The issue of registration of local and foreign NGOs and the case of model Ayaan Ali in recent weeks have brought terror-funding and money laundering into the public discourse. Ms Ali has been given bail due to the competence of her high-profile lawyers. But the case of registration and funding of NGOs is still before a three-member bench of the superior judiciary, which is asking the authorities some tough, probing questions. During a hearing of this case in August, the bench observed that foreign funding was like oxygen to the NGOs operating in the country and if the government choked its supply, terrorism will come to an end for good, and that the government should take practical steps to block foreign funding to NGOs. Similar observations were made on two different occasions and quoted by at least two national newspapers. These thoughts, on the correlation between the source of funding of NGOs and terrorism, require guarded scrutiny. There is a school of thought that would consider it naive and unfair to link NGOs with terrorism. There is a view that all NGOs in Pakistan are instruments of terror funding, disregarding the fact that a lot of public-focused legislation on human rights, including the right to information, the right to education, dealing with harassment at the workplace, improved labour laws, and minorities’ protection inter alia are the result of the hard work that a number of NGOs have put in. To underscore the possible negative consequences of such a view, let us look at the example of a Norwegian government action in May this year against a Norway-based NGO, Global Network for Rights and Democracy (GNRD) — based on similar presumptions. The Norwegian police raided the GNRD offices, accusing it of money laundering. The GNRD has branches in New York, and many Arab, Asian and African countries, and is known for its intellectual independence, with its narrative on human rights challenging the one that originates from Western capitals. Its founding...

With its peace plan stalled, Islamabad is wary of ‘spoilers and detractors’ in Afghanistan. “Imtiaz, you are a very good guy, I agree with your thoughts, but why don’t you grow a beard?” asked the burly, tall Afghan. The venue was the dull café at Kabul’s scarred Inter-Continental, only a few days after the Indian aircraft hijacking drama had ended in Kandahar on December 31, 1999. “Karl Marx had a long beard. So do Sikhs,” I quipped. “That is a different matter. But as a Muslim, you must grow a beard,” said my host. It was Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, the Taliban’s new controversial emir. He was then an aviation minister, and had negotiated the release of the passengers aboard the Indian Airlines Flight 814 a week before the conversation. The insistence on the beard in fact symbolized his rigid views. Mullah Mohammad Omar would not even meet Muslims who did not have a beard. But the Afghan government and external players such as Pakistan and the US did manage to persuade the rigid Mulla Mansoor to be a part of a reconciliation process. This also signaled that more than a decade of insurgency, and nearly five years of operational command of the movement, had softened him. This represented a major breakthrough for Pakistan as well. At least eight of the 15 Taliban Shura members, for instance, had already arrived in Islamabad for the Murree peace talks on July 29, the day the news of Mullah Omar’s death surfaced. These Taliban commanders and leaders were part of the July 7 first round as well. That also underlined Mullah Mansoor’s clout within the organization. Both the ministry of foreign affairs and the military establishment in Pakistan had worked hard to clinch this deal, with the US and China also on board. But the fractures that have appeared in the movement over the issue of succession have stalled the entire process – at least for the moment. “We would like to wait until all the chips have fallen in place,” said an official closely associated with the talks. We...

The death of the Taliban supremo, Mullah Omar, has finally been confirmed by a spokesman for Afghanistan’s security services last month in July, 2015, putting all speculations regarding his mysterious disappearance to rest.[1]  However, contrary to the Afghan assertion that Mullah Omar died in a hospital in Pakistan in April 2013,[2] the Taliban spokesperson, Zahibullah Mujahid, in a statement to the Voice of America, clarified that the Taliban leader indeed died of an illness, however, he “did not leave Afghanistan since the US-Backed forces overthrew the group in 2001”.[3] Within days, the Taliban shura – central council – elected Mulla Akhtar Mansoor, as Omar’s successor, a move that was instantly snubbed by Abdul Manan, the younger brother of Mulla Omar, for lack of transparency. The war of succession, it seems, is gradually intensifying, with Manan and his supporters calling for a grand meeting of the party to determine the new Supreme Leader. Regardless of how this issue settles in the days and weeks to come, Mulla Omar’s departure has dealt a severe blow to the Taliban movement. With the centre of gravity gone, the movement appears fractured and far from the cohesion that it has been known for. Mulla Omar’s death and the ensuing challenge to Mansoor’s leadership have interrupted – for all practical reasons – the peace talks that had begun on July 7 and at least eight Taliban commanders had landed in Islamabad on July 29 for the second round two. Mystery The circumstances of Mullah Omar’s death, and the cause and place may remain unanswered for at least some time. However, the Afghan government’s claim that Omar died in a Karachi hospital once again put Pakistan in the hotspot since after the success of Operation Neptune Spear in May 2011. “The Afghan government has received confirmed reports that Mullah Omar died nearly two years ago in Karachi… We are happy that now the foreign sources have also confirmed that Mullah Omar is no more alive… We still have a...