Pakistanis at large are currently struggling with, and reeling under various narratives about the genesis and causes of the simmering socio-political radicalization. They also differ on the way out. While almost all agree that the decline largely began with the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan and the world reaction to it i.e. USA-led Jihad [holy war], the analysis of course of events thus far varies from party to party.

This narrative is split between components of former Muttahidda Majlis-e Amal (MMA) on the one hand, Awami National Party [ANP], Pakistan Muslim League [PML] (almost all factions) and the civil society, on the other. The military establishment has its own narrative.

The Religio-political narrative:

Let us examine them one by one; the cracked MMA brands the USA-led counter-insurgency as ‘an unjust war against Muslims,’ and keeps ranting about the need for stopping it. They are also the main apologists for various shades of the militants i.e. Taliban including the TTP [Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan], and those based in North Waziristan led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur. None is vocal in condemning the suicide bombings and other forms of violence, usually claimed by the TTP. With their skewed version of jihad and their self-serving views on the West, these religio-political operatives easily mislead ignorant, illiterate people as well, by creating a romance around the terms such as jihad, Taliban and mujahideen [holy fighters].

These parties also play on the common sentiment by taking a dig on the US drone strikes on targets in the Waziristan region [a semi-controlled tribal area which is stronghold of Taliban]. This, they say, is an assault on Pakistan sovereignty. Rightly so, there is little disagreement. But what these apologists of religious militancy shy away from is the infringement on Pakistan sovereignty by organizations such as Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU].

By turning Pakistani territories into their sanctuaries and training grounds, these trans-boundary entities have not only violated Pakistan sovereignty, but also brought misery upon the residents of these areas, and disgraced this country image. These foreign components of militant Islam thus deserve as much condemnation as the controversial US drone strikes.

The ANP side of story:

Unlike the MMA components, the self-styled secular Pashtoon-nationalist Awami National Party condemns the religiously-colored militancy. It supports the drone strikes but insists that the Pakistani establishment is still in cahoots with certain strands of Taliban. They think the establishment is the source of all ills in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and hence wouldn–t mind if it is disbanded (a desire former Indian defense minister George Fernandez had also once expressed).

Many of the ANP zealots, in public meetings, even go to the extent of using dirty superlatives to deride the establishment which they insist doesn–t want stability in Afghanistan. In the same breath they insist the Pakistani wants to treat Afghanistan as its satellite, and thus still trying to stoke unrest. One wonders how a state or one of its institutions can think of controlling something (say Afghanistan) which is beset with violence, devoid of governance structures, and hopelessly polarized. If you were to believe the ANP narrative, this would set out the establishment as a mindless robot, with a fixed program that continues to function and is oblivious to what is happening around it.

Essentially, the ANP ideologues continue to harp on a narrative that is rooted in Bacha Khan dream of a Pashtoonistan, a dream that his son Khan Abdul Wali Khan, had continued to nurture until his death. The best relations that had existed between the ANP leadership, Kabul, Moscow and New Delhi, in the 1970s until recently is a living, documented testimony to the struggle for Pashtoonistan. The turn-around most probably came about in July 2007, when Asfandyar Wali, chief of ANP, and some other ANP leaders had a two-month long tour of the United States, leading to a change of heart.

It is quite an unfortunate scenario in which the top-tier ANP leadership enjoys the fruits of power and rubbing shoulders with the US military and civilian leadership but doing little to inject some sort of sense into the minds of younger ANP workers, who still parrot what the senior leadership used to do sitting in Kabul and Moscow.

Pakistan Muslim League narrative:

As far the various factions of the Pakistan Muslim League leaders, most of them largely sing the MMA narrative i.e. down with the US, stop the drones, leave Afghanistan, and stop the genocide in Afghanistan. For them too, the foreign troops– operations in Afghanistan and their local supporters (such as Pakistan army) are conniving in the killing of innocent civilians both sides of the Durand Line [border between Pakistan and Afghanistan]. Most of these leaders, too, wouldn–t speak out against the Arab-led al Qaeda operating nestled within Pakistani territories.

The Military thinking:

As far the military establishment, its narrative revolves around what Gen. Kayani has been saying since he took over; the army remains committed to conclusively defeating militants that are hurting Pakistan interests. He reiterated the commitment recently (May 19) during the meeting with the US National Security Advisor Gen. Jim Jones in Islamabad. The General says army favours no group, and will take on all those who will harm Pakistan interests.

The Jihadist ideas:

The presence of outfits such as Jamaatud Dawa or Jaishe Mohammad or Harkatul Mujahideen [Jihadi organizations once involved in Kashmir] in the Punjab hinterlands with tentacles in Waziristan, however, caste ominous shadows on the army narrative. Many a people ask as to why mosques and madaris [religious seminaries] affiliated with these organizations continue to survive and thrive?

The army says it has nothing to do with these institutions. The civilian administration in Punjab and elsewhere argue they have little control over them, and thus nothing happens, and the state of Pakistan continues to suffer because of the presence and activities of these entities ´ all of whom officially banned since January 12th, 2002.

Ordinary Pakistani is confused about the real narrative:

What is the reality, and which narrative to believe, is a big question facing us all.

It most probably requires the civilian leadership to evolve a consensus Pakistani narrative, rather than the ones coming from different sources.

If everybody is committed to Pakistan why shouldn–t they be able to rub off clichés, erase skewed and prejudiced versions of the recent history (say since 1973), and develop a narrative that is acceptable by all? If the political leadership can bring this about and owns it, why should outsiders be able to impose their whims and wishes on this country? This, however, is possible when the entire leadership acts with integrity and a determined sense of Pakistani-hood.