

PART 6: LOCAL CONFLICTS

NAP POINT 12: Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.

NAP POINT 16: Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.

NAP POINT 17: Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.

Part 6: Local Conflicts

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Part 6: Local Conflicts

6.1 Introduction

The NAP also attempts to address local conflicts and this chapter focuses on NAP points 12, 16, 15 and 17 which correspond with the on-going conflicts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (#12), Karachi (#16), Balochistan (#17) and Punjab (#15).

Conflict resolution in FATA is being sought through a combination of driving out militants under Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and a FATA Reforms Committee which has recommended judicial reforms and merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

The Karachi operation under Zarb-e-Azb is also continuing and there is a dramatic decrease in violence.

The state is attempting to control the security situation in Balochistan, particularly the Baloch insurgents. However, violence in Balochistan seemed to escalate in 2016.

Although Punjab, for the most part, remains free of any major local conflicts, the Lahore bombing on March 28, 2016¹ prompted widespread criticism and triggered military operations in the province as well.²

6.2 FATA Reforms

6.2.1 Historical Background of FATA

FATA is geographically located along the Durand line with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on its eastern border. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legislation, serves as the manifestation of the government's writ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, dating back to the British colonial period in pre-partition India. The “excluded areas” as they were called by section 91 of the colonial constitutional law of the Government of India Act are still areas excluded from the realm of development, investment, and modern civilization. FATA has no network of state institutions in the modern sense. Almost seven decades after independence, tribal Pashtuns remain subject to the application of this inhumane set of regulations.

¹ Al Jazeera. (2016, March 28). Lahore bombing: Pakistan mourns as death toll rises. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/laure-bombing-pakistan-mourns-death-toll-rises-160328091627212.html>>.

² AFP/Reuters. (2016, March 28). Military gives go-ahead for Punjab operation after Lahore carnage. Dawn. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1248435>>.

Article 247 of the Constitution states: "Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas". NWFP's provincial governor exercises executive authority in FATA as the president's representative. The overall administrative and political control of FATA falls under the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), currently headed by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch.

6.2.2 FCR versus 1973 Constitution

Pakistan's Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights, including the right to equal citizenry, to all Pakistanis under Articles 8-28. However, under Article 247 these provisions do not extend to the residents of FATA. No Act of Parliament extends to these areas unless the president so directs. In fact, even law-makers elected from the region can legislate for any part of the country, except for FATA. The FCR discriminates both in civil and criminal matters, classifies citizens, does not require proof for conviction or a civil decree and gives no right of defense by a counselor, or a right of appeal. In short, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a whole, for all practical purposes, is a redundant and tautological document as far as its application in FATA is concerned. Consequently, the people of FATA have neither any 'human rights' nor can they claim any other status, privilege, position conferred upon other citizens of Pakistan by the Constitution.

6.2.3 Current Status: FATA Reforms

The FATA Reforms Committee, the latest in a line of many, was formed in May, 2014, prior to the enactment of NAP, to frame strategic objectives for the volatile tribal areas. This committee released its report after thorough deliberation but unfortunately the report didn't come up with any suggestions on FATA reforms.³

Another FATA Reforms Committee was formed in November 2015⁴ by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, almost a year after the APS attack to assist with the implementation of point 12 within the National Action Plan. This move was seen by many as a means to appease law-makers from FATA for the withdrawal of their candidate five days before the election for the Speaker of the National Assembly.

The main goal of the Committee was to align FATA into the mainstream judicial system and bring about an end to the violence in the agencies. The Committee was also assigned the task of determining whether FATA should be merged with its neighbouring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or whether it should be declared as a separate province/territory. The five member committee is headed by Sartaj Aziz who also acts as the Prime Minister's advisor on foreign affairs.

The FATA Reforms Committee published its first report in August 2016. According to the report the Committee had visited all seven FATA Agencies and held meetings with the tribal Maliks (leaders) and other political and civil stakeholders to gather an in depth understanding of the security situation and

³ Ali, Z. (2014, March 20). Another commission formed on Fata reforms. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1107498>>.

⁴ Bureau Report. (2015, March 28). 'Much awaited' Fata Tribunal formed. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1184671>>.

determine the best means to bring socio-political reforms. The report included recommendations for reforms which, if approved, would be implemented over a ten year period.⁵

According to the report, there is a desperate need for socio-political and judicial reforms in FATA, and the most appropriate means to achieve these reforms is to integrate FATA with KP. This integration would be beneficial for many reasons which include geographical and cultural factors.

However, in order to achieve a smooth integration, it is important for FATA to develop to a certain level, where it can compare to KP. The National Security Division recognizes this need for extensive developmental programs and suggests that 3% of the National Finance Commission Award should be allotted to FATA over the next 10 years. This amount comes up to approximately 900 billion Rupees and should be used to create and facilitate the FATA Development Authority for building up infrastructure, on par with the other provinces in Pakistan. For example until October, FATA did not have a single university for higher education.⁶ However, as of December 19, 2016, there were still protests against the center for delaying the reform process.⁷

There is also a proposal to replace the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) with a Tribal Rewaj Act which proposes that the “provisions relating to collective responsibility in the FCR should be omitted from the new act”, and that the “jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court should be extended to FATA”. The report also proposes the retention of the Jirga system, with major enhancements, to resemble the internationally accepted Jury system.⁸

However, even with this proposal, concerns as regards the violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan still remain.⁶

For a detailed discussion on the political economy of FATA reforms, please see [Section 6.7](#).

6.3 FATA: Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Operation Zarb-e-Azb is a joint military offensive being conducted by the Pakistan Armed Forces against various militant groups including the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Al-Qaeda (AQ), Jundallah and the Haqqani Network. The operation was launched on June 14, 2014, in North Waziristan, but has since expanded to include urban pacification operations in the port city of Karachi in the Sindh province. The operation had 30,000 soldiers on the front lines and was launched following the breakdown of negotiations with extremist elements and a brazen attack on the Karachi airport.⁹

6.3.1 Operational Progress

FATA has seen significant progress in terms of violence-related fatalities in the last several years running. According to data collected by this think tank, there were 3,371 fatalities in FATA alone in 2014, which dropped to 1,917 in 2015,¹⁰ and further to 495 in 2016.¹¹ This is an overall reduction of over 85%.

Table 6.1 FATA Violence-Related Fatalities by Agency - 2014-2016			
Agencies	2014	2015	2016
North Waziristan	1,790	814	189
Khyber Agency	1,184	752	151
South Waziristan	84	98	17
Kurram Agency	27	90	27
Orakzai	125	74	1
Mohmand	98	51	101
Bajaur	63	38	9
Total	3,371	1,917	495

Graph 6.1 FATA Victims of Violence - 2015 vs. 2016

FATA Victims of Violence - 2015 vs. 2016




Annual Security Report, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

¹⁰ Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 26, 2016, from <<http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>>.

¹¹ Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2017, March 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2016. Retrieved March 22, 2016, from <<http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2016-Final.pdf>>.

In 2016, the Pakistani Air Force and the Army (which manages Operation Zarb-e-Azb), focused on securing the country's borders to prevent terrorism from flowing in. As FATA falls on Pakistan's Western border with Afghanistan, it remained a key geographical area of focus. In partnership with law enforcement agencies, the military continued to conduct operations to root out and prevent terrorism and violence in this region.

Graph 6.2 FATA Fatalities Comparison - 2013-2016



The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

There were a large number of attacks on security forces and civilians in FATA in 2016, but the frequency and intensity was significantly tempered, especially when compares to 2013 and 2014. It must be said, however, that the military claims all terrorist and militant hideouts have been eliminated in FATA. But the fact that the militants continue to create problems for both security agencies and civilians, even in a limited capacity, shows that this is not a sustainable solution. This asymmetrical warfare is not sustainable as it does nothing to eliminate the radical ideology that forms the root of this conflict. Pakistan needs significant policy changes and law reforms to ensure the relative peace acquired is maintained in the long run.

6.3.2 Internally Displaced Persons

Please see [Section 8.3.3: IDPs – Rehabilitation Plans](#).

6.4: Karachi Operation

6.4.1 Violence in Karachi

Karachi, despite a dramatic yearly decline in overall violence in the country, remains the most violent

district of Pakistan. By some estimates, Karachi's population exceeds 24 million, larger than the continent of Australia. It is a sprawling urban metropolis, plagued by urban street crime, violent political militancy, and in recent years, infiltration by the Pakistan Taliban.

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the leading political party in Karachi has been blamed for creating and facilitating political issues in the city for many years. Political militancy has afflicted Karachi, resulting in tens of thousands of target killings – a term that signifies political or religious underpinning to someone's murder. Terms like *namaloom afraad* (unknown individuals) were used as a popular moniker in the city to signify unrest or disruption caused by violent, organized groups of individuals. Both target killings and public disruptions have been curbed significantly in the last two years, but they remain an issue.

