Current Projects
Scarcity of Water and Power in Pakistan is Pakistan's own Fault
Division of water resources: Partition of the sub-continent in 1947 divided the largest contiguousirrigation system within theIndus Rive, while many of the canal head-works remained withIndia. The ad-hoc division led to a serious water conflict, when India stopped the water supply toPakistanon April 1, 1948.The World Bankfacilitated negotiations between India and Pakistan, backed with technical expertise. The resulting agreement, known as theIndus Waters Treaty(IWT), was signed in 1960. Under this treaty, Pakistan obtained exclusive rights to use 135 million acres-feet (MAF) of the water of the Indus,Jhelumand the Chenab. India retained the rights to use 33 MAF of the three eastern rivers: Ravi,Beasand Sutlej. The Bank also created theIndus Basin DevelopmentFund (IBDF) of $895 million for Pakistan to develop dams and link canals on the three western rivers. (India contributed $174 million to the IBDF.) India developed better: Under a comprehensive master plan for the utilization of its allocated share of the water, India constructed link canals and dams having a storage capacity of 17 MAF. In Punjab state alone, this resulted in a 54 percent increase in the sown area. Canal water supplywas supplemented by simultaneous installation of tube-wells supported by power supply throughhydroelectric projectson the rivers. This transformed Punjab and Haryana, once deficient in food grain, in to India '¿bread basket' in the mid-1970s. …and Pakistan did not: In Pakistan, on the other hand, poor water management policies led to salinity and water-logging problems. Meanwhile, due to high sedimentation, the three dams on the Pakistani side have seen their storage capacity go down from 16 MAF to 12 MAF. At the same time, Pakistan allowed 35 MAF of water to escape into the sea every year. Pakistan storage-to- water-flow ratio is only 11 percent, against India 52 percent on the allocated eastern rivers. India hydropower potential utilization better: India has a hydropower...
Scarcity of Water and Power in Pakistan is Pakistan's own Fault
Division of water resources: Partition of the sub-continent in 1947 divided the largest contiguousirrigation system within theIndus Rive, while many of the canal head-works remained withIndia. The ad-hoc division led to a serious water conflict, when India stopped the water supply toPakistanon April 1, 1948.The World Bankfacilitated negotiations between India and Pakistan, backed with technical expertise. The resulting agreement, known as theIndus Waters Treaty(IWT), was signed in 1960. Under this treaty, Pakistan obtained exclusive rights to use 135 million acres-feet (MAF) of the water of the Indus,Jhelumand the Chenab. India retained the rights to use 33 MAF of the three eastern rivers: Ravi,Beasand Sutlej. The Bank also created theIndus Basin DevelopmentFund (IBDF) of $895 million for Pakistan to develop dams and link canals on the three western rivers. (India contributed $174 million to the IBDF.) India developed better: Under a comprehensive master plan for the utilization of its allocated share of the water, India constructed link canals and dams having a storage capacity of 17 MAF. In Punjab state alone, this resulted in a 54 percent increase in the sown area. Canal water supplywas supplemented by simultaneous installation of tube-wells supported by power supply throughhydroelectric projectson the rivers. This transformed Punjab and Haryana, once deficient in food grain, in to India '¿bread basket' in the mid-1970s. …and Pakistan did not: In Pakistan, on the other hand, poor water management policies led to salinity and water-logging problems. Meanwhile, due to high sedimentation, the three dams on the Pakistani side have seen their storage capacity go down from 16 MAF to 12 MAF. At the same time, Pakistan allowed 35 MAF of water to escape into the sea every year. Pakistan storage-to- water-flow ratio is only 11 percent, against India 52 percent on the allocated eastern rivers. India hydropower potential utilization better: India has a hydropower...
