	8	4	34	2	95

Sunni Tehreek (ST)	39	10	1	1	0	0	51
Other	14	27	6	0	0	1	48
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	11	9	3	1	0	1	25
Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)	5	7	1	0	0	0	13
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Sami (JUI-S)	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>373</b>



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### Religious person fatalities

A total of 231 seemed to be targeted because of their faith, or for attending religious gatherings. They are detailed as follows.


Identity	Total
Clerics/Moazzin/Qari/Preachers	58

Pilgrims	56
Worshippers	44
Shrine attendants/Imambargah admin	25
Others	23
Madrassa students/teachers	14
Shia scholars/Zakirs	6
Faith Healers	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>231</b>

### Foreigner fatalities

In the last six years, 60 foreigners lost their lives to terrorism, including Afghans (43), Ukrainians, American, and Nepali tourists (9), Chinese (3), an Uzbek and an Iranian.


Year - >	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Afghan	21	9	3	4	5	1	<b>43</b>
Others (American, Nepali, Ukrainian)	9	1	0	0	0	0	<b>10</b>
Chinese	0	0	0	0	2	1	<b>3</b>
Iranian	0	1	1	0	0	0	<b>2</b>
Uzbek	0	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>
Unknown foreigners	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>60</b>



### Media personnel fatalities

As many as 40 persons belonging to media community lost their lives in six years and most of the victims belonged to mainstream newspapers or TV channels. The majority of them were the victims of target killings or suicide attacks (table 12). Another 55 suffered injuries during the same period, ostensibly as an intimidation tactic.

<b>Table 12 - Fatalities of media personnel by province/region - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>Province/Region</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	14
Sindh	11
Balochistan	8
Punjab	6
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>




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### Polio team fatalities

At least 103 persons associated with polio vaccination campaign were the martyrs of terror attacks during last six years; 17 were females. Another 73 survived the attacks. Nearly a third of these victims were targeted in FATA and nearly another third in KP (table 13)+.

<b>Table 13: Polio teams members' casualties - 2013-2018</b>		
<b>Province</b>	<b>Fatality</b>	<b>Injury</b>
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	30	20
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	29	18
Balochistan	27	8
Sindh	15	11
Punjab	2	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>73</b>




Polio teams comprise of vaccinators and police guards assigned for their protection. Both were targeted in attacks (table 14).

**Table 14: Polio team members’ fatalities by category and year - 2013 - 2018**

Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Polio Guards	4	25	3	24	0	1	57
Polio Workers	9	14	11	7	1	4	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>103</b>






### Security official fatalities


As many as 2,751 security personnel were victims of terror attacks in the reporting period. The table below offers yearly data on the number of fatalities suffered by security. Overall, there has been a rise in percentage of the total victims of terror attacks, but a decline of almost 66% since 2013, and 68% since 2014.

<b>Table 15: Fatalities of security personnel - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>Year</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
2013	695
2014	743
2015	413
2016	359
2017	303
2018	238
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,751</b>



Nearly 50% of these were police officials and followed by personnel from the Army, Frontier Corps, Khassadars, Levies, Rangers, Pakistan Air Force, and others (table 16).

<b>Table 16 - Fatalities of security personnel by institution - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>Institution</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Police	1,311
Army	803
Frontier Constabulary	349
Levies	98
Rangers	69
Khassadar	65
Pakistan Air Force	29
Others (ANF, ASF, Coast Guards, & PN)	27
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,751</b>




## Claimants of Terror Attacks

### Fatalities claimed by militant groups

Among the claimants of terror attacks, the TTP and its splinter groups claimed responsibility for 1,759 fatalities in the reporting period, followed by IS (498). For additional details, please see the table and graph below.

<b>Table 17: Fatalities claimed by militant groups - 2013-18</b>							
<b>Claimants</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Total</b>
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)/TTP splinter groups (and others)	457	436	286	313	195	72	<b>1,759</b>
Daish /Islamic State (and others)	0	0	0	130	148	220	<b>498</b>
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)/ LeJ-AA	170	0	41	5	102	0	<b>318</b>
Others	26	32	31	10	26	1	<b>126</b>
Lashkar-e-Islami (LI) (and others)	2	30	40	16	5	0	<b>93</b>
Al Qaida (and others)	8	63	4	0	2	0	<b>77</b>
Afghan militants	0	7	0	13	17	16	<b>53</b>
Ansarul Islam	46	0	0	0	0	0	<b>46</b>
Jaishul Islam	6	2	0	8	0	0	<b>16</b>
Ansarul Sharia Pakistan (ASP)	0	0	0	0	13	0	<b>13</b>
Pakistani militants	0	0	0	0	12	0	<b>12</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>715</b>	<b>570</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>3,011</b>




### Fatalities claimed by insurgent groups

The insurgent groups in Balochistan also claimed responsibility for various terror attacks. The BLA claimed 59 fatalities, but they were also active for all six years of the reporting period. They are followed by BLF with 45 fatalities claimed.

Claimants	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	15	1	12	14	18	8	68
Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)	18	3	20	4	0	0	45
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	6	19	0	0	0	0	25
United Baloch Army (UBA)	0	17	0	0	0	0	17
Young Baloch Tiger (YBT)	0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Baloch Republican Party (BRP)/BLA	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
United Baloch Front (UBF)	0	4	0	0	0	0	4


Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT)	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>179</b>



## Counterterror Operations

The counterterrorism operations by the security agencies left 8,976 persons dead and 1,152 injured during last six years (2013-18). More than 50% of total fatalities from security operations were recorded in FATA (4,759), followed by Sindh (1,843), Balochistan (1,080), Punjab (835), KP (429), and other regions of the country.

Province	Fatalities	Injuries	Casualties
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	4,759	558	<b>5,317</b>
Sindh	1,843	159	<b>2,002</b>
Balochistan	1,080	144	<b>1,224</b>
Punjab	835	76	<b>911</b>
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	429	108	<b>537</b>
Gilgit Baltistan	13	4	<b>17</b>
Islamabad Capital Territory	12	92	<b>104</b>
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	5	11	<b>16</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,976</b>	<b>1,152</b>	<b>10,128</b>




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### Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from security operations

The regions where counterterrorism/security operations resulted in the most fatalities include four agencies of FATA, four districts of Balochistan, and one each district of Sindh and Punjab each (table 20).

<b>Table 20: Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from security operations - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>District/Agency</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
North Waziristan Agency	2,350
Khyber Agency	1,963
Karachi	1,681
Orakzai Agency	171
Kalat	163
Quetta	133
Lahore	117
Dera Bugti	113
Awaran	105
South Waziristan Agency	83
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,879 (80%)</b>






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### Types of security operations

Nearly 212 air raids during Zarb-e-Azb operations left 3,532 militants dead, roughly 1,701 encounters with security forces left 3,599 dead. The country lost 10 Bomb Disposal Unit personnel in the line of duty. In some cases, encounters with security forces came under question after the families of the victims offered wildly differing accounts of the incidents. Besides suspected encounters, there were also 80 custodial deaths of prisoners/detainees (table 21).

<b>Table 21: Fatalities through security operations by category - 2013 - 2018</b>							
Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Fatalities
Encounter with LEAs (or suspected)	200	1,129	971	652	512	162	<b>3,626</b>
Air Raids	215	1,959	1,094	233	31	0	<b>3,532</b>
Ground operations	0	0	0	18	54	60	<b>132</b>
Died (In custody)	2	36	18	12	6	6	<b>80</b>

Beaten to death (custodial, hate crime)	0	0	0	1	8	1	<b>10</b>
Bomb defused	2	0	0	0	6	0	<b>8</b>
Bomb/Landmine Defuses	0	0	0	1	0	1	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>419</b>	<b>3,124</b>	<b>2,083</b>	<b>917</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>7,390</b>




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## Outlaw Fatalities

### Militant fatalities

A total of 8,976 militants lost their lives for various reasons during the reporting period. Of them 6,482 were eliminated in security operations and the remaining 2,494 were the victims of other incidents, including drone attacks, infighting between groups, and target killings, etc. The TTP and its splinter groups were lost the highest number of militants (1,699), followed by LI (965), AQ, AQIS and others.

<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Total</b>
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)/TTP splinter groups (and others)	359	646	329	185	171	9	<b>1,699</b>
Lashker-e-Islami (LI) (and others)	159	351	402	48	5	0	<b>965</b>
Others	127	111	9	4	38	0	<b>289</b>
Al Qaida, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (and others)	15	10	25	36	15	0	<b>101</b>
Lashker-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (and others)	7	0	16	28	15	6	<b>72</b>
Daish/Islamic State (IS) (and others)	0	0	3	8	36	3	<b>50</b>
Pakistani militants	0	0	0	0	8	5	<b>13</b>
Ansarul Sharia Pakistan (ASP)	0	0	0	0	10	0	<b>10</b>
Jundullah (JA)	0	0	0	0	4	0	<b>4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>667</b>	<b>1,118</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>3,203</b>




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### Foreign militant fatalities

The bulk of foreign militants killed between 2013 and 2018 included Afghans and Uzbeks. These are detailed below.

Affiliation	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Afghan Militants (including IS, Taliban, AQ, LI and cross-border)	1	17	16	10	17	8	69
Uzbek	0	54	0	0	0	0	54
Haqqani Network	9	7	0	5	17	4	42
Arab	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
Unknown	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>173</b>




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### Insurgent fatalities

As many as 365 insurgents lost their lives in security operations during 2013-18 with BRA (87), BLA (80), BLF (63) and UBA (49) suffering the highest fatalities.