There are widely circulated conspiracy theories that unrest in Karachi is driven by external factors. The state has to work on ensuring that the situation is not worsened by hostile intelligence agencies operating in the city, and the youth are not fueled to pick up arms against the state.

It is therefore appropriate that the current security operation in Karachi is being carried out in cooperation with the Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Police, the Counter-Terrorism Department (supported by the Ministry of Interior), Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies. Tasks assigned to the Rangers have been particularly successful. The goal of this operation, as with others, is to minimize violence and crime in the city, and to this end, they have been extremely successful.

However, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. While target killings and urban crime has declined sharply in the city, extra-judicial killings are on the rise. In September, 2016, Human Rights Watch urged that law enforcement agencies halt torture and extra-judicial killings as a mechanism to curb crime.¹²

6.4.2 Ranger's Deployment in Karachi

Rangers are a paramilitary force under control of the Ministry of Interior, and their primary task is to guard, defend and secure borders in peace time as well as war time, provide and maintain security in war zones and areas of conflict and maintain law and order which includes providing assistance to the police.

The Rangers Karachi operation was inaugurated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 5, 2013, to rid the city of crime, political militancy and violence.¹³ Two years later, the Rangers announced the completion of phase one, with the second phase to commence from August 14, 2015.¹⁴

The Rangers operation in Karachi continues at the time of writing this report.

¹² AFP. (2016, September 26). HRW urges Pakistan to halt torture, killings by police. The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 02, 2017, from <<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1188614/rights-group-urges-pakistan-halt-torture-killings-police/>>.

¹³ Tunio, H. (2013, September 04). Karachi law and order: Rangers to launch operation in two days - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/>>.

¹⁴ Khan, F. (2015, August 10). First stage of Karachi security operation complete: Rangers - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/fist-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/>.

6.4.3 Shift in Focus since NAP

A new sense of urgency was observed in January, 2015 when the PM called a high level meeting on the law and order situation in Karachi.¹⁵ There was a clear shift in mandate, as just over a month later, political militancy, a long-standing source of extreme violence in the city was targeted in Karachi. Rangers raided the headquarters of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), arresting absconders and recovering banned, unlicensed weapons.¹⁶ Both sources of violence in Karachi, religious militancy and political militancy, were being targeted.

In August 2016, recordings of MQM's London based leader Altaf Hussain's speech went viral, where he expressed anti-Pakistan sentiments, including, "Pakistan is cancer for [the] entire world... Pakistan is headache for the entire world. Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism the entire world. Who says long live Pakistan... it's down with Pakistan".¹⁷

In this speech, Mr. Hussain is also alleged to have insinuated his followers to conduct violent attacks on the news offices of Samaa TV and ARY News. Subsequently, MQM followers attacked the offices of ARY News and the police rangers, resulting in at least one fatality, with five injured individuals being sent to the hospital for treatment.¹⁸

Additionally, a raid was conducted at the MQM headquarters, Nine Zero, where senior party leaders were arrested and the headquarters were also sealed. In the subsequent weeks, small clashes were reported between police and MQM workers/followers.¹⁹ This was the second time Nine Zero was raided, the first time being in March, 2015.¹⁵

6.4.4 Outcomes of Karachi Operation

Data collected by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) shows that despite the violence in FATA, Karachi remained the most violent and volatile district in Pakistan the last several years running, having lost 5,063 persons to violence in the last three years. However, the level of violence has reduced by nearly 78% in Sindh, while Karachi witnessed a 48% drop in the fatalities from different forms of violence in the year 2015.¹⁰

District	2014	2015	2016
Karachi	2,023	1,040	474


¹⁵ Khan, F. (2015, August 10). PM summons high-level meeting on law and order situation in Karachi tomorrow - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/829573/pm-summons-high-level-meeting-on-law-and-order-situation-in-karachi-tomorrow/>>.

¹⁶ Salahuddin, Z. (2015, April 15). A New Turn for Pakistan's Fight Against Militancy. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/>>.

¹⁷ Staff Reporter. (2016, August 23). What Altaf said... Dawn. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1279393>>.

¹⁸ Ali, I. (2016, August 22). One dead, five injured in attack on ARY News Karachi office. Dawn. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1279242>>.

¹⁹ Dawn. (August 23, 2016). Rangers take MQM leaders into custody, seal party headquarters Nine Zero. Dawn. Retrieved March 17, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1279250>>.

Graph 6.3 Karachi District Fatalities Comparison - 2013-2016

The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

Although there was an overall decrease in violence in Karachi when compared to 2015, it remained the most violent city in the country. With a total number of fatalities at 476, this was a 54% reduction from 2015, where there were 1040 casualties.¹⁰

Street crimes in Karachi increased in 2016, which presents an added challenge for the police force. There is also pressure to ensure that the existing situation is not worsened or fueled by hostile intelligence agencies, calling for the youth to pick up arms against the state. The Sindh government has shown an inclination to bring about reforms in its police force. In September, it was announced that Rs. 2.2 billion from the provincial budget will be allocated to purchase 30,000 sub-machine guns from the Pakistan Army and to provide specialized training to 2,500 police officers. This training would be provided by top notch Pakistan Army and international professionals, and would build the police officers' capacity to deal with higher level crimes.²⁰

There is clearly a lot more work that remains to be done in Karachi. However, the operation must be credited for the reduction in violence over the years.


In a recent interview with CRSS, the National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. (retd.) Naseer Khan Janjua shared the following statistics about the Karachi operation, split into 39 months before, and after, the Karachi operation began.²¹

²⁰ Rasheed, S. A. (2016, October 16). Police reforms in Sindh. The Daily Times. Retrieved February 16, 2017, from <<http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06-Oct-16/police-reforms-in-sindh>>.

²¹ CRSS held exclusive interviews with the NSA in December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017. The NSA leads the National Security Decision, and is responsible for the security of Pakistan. The implementation of the NAP is one of his tasks.

Table 6.3 – Statistics on Violence in Karachi		
Incident Type	39 months before op	39 months after op
Police Encounters	3,628	4,684
Gangs Busted	2,226	2,673
Criminals Killed	Terrorists	21
	Kidnappers	3
	Extortionists	11
	Dacoits	328
	Total	363

Graph 6.4: Statistics on Violence in Karachi




The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

With regards to other kinetic actions, such as operations, arrests and recoveries, the data for 2016 is outlined in table 6.4.²⁰

Graph 6.5: Statistics on Kinetic Actions in Karachi - I - Operations²⁰

Table 6.4 – Statistics on Kinetic Actions in Karachi	
Action	39 months after op
Combing/Intelligence Operations	8,728
Handovers to Police	6,837
Terrorists Arrested	1,466
Target Killers Arrested	933
Bhatta Collectors Arrested	436
Kidnappers Arrested	115
Hostages Recovered	151
Weapons Recovered	10,411
Ammunition Recovered	611,724


Statistics on Kinetic Actions in Karachi - I - Operations



The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

Graph 6.6: Statistics on Kinetic Actions in Karachi - II - Arrests²⁰

Statistics on Kinetic Actions in Karachi - II - Arrests



The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

Prior to his retirement, in November, 2016, Former Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif stated that the operation should continue until peace has been restored in Karachi completely.²² His replacement seems keen to continue this legacy.

Please see [Section 6.8 for a detailed discussion on Sindh](#).

6.5: Balochistan Insurgency


According to data collected by this think tank, Balochistan was the most violent province in Pakistan in 2016 with 805 fatalities, an increase from 719 fatalities last year.¹⁰ Four major suicide attacks contributed to the high casualty count, including one which left 52 lawyers dead in an attack in Quetta.²³ This shows a rise since 2014 and 2015. However, this is still a decline when compared to 948 deaths in 2013.^{9,10}

Table 6.5: Balochistan fatalities from violence - 2014 - 2016

Year	2014	2015	2016
Total	752	719	805

²² Agencies. (2016, November 9). Karachi operation to continue till complete restoration of peace: COAS. Pakistan Today. Retrieved March 18, 2017, from <<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/11/09/karachi-operation-to-continue-till-restoration-of-peace-coas/>>.

²³ Al Jazeera. (2016, August 9). Quetta attack: Pakistan mourns as lawyers begin boycott. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/quetta-attack-pakistan-mourns-lawyers-boycott-160809065837053.html>>.

