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National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) – A Critical Review

by Saddam Hussein

 

NACTA’s Inception

Pakistan had remained at the centre stage of Cold War and experienced rise of extremism and terrorism – tracing back to the commencement of Afghan War in December 1979. The contemporary evolution of extremism and terrorism can be distinguished in two distinct phases based on their peculiar features and characteristics. The first phase can be referred to the era of upheavals starting from 1979 – 2001, paving the way for fanning militant extremism, and a number of individuals sought violent means to promote extremist narratives for their vested interests. Second phase started with the beginning of Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks. The second and on-going phase involves the challenge of countering militant extremism spilling over from the previous era. These two phases have created lasting rifts and fault lines within our society and developed extremist mind-set which will take time, efforts and resources for the reversal. In both these eras significant damage in terms of human and material losses has been witnessed in the country.

In this backdrop, a need for an institution dedicated to counter terrorism and extremism in Pakistan – which can act as a focal body, fully equipped to draft and implement national counter-terrorism and extremism strategies, and was felt. This resulted in the formation of NACTA in January 2008 with a mandate to “coordinate and unify” national counter-terrorism efforts and to draw up a national strategy in consultation with all stakeholders. Moreover, idea behind the establishment of NACTA could be traced back to 3-D counterterrorism policy of the state i.e. Dialogue, Development and Deterrence, a resolution unanimously passed on Oct 22, 2008 by parliament. NACTA was formally operationalized in 2013 after the passage of “NACTA Act 2013” by the cabinet.

The administrative set-up of NACTA comprises different directorates/wings which includes: Administration and Finance Directorate, Research and Analysis Directorate, Information and Communication Technology Directorate (ICT), Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Directorate, Counter Terrorism (CT) Directorate, Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Directorate, Legal and Security Directorate and Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID). Whereas, the financial allocation for NACTA has also been increasing every year, surging to   1643.02 million PKR in the year 2017-18 from 95 million PKR in 2013-14.

NACTA’s Journey – A Bumpy Road

The brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Fazlullah faction) led to the formulation of the National Action Plan (NAP), taking the lead role as a policy guideline in counter-terrorism measures. NACTA, as a coordinating body for counter-terrorism, synchronized all the efforts of security and law enforcement apparatuses across the country under the NAP’s umbrella. Its concerted efforts on multilateral fronts through soft approaches have yielded some positive results.

In pursuance of NAP, revamping the Criminal Justice System (CJS) was proposed, resulting in an amendment – Criminal Laws Amendment Act 2016 – passed by the National Assembly. Later, it was decided to revive all four components of CJS i.e. police, prosecution, judiciary and prisons. Therefore, NACTA, after exhaustive deliberations with all stakeholders, developed a roadmap for re-vamping of CJS; detailed document, comprising of recommendations, implementation plan, responsibilities, timelines and cost has been shared with provinces for further actions.

Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) was another big step taken by NACTA in fighting terrorism. NACTA drafted a bill on “Model law on Facilitation and Regulation of Charities” and shared with the provinces and regions including ICT for their input and enactment from their respective assemblies. Once the bill is passed by respective assemblies, the draft model law would become an effective piece of legislation for governing the registration, functions and regulation of charities and charity-seeking organizations. NACTA has also entered into an agreement with Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) to create awareness among public for giving their donations to the rightful and legally certified entities.

NACTA, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders i.e. FBR, SBP, ANF, FIA and intelligence agencies, has also taken a lead role in coordinating the regulation of cross-border movement of cash through IBMS and Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Similarly, efforts are being made to enable Pakistan Customs to have an integrated database for currency declarations at all airports for strict enforcement of SBP’s prescribed currency limits. Then, issues attached to Branchless Banking (BB) precipitated, which entails certain risks due to low Customer Due Diligence (CDD) by certain financial institutions; NACTA, after obtaining input of various agencies, engaged with the SBP for further improvements in the regulatory mechanism. In line with that, NACTA has also taken the initiative to set up a Task Force on CFT for effective enforcement of AML/CFT regime in Pakistan, having representation of federal and provincial/regional stakeholders. The Task Force is still in its formative phase and is faced with problems of structure, mandate, operational and administrative SOPs, legal cover and the potential issues, in case it is vested with the powers of investigation/prosecution. Though, NACTA was successful in establishment of CFT Units in all provincial CTDs so as to enable investigators to focus on financial aspects of every terrorism-related investigation. It is worthy to mention that NACTA, in collaboration with Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU), also carried out threat assessments regarding terrorism and terrorist financing with all provincial CTDs on board; which resulted in National Risk Assessment (NRA) report submitted to Ministry of Finance.