Affiliation	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	4	36	43	4	0	0	<b>87</b>
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) / suspected	0	24	6	42	5	3	<b>80</b>
Other/unknown	0	0	27	29	7	0	<b>63</b>
Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)	0	0	40	5	3	1	<b>49</b>
United Baloch Army (UBA)	0	0	0	34	2	0	<b>36</b>
UBA/BLA	0	0	20	0	0	0	<b>20</b>
Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) (and others)	0	10	4	0	0	0	<b>14</b>

BLA/Balochistan Musalla Defa Army (BMDA)	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Balochistan Sub-Nationalist Movement (BSNM)	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
BRA/Peace Militia	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Baloch Students Organization (BSO)	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Baloch Republican Party (BRP)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>365</b>




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### Criminal fatalities

The number of criminals killed in security operations during 2013-18 were 1,537 with robbers suffering the highest number of fatalities (693), followed by gangsters (452), unknown criminals (169), dacoits (49), and others.

Table 25: Fatalities of criminals from security operations - 2013-2018							
Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Dacoits/Robbers	3	174	215	115	166	69	742
Gangsters	61	202	165	60	21	19	528
Other criminals	3	12	9	80	73	9	186
Kidnappers	0	12	10	17	10	0	49
Militant facilitators	0	0	1	3	1	8	13
Political militants/ gangsters	1	1	9	0	1	1	13
Foreigners	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
Religious party militants	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>401</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>1,537</b>




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## Terror Attacks and Counterterror Operations Comparison

There is a consistent drop in terror attacks after the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. However, the same is not the same case for counterterror operations, as fatalities from security operations shot up 300% in 2014, before witnessing a similar decline (table 26).


Year ->	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Terror attacks	4,629	3,850	1,718	1,302	1,190	739	<b>13,428</b>
Security operations	833	3,391	2,635	1,154	689	274	<b>8,976</b>
Percentage drop in terror fatalities since 2013		-16.8%	-62.9%	-71.9%	-74.3%	-84.0%	
Percentage drop in security operation fatalities since 2013		307.1%	216.3%	38.5%	-17.3%	-67.1%	





There were 28,223 casualties (13,428 dead and 8,976 injured) from terror attacks, and 10,128 casualties (8,976 dead and 1,152 injured) from counterterror operations in the reporting period.

Province/ Region	Terror Attacks			Security Operations		
	Fatalities	Injuries	Total	Fatalities	Injuries	Total
Balochistan	2,991	4,273	<b>7264</b>	1,080	144	<b>1224</b>
Sindh	4,416	2,588	<b>7004</b>	1,843	159	<b>2002</b>
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	2,553	3,826	<b>6379</b>	429	108	<b>537</b>
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	2,657	2,676	<b>5333</b>	4,759	558	<b>5317</b>
Punjab	694	1,177	<b>1871</b>	835	76	<b>911</b>
Islamabad Capital Territory	85	221	<b>306</b>	12	92	<b>104</b>
Gilgit Baltistan	29	26	<b>55</b>	13	4	<b>17</b>
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	3	6	<b>9</b>	5	11	<b>16</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,428</b>	<b>14,794</b>	<b>28,223</b>	<b>8,976</b>	<b>1,152</b>	<b>10,128</b>




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### Victims of terror attacks and counterterror operations

The table below depicts the number of fatalities by victim category.

Category	Year ->	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Civilians	Affectees	3,368	2,641	1,163	909	849	521	9,451
	Percentage drop		-21.6%	-56.0%	-21.8%	-6.6%	-38.6%	
Security Forces	Affectees	735	766	413	379	308	239	2,840
	Percentage drop		4.2%	-46.1%	-8.2%	-18.7%	-22.4%	

<b>Militants/ Criminals</b>	<b>Affectees</b>	1,359	3,834	2,777	1,168	722	253	<b>10,113</b>
	<b>Percentage drop</b>		182.1%	-27.6%	-57.9%	-38.2%	-65.0%	
<b>Total Affectees</b>		5,462	7,241	4,353	2,456	1,879	1,013	<b>22,404</b>
<b>Total Percentage drop</b>			-32.6%	39.9%	43.6%	23.5%	46.1%	




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### Militant groups - claims and losses

IS and LeJ were the two main outfits where losses were marginal against the number of fatalities their terror attacks afflicted. TTP claimed the most fatalities, and lost the most members.

Militant Group	Claim	Lost
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)/TTP splinter groups (and others)	1,759	1,699
Daish/Islamic State (IS) (and others)	498	50
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)/LeJ-AA	318	72
Lashkar-e-Islami (LI) (and others)	93	965

Al-Qaeda (AQ) (and others)	77	101
Afghan militants	53	17
Ansarul Islam (AI)	46	0
Jaishul Islam (JI)	16	0
Ansarul Sharia Pakistan (ASP)	13	10
Pakistani militants	12	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,885</b>	<b>2,927</b>




Comparative data of insurgents’ claims and their losses - 2013-18

Similarly, the table below shows the fatalities claimed by, and suffered by, the insurgent groups primarily operating in the Balochistan province.

Insurgent Group	Claimed	Lost
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) / suspected	59	88


Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)	45	49
United Baloch Army (UBA)	17	56
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	16	89
Young Baloch Tiger (YBT)	11	0
Baloch Republican Party (BRP)/BLA	6	1
United Baloch Front (UBF)	4	0
Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT)	3	0
Other insurgents/groups/unknown	0	82
<b>Total</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>365</b>



## Drone Attacks

US forces in Afghanistan carried out 76 Drone attacks against the militants in Pakistan leaving 473 dead. The majority of these strikes were carried out in FATA with nine in KP and two in Balochistan. Percentage wise, there has been a 92% drop in fatalities from 2013 (169), to 2018 (13).

Province/Region	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	160	160	69	34	24	13	<b>460</b>
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	9	0	0	0	0	0	<b>9</b>
Balochistan	0	0	0	2	2	0	<b>4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>473</b>
<b>Total Attacks</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>76</b>




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Like counter-terror security operations, the highest victims of drone attacks were the militants whose identities remained unavailable (199). Among the known victims of drone attacks, TTP (and its many splinter groups) was at the top (176), followed by the Haqqani Network (47), and AQ (22).

**Table 32: Fatalities from drone attacks by targeted group - 2013-2018**

Affiliation of victims	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)/TTP splinter groups	84	24	30	29	7	2	176
Haqqani Network (including ex-TTP)	16	7	0	5	17	9	54
Al-Qaeda	15	7	0	0	0	0	22
Foreign militants	2	14	0	2	2	2	22
Unknown militants	52	108	39	0	0	0	199
	<b>169</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>473</b>




## Sectarian violence

### Fatalities from sectarian violence in Pakistan (2018)

As many as 198 persons were targeted in 2018 because of their religious identity, resulting in 91 fatalities, and 107 injuries. FATA suffered the highest number of fatalities from sectarian violence (43), followed by Balochistan (18), Punjab (11), Sindh (11), and KP (8). Between 2013 and 2018, Pakistan lost 2,099 persons in sectarian violence, with another 3,274 injured, as detailed in the table and graph below.

Province/Region	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Sindh	239	231	180	42	101	11	804
Balochistan	213	86	33	73	51	18	474
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	68	15	31	36	153	43	346
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	154	60	32	16	7	8	277
Punjab	29	23	28	79	10	11	180
Islamabad Capital Territory	5	6	5	0	2	0	18
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gilgit Baltistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>2,099</b>





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
### Fatalities from sectarian violence by district/agency

The ten districts/agencies that suffered more than 80% of total fatalities from sectarian violence, the provincial capital of Sindh, Karachi, was the most affected with 594 fatalities. Balochistan’s provincial capital Quetta, was the next highest affected.

District/Agency	Fatalities
Karachi	594

Quetta	298
Kurram Agency	238
Peshawar	178
Lahore	109
Sehwan	91
Shikarpur	66
Khuzdar	62
Orakzai Agency	52
Mohmand Agency	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,724</b>

### Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from sectarian violence - 2013-2018




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### Victims of sectarian violence

Nearly 97% (2,049) of the victims of sectarian violence are civilians. Of these, 1,243 civilians were targeted for their religious identities, while several were performing their duties at a religious place (church, imambargah, mosque, etc.).

A total of 40 security personnel also lost their lives in sectarian violence.

<b>Table 35: Fatalities from sectarian violence by group - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>Group</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Civilians	2,049
Security and government officials	40
Militants/criminals/insurgents	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,099</b>



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
### Sectarian fatalities by sect/religion

The Shia and Shia Hazara communities suffered nearly 54% (815+289) of the total fatalities during 2013-18, followed by Sunnis (367), Sufis (198), Christians (171), and others.

<b>Table 36: Fatalities from sectarian violence by sect/religion - 2013-2018</b>	
<b>Sect/Religion</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Shias	815

Sunnis	367
Shia Hazaras	289
Sufis	198
Christians	141
Shias/Sunnis (indistinguishable)	59
Christians/Muslims (indistinguishable)	59
Ismailis	51
Unknown/Others	46
Hindus	30
Ahmadis	24
Bohras	7
Zikris	7
Sikhs	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>2099</b>

Fatalities from sectarian violence by sect/religion - 2013-2018  
 for complete data, please see table 36




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### Claimants of sectarian violence

Nearly 55% of sectarian violence was claimed to have committed by the militant outfits like TTP and its splinter groups (467), LeJ and its splinter groups (399), and IS (271). While TTP’s splinter groups have been found active throughout the last six years, LeJ and its splinter groups became inactive in 2018.

