Current Projects
Russia Getting Into Afghan Act
The gathering in Moscow last week — the third in the series of consultations between Russia, China and Pakistan — underlines growing concern about the spillover effect of the Afghan crisis in the region. The initiative is the latest example of Russian assertion of its diplomatic power amidst growing frustration over the American failure to deliver peace in Afghanistan. An underlying cause of anxiety is the growing threat of the militant Islamic State group spreading its tentacles in the war-torn country. But it is still unclear whether the new alliance will be able to help reach a negotiated political solution to the Afghan conflict. Although the Kabul government has now been invited for the next round of talks, its exclusion from the earlier meetings cast a shadow over the process. Not surprisingly, the United States was not invited to the Moscow initiated process. It is, however, premature to assume that the new nexus could replace the quadrilateral forum that included the US along with Pakistan, China and Afghanistan. The quadrilateral talks have been suspended for almost one year after the collapse of efforts to bring the Afghan Taliban insurgents to the negotiating table. The killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Taliban chief, in a CIA drone strike last May has further diminished hopes for the talks to resume. It is quite apparent that no peace effort could succeed without the tacit support, if not active participation, of the US, which still has about 10,000 troops involved in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Things have become more complicated with the political transition in Washington. Like other foreign policy issues, there is complete confusion over the Afghan policy in the soon-to-be installed Trump administration. Moscow’s initiative to build a regional alliance against IS points to a changing geo-political landscape. That has perhaps compelled the three countries to find a regional solution to the Afghan crisis that directly affects...
Sabawoon Showcase: Performance of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Government in 2016
January 2, 2017, Peshawar: The latest episode of Sabawoon[i], flagship radio program of Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), reviewed the performance of KP government during the last year. The key discussion points included the budget allocation for developmental schemes, collaborative projects with civil society organizations and increasing investment in health and education sectors. Moreover, the program highlighted the legislations by KP government to ensure transparency and accountability, right to public information and services and e-governance program. The program was aired under the theme of Jarga Marrakka (debate and council) on Monday. Mr. Arif Yousaf, Advisor to KP Chief Minister, and Mr. Zahid Nadeem, Town-1 Nazim Peshawar, participated as the studio guests. A radio report was included in the program. It highlighted the progress made by district governments in Mardan and Peshawar. Furthermore, the report shed light on the KP government’s investments in the secondary and higher levels of education. Ten callers took part live in the program. They shared views about the performance of respective district governments regarding the initiation of developmental projects. They raised concerns about the lack of government attention towards some areas of development. Mr. Arif Yousaf said: “The initiation of local government system is a big achievement of our government. It has an enabled us outreach every part of KP and has helped implement hundreds of small projects.” Sabawoon airs Monday through Thursday on FM-101.5 Peshawar & DI Khan 711 KHZ from 3:20 PM to 4:00 PM. [i] Sabawoon is a flagship radio program by CRSS in the KP/FATA region, designed to highlight local issues, and promote fundamental global values such as women’s rights, rule of law, equal citizenry, democracy, governance and accountability. It airs four times a week, under four themes. On Monday, Jarga Marrakka covers current affairs and issues, coupled with...
Who Defines Violent Non-State Actors in International Politics?
December 14, 2016, witnessed a surprising unfolding of events in Syria, with the Assad forces declaring a victory over the rebel groups in Eastern Aleppo. There were mixed scenes of misery and jubilation on the social and electronic media, with majority of the social media focused on the alleged brutality of Russian and Assad forces killing innocent women and children in the city. On the global front, the US and Russian envoys to the UN also traded barbs at each other. The US tried to shame Russia for supporting Assad and killing Syrians, whereas Russia accused the US of supporting and nourishing non state actors, such as ISIS and the Free Syrian Army. With the complicated war fronts and intra-state conflicts in modern times, especially in South Asia and Middle East, there remains a void on defining violent fringe groups, commonly known as Violent Non State Actors, or VNSAs. Where Afghanistan’s commonly known VNSAs are the Taliban, Pakistan’s NSAs include Tehrik i Taliban and armed groups based in FATA, Balochistan and South Punjab. In international arena, Al Qaeda and ISIS (or ISIL) are the most talked-about VNSAs currently. Now what makes the whole concept of NSAs interesting is how one party can see them as illegitimate groups, whereas the other party see them more on the lines of having a legitimate right to take up arms against the state. For the sake of understanding, one can assume that VNSAs, irrespective of the circumstances, are never to be backed by a legitimate state. Yet, there remains a major dilemma on who defines the legitimacy of VNSAs in current global politics. The VNSA dilemma has taken to the fore since the Syrian war started, with countless groups, all claiming to be legitimate representatives of Syrian people, aiming to overthrow Bashar al-Assad and his regime. The US government, over the course of Obama presidency, has openly supported most of these groups calling for Assad to leave. The Free Syrian Army, which clearly falls under...