Swat’s Agricultural Economy is Destroyed
Demographics of Swat: Of the over 5 million residents of Swat, nearly 2 million have now been internally displaced (including people from FATA and Malakand Division). Administratively, Swat is divided into 65 Union Councils and 1 Municipal Committee. Politically, Swat comprises of two sub-divisions, Matta and Swat. Around 60 percent of Swat population is dependent on agriculture; a family at an average owns a hectare of land and the literacy rate is well below the national average. Matta, surrounded by the Hindu Kush, is famous for its orchards of apples and peaches but 3 out of 4 residents make $2 a day or less. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) and its military are now bracing for another major operation in Waziristan against Baitullah Mehsud, the supreme leader of Tehrike Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As a consequence, the influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is surely expected to rise (the government is yet to announce a firm date for the return of Swat IDPs). Agricultural mix: Swat has 98,100 hectares cultivable while 408,175 hectares remain uncultivable. Swat current fruit production stands at: 5,000 tons of citrus (612 hectares), 50,000 tons of various kinds of apples (4,110 hectares), 6,500 tons of loquats (600 hectares), 41,000 tons of peaches (4,300 hectares), 6,000 tons of plums (6,000 hectares), 7,500 tons of pears (415 hectares) and 300 tons of grapes (60 hectares). Additionally, the Swat Valley produces 110,000 tons of onion (4,000 hectares), 14,000 tons of potatoes (761 hectares), 66,000 tons of tomatoes (6,000 hectares), 800 tons of turmeric (90 hectares) and 4 tons of chilies (3 hectares). According to a survey by the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC), nearly 48% of Pakistan total fruit is produced by the North-West Frontier Province with the Swat Valley being a major contributor. Another NARC survey concludes that a total of 84,524 hectares of land could be added to the cultivable category with little effort and some basic...
Swat's Agricultural Economy is Destroyed
Demographics of Swat: Of the over 5 million residents of Swat, nearly 2 million have now been internally displaced (including people from FATA and Malakand Division). Administratively, Swat is divided into 65 Union Councils and 1 Municipal Committee. Politically, Swat comprises of two sub-divisions, Matta and Swat. Around 60 percent of Swat population is dependent on agriculture; a family at an average owns a hectare of land and the literacy rate is well below the national average. Matta, surrounded by the Hindu Kush, is famous for its orchards of apples and peaches but 3 out of 4 residents make $2 a day or less. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) and its military are now bracing for another major operation in Waziristan against Baitullah Mehsud, the supreme leader of Tehrike Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As a consequence, the influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is surely expected to rise (the government is yet to announce a firm date for the return of Swat IDPs). Agricultural mix: Swat has 98,100 hectares cultivable while 408,175 hectares remain uncultivable. Swat current fruit production stands at: 5,000 tons of citrus (612 hectares), 50,000 tons of various kinds of apples (4,110 hectares), 6,500 tons of loquats (600 hectares), 41,000 tons of peaches (4,300 hectares), 6,000 tons of plums (6,000 hectares), 7,500 tons of pears (415 hectares) and 300 tons of grapes (60 hectares). Additionally, the Swat Valley produces 110,000 tons of onion (4,000 hectares), 14,000 tons of potatoes (761 hectares), 66,000 tons of tomatoes (6,000 hectares), 800 tons of turmeric (90 hectares) and 4 tons of chilies (3 hectares). According to a survey by the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC), nearly 48% of Pakistan total fruit is produced by the North-West Frontier Province with the Swat Valley being a major contributor. Another NARC survey concludes that a total of 84,524 hectares of land could be added to the cultivable category with little effort and some basic...
Pakistan Army can Kill the Taliban Rebellion in Swat
Insurgencies take long to be eliminated: Once Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) and now Insurgents, both domestic and imported, are bent upon capturing Pakistani territory. Pakistani soldiers are now laying down their lives to reclaim the 'occupied territory' and keep Pakistan intact as one geographical entity. Many powerful armies have in the past taken years to beat back much weaker insurgents. The Huk Rebellion, the communist insurgency against the Philippine government, lasted for 8 years. The British Army (147,000 strong) along with the Territorial and Special Police Forces fought Irish insurgents for nearly 3 decades. The Bolshevik Red Army fought for 6 long years. The Angolan Civil War went on for 27 years. The Somali Civil War has been going on since 1991. Why is Pakistan facing an insurgency? In a nutshell, consecutive political and military leadership failures created 'security and capacity gaps.' In Swat, for instance, Pakistan state machinery failed to provide personal, economic and political security to Swat residents. Then there were capacity gaps that did not provide apt justice, food, health and education to a larger number of the residents. The Taliban slipped into these gaps both via coercive and, in situations service, measures and marginalized the state. Pakistan cannot spread its army anymore thinner: Abraham Lincoln fought, and won, the American Civil War by making the presence of his troops so 'pervasive that there simply was no place left for insurgents to hide.' General Franco repeated the Lincoln-model and brought down the Spanish Republic. In Pakistan case, Swat, Chitral, Dir, Shangla, Hangu, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Tank, Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohamand, Orkzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan all put together come to over 56,000 sq km; and with 7 Indian Corps on Pakistan eastern border, Pakistan Army does not have surplus troops to replicate either the Lincoln or the Franco model. Pakistan should try the CHB strategy: The American...