Claimants	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Daish/Islamic State (IS) (and others)	0	0	45	62	126	38	<b>271</b>
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), LeJ-AA, LeJ-NB	236	22	40	5	96	0	<b>399</b>
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and splinter groups	143	3	171	75	64	11	<b>467</b>
Jaishul Islam (JI)	32	2	0	0	0	0	<b>34</b>
Unclaimed	297	394	53	104	38	42	<b>928</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>2,099</b>



# The Role of Counter Terrorism Departments in Countering and Minimizing Terrorism

by Dr. Farhan Zahid\*

Terrorism is a form of political violence and the cheapest one as far as financial aspects are concerned. On the other hand, it is always very expensive for governments to counter the threat of terrorism, whether engaging in anti-terrorism (defensive mode) or counter-terrorism (offensive mode). All over the world, governments suffering from terrorism raise counter terrorism forces, customized to fight terrorist groups. They are imparted with specialized trainings and carry sophisticated counter terrorism equipment. Pakistan, a country ravaged by the scourge of terrorism is no different in adopting a similar set of policy, legislative and tactical measures.

The establishment of provincial Counter Terrorism Departments (CTD) was proposed in the first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-18. Along with other counter terrorism measures the NISP demanded provinces to establish CTDs as desperate measures were required to deal with rising wave of terrorist attacks. One of the contours of the NISP 2014-18 was to reorganize all provincial CTDs, by establishing a Federal Rapid Response Force in collusion with provincial CTDs.<sup>3</sup> Agenda item number 8 of the National Action Plan (NAP) also called for establishment and deployment of counter terrorism forces across Pakistan in order to combat terrorists' designs in an organized manner.<sup>4</sup> It is worth mentioning that before these policy interventions by the federal government the provinces had some rudimentary counterterrorism structures.

## Background

Pakistan has remained a hotbed of activities for a number of local, regional and global Islamist and nationalist-separatist terrorist groups. Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war (1979-89) a number of jihadi groups took roots and flourished in Pakistan and Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, on one hand Afghanistan plunged into another bloody civil war and on the other

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3 Text of National Internal Security Policy 2014-18, available at: <https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/National-Internal-Security-Policy-2014.pdf>

4 National Action Plan

Pakistan faced increasing sectarian violence in its urban centers such as Karachi, Lahore, Jhang, Multan, Rawalpindi and others. The surfacing of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was watershed event for the raising of Elite Force in Punjab province in mid-1990s. A plethora of sectarian and jihadi groups such as LeJ, Sipah-e-Mohammad, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and others perpetrated acts of terrorism across Pakistan in 1990s. Sindh province was also effected by ethno-political violence during 1990s. Hence, the provincial governments had already set to work by establishing ant-terrorist structures to combat the prevailing security threats. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT) set the mode for further measures to be taken by the successive governments in Pakistan. Military intelligence agencies, three wings of armed forces, provincial and federal law enforcement forces, Federal Investigations Agency (FIA), Intelligence Bureau, Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Pakistan Rangers established their counter terrorism units and wings in order to keep abreast of changing times and needs. Since then provincial police forces have invested efforts and resources to bolster their counter terrorism capacities and capabilities. In the recent past Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Police has also fully functionalized its Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) whereas Punjab province raised another CTF unit besides the Elite Force. Sindh province raised Special Security Unit (SSU) which is considered the best equipped CT force in Pakistan as far as weapons and training are concerned.

The *raison d'être* of CTDs in Pakistan is to conduct operations, collect and gather intelligence, conduct terrorism investigations, train elite counter terrorist units, forecast future terrorism-related trends, and finally, monitor individuals on the fourth schedule, in sectarian outfits, and in religious seminaries.


The year 2018 remained pivotal as CTDs functioning in provinces managed to curb the activities of terrorist groups and scaled down the level of violence to various degrees. In 2018, 105 terrorists were killed during encounters with CTDs and other security forces in Pakistan; and 431 suspected terrorists were arrested in operations launched by CTDs. At least 10 major terrorist plots were dismantled.<sup>5</sup>

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5 "Pakistan Security Report 2018", Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (Jan 2019), Islamabad

## CTD Performance against Terrorists in 2018

■ Killed  
■ Captured



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## Punjab

Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of Punjab police was rechristened into CTD Punjab. The CID had been the lynchpin of operations against sectarian and Islamist terrorist groups in Punjab province since 1995. It was formally transformed



into CTD in 2010.<sup>6</sup>

According to a CTD official of Punjab police, a number of terrorist sleeper cells are still operating in the Punjab province. These are mostly Islamist militant groups such as Jamaat ul Ahrar, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Islamic State-Khurassan (IS-K) and splinters of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). More than 500 search and seize operations were conducted in the province.<sup>7</sup>

In its year-long major operations against militant operations the CTD Punjab engaged in scores of activities. Two JuA militants Amjad Khan and Dawood Khan were arrested from Harbanspura in Lahore in January 15, 2018. They were all set to plan terrorist attacks in Lahore.<sup>8</sup> The CTD foiled a bid of TTP terrorists to launch strikes against sensitive installations in Khanewal district and arrested four. The CTD also recovered explosive material, hand-grenades, and weapons from their possession.<sup>9</sup> The CTD Punjab also gunned down six TTP terrorists in an operation in Gujrat district. The six were later identified as proclaimed offenders involved in Ferozpur Road Lahore and Bedian Road bomb blasts. They were also listed in the Red Book of CTD Punjab; a cache of arms was also recovered.<sup>10</sup> In July 2018, in operations against IS-K the CTD arrested an IS-K militant from Daska, district Sialkot, and simultaneously averted a major terrorist plot being hatched by TTP against local politicians in Bahawalpur district while arresting four TTP militants.<sup>11</sup> Two more TTP terrorists were arrested from Bhakkar district by the CTD personnel in August.<sup>12</sup> In another successful operation against IS-K the CTD foiled a bid to perpetrate acts of terrorism on the eve of national defense day celebrated on September 6. The CTD raided a remote area Basti Shorkot of Multan district and arrested three planning to launch attacks.<sup>13</sup>

In October, while operating against TTP the CTD arrested three militants from Gojra bypass area of Toba Tek Singh district. A cache of arms, explosives, detonators, and other material were recovered from their possession<sup>14</sup>; another TTP militant

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6 Official website of the Punjab police, <https://punjabpolice.gov.pk/ctd>

7 Discussions with a CTD official of Punjab police

8 South Asia Terrorism Portal, [www.satp.com](http://www.satp.com)

9 "CTD arrests four militants in Khaneal", *Frontier Post*, May 17, 2018, <https://thefrontierpost.com/ctd-arrests-four-militants-in-khaneal/>

10 "Six TTP terrorists killed in Gujrat shootout", *News International*, May 28, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/322269-six-ttp-terrorists-killed-in-gujrat-shootout>

11 "CTD track down four TTP militants", *Dawn*, July 6, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1418268>

12 "CTD arrests two terrorists in Bhakkar", *Samaa News*, August 25, 2018, <https://www.samaa.tv/news/2018/08/ctd-arrests-two-terrorists-in-bhakkar/>

13 "Plot to sabotage defence day foiled", *Nation*, September 3, 2018, <https://nation.com.pk/03-Sep-2018/plot-to-sabotage-defence-day-foiled>

14 "Three terrorists held in TT Singh", *Daily Times*, October 23, 2018, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/313478/three-terrorists-held-in-tt-singh/>

was arrested from Rawalpindi district with maps of sensitive areas and explosive materials in the same month.<sup>15</sup>

Overall the CTD Punjab had managed to contain the terrorist threat from a range of proscribed groups. A key reason was CTD-Intelligence Bureau (IB) cooperation in the province as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two government organizations.<sup>16</sup> It is pertinent to note here that the successive governments in Punjab invested heavily in Punjab police keeping in view of challenges of terrorism. Hitherto the measures taken by the provincial governments are effective but not entirely adequate in the absence of implementation of policy measures to root out growing extremism from society.

### Sindh

The focus of CTD Sindh remained multifaceted as it struggled to counter multiple threats from a plethora of terrorist organizations operating in the province. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was one of the severe threats. A key leader of AQIS and Emir of Sindh Umar Jalal Chandio alias Haji Sahab was arrested by CTD in Karachi in November 2018, a major breakthrough.<sup>17</sup> Chandio was not only the head of AQIS Sindh Chapter but was also considered very close to Al-Qaeda Central's Emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. His arrest could be a major advance in capturing Zawahiri.

Apart from working to curb the activities of Islamist terrorist groups operating in Sindh province the CTD also apprehended Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) and arrested two militants in April 2018 belonging to this anti-state organization.<sup>18</sup> The leader of JSMM Shafi Burfat is based in a hostile neighboring country and conducts terrorist operations in Sindh at the behest of hostile intelligence agencies. These terrorists were involved in targeting of Chinese working for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and attacked Chinese workers in December 2016 in Sukhar district and in Ghotki district in 2017.

In a discussion with CTD Sindh officials, it was revealed that the CTD in collaboration with Special Protection Unit (SPU) of Sindh police is providing security to the Chinese nationals working for the CPEC projects in Sindh. CTD is responsible for

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15 "CTD foils terror bid, arrests TTP agent in Rawalpindi", *Pakistan Today*, October 26, 2018, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/10/26/ctd-foils-terror-bid-arrests-ttp-agent-in-rawalpindi/>

16 Discussions with a senior official of CTD Punjab

17 "AQIS high profile militant held in Karachi", *Dawn*, November 20, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1446665>

18 "Two JSMM men held for 2016 attack on Chinese engineers". *News International*, April 27, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/309584-two-jsmm-men-held-for-2016-attack-on-chinese-engineers>

providing critical security input.<sup>19</sup> The CTD Sindh also published its Red Book in 2018 providing details of top wanted terrorists in Sindh. This is the second year in a row that Hafeez Pandrani of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi remained atop that list. He was involved in the planning of multiple terrorist attacks such as Sehwan suicide attack and bombing of Shia Imambargah in Shikarpur district. Other important terrorist leaders are Maqsood Brohi (LeJ) and Farooq Ahmad Shah (LeJ).