Graph 6.7: Balochistan Fatalities Comparison - 2013-2016¹⁰

The NAP Tracker, 2016 - The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2017

In October, a suicide attack on a police academy in Quetta claimed 62 lives, wounding at least 117²⁴ and less than a month later 62 fatalities were recorded at a suicide attack at Shah Noorani shrine.²⁵

6.5.1 Balochistan Nationalist Movement

Baloch nationalism in its contemporary form began nearly a century ago in the 1920s in the form of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan (AIB - Organization for Unity of the Baloch). The movement claims that the Baloch people are a nation and emphasizes ethnic loyalty over religious or national loyalty; an idea that is contrary to the ideology behind Pakistan's creation. Their demands have ranged from cultural, economic and political reforms, to political autonomy, to outright secession from Pakistan. The movement is secular and heavily influenced by leftist Marxist ideology.²⁶

6.5.2 Baloch Insurgent Groups

The on-going insurgency is not the first of its kind. In fact, the current conflict that started in 2003 is the fifth of its kind.²⁷ The insurgents in Pakistan are fragmented into several groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and the Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB - Baluchistan's army). While this fragmentation is reflective of the tribal nature of Baloch nationalists, their demands are deeply rooted in Baloch nationalist ideology.

²⁴ AFP, Shah, S. A., Sherani, H. (2016, October 25). 61 killed in twin suicide attacks as terrorists storm police training college in Quetta. Dawn. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1291999>>.

²⁵ Al Jazeera. (2016, November 16). Attack on Shah Noorani shrine in Pakistan kills dozens. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 18, 2017, from <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/dozens-casualties-attack-pakistan-shrine-161112141000715.html>>.

²⁶ Breseeg, T. M. (2004). Baloch nationalism: Its origin and development. Karachi: Royal Book Company.

²⁷ BBC. (2014, February 22). Balochistan: The untold story of Pakistan's other war - BBC News. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897>>.

6.5.3 Indian Influence

Aside from several terror attacks that rocked Balochistan in 2016, arguably the news event that received the most coverage was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's comments about the province.²⁸ In a speech that largely avoided foreign policy, Modi spoke openly against Pakistan, stating that the people of Balochistan had thanked him. Modi dedicated his country's independence day to the Baloch people, who (according to him) were marginalized under Pakistan's biased political regime. Although these remarks were met with condemnation from the Pakistani government and media, they fueled the fire for supporters of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), which continues to fight for Baloch liberation.

Ajit Kumar, India's Ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations (UN), said the following on September 14: "This is a country (Pakistan), which has systematically abused and violated the human rights of its own citizens, including in Balochistan".²⁹ The irony of Indian leaders lamenting human rights abuses notwithstanding, these comments stirred major controversy in Pakistan.

6.5.4 Baloch Insurgency

According to the National Security Department, the insurgency in Balochistan is being marginalized and its leaders are being pacified through political mainstreaming. Several Baloch insurgent leaders are living in foreign countries in self-exile, and serving as conduits in the hands of hostile countries supporting the insurgency. The state has limited control over these leaders while they are abroad.

There is also continued criticism of the state in the media with regards to how the separatist movements are being dealt with. Critics point out that the state does not attempt to reach out to the separatists or resolve the issues that are fueling their agendas. Instead, the state is on the hunt for people involved in these movements and openly targets them for anti-patriotic views.

6.5.5 Missing Persons

Missing persons is a generic term used in Pakistan to refer to the ostensibly hundreds of persons in Pakistan who have disappeared in conflict zones.

At the end of 2016, it was reported that "nearly 1,000 dead bodies of political activists and suspected armed separatists have been found in Balochistan over the last six years"³⁰ with the blame being placed squarely on various groups including insurgent groups as well as security agencies.³¹

²⁸ Reuters. (2016, August 15). People of Balochistan, Kashmir thanked me: Modi on India's Independence Day. Dawn. Retrieved March 25, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1277670>>.

²⁹ The Wire Staff. (2016, September 15). As Pakistan Talks Kashmir, India Invokes Balochistan Charge at UN for First Time. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from <<https://thewire.in/66047/punched-twice-by-pakistan-at-un-india-invokes-balochistan-charge-for-first-time/>>.

³⁰ Monitoring Desk. (2016, December 30). About 1,000 bodies found in Balochistan in six years. The News. Retrieved March 15, 2017, from <<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/175521-About-1000-bodies-found-in-Balochistan-in-six-years>>.

³¹ Ibid.

The number of missing persons is a contested issue, with a huge gulf between the claims by Baloch activists, human rights bodies and the statistics of the government. As of December, 2016, different parties are reporting wildly different estimates. Baloch groups claims the number is as high as 21,000³² and NGO's place it at 3,500.³³ This is radically different from official numbers, as in February, 2015, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED) informed the Supreme Court that 982 missing persons had been traced in the last four years.³⁴ According to the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED) report, 1,273 cases of enforced disappearances are still unresolved, with only 122 of them belonging to Balochistan.³⁵ Meanwhile, Defence of Human Rights, an NGO that traces missing people, puts the number at 5,149 from all over Pakistan.³⁶

Missing persons remain a thorny issue for the authorities to navigate. Without a proper resolution of the problem, reconciliation efforts will be hampered in Balochistan.

6.5.6 Reconciliation Efforts

The government currently believes that reconciliation and addressing grievances is the best way to appease the Baloch nationalists and to end the conflict in the province. The report presented to the law-makers in the National Assembly by the Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar is fairly vague. Verbatim, it states that "surrender and reconciliation/rehabilitation of absconders/outlaws in progress".

According to one report, some 1,025 militants, belonging to various proscribed outfits, have surrendered before the provincial government during the 2015.³⁷ Whereas in 2016,

In April, 2015, the Chief Minister of Balochistan, Dr. Abdul Malik, also said that a reconciliation strategy had been devised to help mainstream Baloch nationalists.³⁸ The Prime Minister also visited Balochistan in August and launched a "Peaceful Balochistan Plan" to bring angry Balochs back into the fold.³⁹ After a meeting, in October, between the CM and the PM, the CM announced that he would hold a tribal council to meet exiled leaders and persuade them to join the political mainstream.⁴⁰

³² Correspondent. (2015, April 17). Raising his voice: 21,000 missing in Balochistan, says Mama Qa-deer - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/871142/raising-his-voice-21000-missing-in-balochistan-says-mama-qadeer/>>.

³³ <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1303380>>.

³⁴ Malik, H. (2015, February 22). Enforced disappearances: Up to 982 missing persons traced in the past four years - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/842656/enforced-disappearances-up-to-982-missing-persons-traced-in-the-past-four-years/>>.

³⁵ Shah, W. A. (2015, September 14). View from the courtroom: Hundreds of missing persons still untraced. Dawn. Retrieved March 11, 2017, from <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1206866>> <https://www.dawn.com/news/1206866>.

³⁶ Iqbal, N. (2015, January 14). SC seeks report on number of missing persons. Retrieved March 2, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1156658>>.

³⁷ (2016, April 26). 1,025 militants surrendered in Balochistan during past year. Retrieved March 06, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1254551>>.

³⁸ Khan, A. (2015, April 26). Reconciliation plan drawn up for estranged Baloch leaders: CM - The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 06, 2016, from <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/876111/reconciliation-plan-drawn-up-for-estranged-baloch-leaders-cm/>>.

³⁹ Shahid, S. (2015, August 07). Plan for 'peaceful Balochistan' approved. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1198912>>.

⁴⁰ Ali, S. (2015, October 08). Sharif intensifies efforts to reconcile with exiled Baloch leaders. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://nation.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/sharif-intensifies-efforts-to-reconcile-with-exiled-baloch-leaders>>.

Balochistan Minister Nawab Sanaullah Zehri had also met the Khan of Kalat⁴¹ in London earlier in August, 2015, as part of the reconciliation policy.⁴²

Please see [Section 6.9 for a detailed discussion on Balochistan](#).

6.6 Punjab

In 2016 424 fatalities and 186 injuries were reported in Punjab due to violence, which constitutes for approximately 16% of the total violence based fatalities in the country. This was the highest number of fatalities reported in Punjab in the last four years. For reference, in 2015, there were 328 fatalities in Punjab.

6.6.1 Militancy in Punjab

Although the overall situation in Punjab is relatively peaceful as compared to other regions, Southern Punjab is home to two radical sectarian groups. These groups, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, are held responsible for various extremist activities, including religious and sectarian violence. Among their noted accomplishments is Lashkar-e-Jhangvi's participation in the Easter attack on Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park in Lahore, which claimed 72 lives.⁴³

The rise of such groups in the region and the development of potential militancy can be attributed to various factors, including the wide presence of madaris (seminaries). Currently there is limited oversight over the curriculum taught in these madaris, and they are surrounded by conspiracy theories that allege that funding is provided by foreign countries to promote Jihadist principles. The students from these madaris become ideal recruits for existing extremist groups.⁴¹

In its 2016 report titled "Pakistan's Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab", the International Crisis Group provides recommendations to both the Punjab and the Federal government on overcoming the issue of militancy in the region. These recommendations include strengthening and reforming the criminal justice system and using a counter-terrorism approach that targets all militant groups, rather than select ones. There also needs to be a focus on discouraging all activities promoting sectarianism, including action against hate speech, laws that discriminate on the basis of religion and introducing curriculum reforms.⁴¹

Please see [Section 6.10 for a detailed discussion on Punjab](#).

