When the Zardari-led Pakistan Peoples– Party swept into power in the Feb 2008 general elections and struck an alliance with Nawaz Sharif Pakistan Muslim League and Awami National Party, it radiated an unusual confidence and hope for qualitative, if not substantive change in Pakistan beleaguered foreign policy.Beleaguered because until then former president, General Musharrafand his cohorts, practically lorded over the entire state including the foreign policy.Shah Mehmood Qureshi¿s appointment as the foreign minister also promised a step forward. But, over three years down the lane, the major contours of the foreign policy remain more or less the same, practically abdication of diplomacy to the security establishment.
During this period, many events and interventions took place which challenged, if not changed, the foreign policy of Pakistan. The major one was the Davis Saga. On January 26, 2011, Raymond Davis, an American official, shot down two Pakistani citizens -armed men- Faizan and Faheem – in Lahore as they were reportedly stalking him for abduction. The US claimedDavis had Diplomatic Immunity but the then foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Quershi, suggested otherwise, and insisted on the law taking its due course.
This was a rareincident when the foreign office officials were united in fighting out any pressure from the governments. The resistance was short lived as Davis was bailed out followinga pardon granted by the affected families in return for a Diyya (blood money) of $2.4million. When Qureshifell out with the government over the issue in March, it delivered a stinging reminder that the war on terror and its consequences had left little space for the ministry of foreign affairs to conduct its defined task.At the same time, the Davis saga also reinforced the perception about the deep impact of the security establishment on matters that are foreign.
Davis was released on March 17th butQureshi practically lost the job for disagreement with President Zardari over the same issue. It was no coincidence. Qureshi had already been seen as mouth-piecing the security establishment view on Afghanistan and the United States. And immediately after President Obama publicly censured Pakistan for ‘holding an American diplomat in violation of the Geneva Convention,’ the establishment stiffened further and put its foot down for a solution not entirely on the American terms.
This particular incident also exposed the limits of the civilian government led by Zardari, who most probably finally realized the futility of charting a new path in foreign relations.This in fact was the latest in the litany of setbacks that Zardari and colleagues received on the foreign front.Earlierin late July 2008, shortly before embarking on his first tour to Washington, when Prime Minister Gillani ordered that the Inter-Services– Intelligence (ISI) be put under the Interior Ministry. Gillani had to revoke that order immediately after landing in the US capital, once he received the army highcommand’s displeasure over this move. This wasaglimpse of the influence the establishment has on state affairs.
And on September 9 the same year, Zardari caused several ripples within the military establishment, when, after taking oath as the president, he announced in the presence of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai that ‘you will soon good news about Kashmir, probably before the end of the month’ The statement, made on the longest running issue between India and Pakistan, took most by surprise but faded away as a mere bluff at best forreasons not difficult to envision.
The reversal of Gillani decision to send the ISI chief Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha to help investigate the November Mumbai attacks was another embarrassing moment for the civilian government, and again exposed the limits to which it can exercise authority on matters that relate to India. The presence of the Army chief, Gen.Kayani in the two rounds of the so-called strategic dialogue with the United States, too, explained the influence that the military establishment wields on the foreign policy.
All these setbacks essentially seem to have prompted Zardari and Gillani to abdicate foreign affairs in favour of the military establishment, which continues to deeply influence, if not control, the dealings with the United States, India and Afghanistan. The appointment of the inexperienced Hina Rabbani Khar, the youngest to hold the office, also illustrates the government resignation with the fact that it hardly matters who wears the cap of the foreign minister. If the army holds sway over this ministry final decisions then what is the point in agonizing over foreign affairs, so runs the argument in the PPP circles.
Therefore, one is tempted to conclude, that the PPP has no real foreign policy, and has largely relied on the establishment definition of relations with key countries i.e India, Afghanistan, the United States and China.Although the president has taken upon himself to rejuvenate relations with Iran, Turkey, Central Asia and China, few tangibles are visible as of now and particularly the China part is seen more as bilateral business and investment promotion than foreign policy ventures.
But, one must admit,thereis also somesilverlining on the horizon as well; firstly, the dialogue with India seems to be well back on track, and presumably with the blessing of the General Headquarter (GHQ). Secondly, relations with the United States seem to be on the mend after the mayhem that Osama bin Laden elimination, in his compound in Abbotabad, on May 2nd caused. Thirdly, President Hamid Karzai stands more inclined towards Pakistan than ever before. Fourthly, civil-military relations with China continue to prosper to the backdrop of Pak-US tensions over Afghanistan and the Haqqani network.
All this seems to result from a greater synchronization of the military- civilian positions, albeit out of an over-riding, short-term expedience. This means the Pakistani leadership now speaks probably in unison over issues mentioned above, essentially a reiteration of the policies defined and designed by GHQ.The pro-active engagement with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan and China, however, underlines a new dimension of diplomacy i.e. attempts to secure more energy from Iran and Central Asia through diplomatic forays.
The growing energy needs of the country necessitate the need for the realization ´ as soon as possible – of the Iran-Pakistan and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipelines. And the real test for Zardari-Gillani diplomacy hinges on whether they can circumvent the Saudi and American opposition to deals with Teheran. Getting India on board for both projects represents another challenge to the Pakistani diplomacy, and that would be the litmus test of the civilian government ability to successfully wade through the complex cobweb of conflicting interests. Creating its own narrative ´ independent of the traditional military outlook – on key foreign policy issues remains a big challenge for the civilian government. Surmounting that challenge requires moral authority and that comes only with unassailable commitment and moral integrity that is missing at the moment.