## Baluchistan

Baluchistan police's CTD also performed well. Baluchistan witnessed a surge of 29% in terrorist incidents. According to a senior official of CTD Baluchistan:

- A total of 227 intelligence-based operations were conducted in the province during 2018
- 21 terrorists from TTP and IS-K were killed in encounters (11 TTP, 10 IS-K)
- 41 terrorists were arrested
- Out of 59 cases of terrorism in 2018 the CTD resolved 47

Key leaders of TTP and IS-K killed in 2018 included: Mufti Hidayatullah (provincial Emir of IS-K Baluchistan), Salman Badini (IS-K Emir of Quetta), Asim Muhammad Hasni (Emir of TTP Quetta), Waheed Bangulzai (IS-K), Saddam Hussain (IS-K), Mahmood Khan (TTP), and Muhammad Saleem (TTP).

Apart from eliminating these key leaders the CTD also arrested a number of important TTP and IS-K leaders: Fazal-e-Haq Khaksar (TTP), Muhammad Rahim (LeJ), Hafiz Ismael (LeJ), Khuda-e-Rahim (TTP), and Murtaza (IS-K).<sup>20</sup>

According to Mohsin Butt, the Inspector General of Police Baluchistan province, 15 police personnel lost their lives and 114 received injuries in combating terrorists across Baluchistan. In total 25 terrorists of both Islamist and nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations were also killed in encounters with CTD and local police. Moreover a total of 55 terrorists were arrested in 1,245 intelligence based operations conducted by the CTD Baluchistan. Overall 5,449 absconders were arrested belonging to 22 different militant organizations.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Discussions with CTD Sindh official

<sup>20</sup> Discussions with CTD official of Baluchistan police

<sup>21</sup> Saleem Shahid, "119 killed in terror incidents in Baluchistan last year: IG", *Dawn*, January 12, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1457079>

## Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KP)


The CTD of KP province police could rightly be considered as the frontline force against terrorism in Pakistan. The CTD was established in 2014 and since then it has performed exceptionally well despite all odds. The CTD faces challenges of terrorism, extortion activities by a number of terrorist groups operating in KP province, targeted killings especially by IS-K militants in provincial capital Peshawar, and kidnapping for ransom by both terrorist and criminal networks operating in the province. With the help of US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the anti-terrorist training school was established in the Nowshera district of the province in 2015. Two specialized anti-terrorist units i.e. Special Combat Unit (SCU) and Elite Women Commandos are additional features of CTD KP police.

Unique on its part is a study conducted by CTD KP of arrested terrorists to trace out the drivers of radicalization and subsequent acts of terrorism. According to this research, out of 1,650 incarcerated terrorists held by the CTD 1,182 were associated with different terrorist groups. Some 36 of them hold master's degrees in different disciplines, another 36 are graduates, 100 are intermediates, and 274 passed matriculation. They joined terrorist organizations while studying or soon after completing their education. 163 of them attended madrasas but 94 out of those dropped out because of different reasons ranging from socio-economic to terrorist recruitment. Majority of the sample are between 20-30 years of age and 140 of them are between 14-19 years age bracket. Most of them hailed from Peshawar (328) followed by Swabi, Bannu, D. I. Khan, and Mardan districts of KP province. As per the interviews, adherence to radical Islamist ideology was the primary reason of their joining of Islamist terrorist groups.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Javed Aziz Khan, "72 militants arrested in KP were graduates, postgraduates", *News International*, January 13, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/267985-72-militants-arrested-in-kp-were-graduates-postgraduates>

## Educational Breakdown of incarcerated terrorists held by CTDs



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At the front the CTD KP faces challenges from IS-K, TTP, Jamaat ul Ahar, LeJ, and a plethora of smaller factions of TTP, operating in different parts of KP province and some operating from eastern provinces of neighboring Afghanistan.

### NACTA's Role

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was established in 2008 to coordinate efforts of different law enforcement bodies, civil and military intelligence, and frame counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies. The organization is playing its role for gathering CTDs and other relevant organizations at least on monthly basis to discuss issues related to counter terrorism. Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) is responsible for collating and assessing intelligence gathered at different levels and to further make it actionable. As far as CTDs are concerned NACTA has been able to provide policy guidance and acts as a place for cooperation and coordination. On confronting extremism, NACTA has formulated National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines (NCEPG) but unfortunately no province has been able to implement in order to curb extremist tendencies.

## Conclusion

For curbing decades long problem of terrorism successive governments have adopted policy, legislative and tactical measures. Scores of military and law enforcement operations, a number of legislations by the parliament, and policies adopted by cabinets have indeed yielded results. It is evident that terrorist incidents have taken a nosedive in Pakistan during last three years which is a commendable achievement.

But all is not well.

The issue of growing extremism has still not been addressed. Another pending matter is need for further cooperation between civil and military organizations dealing with counter-terrorism, and inter-civilian agencies' coordination for concerted efforts against proscribed organizations. The provincial CTDs appear to lead Pakistan's battle against terrorism, but still have a lot of kinetic and tactical work ahead of them. It is expected that with improving conditions, training and political will, they will deliver.

## Military Courts Performance, Review and Challenges

by Imtiaz Gul\*

Military courts in Pakistan were set up in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The brazen attack had left at least 144 dead, 133 of them children.

Early January in 2015, an All Parties Conference (APC) had greenlighted the proposed 21st Constitutional Amendment, which came into effect on January 6, 2015.<sup>23</sup> It allowed changes to the Pakistan Army Act to extend its jurisdiction for speedy trial of cases under specified acts and provide the constitutional cover with a sunset clause of two years from the date of enactment. On January 9, 2015 Pakistan lifted the moratorium on the death penalty to pave the way for trials by the military courts.

Official statistics suggest that - as of December 2018 - ever since their inception over three years ago, the roughly one dozen military courts handled 717 cases and finalized 546 of them.<sup>24</sup> The courts awarded death to as many as 310 terrorists while 234 were awarded rigorous imprisonment of varied durations ranging from life imprisonment to 5-year imprisonment. Two accused had also been acquitted.

### Performance

Out of the 310 convicts only 56 - 18 percent - could be sent to gallows. And these executions were carried out following completion of legal process which included their appeals in superior courts and rejection of mercy petitions both by the Army Chief and the President. The execution of the remaining 254 terrorists is pending completion of legal process in higher courts. This means that even despite fulfilling the entire string of legal formalities, a staggering 82 percent of the “jet black” terrorists could potentially escape the capital punishment.

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23 Acts, Ordinances, President’s Orders and Regulations. (2015). Retrieved from [http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420800195\\_264.pdf](http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420800195_264.pdf)

24 Statistics acquired from Inter-Services’ Public Relations (ISPR)

## Legal Challenges

The establishment of the military courts was not without controversy though. They faced legal challenges before the Supreme Court but the apex court - led by Justice Sheikh Azmat Saeed - on August 5, 2015 upheld the move with a majority ruling on the ground that it was a temporary phenomenon with a two-year sunset clause. It had, however, cautioned it could still review any judgment passed by the military courts. Later, in 2016, even a SC larger bench also endorsed trial of militants conducted by these courts.

But in an indirect challenge to the apex court, the Peshawar High Court (PHC) set aside convictions of 73 persons convicted on terrorism charges including suicide attacks and killing of security personnel and civilians.

In the 173-page judgment authored by Peshawar High Court's (PHC) Chief Justice Waqar Ahmad Seth, the high court directed the government and law-enforcement agencies to set free all the convicts from internment centers if not required in any other case. The second judge in the bench was Justice Lal Jan Khattak.<sup>25</sup>

## Are the Military Courts Essential?

In the aftermath of the APS, military courts emerged as a speedy consensus recipe for dealing with convicted terrorists. They were touted as the “need of the hour.” But, three years on, one wonders if the military courts have been effective at all as a deterrent to terrorists or law-breakers? If official statistics were any indicator the answer would probably be a no, particularly in view of the monumental anti-terror effort by all civilian and military institutions, and the ensuing encouraging results; a whopping nearly 86 percent reduction in terrorism-related violence through kinetic, non-kinetic and intelligence-based operations, in the last 4 years.

It will indeed be unfair to attribute this marked decline in violence to the military courts; much more than this small deterrent, it has been the relentless operations – Zarb-e-Azb and Raddul Fassad – in tandem with the counter-terrorism departments' continued preemptive work that has led to the cumulative dramatic decrease in incidence of terrorism.

It is indeed the security paradigm shift at the highest civil and military levels that has produced results – which even the US Senator Lindsey Graham acknowledged

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<sup>25</sup> Amin, A. (2018, November 2). PHC releases 70 convicts sentenced to death by military courts. *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/388558-phc-releases-70-convicts-sentenced-to-death-by-military-courts>



during his January Islamabad visit.

Gradual efforts are underway to extricate the country from the baggage of the past four decades. This is the only way to make up for the lost economic development opportunities. We must recapture our economic relevance to the world. This is what the Chinese have been advising to Pakistan and the advice, it seems, is being well taken.

Now, particularly when the highest leadership is determined to “transform Pakistan from a security-centric to development-focused state,” the best course would be to discard altogether the debate on whether the military courts be revived or not. The real deterrence is the doctrinal shift that is distinctly visible within various tiers of political governance and the security apparatus.

If discussions with key decision-makers were any indicator, a conscious big course-correction, inspired apparently also by China, is underway with the objective of culling all the godzillas that the war on terror had given birth to.

In this encouraging context the military courts lose their sting as well as relevance. There is no need at all if the intention of sternly dealing with all rogue elements is sincere. Why should the government and the army concede on other critical fronts to the opposition just for the sake of reviving the military courts? The best answer to the military courts is immediate revision of the 170 year old Criminal Procedures Code (CrPC) and the Civil Procedures Code (CPC) to avoid long delays and facilitate quicker and inexpensive justice delivery.