⁴¹ Current Khan-e-Kalat, Mir Agha Suliman Daud, went into self-exile in the United Kingdom after the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 and decided to form a government in exile of Balochistan.

⁴² Shah, S. A. (2015, August 15). Zehri meets Khan of Kalat in London. Retrieved March 04, 2016, from <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1200640>>.

⁴⁴ Article re-printed with author's permission.

6.7 ARTICLE: FATA Reforms: the Political Economy by Imtiaz Gul⁶⁴

Down the Rabbit Hole

In December, 2006, at the height of General (ret'd.) Pervez Musharraf's controversial career as the President of Pakistan, a large meeting was convened. The attendees included officials from FATA, FATA Secretariat (including the Political Agents), SAFRON, and the then NWFP Governor, as well as a number of FATA elites such as ministers and clerics, and a contingent of the military establishment. The President's intent was to put all the FATA stakeholders in one room, and determine the future of FATA. For nearly three days, fiery speeches, ambitious plans and reform proposals bounced back and forth between the political and military elite, the only common thread being universal praise for Musharraf for taking the initiative.

However, the enthusiasm gave way to caution on the third day, when participants universally admonished Musharraf to not tinker with the existing system, lest he was prepared to face catastrophic consequences. Despite days of deliberation and discussion, the group rose, undecided, perhaps to meet another day. One of the Political Agents (PAs) recounted these proceedings to me at the Parliamentarian's Lodges in Islamabad. He was not particularly thrilled about future movement on the status of FATA either, and perhaps understandably so. Military officials, he said, disfavored any changes in the view of the ongoing "religious insurgency".

The military's stake in FATA also came to light in 2009, when a 27-member Committee on Constitutional Reforms deliberated extensively and climaxed with amendments to 105 articles of the federal constitution. However, not one of these applied to Part XII: Miscellaneous – Chapter III: Tribal Areas. Specifically, Article 246 - which geographically defines "Tribal Areas", "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas" and "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" - and article 247 - which gives the President sweeping powers, and excludes these areas from any parliamentary legislation, or legal jurisdiction from the Supreme Court or any High Court - were simply missing from the suggested list.

Representatives from the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) told me in background interviews that the military opposed any discussion on FATA. Jameat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazl-ur-Rehman (JUI-F) members remained vague when asked about FATA. Nearly everyone agreed on the need for reforms, but none had any solutions, and most blamed the GHQ. Military officials, including General Tariq Khan, the then Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, told me the parliamentarians "asked us for our opinion and we told them that the timing was not right". But, he underscored, the military left it to the will of the parliamentarians to do whatever they wanted with FATA.

The net result was that there was not even an "expression of intent with regards to changes in FATA" in the 18th Amendment, passed on April 10, 2010. However, to solely blame the military's manipulation of the FATA reform agenda would be feigning obliviousness to the political economy of the region. This

rabbit hole goes the deeper the more you traverse it.

A Matter of Regulations

In order to understand the political economy of the region, it is important to first take a look at the history and nature of FATA's current status, as well as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).

Historically, FATA has always presented a complex set of judicial and administrative problems. The FCR, formed in 1901, was an evolution of the Murderous Out-rages Regulation of 1867, which gave British rulers, historically unable to establish their writ in the tribal region, powers to prosecute individuals for heinous crimes, such as murder. In 1947, Pakistan not only adopted the FCR, but added the clause that would allow for an individual's arrest without even specifying the crime. Since then, the FCR is almost universally seen as a system of oppression, outdated, ill-advised, and draconic. Over time, the regulation has been amended several times, but never to the benefit of the people of FATA.

The FCR contains 64 sections, most of them ill-intended, but the most detrimental ones are sections 21-30, 32, 34 and 40. Sections 21-30, also known as the Collective Responsibility clause, allow a tribe to be punished for the actions of one member. Section 34 allows for homes and property of the tribesmen to be demolished, if, for instance, the state wishes to acquire that land. Section 32 allows for entire settlements to be burned to the ground. Section 40, perhaps the most abused of all, allows the administration to detain a person, potentially for years, on mere suspicion, and without proof. This also implies that there is no provision for the accused to appeal and prove his innocence under the FCR.

The FCR is also credited with the rise of militancy in Pakistan. Professor Ijaz Khan of Peshawar University believes that as a tool to impose rule of law and improve service delivery in the justice sector, the FCR only became weaker than it already was after 9/11. When the Taliban fled Afghanistan, they came to FATA because there was already a security vacuum due to poor governance, lack of development, with no judicial or administrative system working for the welfare of the people, illiteracy, and anti-state angst, all of which helped the militants make this region their safe haven.

The FCR is also completely silent on women, and affords them no rights.

Understandably, the continuation of the FCR and the lack of progress on the status of FATA only widened the gulf between the citizens of FATA and the federation.

FATA is the only region in Pakistan where the parliament cannot legislate, and the apex courts cannot adjudicate. The area is administered by the Governor (as a representative of the president) of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province, under the supervision of SAFRON in Islamabad. Oddly, the 12 members in the National Assembly and 8 in the Senate from FATA can vote and legislate on bills in any part of the country, but the constituents they represent. They have no technical or political power under article 247 of the constitution. The real power belongs with the Political Agents.

Politically Economical

John Dalberg-Acton, the English Catholic historian, writer and politician once said, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In Pakistan, nowhere is this more evident than the

role of the PAs. Political Agents are a) the symbol of the state's authority, b) the tribal people's advocate, and c) the liaison between the people and the government. The PA serves in three official capacities, a) the titular office, b) district magistrate, and c) sessions judge. He can even impose curfew, reject bail, and hold someone in confinement indefinitely.

Near universally, the PA role is viewed as corrupt officials enjoying unchecked, boundless power. Facilitated and powered by the roughly 35,000 or so Maliks (title-holders/representatives of tribes), the FCR is often used as a fulcrum to exact political vengeance. The elite and rich can easily leverage the FCR as a mechanism to escape punishment (a vote of confidence from four Maliks can prevent detention), and as a tool to eliminate competition, punish enemies, or clear the playing field. It is easy to see how this oppressive and unjust system can be exploited by those with resources and power, and abhorred by youth and the lowest rungs of the socio-economic strata.

The anecdote at the top suggests that the military establishment is adamantly and historically opposed to changes in the status of FATA. They present a formidable blockade against progress on FCR reforms. The 35,000 or so Maliks in FATA, and the elite, including the ministers, the businessmen and other affluent influentials that enjoy a life of luxury and privilege without consequence, also oppose reforms in the region. Finally, the FATA Secretariat and SAFRON are key stakeholders. The Secretariat under the governor, including the seven Political Agents, and their respective staffs (essentially a smattering of super-empowered bureaucrats in Islamabad and Peshawar), have a huge monetary stake in the status quo. The most powerful and vocal of these hail from Khyber and Bajaur Agencies, Bannu (North Waziristan) and D. I. Khan (South Waziristan).

Current Progress

The attempt at FATA reforms is not new. The meeting with Musharraf in 2006, and the constitutional reforms in 2009, are just two examples. In 2010, eleven reforms in the FCR were proposed by the Political Parties Joint Committee on FATA Reforms. These were chided for being invariably chained to government interests. In August 2011, the then President Asif Ali Zardari passed a Presidential Order to amend the FCR. Although minimal in its scope, it is still recognized as the most practical and significant change in the regulation since its inception.

Years later, in May 2014, we at CRSS had another opportunity to discuss FATA, this time through a 20-episode series of TV shows and 60 radio shows - involving about 50 notables such as FATA MPs, businessmen, civil society members, and representatives from mainstream political parties. Ironically, all these discussions yielded a fragmented picture; most of the youth - students, civil society, and younger parliamentarians vociferously advocated for the abolition of FATA's current status. Most of the parliamentarians and businessmen, however, pleaded for a phased, incremental change to the status of FATA through extension of the writ of the Peshawar High Court and the local government elections. Even some of the officials we spoke to also argued that touching FATA in existing circumstances was a dangerous proposition. This mirrors the political economy dichotomy in the previous sections.

Most recently, in September 2015, nearly three months after the FATA Reforms Commission's report, sources indicate that a "step-by-step procedure for merging tribal areas into settled districts" is

underway. To precipitate this, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies from FATA will be merged into PATA. The estimated time for this transition is 8-10 months, and it will serve as a stepping stone for other areas to be brought into the national fold. On the 9th, the 22nd Constitutional Amendment Bill was presented in the National Assembly by FATA lawmakers, proposing amendments to Articles 246/247 to grant full citizenship rights to the tribesmen, extend the reach of apex courts to the region, and the merger of FATA into KP.

