The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), Dhaka, organized a Regional Workshop on "Developing a Counter-Radicalization Policy for Bangladesh" on March 23, 2014. Participants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh gave presentations on their respective country's experience in counter-radicalization. Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Md. Shahidul Haq delivered the keynote address. Imtiaz Gul, the CRSS executive director, also gave a presentation on Pakistan's experiences and new policy measures envisaged in the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) approved by the federal cabinet on March 18. He explained to the experts' workshop that the NISP represented first formal legal-administrative framework to deal with counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-radicalization (CR) issues, though the policy is likely to undergo changes following a national consultative process.

The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), Dhaka, organized a Regional Workshop on "Developing a Counter-Radicalization Policy for Bangladesh" on March 23, 2014. Participants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh gave presentations on their respective country's experience in counter-radicalization. Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Md. Shahidul Haq delivered the keynote address. Imtiaz Gul, the CRSS executive director, also gave a presentation on Pakistan's experiences and new policy measures envisaged in the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) approved by the federal cabinet on March 18. He explained to the experts' workshop that the NISP represented first formal legal-administrative framework to deal with counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-radicalization (CR) issues, though the policy is likely to undergo changes following a national consultative process.

Shooting of the first documentary film for highlighting the role and importance of Public Prosecution Department in Pakistan has started in Lahore on March 15– 2014. Documentary titled as 'QUEST FOR JUSTICE' is written and directed by a young lady journalist from Europe, Ekaterina Harsdorf, who endows her time and work free of charge. The documentary is a brainchild of respectable Secretary Prosecution Punjab, Nadeem Irshad Kaiani who spearheads many reforms like computerization, case management, data collection and evaluation, increased and systemized training, specialisations of prosecutors, among others. German governmental agency GIZ is funding this documentary while technical support is provided by Punjab Prosecution Service. 'Quest for Justice' will be ready in May this year. Ms. Ekaterina Harsdorf while questioned by the media told that th e story revolves around a murder case in which the prosecutor, despite of all challenges, successfully uses science evidence, witnesses, Police and Judicial system to convict the criminal. Shots from Crime Scene, Police Station, Prosecutors– Office and Court Room are included. According to the details, shooting of Pakistan first documentary on Prosecution Service and challenges faced in this mission started in Police Training Academy Chung these days. Public Prosecutors and the crew of documentary have dedicated this film to those prosecutors who sacrificed their lives in the line of duty for the cause of justice. This documentary should be exhibited in Law colleges, Prosecution training institutes and Media all over Pakistan.

In a country that has looked more like a rudderless ship than a functional state, the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) marks the first major response to the multitude of challenges that Pakistan faces today. It provides some guiding principles, first-ever ¿official– data on the extent of losses, lists the number of proscribed organizations (60), and the startling disclosure that the number of madrassas has skyrocketed to 22,052 (up from nearly 16,000 in 2005-06). The policy also gives a first-ever consolidated figure on the total number of police (412,167 for entire Pakistan) and the citizen-police ratio. But the policy has shortcomings that make it another bureaucratic recipe for problems that require practical steps for resolution. Firstly, the concept of 'internal security' is misleading, and erroneous, for an extremely complex situation. It draws distinction between internal and external security, whereby the authors appear totally oblivious to the internal threats that are trans-national in nature. These threats thrive off, and are fueled by, external drivers such as Al Qaeda, as well as negative perceptions on the US-led western civilizations. Secondly, the policy fails in identifying the root-causes of home-grown terrorism and extremism and its links to external factors. Thirdly, it lacks strategic conventional vision, and thus seems to rest on administrative structures as the core components of the strategy, ie reliance on hard power alone, rather than explicitly talking of a narrative that is embedded in i) indiscriminate enforcement of rule of law, and ii) an intellectual and informed debate on the role of religion in modern society and the havoc that 'religious' freedom has played with social values, politics and national cohesion. Fourthly, the policy focuses on visible and invisible terrorist or extremist threats and not on the factors that facilitate terrorism and extremism. One wonders whether the authors consider violations of the Article...