Moreover, NACTA’s initiatives also resulted in rationalization of lists of proscribed persons by the concerned provincial governments, along with implementation of international and domestic legal obligations regarding freezing of assets of such proscribed organizations and persons. As per latest statistics, 65 organizations have been proscribed and 4 are under observation, while 8,374 individuals have been placed under Schedule IV. Similarly, around 5,089 bank accounts have been blocked through State Bank of Pakistan and an amount of over Rs. 157 million has been frozen. Over 2,052 individuals are facing movement restrictions. Additionally, terrorist organizations which have attempted to re-emerge with different names are marked and subsequently banned by the government. Correspondingly, it has initiated the formulation of a robust terrorists’ profile database containing detailed records of individuals accused of or convicted of acts of terrorism and violent extremism.

Besides, there is a common misperception that Madaris are drivers of extremism and centres of terrorist recruitment. In order to substantiate this very notion, NACTA devised a mechanism to seek support of Madaris in fighting against terrorism and extremism. NACTA developed Madaris’ data and registration forms in consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), and other federal and provincial stakeholders. The raison d’etre of this exercise was to standardize the registration process and allow only registered Madaris to operate in the country.

Modern times also brings with itself contemporary challenges; one being cyber-terrorism. To tackle this, NACTA has set up Cyber Security and Information and Communication Technology (CS/ICT) Directorate on modern lines with a renewed approach. In order to counter extremist ideologies, Tat’heer Drive has been initiated in the realm of cyberspace, as well. Tat’heer is a multipronged Cyber Counter-Terrorism (Cyber CT) strategy which includes mapping of radical contents available on internet/social media. Additionally, the government by moving ahead in its counter-terrorism efforts, also authorized NACTA to carry out geo-mapping of Karachi and Quetta for effective CT measures, while geo-mapping of other major cities is also in the pipe-line.

Despite all these initiatives, one of the biggest challenges that Pakistan faced during its fight against terrorists and extremists was to come up with a counter-narrative at national level against the extremist one. NACTA took the initiative and prepared a concept paper on National Narrative based on eight themes (Religious and Interfaith Harmony, Political and International Relations, Embodiment of Constitution and Implementation of Laws, Strengthening National Security, Socio-Cultural Values and Customs, Media Engagement, National Development/Economy, National Reforms/Reconciliations). The document was submitted to the Ministry of Interior for approval. Unfortunately, the document is still in draft form; whereas, at the same time Paigham-e-Pakistan was developed by Islamic International University (IIUI), Islamabad, with the same concept as that of National Narrative, approved by the President of Pakistan.

Furthermore, acutely aware of the imperativeness for consolidation of the hard-earned peace, NACTA in line with its mandate, initiated a multidisciplinary process to formulate a National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines for Pakistan, after 34 rounds of deliberations with 300 plus diverse stakeholders. The National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines are citizen centric and reckon the essentiality of “Whole of Government and Society Approach” in eradication of ideology of violent extremism from our society. The parameters of the said Policy Guidelines comprise: rule of law and service delivery; people’s engagement; media engagement; education reforms; rehabilitation, reintegration and renunciation and promotion of culture.

Likewise, NACTA has adopted various dynamic short and long-term approaches for youth engagement, with the objective to prevent them from falling into violent extremism. In the first phase, NACTA has identified 46 educational institutions from public and private sectors across the country and started conducting interactive sessions with students on youth centrality in inculcating peace and tolerance. In the second phase, NACTA will identify major religious seminaries where youth engagement programs will be executed on similar lines. In the long-term, NACTA would endeavour to formulate a Youth Engagement Policy incorporating issues raised by students during these interactive sessions at educational institutions. In addition to that, NACTA has initiated an internship program for young scholars. The objective of this program is to provide an opportunity to students to gain practical experience in the areas of CT and CVE.

Critical Analysis and the Future Road-Map

On a rocky rutted path, the NACTA has had mixed outcomes of success and pitfalls. It has come a long way; however, there is still much left to do. One of the achievements was the formulation of National Counter-Terrorism Policy guidelines, which serve as the pathway towards an inclusive, connected, peaceful and harmonious society. These guidelines are the bed-rock for joining hearts and minds, and effectively puts an end to the supply line of extremism by engaging in the war of ideas. It, however, requires a whole-of-government and society approach to implement these guidelines. The other major accomplishment was that NACTA started working on a robust ‘National Narrative’ on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy which would serve as the corner stone of ideological response to non-traditional threats. At present, the National Narrative document is ready; it is up to the current government to approve and utilize it and work towards the operationalization phase of this document.