The Way Forward

Moong Qabail, the series of media programs CRSS conducted on FATA reforms, brought forth a range of suggested solutions and ideas on how to manage this century-old problem. The series publically and empirically confirmed the sentiment that the people of FATA hold FCR responsible for the ills being suffered, and that it was time it was repealed, reformed, or abolished altogether. The status quo simply cannot continue. The people in FATA may hold the green passport, but the Constitution's Article 247 and the FCR deprives them of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, even though they are afforded to citizens in all other parts of the country. These Federally "Alienated" Tribal Areas are denied their right to life, security, justice and expression.

The abolishment of the FCR presents three options for the status of FATA. FATA could be merged into KP, become its own province, or FATA could run with its own Governor with Central Council, as well as agency and tehsil councils. The 22nd Constitutional Amendment proposes the first of these. Failing this, a plethora of is-sues need to be managed. These include the influence of the political agents, the separation of administration and judiciary, the FATA council, holding local body elections, representation of women, development, education and health facilities and the influence of the government within the ambit of the judiciary.

As it stands, two things seem to be happening simultaneously: the ginger first step of merging two agencies into PATA, and doing away with FCR altogether, and merging FATA into the KP. Both are good news for a people subjugated by over a century of bad governance, archaic policies, and dated regulations, but it must be said that neither is official or expected soon. Most of the older FATA MPs believe in a gradual shift from the current status to mainstreaming of FATA. However, the pull of the forces of status quo is simply much stronger than those who favor comprehensive reform, whereby the law of the land could be extended to the FATA and it could be thus mainstreamed. To turn the tide, a series of mechanisms will need to be deployed to help mitigate the powerful political economy that so vehemently resists any attempt at change.

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6.8 ARTICLE: The Situation in Sindh by Hasan Mansoor

The Sindh home ministry has carried out a study to compare the law and order situation in the province 37 months before the ongoing operation and as many months during the operation, which

showed the law enforcement agencies' efforts had improved the lingering issues.

Officials in the home ministry say the LEAs had carried out 3,458 encounters 37 months before the targeted operations while the number of such encounters was 4,566 during the same period after the continued effort.

Other figures the study suggests are:

Gang busted: 2,139 [before] and 2,600 [after]

'Terrorists' killed: 20 [before] and 367 [after]

Kidnapers killed: 3 [before] and 38 [after]

Extortionists killed: 10 [before] and 31 [after]

The report gave comparative statistics of the last two years regarding street crime in the city.

Some 288 cars were snatched in 2015, which reduced to 174 in 2016 registering 39.58 per cent decrease.

1,351 cars were stolen in 2015 and 1,232 in 2016 showing 8.81pc decrease.

Some 2,732 motorcycles were snatched in 2015 and 2,295 in 2016 showing 16pc decrease. The figures for stolen motorcycles in 2015 was 12,832, which increased by 36pc in 2016 registering the theft of 17,461 motorcycles.

The incidents of snatching of cell phones or cash were 16,684 in 2015, which decreased by 23.9pc in 2016 when 12,697 such incidents were reported.

The Karachi police's performance during the targeted operations since September 5, 2013 shows it killed 367 and arrested 1,246 'terrorists'. Similarly, 10 extortionists were killed and 655 were arrested.

During that period 25 'murderers' were killed and 2,786 were arrested; while 38 kidnapers were killed and 143 were arrested.

A total of 22,190 weapons and 577,947 ammunitions were recovered since the targeted operations have been launched.

A similar report regarding the efforts of Pakistan Rangers Sindh shows it carried out 8,507 combing or intelligence based operations during which it detained 6,693 suspects, who were handed over to the police.

The Rangers arrested 1,393 'terrorists', 915 'killers', 424 extortionists, 104 kidnapers; and recovered 144 hostages or abductees.

It also recovered 10,195 weapons and 588,652 ammunition.

The home ministry has also recorded 'significant' decrease in the crime rate by comparing figures 35 months before and as many months after the operations in Karachi.

The brief analysis shows 34pc increase in police encounters against criminals and militants with 23pc more gangs busted than the figures reflected 35 months ago.

The killing of 'terrorists' show a phenomenal 1,735 per cent increase. Such increase was 1,167pc in the elimination of kidnappers; 210pc in killing of extortionists and 248pc in the elimination of dacoits or robbers.

Similarly, the comparison analysis shows 77 cases of terrorism were reported across Sindh 35 months before the Karachi operation, which decreased by 30pc to 54 after as many months to the operation.

The city saw 6,991 murders 35 months before the operation, which reduced by 41.5pc to 4,097. 'Targeted' killing incidents were 1,245 which reduced by 64pc to 447 now.

Kidnapping for ransom cases reported earlier were 274, which reduced by 33pc to 183. However, the cases of extortion have increased by 32pc from 771 earlier to 1,021 now.

Figures compiled by the home ministry show that the LEAs have killed 282 militants affiliated with Al Qaeda, TTP, BLA, LeJ, Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz, Jundullah (Haji Khalil group), Punjabi Taliban and Daish across the province. LEAs in Karachi killed 220 of them while the rest of them were neutralised by the counterterrorism department (CTD). 171 of them were arrested. Similarly, 86 of sectarian militants were killed across the province of whom LEAs in Karachi killed 77 and eight were killed by the CTD. One of them was killed by Larkana police.

267 sectarian militants were arrested in Sindh, of whom LEAs in Karachi arrested 216, CTD nabbed 30 and police in Sukkur and Larkana arrested one and 20 respectively.

A total of 75 cases were registered against the Baloch Liberation Army, JSMM and other sub-nationalist groups in Sindh in which 176 suspects were arrested.

55 cases were registered in Karachi and as many suspects were arrested. Just three cases were registered in Benazirabad division in which 71 accused were arrested. Similarly, cases and arrests thereof in other four divisions are as under:

Hyderabad: five cases, seven arrests; Sukkur: one case, one arrest; and Larkana: 16 cases, 42 arrests. No case was registered in Mirpurkhas division.

Reports show the police charge-sheeted 180 suspects belonging to militant organisations in 112 cases, in which six cases were decided with the acquittal of 11 suspects. The remaining 169 accused have got bail.

Similarly, 110 cases against 216 suspects were charge-sheeted in the province of which four were decided with the acquittal of 19 suspects while 197 have secured bail.

Regarding the government's effort against the hate speech, officials in the home ministry said police had registered 82,525 cases against the violation of ban on graffiti during the current year, of which charge sheets were filed for merely 546 cases.

Of those cases, they added, just 47 cases had been decided. The police detained 78 persons, of whom 50 were acquitted for lack of evidence and 22 have secured bail. The remaining three persons have been arrested and are in jail.

A dominant majority of the graffiti cases [78,238] were filed in Karachi, of which, charge sheets were

filed for 471 cases and 20 of them were decided. The police detained 47 people of whom 22 have secured bail and as many have been acquitted by the police. All the three persons in the province, who are in jail, belonged to Karachi.

With 4,014 cases registered, Sukkur division is distant second where 64 charge sheets were filed, 23 cases were decided and three were shown as arrested. Some 27 people were in police custody of which 24 were acquitted for no sufficient evidence against them. In Larkana, 209 cases were registered and charge sheets for 11 of them were filed.

Some 39 cases were registered in Hyderabad and 25 in Benazirabad and none of them was charge-sheeted. Mirpurkhas police registered not a single such case. The official report shows 306 cases of hate speech and hate material were registered in Sindh in which 240 persons were arrested.

Some 166 such cases were registered in Karachi with the arrest of 112 persons. 51 cases were registered in Hyderabad and 87 persons were arrested.

The figures for other divisions is as under: Larkana [50 cases, 11 arrests]; Sukkur [32 cases, 24 arrests]; and Benazirabad [seven cases, six arrests]. There was no such action was reported from Mirpurkhas. For violation of sound system act or loudspeaker act, 4,485 cases were registered in the province and 3,712 persons were arrested. 3,079 cases were registered in Karachi only with 2,258 persons were arrested.

The figures for other divisions are: Hyderabad [448 cases, 403 arrests]; Sukkur [453 cases, 528 arrests]; Benazirabad [212 cases, 208 arrests]; Larkana [159 cases, 180 arrests]; and Mirpurkhas [134 cases, 135 arrests].

Officials said the government had got 'appropriate' legislation done in shape of Sindh Sound System (Regulation) Act, 2015 and Sindh Information of Temporary Residents Act, 2015.

However, the effort against 'choking financing for terrorists and terrorist organisations' remained lacklustre. Officials said they registered seven cases under that account – all in Karachi – and charge-sheeted six of them in courts. None of those cases has been decided and 11 persons arrested are in judicial custody.

Proscribed Organizations

Officials have identified 62 banned religious or sectarian organisations active in the province, which included the re-emergence of 35 such groups. They said they had requested the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for more information about them.

Reports said 35 groups, which had gone into hibernation after being slapped with the ban by the federal government, had re-emerged.

