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Success And Failure On The Terror Front

Quetta’s attack makes 2016’s third quarter the deadliest but there have been successes elsewhere The brazen attack in Quetta this Monday night is indicative of several troublesome trends. First, it reveals serious security lapses and failures at the highest levels. Second, it reinforces the idea that despite a concerted initial push in a state of national grief after the Army Public School attack on December 16, 2014—that claimed the lives of 144, mostly children—the political will dried up, the focus shifted to the next big catastrophe, and the government re-prioritized. This second point can be best exemplified by the fact that the first meeting by the prime minister to gauge progress on the National Action Plan (NAP) was called 19 months into its enactment. Third, and perhaps most problematically, it defies the state’s narrative that terrorism has been mostly curbed, and legitimizes the extremist element as a potent, resourceful foe. Data from the Center for Research and Security Studies ‘Pakistan Security Report, Q3, 2016’ reveals that this quarter saw a rise in violence-related casualties across Pakistan, with 651 fatalities, and 441 injuries. This is still lower than the 872 fatalities and 572 injuries reported in the first quarter of the year. The interior ministry’s claim that the number of attacks has been reduced significantly is not without merit. A comparative study reveals that there was an overall 40% reduction in violence-related casualties in 2015 over 2014. However, a deeper look also shows that the bulk of this came from a remarkable reduction in violence in Karachi, which alone accounted for well over a quarter of the country’s violence-related fatalities. Data from the first three quarters shows that violence-related fatalities have continued to decline rapidly across the country, with the exception of Balochistan. Within victims, the broad groups with the most fatalities were militants, insurgents and criminals (256), civilians (278), and...

Time To Change Your Proxy Settings

Abysmally shameful is the only way to describe the acrimonious exchange of words among political leaders following the Quetta attack on Monday in which 61 cadets were killed at the police training centre. As condemnations poured in from global capitals, here Imran Khan, Bilawal Zardari and the Nawaz-League brigade led by Khawaja Asif sunk to new depths with accusations and counter-accusations. In the process, our real challenge was drown out. The commentary on television was no better, with trivial discussions of “cowardly act by enemies”, “merciless attackers” etc. What becomes evident amid this circus is the lack of understanding of what these terrorist incidents mean, the missing links in our counter-terror strategy, the indifference of the ruling elite to crucial issues such as institutional reform and a reinforcement of the status quo. Officials jump to declare that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami was linked to the attack. Some spoke of Jamaatul Ahrar. One claim came from Daesh/ Khurasan accompanied by photographs of the three suicide attackers. But regardless of who claims responsibility, one thing is abundantly clear: we are faced with multiple instruments of terrorism: TTP, IS/Daesh and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), to mention a few. Some are handy pawns in a proxy war that is being fought in the region. The objective is the same: destabilization and instability and sowing fear. These groups use various names as a useful ploy to obfuscate their real identity and deflect focus from the real debate. These groups are part of a larger terrorist network that deploys innocent young people for such termination missions as part of a tit-for-tat strategy by the Indian, Afghan and all those establishments which believe Pakistan needs to do more to neutralize and uproot the Haqqani Network and Jamaatud Dawa. Critics of Pakistan completely disregard the proxy war factor. They link it only to Pakistan’s flawed security policies...

Q3 Security Report – 2016

Introduction Pakistan experienced a 19.4% rise in the number of fatalities from violence from July to September, when compared with the last quarter. The most affected province was Balochistan, followed by FATA, Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, respectively, in terms of the number of casualties suffered from violence. FATA observed a 90.5% rise in fatalities from violence-related activities this quarter while Punjab recorded a 52% increase when compared with the last quarter. However, it must be said that Punjab remains one of the least affected units in the federation. This quarter also witnessed continuous operations being carried out in various districts of Punjab in an attempt to preempt any terrorist activities as well as locating and arresting various gangs and banned outfits in the province. Sindh, on the other hand, observed a reduction in fatalities from violence-related activities. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, despite the introduction of the KP Police Ordinance 2016, the efficiency of the law enforcement agencies did not improve. In fact, there were more civilian and security officials' casualties reported from the province than those of militants’. While the Pakistan Army had claimed that the threat of terrorism had been mitigated to a great extent, this did not show in the data gathered between July and September. Due to the rising count of civilian casualties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in this quarter particularly, the Army decided to launch a military operation in the Khyber Agency in August against insurgents and militants still hiding and active near the border areas. Pakistan has faced both external and internal security threats in these months, with India on the eastern border threatening to isolate Pakistan regionally by branding it the “mothership of terrorism”, and even withdrawing from the Pakistan-hosted 19th SAARC summit, and Afghanistan on the western border closing border trade with Pakistan a third time this year. Several Indian and Afghan...

The Politics of Opposition: A Challenge to the National Unity Government?

