Kashmir, Kashmir and Kashmir:
Kashmir is in the news again. With over 100 deaths, the valley of Srinanagar has been in grip of protests, police violence and public unrest since May. This also seems to have prompted India to express interest for resuming dialogue with Pakistan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly some time next month. But will this change the substance of the bilateral relationship?
Even a cursory look leads to the conclusion that terrorism sits deep at the heart of the Indo-Pak relations. India remains convinced, and therefore focused, on Lashkare Taiba, which it believes is the prime source of terrorism on the Indian soil including Kashmir. In fact, India gradually revised its characterization of the violence in Kashmir in early 1994, from militancy to Terrorism, after ‘the guest organization’ LeT unleashed their militant campaign in Kashmir, along-with other guest organizations such as Harkatul Mujahideen.
Terror Attacks always Derail the Indo-Pak Peace Process:
Theattack on the Indian parliament (13th December 2001) and the Mumbai carnage (Nov 26th, 2008) not only reinforced that characterization but also stands out today as the stumbling bloc in the way of resumption of formal talks between the two countries.
A multitude of factors in fact bedevils the bilateral relationship, and thus obstructing almost every move to peace and joint counter-terrorism strategies, terrorism being the centrepiece of the Indian argument.
The deadlock on the dialogue stems not only from the Indian conviction that Pakistan security establishment supports the LeT and Jaishe Mohammad; it also draws strength from New Delhi belief that the Pakistani establishment continues to back non-state actors against the Indian state, and thus remains a rogue army, a source of violence and instability in Kashmir and rest of India. And the US establishment in particular also views the Pakistani security apparatus through the Indian prism, a fact explained through the fact that almost every visitor from Washington or elsewhere invariably asks about the fate and the status of Lashkare Taiba (Jamaatud Dawa).
During a lecture on the US-Pakistan-China relations at Islamabad on Sept 21s, renowned American scholar Stephen Cohen also underscored the need for the Pakistani authorities to “delegitimise and disarm” that are operating across the 750-km Line of Control (that divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan) and the 2560 km Durand Line (the Pak-Afghan border).
View from Pakistan:
This view on the Pakistani establishment practically scuttled the 2004 proposals on a joint anti-terror mechanism. Cooperation in countering terror networks prerequisites bilateral trust. Another must is an irritant-free, if not dispute-free environment, which it is not. This strained bilateral relationship has trilateral dimension, with Afghanistan serving as the third component that fuels the Indo-Pak tensions and concerns. The Afghans apply more or less the same yardstick to measure Pakistani policies as the Indians do; the nexus between the establishment and some Taliban factions, the Haqqani Network, Mulla Omar and Hikmetyar in particular, they claim, are still under the Pakistani protection.
All three i.e the Indians, the American and the Afghans lump the LeT with the TTP, Lashkare Jhangvi and Al Qaeda when making a case that Pakistan abets terror outfits. For instance, almost every body from outside keep asking as to why is the government not moving against the Punjabi Taliban. Little do the outsiders try to understand that the government (the army) moved against all those groups which challenged the writ of the state (Swat, South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber are cases in point).
Kashmir is a Must:
Continued unrest in Kashmir also comes in the way of peace and counter-terror cooperation. While most in Pakistan view this with concern and many also feel vindicated that ‘the Kashmiris are unhappy with New Delhi,’ India blames it on separatist militants which it says are backed by the Pakistani security apparatus.
The latest unrest in Kashmir has triggered alarm as well as critcialanalysisin the United States as well. In his latest review article Steve Collhas also underscored the need for a pro-active American role in nudging India and Pakistan towards a peaceful resolution, for accountability of the Pakistani security establishment as well as the need to adress the Pakistani concerns both sides of its borders. Coll also recals Barack Obama’sJuly 2008interview with Joe Klein ofTime magazine, in which Obama acknowledged that Kashmir disputed territory was ‘obviously a potential tar pit diplomatically. ‘
Coll quotes from Howard Schaffer book “The Limits of Influence, America’s Role in Kashmir’ saying that in 1956, President Eisenhower wrote identical letters to the leaders of India and Pakistan, urging them forward. In the absence of a Kashmir settlement and the removal of other obstacles to normalized Indo-Pakistani relations, Eisenhower wrote, ‘the peaceful, progressive economic development which each nation desires…cannot succeed.’ That has not changed, says Coll.
But now, India Needs to Do More:
The conclusion drawn in the August 30th edition of the TIME magazine is quite instructive. While summarizing the volatile conditions in Kashmir, it says ‘A repeal (of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), a law that gives security forces broad leeway to operate in Kashmir without fear of oversight or prosecution) will require the kind of political courage that New Delhi has yet to show in the region. If it continues with the same old strategies ¶ blaming Pakistan for stirring trouble, imposing curfews and superseding talks with bloody crackdowns, it will engender the same cycles of violence.
In other words, the only effective response to this new generation of Kashmiri stone pelters may well be a new generation of Indian statesmen, argues the TIME special report.
And in fact the last line contains the catch for any progress forward as far as Indo-Pakistan peace is concerned; a new generation of Indian statesmen.
Both sides certainly need thinkers, if not a new generation to embark on the way to cooperation. While Pakistan reels under the dire effects of the counter-insurgency ´ a fledgling economy, an instable political government, and an army establishment that is exhausted and stretched to the hilt ( war on terror as well as the unusual preoccupation with the post-flood relief and recovery operations), the Indian establishment refuses to review its analysis of the Pakistani establishment.
Indians Lost a Historic Opportunity to Move Forward:
When an all-powerful General Musharraf laid open all his cards and invited New Delhi to think out-of-box on Kashmir, the Indians got cold feet, saying they would rather deal with a civilian government. When the civilians (returned to power in February 2008) found the going tough because of the establishment reservations on their India-policy, the Indians once again retreated into a wait-and-see mode, saying the government is too weak to deal with.
It is a dilemma on both sides that seems to have stymied forward movement. In the words of noted American scholar Micahel Krepon, ‘The Army is taking on one group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan that has blown up mosques, markets and military installations, at significant cost. Other outfits, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its parent organization, are inconvenienced only after major explosions in India. They are poison to Pakistan’s political and economic development, posing a threat to the state but they are also likely to become the Pakistan Army’s allies in the event of an Indian attack triggered by their actions. The longer this dilemma continues, the harder it becomes for the Pakistan Army to address.
India, on the other hand, faces the dilemma of indecision as to who should they talk to. It shall have to concede that the Indo-Afghan influence in Kabul and their alleged role in Balochistan does constitute a legitimate concern for the Pakistani establishment, as much as the alleged Pakistani involvement with groups operating across the Line of Control (Kashmir) and the Durand Line (Afghanistan) serves as the major source of concern for New Delhi and Kabul. Unless both sides recalibrate their positions on issues of concern to each other, this relationship will remain dogged and beset with suspicion and acrimony.