Division of water resources:
Partition of the sub-continent in 1947 divided the largest contiguousirrigation system within theIndus Rive, while many of the canal head-works remained withIndia. The ad-hoc division led to a serious water conflict, when India stopped the water supply toPakistanon April 1, 1948.The World Bankfacilitated negotiations between India and Pakistan, backed with technical expertise. The resulting agreement, known as theIndus Waters Treaty(IWT), was signed in 1960. Under this treaty, Pakistan obtained exclusive rights to use 135 million acres-feet (MAF) of the water of the Indus,Jhelumand the Chenab. India retained the rights to use 33 MAF of the three eastern rivers: Ravi,Beasand Sutlej. The Bank also created theIndus Basin DevelopmentFund (IBDF) of $895 million for Pakistan to develop dams and link canals on the three western rivers. (India contributed $174 million to the IBDF.)
India developed better:
Under a comprehensive master plan for the utilization of its allocated share of the water, India constructed link canals and dams having a storage capacity of 17 MAF. In Punjab state alone, this resulted in a 54 percent increase in the sown area. Canal water supplywas supplemented by simultaneous installation of tube-wells supported by power supply throughhydroelectric projectson the rivers. This transformed Punjab and Haryana, once deficient in food grain, in to India ‘¿bread basket’ in the mid-1970s.
…and Pakistan did not:
In Pakistan, on the other hand, poor water management policies led to salinity and water-logging problems. Meanwhile, due to high sedimentation, the three dams on the Pakistani side have seen their storage capacity go down from 16 MAF to 12 MAF. At the same time, Pakistan allowed 35 MAF of water to escape into the sea every year. Pakistan storage-to- water-flow ratio is only 11 percent, against India 52 percent on the allocated eastern rivers.
India hydropower potential utilization better:
India has a hydropower potential of 150,000 megawatt and is ranked fifth in the world. With the focus of India hydroelectric policy on the eastern rivers, the country has developed hydroelectric projects of about 12,500 MW, or almost 80 percent of the total potential of the eastern rivers basin. These hydro projects are mostly inHimachal Pradesh, which is now ranked as the second-richest state because of its supply of cheaphydroelectric powerto other states. (In contrast, the Brahmaputra Basin, which has the potential of 66,000 MW, has remained relatively untapped because of India priority to the harnessing of its eastern rivers.)
…and Pakistan did not:
After the IWT, India achieved the capacity of 4,181 MW on theRiver Beasalone, which is only 470 kilometers long. In comparison, the Pakistani rivers yield only 5,200 MW, against the identified potential of 38,000 MW. In 2002, the ministry of water and power set a deadline i.e. 2006 for adding new hydel-power projects with a capacity of 1,350 MW. But it could add only 81 MW after seven years. That is why Pakistan currently, faces a severe energy crisis, with at least 3,500 MW gap between supply and demand. But instead of accelerating the pace of on-goinghydropower projects, it is buying the bulk of electricity from IPPs (independent power plants). IPP thermal plants are the most expensive option and have a high environmental cost. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) buys electricity from IPPs at the Rs16 per unit while hydropower hardly costs Rs0.60 per unit.(One US Dollar = 82 Rupees).
Pakistan Planning Commission did not plan well:
The Planning Commission and the implementing bodies have delayed the development of hydropower, and given advantage to India on the Indus basin. According to the IWT, the country, which first completes its project on a river will get the complete rights of that river.
…but India has:
India planning commission has prepared a roadmap for acceleration of economic development, with a 50,000 MW hydroelectricity initiative and a plan to develop 16,000 MW inKashmiron the western rivers of theIndus Basin. According to IWT annexes India can store water on its western rivers for several purposes, including for hydropower, but only up to 0.40 MAF on the Indus, 1.50 MAF on Jhelum and 1.70 MAF on Chenab basins. Nevertheless, this overambitious plan can potentially lead to conflict between the hostile neighbors. Talks to clarify such sticky issues are essential, but making little headway.
Contrary to common belief, Indus Water Treaty is a success:
To settle disputes promptly, the Indus Water Commission (IWC) was established.. The objective of the commission is to provide a platform for better coordination and exchange of all hydrological data. This includes daily discharge data of river and tributary flows at all observation sites, daily rainfall, snow, and data of irrigated cropped area as defined in the catchments of the three western rivers in Indian Held Kashmir. The commission has been given the right to devise its own procedures for building trust. Unfortunately, even after 49 years this institution has failed to build the capacity to settle the disputes and to develop a fair, transparent mechanism of enforcement of the treaty.On the face of it, the IWT has been a success an honest broker in the IWT. Even today, the Bank supports a series of trans-boundary water issues with diligence and unbiased reporting for all stakeholders of shared waters.
Yet, the level of Indo-Pak rivalry and mistrust on the one hand, and the increasing demand for water on the other, requires a much more effective, stronger and credible mechanism to address the bilateral water disputes. The commission must reinforce real-time monitoring technologies to check the status of water quality and quantity. International bodies such as theWorld Bankought to help revise the Indus Water Commission to prevent any serious conflict between the two nuclear-armed south Asian neighbors.