The failure to implement its own agreement and the continuing rift within the National Unity Government has served as a platform for political opposition groups across the spectrum to voice their criticisms of the government. In the past, Afghanistan’s political opposition has been made up of various councils and fronts, often associated with prominent powerbrokers and former government officials. This is still the case, but they have been joined by popular protest movements, such as the Enlightenment Movement. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Lenny Linke (with input from Thomas Ruttig and Obaid Ali) look at who is who in the opposition and how each of them is positioning themselves vis-à-vis the government. In many countries, a healthy political opposition is seen as crucial to keep governments in check and to provide the electorate with a possible future alternative. In Afghanistan, however, political opposition groups have struggled to coalesce around an ideology or shared interests. Rather ‘opposition’ groups have often formed like bubbles in the political churn, rising and falling, functioning as temporary instruments for prominent individuals who wish to maintain their profile, as they sit out periods without government positions hoping for high office again. The 2014 elections, if they had ended with an undisputed winner might have brought that pattern to an end, with the supporters of one strong candidate in government and the supporters of the other in the opposition. The opposite was true. The bitter disputes of the summer of 2014 over who had won resulted in a government of national unity. The government was created under an agreement that divided the country’s political power between the two contenders on the basis of parity – at least on paper (see AAN’s previous reporting. The National Unity Government agreement did, somewhat bizarrely, establish the position of an internal ‘leader of the opposition’ within the executive – seemingly in addition to...

Exhibition for Peace: Peace Murals of Artlords Exhibition held at NCA

On Thursday 20th October 2016 the Zahoor ul Akhlaq Gallery at National College of Arts (NCA), Lahore, held a unique exhibition of works titled “Peace Murals of Artlords, Afghanistan.” The exhibition was a peace initiative between civil society organizations – Artlords and Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) - in joint partnership for this Pakistan-Afghanistan civil society initiative. Mr. Rana Mashhood Ahmad Khan, Minister of Education, Government of Punjab inaugurated the exhibition and was the chief guest. The Minister applauded the efforts of both the civil society organizations to have taken such a unique initiative to promote people-to-people contact. He said Lahore is the cultural hub of Pakistan, and has always taken a lead in promoting art and culture. Mashhood thanked CRSS, and Artlords, as well as the National College of Arts, and the Jang Media Group for partnering together to give the students and faculty of NCA and other art lovers of Lahore the opportunity to promote culture, liberal arts and peace building measures between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was all praise for the work of the Afghan artists and noted that such artworks depict the message of peace, love, and harmony and also is a strong portrayal of unique and meaningful message against terrorism, war, arms, drugs and warlods, through their artworks. He emphasized the importance of using art and culture to foster peace and brotherhood. Artlords was established in 2014 by its founder, Mr. Omaid Sharifi and consists of artists and volunteers motivated by the desire to bring about a positive social change through the soft power of art and culture as a non-intrusive approach. Mr. Sharifi invited and led the Minster to show reproductive artworks displayed at the gallery, explaining the message of peace and against terrorism behind each artwork. Reproductions of murals executed by artists and volunteers belonging to Artlords lined the walls of the Gallery. A video documentary was...

Book Launched: Pakistan’s Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence

About the Book: Politics in Pakistan has traditionally been understood in the context of civil-military relationship. In May 2013, for the first time in history, Pakistan saw an elected government complete a full term in office and transfer power through the ballot box to another civilian government. In view of such an important development, this book offers critical perspectives on Pakistan’s current democratic transition and its implications for national politics, security and foreign policy. It critically analyses the emerging political trends in the country, including their underlying sources, attributes, constraints, and prospects of sustainability. Drawing on history, diverse theoretical perspectives, and empirical evidence, it explains the dynamics of the democratic process, contested borders and spaces, and regionalism. Contributions are from 13 prominent scholars in the field, who provide a wide-ranging analysis of Pakistan’s contemporary national and regional challenges, as well as the opportunities they entail for its viability as a democratic state. Taking the debate on Pakistan beyond the outmoded notions of praetorian politics and security, the book explores the future prospects of civilian supremacy in the country. It will be of interest to students and scholars of South Asian Politics, Political Sociology and Security Studies, as well as policy-makers, diplomats, security experts and military professionals. About the Editors: Ishtiaq Ahmad is Director of the School of Politics and International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. Adnan Rafiq is DPhil candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at University of Oxford, UK. The book is now available on Amazon along with other major outlets. click here

Book Launched: Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence

About the Book: Politics in Pakistan has traditionally been understood in the context of civil-military relationship. In May 2013, for the first time in history, Pakistan saw an elected government complete a full term in office and transfer power through the ballot box to another civilian government. In view of such an important development, this book offers critical perspectives on Pakistan’s current democratic transition and its implications for national politics, security and foreign policy. It critically analyses the emerging political trends in the country, including their underlying sources, attributes, constraints, and prospects of sustainability. Drawing on history, diverse theoretical perspectives, and empirical evidence, it explains the dynamics of the democratic process, contested borders and spaces, and regionalism. Contributions are from 13 prominent scholars in the field, who provide a wide-ranging analysis of Pakistan’s contemporary national and regional challenges, as well as the opportunities they entail for its viability as a democratic state. Taking the debate on Pakistan beyond the outmoded notions of praetorian politics and security, the book explores the future prospects of civilian supremacy in the country. It will be of interest to students and scholars of South Asian Politics, Political Sociology and Security Studies, as well as policy-makers, diplomats, security experts and military professionals. About the Editors: Ishtiaq Ahmad is Director of the School of Politics and International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. Adnan Rafiq is DPhil candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at University of Oxford, UK. The book is now available on Amazon along with other major outlets. click here