Most of those groups [12], said the report, were re-emerged in Benazirabad, the native district of the co-chairman of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party. Besides, six of them were resurfaced in Sukkur, five in Mirpurkhas, three each in Hyderabad and Korangi, and two each in Karachi West, Sujawal and Tando Muhammad Khan.

The government has included 602 persons in the IVth Schedule of the banned organisations in Sindh.

Most of such individuals [221] belonged to the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Khudam-ul-Islam [four], Harkat-ul-Mujahideen [19], Mohajir Qaumi Movement-Haqiqi [three], Pakistan Sunni Tehrik [10], Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan [39], Lashkar-i-Jhangvi [41], Lashkar-i-Tayyba [12], Jaish-i-Mohammad [32], Jindullah [five], Jamat-ud-Dawa [10], Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan [27], Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz [three], Tehreek-i-Jafria Pakistan [20], Lyari gangs [one],

Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslameen [four], Hizb-ul-Tahrir [one], Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat [eight], Al-Qaeda [three], persons categorised as jihadis [18], and 'suspicious persons' of all sects [120].

Most of such persons [395] reside in Karachi, followed by 65 in Sukkur, 55 in Hyderabad, 32 in Benazirabad, 46 in Larkana and nine in Mirpurkhas division.

About the action so far taken against the persons on the IVth Schedule, the report said out of total 602 such individuals, 28 accused had been arrested who were booked in 48 different cases. Some 29 of such cases have been registered in Karachi division alone. Eight cases were registered in Hyderabad, six in Sukkur, four in Benazirabad, and one in Mirpurkhas. No case has been registered in Larkana.

Regarding religious persecution, officials say, all religious places of minority sects had been surveyed and were being provided 'due protection'. They said Hindu Marriages Act 2016 had been promulgated. However, the bill against enforced conversions, passed by the Sindh Assembly has not been promulgated yet and the government's indecision is clear because of the pressure of the religious parties and groups, including the proscribed organisations against the law.

The officials said 2,309 madressahs had been closed for certain reasons they did not elaborate, most of which (910) were running in Hyderabad division. The remaining 7,724 madressahs in Sindh have been geo-tagged. 3,110 of them are in Karachi, 1,291 in Hyderabad, 750 in Mirpurkhas, 1,536 in Sukkur and 1,037 in Larkana division.

Close to a million students are enrolled in the seminaries which included 818 foreigners.

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6.9 ARTICLE: The Situation in Balochistan

by Shehzada Zulfiqar

As compared to 2015, the security forces has received setbacks one after another in the year 2016 that proved deadliest for Balochistan and its people who lost a generation of lawyers and 348 civilians besides 154 personnel of police, Frontier Corps and Army lost their lives in line of duty.

There was no implementation on the twenty points of National Action Plan during the last year as the

security forces stuck to Information based Operations (IBOs) throughout Balochistan against militants both separatists and Islamists. According to the information provided by the security forces, some 1458 operations have been conducted through 2016 in which 174 miscreants mostly separatists were killed while 50 others got injured. However some 502 persons-- 348 civilian, 3 Army personnel (including one captain), 41 Frontier Corps and 110 Police---have lost their lives and 950 others received injuries in the war against terrorism.

However, Balochistan Government has been taking credit for bringing peace and rooting out terrorist activities in Balochistan, but practically terrorists continued to carry out their activities unabated in whole 2016 like they have been doing in 2015. These IBOs yielded results to a great extent against separatists who have been reduced to minor activities against civilian and installations. But they either went underground or are unable to strike hard against security forces and big installations. Similarly banned sectarian organizations also could not make any major terrorist activity during the year except the killing of three Hazara and a Baloch women which is very significant not in term of human loss but in its nature. In five sectarian based incidents 10 people including 4 women were killed.

Some 53 target killing incidents have been reported in which 76 persons were killed as compare to 45 incidents and 77 killings in 2015. In three major suicide attacks in Hospital, Police College and Shah Noorani Shrine, altogether 188 persons have been killed while over 350 got injured. Banned sectarian organizations LJ, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alimi, Jamaat-Ur-Ahrar and Daesh claimed the responsibility for these attacks.

The government has been able to control separatist issue, but failed to tackle Islamist terrorists who probably shifted their focus from other parts of the country to Balochistan. In three major incidents, all suicide, with period of three months, they took full benefit of state machinery weakness, striking in hospital, then police's well-guarded compound of Training College and a shrine in the remotest part of Balochistan.

In 2015, out of 116 cases pending before the court, the government referred 54 to military courts. But neither it could get the cases of those convicted in cases of terrorism expedited for their execution nor implemented as promised in the first point of National Action Plan in the province despite the long standing demands of Shia organizations. Similarly it also couldn't establish a military court announced for Balochistan as these already expired on January, 08 this year after completing two year period. For Balochistan the maiden apex committee meeting held in Quetta in February 2015 with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the chair and presence of former Army Chief General Raheel Sharif, planned a road map for implementing NAP. The plan was with a clear policy of taking cudgel against all terrorists mainly separatists and initiating reconciliation efforts simultaneously with Baloch separatist leaders sitting abroad leading self-exile lives. Besides that an amnesty scheme has been announced with some incentives like monetary benefits, employment opportunities and security for those planning to surrender and their families.

Under the amnesty scheme, half to two million rupees have been announced to be awarded to them-- from a foot soldier to a local commander and area commander---according to their status and influence. It has also been decided to seek extradition of these leaders sitting abroad particularly

those running terrorist organizations like Brahamdagh Bugti, Hairbiar Marri and Zamran alias Mehran Marri. It was announced to confiscate their all moveable and immovable properties in order to freeze finances to their banned organizations. Similarly the federal agencies like FIA, Customs and NAB and Police have been directed to investigate into the funding of terrorists.

The previous government led by Dr. Malik Baloch who stepped down after completing his two and half year term in December 2015 under an NP-PML(N) agreement took some initiatives for negotiation with Baloch leaders, but his successor Nawab Sana Zahri didn't resume it. Malik Baloch had held a very fruitful meeting with Brahamdagh in Geneva while sent Party's delegation to London to Khan Kalat Mir Suleman Daud Khan.

Bugti is said to have put some demands before government of making some measures that may help him return home while Khan Kalat made his return conditional with halting on-going operation, resolving the issue of missing persons etc. The establishment and Chief Minister Zahri took no interest even to consider the demands of Bugti and made a reply to him. Both have been convinced by hawkish elements in establishment as well as in political lot that the already weak separatist movement is about to die so bringing these leaders back is tantamount to put their movement on oxygen.

Brahamdagh was in a vulnerable position as his asylum case has been turned down by Swiss Government, but filed his appeal to higher authorities. He also applied for Indian nationality in case his appeal is rejected in Switzerland. Government of Pakistan requested Geneva to hand over him to it for being involved in terrorist activities in Balochistan, however its request is pending before the authorities there.

As far as rebels popularly known as "Sarmachar" are concerned as compare to 2015, some two hundred rebels has surrendered this year bringing the total number of surrendered Sarmachar are around 800 including 10 to 15 commanders. Like past, federal or provincial agencies didn't show any progress in tracking down the Hawala people or any source helpful in making transactions from foreign agencies or sources to local terrorists. There are reports that some actions have been taken to stop the local farmers to grow crops on the land belonging to Brahamdagh Bugti in Dera Bugti and Bakhtiar Dombki in Lahri area.

Despite repeated wall chalking in favour of Daesh in Quetta on the government buildings close to Chief Minister and Governor Secretariats, provincial government has been denying the presence of Daesh related elements in any part of Balochistan. The claim of responsibility by Daesh in two deadliest incidents of suicide attacks on lawyer's gathering inside hospital on August, 08 jolted the government and its establishment badly. Among Islamic/sectarian banned organizations, TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Aalami and Jamaat Ur Ahrar have been operating in the province for quite some time. The oldest among them are LJ and TTP.

The activists of Pakistani Taliban have also been operating in northern Balochistan bordering Afghanistan and FATA since operation has been launched against them, before and after NAP. They have also been involved in abduction of government and NGOs' officials for ransom. Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan has been involved in sectarian violence in the province and after being banned it was replaced by LJ. Jaish-Ul-Islam, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Aalami and Jamaat-Ur-Ahrar are the names being

used for operational purposes and probably to create confusion in the public that there are a number of such terrorist organizations operating in the province.

During 2015, some literature of banned organizations have been confiscated and shown on media but last year the law enforcing agencies nothing mentioned in this regard. On the direction of government electronic media has completely blacked out their statements and activities while newspapers are forced to carry their claims of responsibility for their activities. The media has been directed not to give coverage to these organizations.