Analysis: Can The Supreme Court Ban India’s Communal Habit?
The Supreme Court of India on Monday reportedly prohibited politicians from using peoples’ religion or caste to garner their votes, and the verdict has been described as one that could force political parties to change their strategy for the coming elections. The court had expressed a similar view in October. “No politician can seek a vote in the name of caste, creed or religion,” said Chief Justice T.S. Thakur in an order, adding that election process must be a “secular exercise” Gandhiji said of the western civilisation that it was a good idea. The same can be said on behalf of the apex court’s verdict. It is a good idea. However, it looks untenable in its execution. Clever politicians seldom appeal directly to their constituents to vote according to their religion or caste. More often in practice it is done deviously. For example, some people may ‘discover’ in an Uttar Pradesh village, bang on the eve of its state polls, that a Muslim ironsmith had slaughtered a cow for his daughter’s wedding. The dubious discovery could be enough of a trigger for a violent communal polarisation, without the politician lifting a finger. The country is replete with any number of permutations that could easily waylay the Supreme Court’s judgment without inviting contempt proceedings. Examine: Is it safe to be a communal peace hero in India? If the Supreme Court prohibited the media against fanning religious trouble, on the other hand, which is how communalism gets oxygen, it could begin to help stem the rot. Another approach to deter the use of communalism in politics can be to speed up the cases in communal riots. For example, punish the guilty in the one involving the demolition of the Babri masjid in Ayodhya. Deterring hate speech could be another condition to make politics less communalism-prone and that is a major challenge. Narrow nationalsim Does the ambit of communalism include narrow nationalism, for example, the act of calling Indian Muslims agents of Pakistan?...
Pakistan muddles along
Pakistan has endured over a decade of political discord, security crises and prolonged military rule. In 2016, the fragile civilian-led government experienced both setbacks and successes following this legacy of instability. Back in 2013, Pakistan underwent an unusual military to civil transition, beginning with the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in democratic elections in June. In November of that year, General Ashfaq Kayani handed the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) baton to General Raheel Sharif. And in December, Iftikhar Chaudhry — the iconic yet controversial chief justice — also retired. In November 2016, General Qamar Hayat Bajwa was appointed the new COAS and in December Sharif picked Lieutenant-General Naveed Mukhtar as the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. These new appointments were a huge step forward in Pakistan’s troubled journey to becoming a civilian-led government. They also meant that the country saw the backs of three generals in a span of just eight years. During this period the army’s control over certain issues — such as terrorism — increased, as the federal and provincial civilian governments kept ceding space to the army due to the government’s own disunity and weakness. On several occasions General Sharif cautioned the government against corruption and poor governance as his power and popularity grew. Beyond domestic political transition, Pakistan also negotiated a difficult international environment in 2016. In terms of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, General Sharif began discussions with Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani in earnest as he was determined to drag the Taliban to the table. But he was thwarted on all sides by various vested interests within the two countries’ intelligence agencies. By November 2016, relations between the two countries were at rock bottom and some of the dreaded Pakistan Taliban factions embodied by the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had begun morphing into the so-called Islamic State...
The Economics of CPEC
In a country where negativity and cynicism reign supreme, critics and detractors of all kinds are revered, and emotional outbursts and fabricated stories dominate the air waves and social media, it is difficult to present a dispassionate analysis of national issues. Since China announced the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), more time and energy has been spent in finding faults, poking holes and raising doubts based on speculation and conjecture. Had this investment been announced in another developing country, the national reaction would be: how do we plan to ensure maximisation of benefits to the economy? What are the weaknesses and deficiencies in the existing set-up we need to overcome? But this type of thinking is not in our DNA. We are either in a mood for celebration and self-congratulations or outright condemnation and depiction of exaggerated pitfalls. There are three types of reservations against CPEC. First, those who believe that this whole endeavour is designed to benefit Punjab to the neglect of the three smaller provinces. Fanning parochial and ethnic prejudices, doubts are created about the narrow impact of these projects. Second, that the country would be saddled with costly external loans and outflows forcing Pakistan to go for another bailout. Frightening numbers such as totals of $110 billion are floating around. Third, some Baloch youth believe that they would become a minority in their own province. Mistrust and not perceived economic gains underlies such anxiety. The government has not helped matters as it has not placed all the data and information about capital structure, detailed sources of financing, project sponsors etc pertaining to CPEC, in the public domain. There are three types of reservations against CPEC. How can we address them? This article, to allay some of the reservations, proposes that the Planning Commission and PIDE use the well-established framework of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate and monitor the net benefits...