Pak-Afghan Relations and Reprisals

“Gradual squeeze” is the new phrase Pakistani officials are invoking when responding to questions on what they are doing to blunt the Taliban ability to plan and organise operations inside Afghanistan. Taliban leaders are being told to move families and businesses elsewhere and refrain from cross-border operations. Recent arrests in Balochistan of several Taliban leaders, including Ahmadullah Muti alias Mullah Nanai, Suleman Agha alias Samad Sani, and Mullah Sani appeared to be part of this squeeze, which also prompted three Taliban leaders to rush to Pakistan from Doha, where their political office is located. Taliban were told to close ranks for the peace process and follow the path that the Hezb-e-Islami chose for its peace with Kabul. Sartaj Aziz, the foreign affairs advisor, also believes the peace deal could serve as a good model for other Taliban factions to follow suit as Pakistan presses these factions to focus on talks instead of fighting. But will such statements correct the deep-seated perceptions of the nexus between the Haqqani Network and the Pakistani establishment? Fearful of a possible backlash by the Pakistani Pashtoon-Punjabi militants stalking parts of mainland Pakistan, officials remain extremely careful. They would not want to take on all those denounced by the Afghan government as the “enemies of innocent Afghan women and children.” This begs another big question: if stymied by the fears of a blow-back, will Pakistan still be able to convince Afghan or American officials of its “squeeze on Taliban?” And more importantly, will reiterations of support for the Afghan peace and reconciliation prevent gory attacks such as the one on the Police Academy in Quetta, or the one that left nearly 13 dozen lawyers dead end of June this year in the same town. Probably not, for the simple reason that Pakistan is damned if it does. And it is damned if it doesn’t. Critics disregard the proxy war factor and the pawns that are used in this; the TTP,...

Quetta College Carnage: It’s Nothing Else But Tit For Tat

Regardless of how you look at it, central to terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan are known instruments of destabilisation and instability i.e. TTP, IS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. They are the handy pawns in the proxy war that is currently underway in the region. The only plausible explanation for such termination missions is a tit for tat strategy born out of the perception that Pakistan needs to do more to neutralise and uproot the Haqqani Network. Until Pakistan is seen doing so, its security apparatus is likely to remain under attack – both by the international players as well as by their instruments of terror and instability. The deadly terrorist raid on the New Sariab Police Training College near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochsitan province, does not come as a surprise. The attack has so far claimed the lives of 61 security personnel, by far the largest in terms of fatalities among those carried out against Pakistan’s security apparatus. It has been in the offing in view of the excessive bleeding of the number of unusual fatalities among the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since early this year. The Quetta attack is reminiscent of two attacks within six months (March /October 2009) at the Police Academy at Manawan outside Lahore; typical fidayeen (suicide) termination missions with the objective of inflicting as much damage as possible. The latest blood-spilling can be interpreted in two ways; it’s a strike either by the Pakistani or Uzbek proponents of Daesh i.e. Lashkare Jhangvi or different splinters of the TTP. Or it is a tit for tat, reprisal attack by all those who see Pakistan’s security establishment as the patron and harbourer of the Haqqani Network, which is seen as the major source of unusual attrition within the ANSF; a staggering 3,500 losses until August this year, including nearly 2,000 in July and August alone. Sine early this month, the ANSF losses in Helmand alone have...

Quetta College Carnage: It's Nothing Else But Tit For Tat

Regardless of how you look at it, central to terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan are known instruments of destabilisation and instability i.e. TTP, IS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. They are the handy pawns in the proxy war that is currently underway in the region. The only plausible explanation for such termination missions is a tit for tat strategy born out of the perception that Pakistan needs to do more to neutralise and uproot the Haqqani Network. Until Pakistan is seen doing so, its security apparatus is likely to remain under attack – both by the international players as well as by their instruments of terror and instability. The deadly terrorist raid on the New Sariab Police Training College near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochsitan province, does not come as a surprise. The attack has so far claimed the lives of 61 security personnel, by far the largest in terms of fatalities among those carried out against Pakistan’s security apparatus. It has been in the offing in view of the excessive bleeding of the number of unusual fatalities among the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since early this year. The Quetta attack is reminiscent of two attacks within six months (March /October 2009) at the Police Academy at Manawan outside Lahore; typical fidayeen (suicide) termination missions with the objective of inflicting as much damage as possible. The latest blood-spilling can be interpreted in two ways; it’s a strike either by the Pakistani or Uzbek proponents of Daesh i.e. Lashkare Jhangvi or different splinters of the TTP. Or it is a tit for tat, reprisal attack by all those who see Pakistan’s security establishment as the patron and harbourer of the Haqqani Network, which is seen as the major source of unusual attrition within the ANSF; a staggering 3,500 losses until August this year, including nearly 2,000 in July and August alone. Sine early this month, the ANSF losses in Helmand alone have...