Operation Raah-e-Rast is the War to Save Pakistan
The rise of the obscurantist: One of the battle zones is the northern Bajaur area, separated from the eastern Afghan province Kunar. Bordering this region is the Malakand area, the crown of which is Swat valley - with ski resorts, hilly retreats, glacial water lakes at Mahudand, and hot water springs. It once attracted tens of thousands of local and foreign tourists every year, until the first signs of the Islamist reaction to the questionable War on Terror began emerging in the valley. At first Mehsud's deputy Maulana Fazlullah got his vigilantes to scare shopkeepers into burning music CDs and videos. They warned women not to appear in public without a veil and also instructed hotels not to allow "un-Islamic activities" in other words, the drinking of alcohol. The situation became increasingly frightening when Fazlullah's men began physically checking out hotels in June that year. Two couples, with their children, had travelled to Malam Jabba - the scenic ski resort - and then settled down in a hotel at Mingora, the administrative headquarters of Swat, for a peaceful weekend. At around 2am a band of about a dozen Taliban knocked at their doors and ordered them to leave. 'Don't spread obscenity here, just leave the place,' one of them thundered while swinging his gun. The two frightened women took refuge in one of the bathrooms. But the Taliban shot twice at the door to force them out. Both horrified women were wounded and came out limping. Bleeding profusely, and with children crying, the families packed up and fled from the hotel. From then on, Taliban militants never looked back; one after the other they seized 12 police stations, enforcing their brand of Sharia, eventually prompting the Pakistan army to launch Operation Rahe Haq - the right path - to wrest control of the valley from the rag-tag army in November; but ever since, Swat never settled down. The ensuing hostilities in the areas around Swat led to two peace deals, one in May 2008 and the other in...
Pakistan is fighting four wars at the moment
Pakistan is engaged in multi-theater wars; a total of four theaters that are all inter as well as intra connected (a single theater of war is defined as a 'specific geographical area of conduct of armed conflict' that is separated from another theater by natural obstacles-a mountain range, river, desert etc.). War 1: Some 650,000 square kilometers of Afghan landmass, west of the Durand Line and surrounded by China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (the Durand Line, stretching some 2,600 kilometers, separates Afghanistan and Pakistan). This theater went hot on 7 October 2001 when the U.S., along with the U.K., launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The casus belli for OEF-or the reason for the war-was the terrorist attack on the U.S. and the stated objectives were to remove the Taliban regime, neutralize al-Qaeda and capture Osama bin Laden. For more than 7 years, NATO-ISAF forces have occupied Afghanistan as an occupying foreign force and the war theater is now getting even hotter. The combatants in this war theater are NATO-ISAF plus the Afghan National Army (led by General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi), on the one side, and the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hezb-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen, Laskhar-e-Tayaba and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on the other side. This war theater is mostly about a war against foreign occupiers, being fought by Afghans while some of the supply lines-men and material-either originate or pass through Pakistan. War 2: The entire geographical landmass east of the Durand Line and (mostly) west of the Indus River. This area comprises Bajaur, Mohamand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan plus Chitral, Swat, Dir, Shangla, Kohistan, Battagram, Buner, Mardan, Charsadda, Kohat and Karak-some 100,000 square kilometers of physical Pakistani terrain. The western most parts-especially parts of FATA-of this theater have been hot for more than a decade, at least a couple of years before the launch of Operation...
General Petraeus’s “The Surge” in Afghanistan will not Help
Situation now: As of the end of April 2009, Afghan insurgents have killed 90 foreign soldiers marking a 67 percent increase from the same period of 2008. The UN and European Union and NATO security establishments speak of an over 70 percent spike in the spiral of violence. The coalition-insurgents clashes also leave about two dozen dead almost daily. The American Security Project attributes the rise in incidents to the spread of the Taliban, which it said has a 'persistent presence' in about 75 percent of the Afghanistan. This deteriorating situation qualifies as the main source of General Petraeus proposed 'surge' that will raise the US troops to 68,000 by the end of the year. Of the new US reinforcements, some 17,000 soldiers and marines will join the NATO force in Helmand to bolster British, Canadian, Dutch and other NATO troops fighting resurgent Taliban in the southern provinces. This surge will bring the total number of foreign forces in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000 drawing an interesting parallel with the peak number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan i.e. 120,000. With 'the surge,'US and NATO officials hope the coalition would be able to provide a 'degree' of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent now. Why 'the surge?' The coalition partners believe that the surge ´ in the form of more troops, 50 more Reapers, and fresh financial injections ´ will, in Obama words, defeat, dismantle and destroy the militants in Afghanistan. With these '3Ds' achieved, this will also help the US chalking out an exit strategy before the international commitment wanes in the face of domestic criticism and skepticism of the engagement in Afghanistan. Essentially the military surge draws on Gen. Petraeus experiences in Iraq, where he managed to get the anti-Saddam Shiite elements within society on the side of the coalition and also raised local councils as part of the nation-building. He unveiled his 14 ideas on the surge cum engagement with...