As promised in NAP, NACTA has never been strengthened as anti-terrorism institution during the last two years and the Supreme Court Commission led by Justice Qazi Faez Esa also pointed out the same weakness of the government in this regard. Similarly no counter force has been raised to fight terrorism in the country as well as Balochistan. Although the problem is minor, no step has also made to stop religious persecution in the province.

Regarding registration of Afghan refugees, no step has been taken in this regard to keep them away from political activities and at least have their record. However some measures have been introduced at Pak-Afghan border under the name of border management to check infiltration of miscreants. Baloch parties are opposing census to be conducted in March 2017 in the presence of Afghan refugee who are estimated to be two and an half million in Balochistan. Both BNP Mengal and National Party filed constitutional/ review petitions in Supreme and High Courts praying that unless Afghan refugees are sent back and over a million Baloch IDPs are repatriated in their areas, the census should not be conducted in Balochistan.

On the direction of Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Industries department had registered over 3,000 seminaries in 2015 and 2016 with 180,000 students including 6,000 foreign students. But still it is believed that hundreds of seminaries are yet to be located and registered in far flung areas of the province.

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6.10 ARTICLE: The Situation in Punjab - A Long Way to go by Waqar Gillani

With the completion of two years of National Action Plan (NAP), a 20-point counter terrorism strategy to implement by Pakistani state after deadly attack on Army Public School Peshawar in December 2014, progress on many of its points seems slow, especially, in the largest populated province of Punjab considered as nursery of terrorist and extremists groups where politics and extremist groups seem working hand in glove for one another for political gains.

After every major act of terrorism in the country efforts to act against extremist elements and notorious and proscribed outfits get a renewed resolve but whether Pakistan succeeded against a certain religious mindset, which largely prevails in rural-urban landscape of the Punjab province that still remains a big question in the views of critics. The major reason behind this unfinished agenda and

unanswered question about the implementation of anti-terror National Action Plan (NAP) is consistent lack of interest in having a clear policy about the extremist and proscribed religious outfits and their political patronage that has marred the status of such groups in confusion.

For the past two years, there have been loud calls from progressive political circles and civil society groups at large to take action against the religious groups promoting sectarianism, extremism, hate speech and intolerance in society. However, there have been least actions on the record to fulfill this demand that duly falls under the NAP, consensually approved by civil-military leadership of the country in 2014.

Regarding proscribed organizations, the NAP point three states “Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country” while point seven reads “The defunct outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name. Moreover, point 13 and 14 say “Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely” and “Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.”

Moreover, point five of the NAP calls for “strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance”. Point nine of the NAP calls to “End to religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured, while point 18 urges to deal with sectarian elements.

In Punjab, the biggest concerns are least actions against the extremist outfits, wither proscribed or under observation. Ahl-e-Sunnah Wal Jamaat (a hardcore sectarian – anti-Shiite – group), formerly Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), is banned according to the list of National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), but it is seen socially and politically fully alive. A recent example of this is huge victory of Masroor Nawaz Jhangvi, young son of founder of Sipah Sahaba Pakistan Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who beat the candidate of ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and other mainstream political parties with a huge margin while independently contesting by-election on a provincial assembly seat in Jhang city on December 1, 2016. Masroor is also placed on the list of people under observation by the Punjab government. Importantly, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a militant offshoot of Sipaha Sohaba Pakistan involved in many major terror attacks in Pakistan, belongs to same ideology and now acts through different splinter groups in different parts of the country.

Another left-over issue in the Punjab province is to take action against “under observation” Jamaat-ul-Dawah (JuD), parent organization of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant outfit allegedly involved in backing Indian Kashmir’s freedom movement. JuD denies its links with LeT. One more major extremist faction operational in Punjab is Jaish-e-Muhammad, a hardcore religious outfit promoting Jihad against India in Indian Kashmir. The organization was named behind Pathan Kot airbase attack in 2016 in India. Following the Indian allegations, federal government announced some action against some elements of the organization and banned it publications. Later, after some days, the JeM continued with its publication weekly Al-Qalam. A latest issue (December 23-29, 2016) of this largely circulated weekly Al-Qalam of Jaish-e-Muhammad carries reports and articles against Ahmadis, anti-forced-conversion bill of Sindh government to protect minorities and glorifies killing of Afghan, NATO and American forces in a recent attack by Taliban in Helmand, Afghanistan. One article also condemns Iran, Syria and Russia and supports jihad and IS actions in Syria. Similarly, some religious groups, at a small level, also

condoned killing of Russian ambassador to Turkey supporting the slogan “You kill in Syria, we kill here.”

According to the official data of country's National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), ASWJ is among the proscribed factions and it was banned in 2012. While, its parent organization Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its militant offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Aug were already banned during Pervez Musharraf regime. Moreover, JuD is also under Pakistan and United Nations' watch list. Jaish-e-Muhammad was banned in the NACTA list in January 2002.

According to the established facts in the past, in 2010 Punjab province government, headed by the same present rulers of PMLN, Punjab government published allocation of about \$1m from its fiscal year 2009-10 budget to institutions linked to a charity to JuD which was declared a United Nations terror-blacklist, it has emerged. Punjab law minister Rana Sanaullah officially confirmed these figures saying the money was given on “humanitarian grounds” for the organization's hospital and schools. JuD's four senior leaders were added to a UN sanctions list in December 2008. Similarly, in 2008, Malik Ishaq, leader of defunct Lashkar-e-Jhangvi involved in nearly one hundred sectarian (Shiite) killing and was shot dead in police encounter a couple of years ago, was given financial assistance by the same PML-N government as stipend for his family while he was facing trial in jail. The Punjab government confirmed the disbursement saying it was for his Malik's family.

Another unattended agenda of NAP covering hate material, hate speech, sectarianism, extremism and intolerance, is a consistent campaign against Ahmadi community, which is largely run by Sunni religious factions on more motional grounds rather sensible. A latest example of persistent persecution of this community, declared as non-Muslim through a constitutional amendment in 1974 and pressed through anti-Ahmadi laws in 1984, is attack of a violent Muslim mob in a village in district Chakwal in Punjab province on December 12, while celebrating birth anniversary of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) according to Islamic calendar. The mob attacked the Ahmadi worship place over 20-year-old dispute on the ownership of a mosque under Ahamdi community control and resultantly there was clash between the two groups leaving one dead. No proper action or investigation details have been publicized by the Punjab government yet.

An official data sheet of the Punjab police claims 71,743 search operations and 2,438,863 (2.4 million) persons questioned during search operations from December 2014 to November 2016. While the number of cases registered among these is 12,010, majority later bailed out by the courts. Datasheet further showed that from January 2015 to November 2015, 508 cases were lodged under Pakistan Penal Code for spreading hate material and 590 people were arrested out of them 39 have been convicted by the court, 78 acquitted and remaining cases are pending. While, there have been 518 cases of hate material under Anti-terrorism Act and 650 people were arrested out of them 132 have been convicted and 284 (nearly half) acquitted) with remaining cases as pending. There is no progress report on NAP available on any Punjab government or Punjab Police department websites and limited information is shared after much effort by the subscribers. The statistics merely seem number game and formality, in-fact, rather a practical commitment.

The only major achievement which the Punjab government claims in the line of NAP is killing of terrorists and suspect-terrorists in police encounters. An action which human rights bodies consider extra-judicial and committed without transparent information provided to media and public. According to Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah, the Punjab government has killed nearly 150 “jet-black terrorists” in the past two years including 88 in 2015 including the chief of LeJ Malik Ishaq who was gunned down in a major police encounter along with his two sons and a dozen aides. Many police insiders believe that the killings of the LeJ and other terrorists in Punjab are mostly related to their links with Daesh. There has been no major action against extremist seminaries in the Punjab.

Despite these killings, the terrorist are targeting Punjab from time-to-time. One major attack was suicide blast at the public meeting place of the then Punjab Home Minister Shuja Khanzada, who supervised police encounter against Malik Ishaq. In March 2016, twin suicide blasts killed more than 80 people in a public recreational park in Lahore. There have been attacks on Shiite mosques and Imambargahs. In January 2015, at least eight people were killed in a bomb blast targeting an Imambargah in district Rawalpindi. At least 8 people were killed in a blast near Police Lines in Qila Gujar Singh area of Lahore in 2015. In October 2015, nine people were killed in blast in Taunsa, district Dera Ghazi Khan.

Another major challenge to the Punjab is significant existence of elements related to Daesh (ISIS) in various cities of the province. The Daesh affiliates, working individually and connecting to Daesh through social media according to police, are continuously being spotted in various militancy and sectarianism embedded zones in the past two years. Daesh flags and wall chalking have also been reported in some cities of the Punjab including Lahore, the provincial capital. There have been police claims networks of Daesh broken in Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, and Attock. However, on December 18, 2016, police claimed killing of five terrorists in “encounter” for Daesh links too. More than 50 were arrested in the past few months in connection to Daesh.

