Situation now:
As of the end of April 2009, Afghan insurgents have killed 90 foreign soldiers marking a 67 percent increase from the same period of 2008. The UN and European Union and NATO security establishments speak of an over 70 percent spike in the spiral of violence. The coalition-insurgents clashes also leave about two dozen dead almost daily. The American Security Project attributes the rise in incidents to the spread of the Taliban, which it said has a ‘persistent presence’ in about 75 percent of the Afghanistan. This deteriorating situation qualifies as the main source of General Petraeus proposed ‘surge’ that will raise the US troops to 68,000 by the end of the year. Of the new US reinforcements, some 17,000 soldiers and marines will join the NATO force in Helmand to bolster British, Canadian, Dutch and other NATO troops fighting resurgent Taliban in the southern provinces. This surge will bring the total number of foreign forces in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000 drawing an interesting parallel with the peak number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan i.e. 120,000.
With ‘the surge,’US and NATO officials hope the coalition would be able to provide a ‘degree’ of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent now.
Why ‘the surge?’
The coalition partners believe that the surge ´ in the form of more troops, 50 more Reapers, and fresh financial injections ´ will, in Obama words, defeat, dismantle and destroy the militants in Afghanistan. With these ‘3Ds’ achieved, this will also help the US chalking out an exit strategy before the international commitment wanes in the face of domestic criticism and skepticism of the engagement in Afghanistan. Essentially the military surge draws on Gen. Petraeus experiences in Iraq, where he managed to get the anti-Saddam Shiite elements within society on the side of the coalition and also raised local councils as part of the nation-building. He unveiled his 14 ideas on the surge cum engagement with locals in his Jan 23, 2007 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing after nomination to lead all U.S. troops in Iraq. His ‘surge doctrine’ included points such ‘do not do too much with your own hands, money is ammunition, increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success, success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations, ultimate success depends on local leaders, there is no substitute for flexible and adaptable leaders, and, finally, a leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.
Financial commitments:
President Obama plans to ask the Congress for an additional $83 billion in funding for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. According to Congressional Research Services (CRS), if Congress grants President Obama what he wants, this would bring the running tab for both conflicts to about $950 billion. More than three-quarters of the $864 billion appropriated so far has gone to the war in Iraq. The US Army is building nearly $4 billion worth of military bases and other facilities in Afghanistan and is planning to start projects costing an additional $1.3 billion this year. That is definitely indicative of a long-term commitment for the US military to stay in the country. While submitting the Pentagon 2010 budget to the US Congress, Robert Gates announced an extra $2 billion for intelligence and surveillance equipment, including more spending on special forcers units and 50 new Predator and Reaper drones that are currently used in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, Camp Bastion, the main British base built in the desert of Helmand province, is undergoing expansion to house more than 8,000 US marines. Four new bases, as well as several air strips, are being constructed across the south of the country. New civilian and military aviation facilities
Weak Afghan government wouldn–t help ‘the surge:’
‘Eight years after 9/11, the extremists are again emboldened across the sub-continent. Sensible Afghans ¶ most of them ¶ are appalled by the Islamists but just as disgusted by the corrupt spinelessness of the Western-sponsored government that replaced them. The peaceful, democratic future we promised Afghans after 9/11 hasn’t arrived, the power’s still disconnected’. This sad comment illustrates the present day Afghanistan. It also contains a prophecy on the immediate future of this embattled country. The American Security Project says the Taliban have a ‘persistent presence’ in about 75 percent of the Afghanistan. Ellis calls the calls Kabul ‘the corrupt urban hellhole of ocean-going proportions.’ Afghanistan is caught in a tripodal vicious cycle; a corrupt ruling elite eating the vitals of whatever little resources are available to the country, a reticent and obscurantist religious movement shaking it to the core through its resistance to ‘foreign occupation forces’, and an ambitious international community – ‘foreign occupation forces’ – bent on bending the situation according to its own whims, this time around with the help of a combination of military surge and more effective funding. With the announcements of the surge coming from the US in late April, the Taliban promised ‘new offensive’ and a ‘wave of suicide attacks.’ ‘There is going to be a fight this summer, and where there’s a fight, you take casualties. It’s going to be a bloody summer,’ British Brigadier David Hook, deputy commander of the NATO told.
More foreign troops mean more violence:
At the heart of the Taliban-led insurgency lays the presence of ‘foreign troops’, which works as the raison d–être for the militants, and also fuels the anti-Western sentiment. Many of the Afghan leaders residing in Peshawar and Islamabad believe that most of the Afghans want the foreign troops out and if ‘the surge happens, Taliban will be strengthened and make things more difficult for all the players in the conflict, US, NATO, Afghanistan and Pakistan.’ It is therefore questionable whether Gen. Petraeus and his boys can replicate the Iraqi experience in Afghanistan; there, the US managed to marginalize the Iranian and Syrian influence and create stakeholders within the ruling elite. In Afghanistan, a tribal and sub-tribal society with a very difficult topography, the US-led coalition forces have yet to find stakeholders that can sustain the surge followed by a phased withdrawal of foreign troops (if at all).
…and ‘President’ Zalmay Khalilzad wouldn–t help either:
Also the ownership of the anti-Taliban fight is missing in Afghanistan as most of the Karzai cabinet viewed as US-UK poodles, and that makes coalition success more difficult. With ex Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad supposedly entering the electoral fray, suspicions on the predominance of the US role in Afghanistan will become even stronger. This basically means, peace is hard to come by off the ‘surge policy’ in a tribal society of Afghanistan with a weak government whose president is internationally mocked as the ‘Mayor of Kabul.’ There is also no likelihood of different competing interests pulling back in favor of peace. The surge in Afghanistan is also likely to bring more strain on Pakistan, as militants would begin escaping into this country to recuperate, reorganize and network with like-minded groups. That means continued squabbling between Pakistan and its foreign friends led by Washington. Unless the war effort in Afghanistan is ‘de-Americanized,’ and local ownership created, unless the Afghan governance and security capacity (Army/Police/ Bureaucracy training and capacity-building is ensured) and until the removal of people considered as US-lackeys from key position take place, no financial and military surge will be able to nip in the bud the spiral of violence in Afghanistan and other parts of the region.