Both the military and the government should better spend time and energy on devising strategies for de-radicalizing cadres of banned outfits. Long term salvation and deterrence lies in long-term, indigenous reform programme to wean radicals and potential allies of externally-driven terrorist outfits away from the violent path, not really in military courts, which are in conflict with principles of fairness, due process and justice itself.

The fight against militancy, terrorism and violent extremism will of necessity be long. But the country must not lose its constitutional, democratic and fundamental-rights moorings in the process.<sup>26</sup> The answer to the aforementioned challenges lies in reforming the dated criminal justice system, instead of clutching at straws such as the military courts. Pakistan must reform the CrPC for a more effective and speedy litigation and indiscriminate law-enforcement. An improved justice system will automatically make the aberrations such as military courts irrelevant.

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<sup>26</sup> Extending military courts, again? (2019, January 10). *DAWN*. Retrieved from [https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=10\\_01\\_2019\\_008\\_001](https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=10_01_2019_008_001)

## Judicial Delay, Intervention, and Legislature

by Malik Altaf Javaid\*

Ever since March 2007, when former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry refused to become a party to former President Pervez Musharraf's desire for a second term, Pakistan has been abuzz with judicial intervention, activism and judicial delay that has all led to unusual pendency. A vast majority of people consider this activism and/or the judicial intervention as the real cause for some 1.9 Million cases pending across Pakistan. Since some people believe that only the Chief Justice of Pakistan has the power to exercise suo motu powers; therefore, the rest of the 3,999 judges working across Pakistan are available for expeditious disposal of the cases, which is not being done.

Some maintain that it's the poor legal education system, the nursery of the legal system, which is not producing the required quality. Hence, there is a judicial delay. Some lament the outdated law, while others hold that judicial policies mutilate the law and this apparent clash leads to judicial delay. As maintained by one faction, there is a sheer disparity in the growth of the judicial system and the population of Pakistan, resulting in judicial delays. They believe that in 1973 the population of Pakistan was around 65 million which has now grown to 212 million with the number of Supreme Court Judges remaining constant at 17. One also cannot discount the approach of the executive: using judicial delays as a tool to lambast the judiciary.

Judicial delays have never been a serious concern of the executive and/or the legislature. However, in order to completely shift the burden on the judiciary, the executive maintains it is the judicial intervention which is the root cause for the pending 1.9 million cases, conveniently ignoring the fact that the number of judges in the superior judiciary is to be increased by the legislature. The judicial organ is to be funded by the executive and lands for establishments of new courts. As such one could safely maintain that the rhetoric of the executive could, at best, be termed as political point scoring or political jugglery.

Almost daily, one finds legislators complaining about the judicial interventions as well as massive delays, realizing little that even the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PLM-N) Government, having a 2/3rd majority, never did anything to find legal ways to stop, manage or curb the judicial intervention. There has never been any meaningful debate in order to cure the menace of judicial intervention. The apparent helplessness of the legislature raises serious questions about their wisdom and their seriousness to find a panacea for judicial intervention,

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which per legislature is not only causing judicial delays but has also crippled the government.

Judicial intervention apparently flows from the principle of trichotomy of powers and the powers given by the Constitution, a document framed by the legislature with no intervention of the judicial organ. Then why lament the judicial intervention or apparent over-reach? It took days to annul the powers of the President under Article 58(2) (b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, while even after decades nothing has been done on other issues. The legislature has never seriously mulled to introduce reforms in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898 or to change the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1908, which are allegedly outdated laws. The legislative history is also silent about the increase in the number of judges. The committees of the legislature have never devised to have a dialogue with the judiciary to curb the issue of chronic judicial delays.

The legislature, prima facie, does not consider expeditious justice a fundamental right of the masses. The legislature holds itself high and proudly maintains “the judiciary is independent” to get itself absolved from everything. In this backdrop, if we examine the elimination of Article 58(2) (b), introduced through the 8th Amendment, one could safely maintain it was meant to protect the personal interests and never the democracy. The unholy unanimity of the legislature is a self-explanatory proof of the fact. The premature dissolution of the assemblies was causing serious trouble for the legislators to present themselves for re-election; as such the best option was to delete the powers from the statute book. Shockingly, the legislators who never uttered a word in the sessions for the populace voted in favor of the amendment. Needless to say that all this was motivated by political interests.

The procedural law, i.e. CrPC and CPC, are unchanged. The legislature, in particular, without examining its contents, has relegated these as “outdated laws”. However, in reality, these are the same laws under which the cases were decided expeditiously and there were no complaints of judicial delay. Even today there are hardly any complaints on the efficacy of these two laws, the only issue is with regard to their dates of birth. The efficacy of the procedural laws has been undermined by the judicial policies, manifest of individual wisdom.

To quote an example, item 10 of the Chapter Expeditious Disposal of the Case of National Judicial Policy 2009 provides that cases involving punishment of seven years or more shall be tried within one year. Whereas the law provides the challan (police report) shall be submitted in 14 days with an allowance of 3 days. The magistrate, after collecting the entire record if opines that the case is made out, shall commit it for trial and shall supply copies of the relevant document to the accused seven days prior to trial (Section 265 (C) & (D) of the CRPC). The

concerned court shall reexamine the same and if decides to try the accused, the charge shall be framed, followed by the recording of statement of witnesses and the judgment. The judicial policy has however created room to prolong the trial for one year which otherwise could have been done in a month. The efficacy of the law could be appreciated from the fact that military courts also use the CRPC for trial and there is no other special law.

To quote another example, while striking out the military courts established in 1997, the Supreme Court observed that if similar facilities of submission of challan and attendance of witnesses are provided to ordinary courts, the cases could be decided just as expeditiously. As such, there is no strength in the claim that the procedural laws i.e. the CRPC and the CPC, are either outdated or ineffective. The laws implemented by Lord Michalay are as effective as they were some hundred years ago. The change; however, is in the social fabric. The poor legal education system, apparent disparity between the growth of population and judicial system, control over the resources, political might, personal vendettas, bribery, and corruption are a few of the many elements which are prominent in this change.

The issue of population is perhaps the mother of all other issues. Let's explain the judicial delay in the backdrop of a growing population. The District & Sessions Court Malir, Karachi, was established in September 1994 with five courts. After 25 years, it now has 23 courts. During these two and a half decades, its population has grown ten times. It would be useful to point out here that the apparent increase in the number of courts is due to the addition of civil judges/magistrates which have been increased from 4 to 13, whereas it only has five additional district and sessions judges and four civil judges. This took a period of 25 years. One would be justified to question the efficiency of Ministries of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.

Likewise, a Circuit Bench of Sindh High Court is working in Hyderabad. It caters to an area of around 77,029 square kilometers, serving a population of 15,538,056. One judge serves an area in excess of 15,000 square kilometers and a population of over 31 million. It would be necessary to mention here that as per Article 193 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the number of judges would be determined by law, and the law-making powers solely vests in the legislature, and the judiciary has no say. Then who is to blame? No matter how efficient the judges might be, the backlog of 1.9 million is too much for 4,000 judges working across Pakistan, as pointed out by the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has a sanctioned strength of 17 judges, who are to take care of the legal issues of a population of more than 207 million, as well as the issues of the government and other litigations arising from suo motu and the human rights jurisdiction. It is worth noting the fact that the superior judiciary is

working with the same strength as sanctioned in 1973, while the population has increased at a much more accelerated rate. In more than three decades, this issue has never been addressed by the Parliament. The executive has never taken into consideration the impact of the population hike and the number of judges. History shows that the executive has always avoided spending on the judicial organ.

The megalopolis Karachi, with a population of around 22 million, has 249 judges working in the district judiciary. While 217 judges are working in district judiciary at Lahore, serving a population of around 12 million. The number of constituencies of the national assembly and provincial assemblies has been subjected to change based on the population. However, an increase in the number of judges never found any attention of the legislature. Likewise, the budgetary allocation is in the hands of the legislature. The forum is with the legislature. The judiciary can advise, not compel. The increased number of judges can, definitely, enhance the health of the judicial system and the key to this solution is with the executive and legislature.

One could safely maintain that after population, unregulated legal education is responsible for the judicial delay. Lawyers are the lynchpin of the entire judicial system. The merit for admission to law schools and universities is lowest amongst other faculties, whereas it is the highest in the developed world. Unregulated law schools which offer a degree without attendance are abundant in Pakistan. The law schools are mass producing lawyers, without any practical knowledge or experience which ultimately shows in their performance. The judges, prosecutors, attorneys, NAB prosecutors, Advocate Generals, and Attorney Generals are appointed from these mass-produced lawyers. Saqib Nisar, Chief Justice of Pakistan, took an action against these law schools, which was widely applauded by the bar councils. However, it was a judicial intervention for the executive.

Coming to judicial intervention, apparently, it is condemned on two counts, viz., it causes judicial delays since the judiciary is not able to focus on the proceedings of the case and rather focuses on proceedings with governmental functions. Secondly, it causes administrative delays. The executive holds that it is nothing short of misfortune to the state that at times the judiciary has been found involved in making efforts to run PIA, steel mills, hospitals, and schools, instead of proceeding with the pending cases.

The judiciary claims to be endeavoring for the enforcement of fundamental rights through the constitutional jurisdiction. The legislature believes that Article 184(3)'s excessive use has rendered it as a tool for intervention in judicial functions and a cause for judicial delays. The opposite argument is, Article 184(3) is a panacea to administrative lack of interest in administrative functions and provides with a check on the legality of administrative functions. The people of Pakistan should

not be at the mercy of the legislature, aware of its basic responsibilities. By now, the general public shows a lukewarm response in challenging the legality of administrative functions. If someone challenges the legality of administrative function, they are often termed a “blackmailer” or a person acting for their vested interest. Therefore, the general public, unless they have some compelling reasons coupled with their private interest, generally do not question the legality of administrative action.