It seems evident that the challenge before the ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz and its Punjab government to deal with the problem of militancy and religious extremism remains fully unsettled. Sectarianism and religious fanaticism is still least priority of the government to deal with. Till now, actions of the government are more “curative” rather “preventive” to tackle militancy and extremism in Punjab because there is more radicalism than violent extremism in Punjab which makes theoretical base of the extremist and militant factions active on multiple fronts against humanity. And for this there is no short-term solution except straightly engaging these groups in a debate for change in direction through a counter narrative, which is missing link in the whole official exercise of the NAP.

Waqar Gillani is Islamabad based journalist and works for The News International. He has also contributed to international media - New York Times and Agency France Press. He has done extensive reporting on human rights violations, religion, extremism, security and politics. He can be reached at vaqargillani@gmail.com.

6.11 ARTICLE: NAP in KP – A Ray of Hope

by Imtiaz Gul

Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province has been in the eye of the storm for decades. Its proximity to Afghanistan has had an unusual bearing on it. Beginning with the US-led anti-Soviet Union jihad in the early 1980s and the controversial war against terrorism there after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the province served as the springboard for both US-led interventions in Afghanistan. At the same time KP's geographical location served as another complicating factor; besides sharing a 1350 km border with Afghanistan, it is surrounded by tribal regions known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and the Frontier Regions (FRs). All of them governed by a special set of laws such as Frontier Crimes Regulations.

This unusual geographical proximity to the once virtual “no-go areas” and the Pakistani rulers' thoughtless use of these regions for the anti-Soviet jihad has generated numerous socio-political and economic challenges which gradually eroded and also compromised the quality and authority of civilian law enforcement in the province.

Cross-border militancy, terrorism, religious radicalization, and the presence of several million Afghan refugees were some of the unavoidable consequences arising out of this complex situation in addition to the regional geopolitics.

These factors have cost the province heavily in financial terms too, causing losses worth Rs15 billion ever since the war on terror began unfolding in late 2001.

The terrorist attack on Peshawar's Army Public School on Dec 16, 2014 exacerbated the situation and eventually resulted in the National Action Plan (NAP). Some of the NAP points understandably were directly related to the KP and FATA regions.

NAP and Police

Point 12 of NAP, for example, promised “administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs,” and point 19 spoke of “formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with the registration of all refugees.”

Both issues are directly related to law and order as well governance in the province and thus were a special focus of both the military-led counter-terrorism Operation 'Zarb-e-Azb since June 2014 as well as the provincial government's efforts to restore law and order.

Before this, operations in Swat, Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai and Mohmand agencies brought with them unusual challenges such as the flight of terrorists to urban centres such as Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu and Kohat. They also forced displacement of tens of thousands of people from the FATA and PATA areas. This represented a new challenge to the provincial police, which has been battling terrorists and religious militants, as well as criminal syndicates – all operating out of the FATA and PATA regions.

⁴⁵ CRSS conducted personal interviews with police officers and the Inspector General of Police for the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Nasir Khan Durrani.

This unusual situation required unusual response from the embattled police in the province. And NAP provided the opportunity to the police and other civilian law enforcement to take this fight to a new level.

The KP police especially is facing an unprecedented threat since they had been trained only to deal with common criminals. Now they find themselves confronted with a deadly mix of criminal syndicates and trans-border terrorists. It should come as no surprise that the KP police lost 113 officers between 2105 and 2016, with another 1,000 or so dead since the war on terror began in late 2001.⁴⁵

Provincial police chief Nasir Khan Durrani says the objectives of Zarb-e-Azb and the operational autonomy given to his forces helped align them with the counter-terrorism objectives as well as prepare the police to face the consequences of these operations.

“One of the major ones was the flight of the top leadership of militants and terrorists to Afghanistan and that of their operators to KP's urban areas. Had they not been busted, arrested or killed, they would have wreaked havoc. It required a special professional response and this is what we have tried to do in the last three years or so, Durrani told CRSS, underlining that the trends in 2016 certainly improved as a result of a focus on NAP objectives and the continuation of the Zarbe Azb Operation in some of the FATA regions.

In a series of well-coordinated efforts that accompanied the implementation of the National Action Plan, the provincial government also introduced three new laws to create an oversight for hotels, rented houses and educational institutions: the KP Restriction of Rental Building Act, 2014, the KP Hotel Restriction (Security) Act, 2014 and the KP Sensitive & Vulnerable Establishments Security Act, 2015 (including Education Institutions).

As a whole, professional policing and close coordination with the Pakistan military have helped contain the tide of terrorism in urban centres as the army went about terrorist networks in the tribal areas. During 2016, for instance, incidents of terrorism declined to 190, considerably down from 207 in 2015 and 485 incidents in the year 2014. This was the obvious result of an offensive-cum-defensive strategy that the provincial Counter Terrorism Department adopted. The CTD and police, during the last two years, for instance, carried out 25,448 search operations, detained and arrested 104,227 suspects, seized thousands of arms, ammunition and explosives.

Most importantly, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) succeeded in arresting 1,156 hardcore militants (121 of them with head money) and 738 cases from previous years were traced and sent to courts.

Random raids and checks on rented houses and hotels, for instance, were part of the defensive strategy, which too yielded incredible results. This basically underlines the point that if implemented, the law and strategies can work as effective deterrents. Our performance on the ground is backed by statistics, IG

Durrani said, adding that some 3,101 cases were lodged against the owners and managers of hotels for not verifying the identity of their guests. As many as 22,535 people were penalized for not informing the police about their tenants as required under the KP Restriction of Rented Buildings (Security) Act 2014.

Cumulatively, this strategy helped shield the province against the much apprehended “blowback” of operation Zarb-e-Azb in KP.

In order to build capacity, schools for the police were set up with the existing resources of the police department. They include the School of Investigation, School of Explosives Handling and the School of Tactics. Similarly IT tools and technologies have also been introduced to help develop and maintain a database of hardcore criminals and militants and this has been linked up with the end-user i.e. the police officer in the field. Similarly, other professional units such as the Bomb Disposal Unit, Rapid Response Force and Special Combat Unit have also been raised.

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6.12 Excerpt from Interview with NSA, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Naseer Khan Janjua⁴⁶

Zeeshan Salahuddin (ZS): ...[I]t is clear that Pakistan has scored critical victories against armed militias. But the bulk of these victories have come from military interventions. Do you feel this is sustainable in the long term?

Lt. Gen. (retd.) Naseer Khan Janjua (NSA): This is a collective national effort, taken up by civilian law enforcement, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies, and the ordinary citizens of Pakistan. They form the foundation of this great struggle against extremism and terrorism. We have 220,000 troops committed on the Western border. We have successfully completed Operation Zarb-e-Azb and systemically removed their physical hideouts from Pakistan soil. In Karachi, the urban pacification has resulted in remarkable improvement in crime rates and citizen safety. However, in the long term, obviously this is the job of the civilian law enforcement agencies to maintain the peace and prevent any resurgence. To this end, we need to conduct more organized, intelligence-based, terror-combing operations, reconcile with our neighbors, have the National Directorate of Security [Afghanistan's intelligence agency] and [Pakistan's] Inter-Services Intelligence work in close cooperation, allow the Quadrilateral Coordination Group [Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and China] to continue to build confidence in the region, engage in better border management, extend critical intelligence to Afghanistan and vice versa, eradicate Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leadership in Afghanistan, improve provincial capacity, form the Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) under NACTA, and reform both our police and criminal justice sectors.

⁴⁶ Salahuddin, Z. (2017, Apr 07). Pakistan's National Security Adviser on Counterterrorism. Retrieved April 12, 2017, from <<http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/pakistans-national-security-adviser-on-counterterrorism/>>.

ZS: You spoke about Karachi. Can you tell us a little about Balochistan and Punjab?

NSA: Unrest in Karachi is a part of a bigger, external strategy to destabilize Pakistan. That network is being dismantled, and the success of these endeavors speaks for itself. In this regard, the police forces, the Rangers [Pakistan's paramilitary force], and the people of Karachi must be commended for displaying such incredible resilience and conviction.

Balochistan has also been and is still part of external designs. Balochistan and its beautiful people are very close to my heart, as I have served in the province. There again, we have been able to marginalize the insurgency to a great extent. We have been very lucky that this time, the people of Balochistan have become the biggest stakeholders of peace. They have rejected the terrorism and insurgency. They have realized that they were being misguided and misused. They love Pakistan and want to embrace education, progress, and prosperity as they have refused to live in the past. We are now endeavoring to bring some misguided individuals into the political and national mainstream. They have a few leaders, in self-exile, who serve the interest of certain foreign powers. Reconciliation and mainstreaming is the only permanent solution to this conflict.

Punjab, with all its law enforcement agencies, particularly the Counterterrorism Department, have done extremely well in implementing NAP. To improve the security situation, Rangers have also been provided and soon you will see the situation improve further.