Ever since Afghan President Hamid Karzai became vocal in his criticism of the US role in the last decade and publicly made signing of theBilateral Security Agreement(BSA) conditional, American officials and media began peddling the perception that Karzai is making these statements only because of fear of becoming irrelevant once his tenure ends in less than two months. But some analysts contend that he remains very much relevant to Afghan politics ¶ both during the presidential election and beyond the December 2014 US-led international troops drawdown. Afghan watchers know that except for Dr Abdullah Abdullah, most of the remainingpresidential aspirantsare either Karzai loyalists or have fielded their nominations under a cleverly tailored strategy to prevent Abdullah from winning the polls. It seems that most pro-Karzai presidential hopefuls will pull out of the polls one by one in favour of his desired candidate. Observers believe that the phased withdrawal of candidates in the presence of a large number of television channels will leave a strong impression on voters. The apparently surprise pullout of the president brother, Qayum Karzai,in favour of former foreign minister Zalmai Rassoul, lent even greater credence to the perception that the president has, indeed, carefully choreographed the campaign of his ¿favourite–. Karzai-watchers based in Kabul say that Qayum Karzai withdrawal in favour of Rassoul has come as a surprise for many because the brother comes from an influential background compared with Dr Abdullah, and respect for clans and family affinities remains very much intact in Afghan society. Rassoul lacks the ingredients that are essential for success in Afghanistan ¶ he is not charismatic, cannot boast of any national achievement and lacks a strong traditional support base. Analysts also believe that the controversy that stemmed from last June opening of an Afghan Taliban office in Qatar under a US-initiated peace process, sowed seeds of suspicion...

Ever since Afghan President Hamid Karzai became vocal in his criticism of the US role in the last decade and publicly made signing of theBilateral Security Agreement(BSA) conditional, American officials and media began peddling the perception that Karzai is making these statements only because of fear of becoming irrelevant once his tenure ends in less than two months. But some analysts contend that he remains very much relevant to Afghan politics ¶ both during the presidential election and beyond the December 2014 US-led international troops drawdown. Afghan watchers know that except for Dr Abdullah Abdullah, most of the remainingpresidential aspirantsare either Karzai loyalists or have fielded their nominations under a cleverly tailored strategy to prevent Abdullah from winning the polls. It seems that most pro-Karzai presidential hopefuls will pull out of the polls one by one in favour of his desired candidate. Observers believe that the phased withdrawal of candidates in the presence of a large number of television channels will leave a strong impression on voters. The apparently surprise pullout of the president brother, Qayum Karzai,in favour of former foreign minister Zalmai Rassoul, lent even greater credence to the perception that the president has, indeed, carefully choreographed the campaign of his ¿favourite–. Karzai-watchers based in Kabul say that Qayum Karzai withdrawal in favour of Rassoul has come as a surprise for many because the brother comes from an influential background compared with Dr Abdullah, and respect for clans and family affinities remains very much intact in Afghan society. Rassoul lacks the ingredients that are essential for success in Afghanistan ¶ he is not charismatic, cannot boast of any national achievement and lacks a strong traditional support base. Analysts also believe that the controversy that stemmed from last June opening of an Afghan Taliban office in Qatar under a US-initiated peace process, sowed seeds of suspicion...

Within hours of the Islamabad court carnage on March 3, chief justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani vowed to take the culprits to task. The next day, he ordered the installation of security cameras at all court premises. The prime minister expressed his displeasure over the attack, saying 'it does not augur well for peace talks.' The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) dissociated itself from the incident but refrained from condemning it. The government, embarrassed by the continued string of attacks all over the country, lapped up the TTP statement, giving credence to the widely-spread perception that individual groups associated with the terror outfit may be carrying out subversion on their own. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan seems to believe so too. That is why both the minister and his boss Nawaz Sharif are adamantly pursuing talks as a panacea to the raging violence, despite the fact that a couple of members of the original negotiators– team never gave success even a ten percent chance. Even if we give Khan and Sharif the benefit of doubt, the so-called Ahrarul Hind, the group that claimed responsibility for the Islamabad attack, is not doing anything different from what Hakimullah Mehsud stood for all his life ´ rejection of the state of Pakistan in favour of an Islamic emirate. Nor has Mullah Fazlullah recanted Mehsud anti-Pakistan mission. Equally vociferous is Maj Haroon alias Mast Gul ´ the Jamaat-e-Islami/Hezb-e-Islami commander who fought and dogged the Indian army in Kashmir in the late 1990s ´ about his pro-Sharia pretense. And all of them exhibit no qualm whatsoever for their gruesome tactics like sending in suicide bombers or planting bombs to kill innocent Pakistanis. They even claim to slaughter captured security forces personnel. Discussions with on-ground intelligence officials, private observers and reporters ´ all of them familiar with the militant organizations ´ reveal that it is fatally naïve to believe in the claims made by the...