Much Activity, Less Delivery:
Late last week Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the US commander General David Petraeus, the American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio. Officials touted theirmeetings with Gen.Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials as well as the civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet, the surge in violence and an extremely low turn out in the Afghan parliamentary election two days lateron Saturday, betray the bitter ground reality; Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated for failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of the US high-handed approach andPakistanitself is struggling with the consequences ofan over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Getting nowhere is the sense from all stakeholders, and it also suggests things for them all have gone from bad to worse.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the day centered more on money and military muscle and less on long-term strategies.
Pakistan and the US do not Trust Each Other:
Interestingly, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad,the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several, previously secret documents (Sept.13) which shed considerable light on the ups and downs of the US-Pakistan relationship since the 9/11 attacks as well.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistanin the aftermath of the tragic terror events of 9/11, bothWashingtonand Islamabad hardly trusted each other.
Equally revealing are some remarks and warnings contained in discussions between former ambassador Wendy Chemberlin, Richard Haas, Pakistani intelligence officials and (unnamed) sources.
‘We will not flinch from a military victory…but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now,’ former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told the US ambassador in Islamabad Wendy Chamberlinon September 23rd, according to a 12-page, document ‘Islamabad 5337 .’
Gen. Mahmud, whom Gen. Musharraf had sent on premature retirement along with General Muzaffar Usmani under Washington pressure, expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had “bluntly” ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban, saying the time for it was finished as of September 11, ” the memo suggests. Gen. Mahmud also requested the ambassador “not to act in anger.’
New US Strategies are not Working:
Viewed against the bloody cycle of violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems a little over nine years since the US and allies unleashed the war on al Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban, history seems to have moved full circle. Outraged US authorities had then snubbed Pakistani officials– requests for patience and dialogue. Today, all stakeholders including the frustrated Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai and senior US officials are exploring ways to reconcile or “flip” Taliban militants as well as stem the tide of radicalism.
American Arrogance Led Pakistan into Trouble:
In retrospect, though, one wonders as to how things would have looked had the angry American leadership heeded Pakistan calls. But the consequences for Pakistan since October 2001 have been nightmarish; particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-US appeal. and trained in the remote FATA regions have swelled the ranks of radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi, and hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel ´ all in the name of Jihad against the ‘infidels occupying Afghanistan.’
In another memo, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned as far back as in 2005 that ‘if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would “lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom) intervention” in 2001.’
‘The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the “four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government,” Neumann had said, according to the declassified documents released by the NSA.
And the sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his secret dispatches to Washington wasobviouslythe FATAlands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their humiliating defeat by the US-led coalition.
The memos basically explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 sq. kms turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially “the tribes in (FATA regions) were overawed by U.S. firepower” after 9/11, provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in but quickly again became “no-go areas” where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
Failure in Afghanistan Turned FATA into the Militants– Den:
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them intointernational limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn–t inspire much for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a dispassionate, selfless broader view of the situation that must be embedded in ground realities, rather than driven by concerns and considerations of one or two of them.