It’s worth highlighting that Counter-Terrorism Police Departments have done a commendable job in countering terrorism and extremism. Their performance can be improved further if the federal and provincial governments introduce some accountability and transparency reforms accordingly. Moreover, it has been observed that police departments are not well intertwined into the efforts to choke the financing of terrorism. Police departments are well-suited to serve this purpose, because they are the first responders, investigators, and have wide-spread reach. So, the police should make ‘choking terror financing’ as an essential part of their training through different relevant organizations, such as FIA and the SBP, for more robust response in this regard. Whereas, NACTA’s claim for updating of the lists of 4th schedulers under the Anti-Terrorism Act, was actually the achievement of police and their CTDs. NACTA’s role was just limited to get the information from the provinces and send the lists to the SBP with the request to freeze the assets of the listed individuals. Moreover, NACTA does not even have any legal powers to compel CTDs to cooperate. In the absence of any operational and coordination roles, NACTA can merely act as a think tank; to spend that much resources on such an organization would be strange then. Also, NACTA is primarily a policy formulating body; hence the driving seat should be given to those who are from policy making domain and have comprehensive experience in the field, rather than assigning positions to those who are trained to enforce/implement. This leads towards an inherent problem in the way of effective policy making.

The most significant aspect in counter-terrorism strategy that NACTA has gained some tangible results in, is about choking the financing for terrorism. Numerous organizations were involved in choking terror financing, but there was a lack of coordination among them. So, a National Task Force for choking financing for terrorism, comprising of 27 relevant organizations was established within NACTA; serving as a coordinating body. Next step which should have been taken before is now up to the current government. This includes making this task force more inclusive by accommodating other relevant stakeholders, and letting it evolve into an independent authority – which would not only coordinate, but also take part in operational activities.

NACTA also reached-out to different universities and interacted with the youth on counter extremism. What is lacking is that NACTA has not yet devised a plan as how to reach out to the significant portion of the population – which includes laborers, street-hawkers, shop-keepers – the common man etc., who are more prone to extremism.

On the contrary, NACTA’s performance has been significantly impacted by lack of ownership by the Prime Minister House, the Ministry of Interior wanting NACTA to work as its subsidiary and holding back or uneven flow of finances from the Ministry of Finance. In 2014, a ruling was passed by the Islamabad High Court, placing the command of NACTA directly under Prime Minister but till the end of previous government, it was reporting to the Minister for interior. It is an upsetting fact that not even a single meeting of the Board of Governors of the NACTA could be convened since its inception; this points out that the neglect of the past government resulted in the lack of focus on improving the functioning of an important organization. The section 6 of NACTA Act says that “the Board may meet as and when required but it shall meet at least once in each quarter of a year.” However, the last two prime ministers including Nawaz Sharif and Shahid Khaqan Abbasi did not hold any single meeting of the Board. Now, the current government can clear out the ambiguity in functions, responsibilities and resources to let NACTA function optimally.

Nevertheless, a stronger NACTA is needed to address trans-provincial issues, especially de-radicalization and madrasa reforms initiatives. Progress on revamping CJS is very slow. With regard to the effectiveness of police, the government’s emphasis is on enhancing the counter-terrorism capability of police and on raising specialized units with better military capabilities, while improvement in the quality of investigation of terrorism cases which is a prerequisite, and demands better training, use of technology, forensic labs and an integrated national database seems not to be a priority.

In the most recent development regarding NACTA, Prime Minister Imran Khan, on September 25, 2018, has decided to review the role and functions. The Prime Minister revealed this while chairing the first-ever meeting of the Board of Governors of NACTA at the Prime Minister’s Office, since the NACTA Act was promulgated in March 2013. PM Khan remarked that the new ground realities called for revisiting the role of the organisation in order to make this body truly a proactive and sophisticated organisation with a well-defined mandate. It was, therefore, decided during the meeting to constitute a committee for reviewing the role and functioning of the organisation. It shows that the PTI government has a vision, but whether they could translate it into action is the real question; only time can tell.

Summing it up, NACTA was a good idea that has been poorly developed and executed. It has been caught up in bureaucratic strife, lack of collaboration across security apparatuses, scarcity of resources and, for vague direction or purpose. Reportedly, Prime Minister Khan has decided to retain control over the Authority. It is a good decision because countering terrorism requires multi-disciplinary approach and Interior Ministry alone cannot handle it. It may imbue the organization with fresh vigour. A re-energized and effective NACTA would in turn give a new impetus to fading NAP. Other problem is that law and order is a provincial subject and NACTA neither has its provincial extensions nor has control over provincial counter terrorism departments. Unless rules of business are amended, NACTA would invariably come in conflict with federal and provincial interior ministries. Having provincial extensions of NACTA can be a viable option, along with chalking out a provision to have countering extremism and terrorism as common responsibility of federation and provinces.

Whatever the pace may be, NACTA at-least kick-started the basic machinery to scuffle terrorism and related factors, nonetheless it could have done a lot more and more could be done, but some internal and external impediments made NACTA’s journey rather a bumpy one. Lastly, NACTA should be prepared and ought to do its homework on the new drivers of insecurity in Pakistan which includes: youth alienation and frustration, exclusionary identity narratives, lack of social justice and the rule of law, regional disparities, and lack of accountability as the significant drivers of insecurity in Pakistan.