The year 2011 is likely to go down in history as a watershed in the Pakistan-US relations. The relations touched an all-time low with the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO-attack from Afghanistan on Nov 26th, triggering a series of events which suggest that continued US-NATO pressures have unintentionally invited an unusual show of unity betweeen Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership. Here is a special Post penned by Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director, CRSS, on the subject:
Pakistan remains in the eye of the storm. It continues to be the subject of speculation and controversies revolving around the alleged nexus between its security apparatus and some of the Al Qaeda-linked militant groups. Its rather stern response to 26/11 ´ an over two-hour intermittent NATO attack on one of its 890 border posts in the border region that left two dozen Pakistani soldiers dead ´ has further fueled the western coalition’s frustrations. This response climaxed with a two-day Envoys Conference in Islamabad on Dec 13th.
After the conference, the message that came out of the hurriedly called gathering, also addressed by Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, sent out a message that practically amounts to a redefinition of the decade-old counter-terror cooperation with the United States; Pakistan will not accept transgression of its territorial integrity under any circumstances and its cooperation with US/Nato/Isaf is based on respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, was the unanimous view of ambassadors who had been summoned from various capitals to discuss the post 26/11 situation.
‘Under no circumstances, could Pakistan accept flagrant transgression of our territorial frontlines. This remains the base line and there can be no compromise on our sovereignty, dignity and national honour,’ PM Gilani told the concluding session.
The envoys unanimously called for a complete recast of cooperation with Washington, and also recommended scrapping agreements and understandings made during the rule of former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf. Reducing reliance on American aid was also among recommendations that are likely to be firmed up at the ministry of foreign affairs shortly.
All Pakistani diplomats present on the occasion also underlined the need for answers to ‘disturbing questions’ that Pakistan own investigations into the Mohmand raid have raised. The US administration hopes to complete its own enquiry into the tragic incident by Dec 23rd.
Several administrative steps had preceded the conference to underscore Pakistan protest over the controversial NATO raid on the Pakistani check post in the Mohmand tribal region; those include suspension of the food, fuel and construction materials– supplies via Pakistan, eviction of the CIA-led drone-operating units from the Shamsi airbase, cancellation of all high-level trips to the United States, preparation for installation of new air-defense systems on the 2,560 km long western border with Afghanistan.
The suspension of NATO cargo has resulted in a pile-up of thousands of Afghanistan-bound food and fuel containers at various locations, bringing these supplies to a halt, jeopardizing at the same time several thousand jobs in the trucking industry as well.
On December 11th, last of the US C130s took off the Shamsi airbase, ending thereby almost a decade of drone operations into Pakistani border regions ´ case in which a Pakistani facility was being used to kill Pakistani citizens, though most of them perceived to be harborers of al Qaeda-linked terrorists.
Now, the demand for a complete review of ties with the United States, made at the ambassadors– conference where top military leadership also sat by, reflects a new emerging reality about the civil-military relations; since May the 2nd US Navy SEALs– raid on Osama bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, the embattled army has increasingly taken cover of the civilian government to stay relevant and seek political legitimacy for its Afghanistan-related policies. Not only did the army chief and his deputies attend the unusual May 13th joint parliamentary session, that had been convened to discuss the fall-out of the US raid, until mid-night.
Earlier, the civilians and the army top brass had also appeared together at an All-Parties Conference (APC) on Sept 29th to the context of a crisis that Admiral Mike Mullen, former US army chief, had kicked up a week earlier by leveling extremely serious allegations against Pakistani intelligence apparatus. The message then was also one of unity and renewed rejection of the American pressure on the counter-terror front.
Once again on Dec 13th, the civilian stamped a policy that is generally perceived to have been devised by the General Headquarters (GHQ) south of Islamabad after the NATO attack on the Pakistani security check post.
The Obama administration as well as NATO commanders in Afghanistan probably had probably miscalculated the Pakistani response to this attack as well as to the incessant pressure out of Washington, and thus refused to offer an apology. Even President Barack Obama phone call to his counterpart in Islamabad, Asif Ali Zardari, remained restricted to condolences for the 24 soldiers.
Also, General John Allen, the US head of the NATO forces in Afghanistan, rang up General Ashfaq Kayani on Dec 13th to offer ‘regrets ‘ over the Salala Check post attack. But Gen Allen also refrained from apologizing over an incident that has clearly sent the Pak-US cooperation in a spin ´ for the time being at least.
Top military as well senior foreign ministry officials insist that the killing of two dozen soldiers in an extremely controversial attack left them with little choice but to suspend dealings with the United States for the simple reason that ‘we had no face to show to the aggrieved families, nor could we convince other soldiers to continue fighting a war that many within and without the garrison still refuse to consider as theirs.’ This sentiment clearly runs high not only within the armed forces but also at the grass-roots level, where the ruling elites– argument ‘ we cannot confront the United States ‘ has increasingly been questioned. The moot point for detractors is the loss of over 38,000 civilian and security lives, an extremely volatile security situation, and Pakistan branding as ‘the most dangerous place’ of the world.
Most Pakistanis meanwhile wonder as to whether a relationship constantly beset by mutual mistrust, and marked by ‘high-handed ‘ American approach , is worth continuing at all.
If we are damned after sustaining so many losses in over ten years, why then stay part of this endeavor, so runs the argument.
As a whole, the year 2011 probably will mark a watershed in the chequered US-Pakistan relations ´ precipitated on the one hand by US-NATO frustrations in Afghanistan, and by the unauthorized raid on the bin Laden compound in May followed by the Nov 26th attack on the security check post on the other.
This will amount to as much a defining moment for the Pak-US relations as 2o11 for the American-led counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (according to Leon Panetta, the US Defense Secretary).
As long as the US administration, and its mighty security establishment attempt to pursue Afghanistan reconciliation their own way ´ whereby they want to pursue talks with Mulla Omar Taliban but demand of Pakistan to crackdown on Omar deputy Jalaluddin Haqqani ´ the mission in Afghanistan will remain beset with pot-holes, fraught with frictions with Pakistan, and thus remain a hot-bed of instability. With the latest turns and twists in Islamabad view on Washington, the situation hardly promises any substantial change in the weeks and months ahead. But the rocky relations with Washington seem to have forced Pakistan military and civilian leadership closer to each other, with the military continuing to project power and authority.