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was framed in the leadership of Mr. Bhutto when there were no other noticeable political parties. Therefore, the framers of the Constitution would have been very mindful at the time of framing Article 184(3) whereby they allowed the judicial organ to take certain actions. What prompted Mr. Bhutto to confer such, apparently dangerous, power on the judicial organ? Was it a result of farsightedness? Was he trying to strike out a balance? Was he looking to pollute the executive authority? Was he aware that he would be succeeded by the inefficient? Were the framers of the Constitution intending to permanently create a parallel government? Was he intending to create a situation of judicial and administrative delays?

It must have been the result of farsightedness and to provide a strong check on the executive actions. One must keep in mind that in the yesteryears, every executive has demanded complete immunity to his actions, irrespective of its results and impact on the society. Therefore, one could safely lean in favor of the fact that the power was granted to strike out a balance and was never meant for judicial and administrative delays.

Now, what if this power, which was meant to create a balance, causes imbalance? Once again, it is with the legislature to consider. Eighteen amendments have been made in the constitution, including the one whereby the unbridled power of president to dissolve the national assembly has been taken away. Then why is the legislature observing silence? Why is the legislature not mulling to amend this power? Perhaps, the legislature is aware of its shortcomings and poor efficiency.

What prompted the legislature to unite against Article 58(2)(b)? Why are they not uniting on these issues which, according to them, are a bottleneck? The legislature, most likely, is lacking the legislative wisdom which the framers of the constitution had. What has precluded the legislature to determine the extent of suo motu action? Again, the answer would be the lack of legislative wisdom.

One could argue that good performance could also render Article 184(3) useless and perhaps, except amendment, it is the panacea to avoid the sou motu actions. A transparent and meaningful performance is the only thing which would render Article 184(3) ineffective, despite its availability in the Constitution. The legislature has the option of amending Article 184(3), but that would give the executive absolute power.

One could also argue and maintain that 3,999 judges do not enjoy the power of *sou motu*. Therefore, the argument of judicial intervention causing judicial delays, by large, is an irrational argument. Increase in the number of judges, improved quality of lawyers, meaningful education, a collective approach, precedence of collective wisdom over individual wisdom and a wise legislative approach could improve the health of the judicial system and the menace of judicial delays plaguing the public could be eliminated.

## FATA Merger - Developments and Challenges So Far

by Shagufta Khaliq

Following a string of quick legislative moves, President Mamnoon Hussain signed and sealed the 25th Constitutional Amendment on May 31, 2018, putting an end to the British colonial legacy called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Amendment finally put the region on the way to mainstream integration through the merger with the north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.

The merger of seven (ex-FATA) agencies and six frontier regions generated new political, territorial and demographic dynamics and required new administrative structures to take care of the additional population from the ex-FATA regions. It necessitated several administrative, and constitutional measures such as:

- i) Replacement of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a special set of laws enforced in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the law of the land.
- ii) Adjustments in the number of seats in the federal and provincial assemblies; 366 seats for KP in the National Assembly, 96 seats in the Senate – the upper house – while the KP Assembly members of parliament rose from 124 to 145 after the addition of 21 seats. These included 16 general seats and four reserved.
- iii) Creation of new district administrative structures for a population of about 17,743,645. KP's population has swollen to 20,919,976 spread over 101,741 square-kilometers.

In order to facilitate and closely monitor the merger process, Prime Minister's Task Force for mainstreaming the merged tribal districts was announced on September 04, 2018 with well-defined terms of reference (TORs). The Chief Minister of KP heads the task force, an advisory and monitoring body to look into the planning and execution of proposed measures for smooth transition of the process at all levels. It comprises federal and provincial ministers, advisors and secretaries. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, a seven-member committee headed by Mr. Atif Khan, Tourism Minister, was also constituted. It includes the Finance Minister, Law Minister, Information Minister and the Inspector General of Police, KP. After some reservations and criticism, Additional Chief Secretary, Mr. Shazad Bangash, Chief Secretary, Mr. Kamran Naveed, and Home Secretary, Mr. Ikram, were also included in the committee. However, the committee never officially functioned and the provincial cabinet is now looking after the post-integration scenario.



The major decisions as per the meeting on January 1, 2019 of the task force with the PM and different stakeholders set a framework for the planning and implementation of development activities for the tribal districts. However, the task force has been dissolved and the matters are now handled by the provincial cabinet. The key areas taken into consideration were:

### 1. Interim Governance Regulation

The abolition of FCR and promulgation of the Interim Governance Regulation for the interim period to provide legal cover to the transition period.

### 2. Health

Extension of the Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) to the merged areas to demonstrate immediate provision of staff and removal of deficiencies from 7 District Head Quarters (DHQs). Immediate recruitment will offer livelihood to 2,200 families.

### 3. Law and Order

To fill the 2,200 vacant posts of levies, training of levies to be conducted according to police standards and the police to move inside in a sequential manner. Establishment of courts for a uniform judicial system with the provision of Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs), a method of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which has been beneficial to the people despite the violations of human rights.

### 4. Finance

Punjab and KP, along with the Federal Government, to provide three percent of their share from the federal development budget. The provincial budget shall include a budget for erstwhile FATA in FY 2019-2020 making it the legal responsibility of the Provincial Assembly and the Cabinet.

### 5. Education

To show the immediate presence of the government, checking for absent teachers and identification of missing facilities, extension of the IMU system, fulfilling the needs of all high schools, vacant posts to be filled and sanctioning of new posts needs to be carried out.

### 6. Political Participation

Enact the Local Government Act and hold local government elections at the same time as provincial which will ensure grass-root level ownership. District level elders

nominated by tribes for peacekeeping and conflict resolution in coordination with elected local bodies members.

### 7. Overall Governance

Abolition of all posts of Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) (FATA); matters dealt by the ACS to be transferred to secretary home and tribal affairs. Ministers and secretaries will start visiting merged districts to ensure the visibility of the government. The Cabinet is to take an update of the progress through a special cabinet meeting every two months for better coordination and better supervision. Vigilance by the administration so that corrupt and inefficient practices are shunned.

The guidelines set were quite comprehensive and self-explanatory. In pursuance of integration and to provide a better line of management administration, the following directorates working under FATA Secretariat were directed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Establishment Department on November 15, 2018 to report to the respective secretary of the KP Government: the Directorate of Agriculture, Directorate of Livestock and Dairy, Directorate of Fisheries, Directorate of Forests, Directorate of Irrigation, Directorate of Sports, Directorate of Industries, Directorate of Technical Education, Directorate of Skills, FIFA Small Dams, Directorate of Minerals Oil, Roads and Infrastructure. On December 11, 2018, the Directorate of Agriculture and Research, Directorate of Local Government and Rural Development Works and Services and Public Health Engineering were merged. The notification by the Establishment Department on January 16, 2019 orders the merger of FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) and Rehabilitation Unit with the KP Government which will report to the Secretary of Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Department. The latest press conference by the Provincial Minister of Information, Mr. Shaukat Yousufzai, on January 16, 2019 shared the developments in alignment with the targets and objectives set in the first meeting. He shared that the immediate recruitment of 15,000 employees out of 30,000 vacant posts in line departments and offices and 6,000 police constables and officers will be ensured in the first meeting.

Another major development was the notification by the Home and Tribal Affairs Department KP on January 29, 2019 declaring the seven tribal districts as session divisions and seven Frontier Regions as the subdivisions which will pave the way for setting up regular courts in the region. A recent step by Governor Shah Farman is the formulation of an advisory board with Mr. Umer Khan as the chairman and Mr. Rustam Shah, Mr. Laiq and Mr. Sangal as members; however, the board has become controversial. Firstly, this is due to the presence of Mr. Rustam Shah who has openly opposed the merger, and secondly, under the 1973 Constitution the Governor cannot exercise such authority. To ensure access to the formal justice system, Chief Minister Mehmood Khan issued the directives for the appointment

of judges and support staff in the merged tribal districts.

Apparently, the overall scenario seems satisfactory after statements and news pouring in daily after the visits of Mr. Atif Khan, Minister of Tourism, Mr. Shaukat Yousufzai, Minister of Health and Information, Mr. Amjad Ali, Minister of Minerals, Mr. Abdul Karim, Advisor to CM on Industries and Mr. Zia Ullah Bangash, Advisor to CM on Education. However, a holistic approach seems to be the missing link and each department seems to be operating in isolation.

The transition period is the most sensitive period as far as rule of law and dispute resolution is concerned. Currently, a constitutional and legal vacuum exists after the abolition of FCR and IGR. The PA's designation has been renamed as DC, yet there is confusion and the decision is being taken in the absence of legal directives following the past practices under FCR or IGR. Extension of the judiciary on emergency grounds must be handled on an urgent basis. KP Government requested the High Court for an extension in the timeline for the extension of the judicial system and a six-month extension has been granted as well. The Provincial Government has decided to carry on the traditional Jirga with modifications and the introduction of DRCs. Experienced Jirga elders have been involved in conflict resolution for decades; however, the inclusion of the members with the clarity on ADR Human Rights and Reconciliation will help as this informal mechanism of justice would not require any specific infrastructure and can be carried out in a traditional manner with some modification.

Another mega challenge is law enforcement; the Levies and Khasadar Force. Around 14,000 Levies and Khasadar personnel are working in erstwhile FATA. The Khasadars are mostly illiterate and from poor families. Their selection is based on nominations by the Maliks. Each agency had its own rules and conventions for the Khasadar service. No induction or in-service training was imparted and every tribal agency has the Khasadari system, whereas Levies are provided weapons by the government. They are recruited from amongst the indigenous tribes. Unlike Khasadar Force, Levy Force is better trained. The induction of Levies and Khasadar into KP Police would be a big challenge for the Provincial Government. It needs to be resolved on an urgent basis so that mistrust and misunderstandings are not allowed to creep in.