General Petraeus's "The Surge" in Afghanistan will not Help
Situation now: As of the end of April 2009, Afghan insurgents have killed 90 foreign soldiers marking a 67 percent increase from the same period of 2008. The UN and European Union and NATO security establishments speak of an over 70 percent spike in the spiral of violence. The coalition-insurgents clashes also leave about two dozen dead almost daily. The American Security Project attributes the rise in incidents to the spread of the Taliban, which it said has a 'persistent presence' in about 75 percent of the Afghanistan. This deteriorating situation qualifies as the main source of General Petraeus proposed 'surge' that will raise the US troops to 68,000 by the end of the year. Of the new US reinforcements, some 17,000 soldiers and marines will join the NATO force in Helmand to bolster British, Canadian, Dutch and other NATO troops fighting resurgent Taliban in the southern provinces. This surge will bring the total number of foreign forces in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000 drawing an interesting parallel with the peak number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan i.e. 120,000. With 'the surge,'US and NATO officials hope the coalition would be able to provide a 'degree' of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent now. Why 'the surge?' The coalition partners believe that the surge ´ in the form of more troops, 50 more Reapers, and fresh financial injections ´ will, in Obama words, defeat, dismantle and destroy the militants in Afghanistan. With these '3Ds' achieved, this will also help the US chalking out an exit strategy before the international commitment wanes in the face of domestic criticism and skepticism of the engagement in Afghanistan. Essentially the military surge draws on Gen. Petraeus experiences in Iraq, where he managed to get the anti-Saddam Shiite elements within society on the side of the coalition and also raised local councils as part of the nation-building. He unveiled his 14 ideas on the surge cum engagement with...
General Petraeus's "The Surge" in Afghanistan will not Help
Situation now: As of the end of April 2009, Afghan insurgents have killed 90 foreign soldiers marking a 67 percent increase from the same period of 2008. The UN and European Union and NATO security establishments speak of an over 70 percent spike in the spiral of violence. The coalition-insurgents clashes also leave about two dozen dead almost daily. The American Security Project attributes the rise in incidents to the spread of the Taliban, which it said has a 'persistent presence' in about 75 percent of the Afghanistan. This deteriorating situation qualifies as the main source of General Petraeus proposed 'surge' that will raise the US troops to 68,000 by the end of the year. Of the new US reinforcements, some 17,000 soldiers and marines will join the NATO force in Helmand to bolster British, Canadian, Dutch and other NATO troops fighting resurgent Taliban in the southern provinces. This surge will bring the total number of foreign forces in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000 drawing an interesting parallel with the peak number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan i.e. 120,000. With 'the surge,'US and NATO officials hope the coalition would be able to provide a 'degree' of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent now. Why 'the surge?' The coalition partners believe that the surge ´ in the form of more troops, 50 more Reapers, and fresh financial injections ´ will, in Obama words, defeat, dismantle and destroy the militants in Afghanistan. With these '3Ds' achieved, this will also help the US chalking out an exit strategy before the international commitment wanes in the face of domestic criticism and skepticism of the engagement in Afghanistan. Essentially the military surge draws on Gen. Petraeus experiences in Iraq, where he managed to get the anti-Saddam Shiite elements within society on the side of the coalition and also raised local councils as part of the nation-building. He unveiled his 14 ideas on the surge cum engagement with...
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TESTIMONIALS
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I am also a member of National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Information and Broadcasting. Recently, we held a meeting with the Director General of Radio Pakistan and we told them to initiate such local programs (like Constituency Hour) in regional languages to educate and inform people. Even Indian Radio can be heard in FATA which is being used for propaganda purposes and must be closed. Therefore, we should launch some standard and quality programs like CRSS that will change the taste of the listeners.