People of the newly integrated tribal districts of KP are eagerly waiting for the political process to start. The most recent development is the completion of demarcation/delimitation process and Election Commission's directive expected to announce the date of local bodies' election. One segment believes it has to start off from macro to micro. To initiate political participation, the election for the Provincial Assembly should have been the first step due to two reasons. Firstly, the elected MP will be in position to receive the funds from ADP and NFC

Award in June 2019. Secondly, if the elections for the Provincial Assembly are held before the local bodies', the voters will just have to vote for the MPA with a single ballot paper. If the local bodies elections are conducted first, the public will not be educated on the local bodies system as the KP government had introduced a seven-tier system of local bodies, and if the same model is to be opted for, it is going to be quite confusing for the voters. Also as a first step it is suggested that the simplest form of local bodies be introduced.

Health and educational rights are the topmost priority and steps should be taken on emergency basis in the newly integrated tribal districts. Almost 1,000 schools stand demolished during militancy and a host of other educational institutes have several missing facilities. As per Mr. Zia Ullah Bangash, the provincial educational policy will be applied to these districts as well. All the schools will be renovated and reconstructed.

### Suggestions

After the merger of FATA line departments with the provincial government, news is pouring in on daily basis. However, coherence and coordination among different government departments is needed to achieve the targets in minimum time with appropriate planning and use of resources. Tribal districts had informal mechanisms under the supervision of PA. Similarly, the communication system in the tribal districts need upgrading, for example Bajaur and Waziristan don't have internet facilities yet. The Tirah Vally (Khyber, Orakzai and Kurram districts) still don't have mobile service.

New schools will be established on a need basis. There is news of the establishment of Army Public School in Khyber District but the monthly fee may result in dropouts due to low incomes in the conflict stricken areas. The education department should initiate simple and low-cost programs for the enrollment of students.

The capacity of both male and female teachers can be built to access the communities along with new appointments being incentivized. The health card issuance has been reassured to tribal families; however, it needs to be addressed on an emergency basis.

Sensitization programs on human rights, equal citizenry, voting, local bodies' structures, administrative systems and procedures, and State's formal justice system should be initiated in collaboration with the education department and civil society organizations. There are 27 civil society organizations currently active under the umbrella of FATA youth Jirga. They can be engaged in sensitization programs on electoral process and administrative issues.

The female population must be accessed as their inclusion politically, socially and economically will make a difference. Need based skill development programs can be introduced for the female population which will not only support their self-reliance but also help in the economic development of the region.

The male and female teaching resource can be involved in several programs due to their reach to the students and community. Teachers can be trained to access the female community for raising the awareness level. In a recent development, women have been deployed in Levies in Bajaur and similar initiatives in all districts can encourage female participation. As a kick start, 20 women will be recruited for the Levies Force to be appointed in Bajaur for the first time in the district's history.

Presently, Kurram and Khyber already have female Levies personnel. The process must continue for all the tribal districts as it will be an employment opportunity and the inclusion of women will ensure rule of law and peace building process. Inclusion of tribal elders as advisors in the development plans can be one of the steps in trust building as they still have influence in the communities.

# National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) - A Critical Review

by Saddam Hussein\*

## NACTA's Inception

Pakistan had remained at the centre stage of Cold War and experienced rise of extremism and terrorism - tracing back to the commencement of Afghan War in December 1979. The contemporary evolution of extremism and terrorism can be distinguished in two distinct phases based on their peculiar features and characteristics. The first phase can be referred to the era of upheavals starting from 1979 - 2001, paving the way for fanning militant extremism, and a number of individuals sought violent means to promote extremist narratives for their vested interests. Second phase started with the beginning of Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks. The second and on-going phase involves the challenge of countering militant extremism spilling over from the previous era. These two phases have created lasting rifts and fault lines within our society and developed extremist mind-set which will take time, efforts and resources for the reversal. In both these eras significant damage in terms of human and material losses has been witnessed in the country.

In this backdrop, a need for an institution dedicated to counter terrorism and extremism in Pakistan - which can act as a focal body, fully equipped to draft and implement national counter-terrorism and extremism strategies, and was felt. This resulted in the formation of NACTA in January 2008 with a mandate to “coordinate and unify” national counter-terrorism efforts and to draw up a national strategy in consultation with all stakeholders. Moreover, idea behind the establishment of NACTA could be traced back to 3-D counterterrorism policy of the state i.e. *Dialogue, Development and Deterrence*, a resolution unanimously passed on Oct 22, 2008 by parliament. NACTA was formally operationalized in 2013 after the passage of “NACTA Act 2013” by the cabinet.

The administrative set-up of NACTA comprises different directorates/wings which includes: Administration and Finance Directorate, Research and Analysis Directorate, Information and Communication Technology Directorate (ICT), Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Directorate, Counter Terrorism (CT) Directorate, Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Directorate, Legal and Security Directorate and Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID). Whereas, the financial allocation for

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NACTA has also been increasing every year, surging to 1643.02 million PKR in the year 2017-18 from 95 million PKR in 2013-14.

## NACTA's Journey - A Bumpy Road

The brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Fazlullah faction) led to the formulation of the National Action Plan (NAP), taking the lead role as a policy guideline in counter-terrorism measures. NACTA, as a coordinating body for counter-terrorism, synchronized all the efforts of security and law enforcement apparatuses across the country under the NAP's umbrella. Its concerted efforts on multilateral fronts through soft approaches have yielded some positive results.

In pursuance of NAP, revamping the Criminal Justice System (CJS) was proposed, resulting in an amendment - Criminal Laws Amendment Act 2016 - passed by the National Assembly. Later, it was decided to revive all four components of CJS i.e. police, prosecution, judiciary and prisons. Therefore, NACTA, after exhaustive deliberations with all stakeholders, developed a roadmap for re-vamping of CJS; detailed document, comprising of recommendations, implementation plan, responsibilities, timelines and cost has been shared with provinces for further actions.

Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) was another big step taken by NACTA in fighting terrorism. NACTA drafted a bill on "Model law on Facilitation and Regulation of Charities" and shared with the provinces and regions including ICT for their input and enactment from their respective assemblies. Once the bill is passed by respective assemblies, the draft model law would become an effective piece of legislation for governing the registration, functions and regulation of charities and charity-seeking organizations. NACTA has also entered into an agreement with Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) to create awareness among public for giving their donations to the rightful and legally certified entities.

NACTA, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders i.e. FBR, SBP, ANF, FIA and intelligence agencies, has also taken a lead role in coordinating the regulation of cross-border movement of cash through IBMS and Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Similarly, efforts are being made to enable Pakistan Customs to have an integrated database for currency declarations at all airports for strict enforcement of SBP's prescribed currency limits. Then, issues attached to Branchless Banking (BB) precipitated, which entails certain risks due to low Customer Due Diligence (CDD) by certain financial institutions; NACTA, after obtaining input of various agencies, engaged with the SBP for further improvements in the regulatory mechanism. In


line with that, NACTA has also taken the initiative to set up a Task Force on CFT for effective enforcement of AML/CFT regime in Pakistan, having representation of federal and provincial/regional stakeholders. The Task Force is still in its formative phase and is faced with problems of structure, mandate, operational and administrative SOPs, legal cover and the potential issues, in case it is vested with the powers of investigation/prosecution. Though, NACTA was successful in establishment of CFT Units in all provincial CTDs so as to enable investigators to focus on financial aspects of every terrorism-related investigation. It is worthy to mention that NACTA, in collaboration with Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU), also carried out threat assessments regarding terrorism and terrorist financing with all provincial CTDs on board; which resulted in National Risk Assessment (NRA) report submitted to Ministry of Finance.

Moreover, NACTA's initiatives also resulted in rationalization of lists of proscribed persons by the concerned provincial governments, along with implementation of international and domestic legal obligations regarding freezing of assets of such proscribed organizations and persons. As per latest statistics, 65 organizations have been proscribed and 4 are under observation, while 8,374 individuals have been placed under Schedule IV. Similarly, around 5,089 bank accounts have been blocked through State Bank of Pakistan and an amount of over Rs. 157 million has been frozen. Over 2,052 individuals are facing movement restrictions. Additionally, terrorist organizations which have attempted to re-emerge with different names are marked and subsequently banned by the government. Correspondingly, it has initiated the formulation of a robust terrorists' profile database containing detailed records of individuals accused of or convicted of acts of terrorism and violent extremism.



### Proscribed Organizations

- Proscribed
- Watchlist



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8,374



individuals  
placed on  
4th schedule

5,089



bank  
accounts  
frozen

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Besides, there is a common misperception that Madaris are drivers of extremism and centres of terrorist recruitment. In order to substantiate this very notion, NACTA devised a mechanism to seek support of Madaris in fighting against

terrorism and extremism. NACTA developed Madaris' data and registration forms in consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), and other federal and provincial stakeholders. The raison d'être of this exercise was to standardize the registration process and allow only registered Madaris to operate in the country.

Modern times also brings with itself contemporary challenges; one being cyber-terrorism. To tackle this, NACTA has set up Cyber Security and Information and Communication Technology (CS/ICT) Directorate on modern lines with a renewed approach. In order to counter extremist ideologies, Tat'heer Drive has been initiated in the realm of cyberspace, as well. Tat'heer is a multipronged Cyber Counter-Terrorism (Cyber CT) strategy which includes mapping of radical contents available on internet/social media. Additionally, the government by moving ahead in its counter-terrorism efforts, also authorized NACTA to carry out geo-mapping of Karachi and Quetta for effective CT measures, while geo-mapping of other major cities is also in the pipe-line.

Despite all these initiatives, one of the biggest challenges that Pakistan faced during its fight against terrorists and extremists was to come up with a counter-narrative at national level against the extremist one. NACTA took the initiative and prepared a concept paper on National Narrative based on eight themes (Religious and Interfaith Harmony, Political and International Relations, Embodiment of Constitution and Implementation of Laws, Strengthening National Security, Socio-Cultural Values and Customs, Media Engagement, National Development/Economy, National Reforms/Reconciliations). The document was submitted to the Ministry of Interior for approval. Unfortunately, the document is still in draft form; whereas, at the same time Paigham-e-Pakistan was developed by Islamic International University (IIUI), Islamabad, with the same concept as that of National Narrative, approved by the President of Pakistan.

Furthermore, acutely aware of the imperativeness for consolidation of the hard-earned peace, NACTA in line with its mandate, initiated a multidisciplinary process to formulate a National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines for Pakistan, after 34 rounds of deliberations with 300 plus diverse stakeholders. The National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines are citizen centric and reckon the essentiality of "Whole of Government and Society Approach" in eradication of ideology of violent extremism from our society. The parameters of the said Policy Guidelines comprise: rule of law and service delivery; people's engagement; media engagement; education reforms; rehabilitation, reintegration and renunciation and promotion of culture.

Likewise, NACTA has adopted various dynamic short and long-term approaches for youth engagement, with the objective to prevent them from falling into violent

extremism. In the first phase, NACTA has identified 46 educational institutions from public and private sectors across the country and started conducting interactive sessions with students on youth centrality in inculcating peace and tolerance. In the second phase, NACTA will identify major religious seminaries where youth engagement programs will be executed on similar lines. In the long-term, NACTA would endeavor to formulate a Youth Engagement Policy incorporating issues raised by students during these interactive sessions at educational institutions. In addition to that, NACTA has initiated an internship program for young scholars. The objective of this program is to provide an opportunity to students to gain practical experience in the areas of CT and CVE.

### Critical Analysis and the Future Road-Map

On a rocky rutted path, the NACTA has had mixed outcomes of success and pitfalls. It has come a long way; however, there is still much left to do. One of the achievements was the formulation of National Counter-Terrorism Policy guidelines, which serve as the pathway towards an inclusive, connected, peaceful and harmonious society. These guidelines are the bed-rock for joining hearts and minds, and effectively puts an end to the supply line of extremism by engaging in the war of ideas. It, however, requires a whole-of-government and society approach to implement these guidelines. The other major accomplishment was that NACTA started working on a robust 'National Narrative' on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy which would serve as the corner stone of ideological response to non-traditional threats. At present, the National Narrative document is ready; it is up to the current government to approve and utilize it and work towards the operationalization phase of this document.

It's worth highlighting that Counter-Terrorism Police Departments have done a commendable job in countering terrorism and extremism. Their performance can be improved further if the federal and provincial governments introduce some accountability and transparency reforms accordingly. Moreover, it has been observed that police departments are not well intertwined into the efforts to choke the financing of terrorism. Police departments are well-suited to serve this purpose, because they are the first responders, investigators, and have wide-spread reach. So, the police should make 'choking terror financing' as an essential part of their training through different relevant organizations, such as FIA and the SBP, for more robust response in this regard. Whereas, NACTA's claim for updating of the lists of 4th schedulers under the Anti-Terrorism Act, was actually the achievement of police and their CTDs. NACTA's role was just limited to get the information from the provinces and send the lists to the SBP with the request to freeze the assets of the listed individuals. Moreover, NACTA does not even have any legal powers to compel CTDs to cooperate. In the absence of any operational

and coordination roles, NACTA can merely act as a think tank; to spend that much resources on such an organization would be strange then. Also, NACTA is primarily a policy formulating body; hence the driving seat should be given to those who are from policy making domain and have comprehensive experience in the field, rather than assigning positions to those who are trained to enforce/implement. This leads towards an inherent problem in the way of effective policy making.

The most significant aspect in counter-terrorism strategy that NACTA has gained some tangible results in, is about choking the financing for terrorism. Numerous organizations were involved in choking terror financing, but there was a lack of coordination among them. So, a National Task Force for choking financing for terrorism, comprising of 27 relevant organizations was established within NACTA; serving as a coordinating body. Next step which should have been taken before is now up to the current government. This includes making this task force more inclusive by accommodating other relevant stakeholders, and letting it evolve into an independent authority - which would not only coordinate, but also take part in operational activities.

NACTA also reached-out to different universities and interacted with the youth on counter extremism. What is lacking is that NACTA has not yet devised a plan as how to reach out to the significant portion of the population - which includes laborers, street-hawkers, shop-keepers - the common man etc., who are more prone to extremism.

On the contrary, NACTA's performance has been significantly impacted by lack of ownership by the Prime Minister House, the Ministry of Interior wanting NACTA to work as its subsidiary and holding back or uneven flow of finances from the Ministry of Finance. In 2014, a ruling was passed by the Islamabad High Court, placing the command of NACTA directly under Prime Minister but till the end of previous government, it was reporting to the Minister for interior. It is an upsetting fact that not even a single meeting of the Board of Governors of the NACTA could be convened since its inception; this points out that the neglect of the past government resulted in the lack of focus on improving the functioning of an important organization. The section 6 of NACTA Act says that "the Board may meet as and when required but it shall meet at least once in each quarter of a year." However, the last two prime ministers including Nawaz Sharif and Shahid Khaqan Abbasi did not hold any single meeting of the Board. Now, the current government can clear out the ambiguity in functions, responsibilities and resources to let NACTA function optimally.

Nevertheless, a stronger NACTA is needed to address trans-provincial issues, especially de-radicalization and madrasa reforms initiatives. Progress on revamping CJS is very slow. With regard to the effectiveness of police, the government's

emphasis is on enhancing the counter-terrorism capability of police and on raising specialized units with better military capabilities, while improvement in the quality of investigation of terrorism cases which is a prerequisite, and demands better training, use of technology, forensic labs and an integrated national database seems not to be a priority.

In the most recent development regarding NACTA, Prime Minister Imran Khan, on September 25, 2018, has decided to review the role and functions. The Prime Minister revealed this while chairing the first-ever meeting of the Board of Governors of NACTA at the Prime Minister's Office, since the NACTA Act was promulgated in March 2013. PM Khan remarked that the new ground realities called for revisiting the role of the organisation in order to make this body truly a proactive and sophisticated organisation with a well-defined mandate. It was, therefore, decided during the meeting to constitute a committee for reviewing the role and functioning of the organisation. It shows that the PTI government has a vision, but whether they could translate it into action is the real question; only time can tell.

Summing it up, NACTA was a good idea that has been poorly developed and executed. It has been caught up in bureaucratic strife, lack of collaboration across security apparatuses, scarcity of resources and, for vague direction or purpose. Reportedly, Prime Minister Khan has decided to retain control over the Authority. It is a good decision because countering terrorism requires multi-disciplinary approach and Interior Ministry alone cannot handle it. It may imbue the organization with fresh vigor. A re-energized and effective NACTA would in turn give a new impetus to fading NAP. Other problem is that law and order is a provincial subject and NACTA neither has its provincial extensions nor has control over provincial counter terrorism departments. Unless rules of business are amended, NACTA would invariably come in conflict with federal and provincial interior ministries. Having provincial extensions of NACTA can be a viable option, along with chalking out a provision to have countering extremism and terrorism as common responsibility of federation and provinces.

Whatever the pace may be, NACTA at-least kick-started the basic machinery to scuffle terrorism and related factors, nonetheless it could have done a lot more and more could be done, but some internal and external impediments made NACTA's journey rather a bumpy one. Lastly, NACTA should be prepared and ought to do its homework on the new drivers of insecurity in Pakistan which includes: youth alienation and frustration, exclusionary identity narratives, lack of social justice and the rule of law, regional disparities, and lack of accountability as the significant drivers of insecurity in Pakistan.

# About CRSS

## CRSS Background

The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is a think tank/advocacy center founded in September, 2007. Founded by noted security expert and media personality Imtiaz Gul, it is committed to the cause of independent research and nonpartisan analysis, and informed advocacy, and help people outside Pakistan understand this nation of 212 million people.

As an advocacy center, CRSS is dedicated to trigger critical thinking through discourse anchored in global democratic values such as socio-political diversity, rule of law, equal citizenry, and acceptance of diversity, fundamental human rights, all at the intersection of empirical research in security studies

## CRSS Core Values

CRSS strives to embed the national conversation in constitutionalism, and rationalize it over extremism and sectarianism. CRSS believes the path to peace is through embodying fundamental human rights, specifically:

- strict adherence to the rule of law, and stringent implementation
- informing the public on civic education, especially good governance and public accountability
- promoting equal rights for all citizens of Pakistan
- championing women empowerment
- providing training and opportunities to youth to veer them away from radicalization through critical thinking

CRSS' programming reflects its core values, which CRSS believes can, along with time-tested methodologies in strategic communications, impactful message development, research and advocacy result in a more tolerant and cohesive Pakistan.

## CRSS Publications

CRSS produces several publications annually. Our flagship publications are the NAP Tracker, an annual audit of the counter-terrorism/counter-extremism National Action Plan (NAP) of the Government of Pakistan; and the Annual Security Report, a measure of the state of security in Pakistan by gauging the number of violence-related casualties across the country.

In addition, our most recent publication was the Role of Madrassas, which provided answers to why parents continue to send their children to madrassas. CRSS also regularly publishes papers, commentary and analysis by our research fellows from around the world. You can find all of our publications freely online, or collect copies free of cost from our offices in Islamabad.

You can also visit the CRSS Blog, as well as the website of our sister organization Afghan Studies Center.

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