The Non-Pashtun Taleban of The North: A Case Study From Badakhshan
The Taleban movement is winning ground in the northern province of Badakhshan, a province that was never conquered when the Taleban were in power in the 1990s. Over the past two years, a new generation of largely Tajik Taleban has come to pose a serious challenge for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) : a number of districts have changed hands between the ANSF and insurgents, and two strategic districts are now insurgent strongholds. Its success seems partly due to a recruitment policy that – in contrast to the 1990s – favours local non-Pashtuns for key provincial positions and as fighters. In this provincial case study, AAN’s Obaid Ali analyses the Taleban’s new recruitment policy and how it has strengthened the movement (with input from Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig). In 2004, as the insurgency began to gather pace, setting up a shadow administration was one of the Taleban’s major political strategies for controlling both territory and population. Over the years, in the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated provinces in the north, the movement increasingly appointed local non-Pashtuns, from shadow governors – both at the provincial and district level – to judges and heads of provincial committees. In Badakhshan, a Tajik-dominated province, most Taleban posts are now occupied by Tajiks. The shift in the movement’s recruitment strategy seems to have had a visible impact on its battlefield gains in Badakhshan. To put this into historical perspective, a comparison of the Taleban’s recruitment in Badakhshan during the current insurgency period and the movement’s years of rule, is useful. Badakhshan’s contribution to the Taleban regime during the 1990s During the Taleban regime in the 1990s, there were no more than a handful of high-ranking Taleb figures from Badakhshan. They were: Mawlawi Sayed Ghiasuddin, a Tajik from Badakhshan who served among the Taleban leadership soon after the formation of the movementin the mid-1990s; Qari Din Muhammad Hanif, a Tajik originally...
Terrorism Equally Threatening Afghanistan and Pakistan: Pak Army Chief
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa has said terrorism and extremism equally threatens Afghanistan and Pakistan as he pledged full support to cooperate in eliminate the menace of terror. The Office of the Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah said Gen. Bajwa conveyed the message during a telephone conversation on Saturday afternoon. Reiterating Pakistan’s hope for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, Gen. Bajwa said ‘He is hopeful the two brotherly nations work together for a lasting peace considering the current challenges and threats the two countries are facing.’ According to a statement by Chief Executive’s Office, Gen. Bajwa has called extremism and terrorism a joint threat to both the nations as he pledged full support by Pakistan to eliminate the shared threats. In his turn, CE Abdullah congratulated Gen. Bajwa for his appointment as the new Chief of Staff of Pakistan’s army and said terrorism and extremism poses a serious threat for peace and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Abdullah further added that both Afghanistan and Pakistan should work closely to fight the menace of terrorism and extremism in a bid to ensure peace and stability of the region. This article originally appeared on www.khaama.com, January 01, 2017. Original link. Disclaimer: Views expressed in the article are not necessarily supported by CRSS.
The Decline of Afghanistan's Hindu And Sikh Communities
Hidden in plain sight, on a poorly lit busy road, the exteriors of the Asmayee temple are deceiving - a plain, old building that could easily be confused for any other building in Kabul. In contrast, the mosque next door stands out with its beautiful, intricate architecture. The call for evening prayers from the mosque intertwines with the sounds of the Hindu chants resonating from within the halls of the temple. Several finely dressed, middle-aged women, move in and out of the many rooms of the vast temple complex, offering prayers and lighting candles. There are seven rooms built in a circle that serve as the temple for the various Hindu goddesses and gods, and one expansive hall, colourfully decorated and covered in Persian carpets, that serves as the community prayer room. The women celebrate separately from the men. There is also a separate dining hall and community kitchen for the men and women who come to the temple. Ramnath, 25, explains that "this is because the culture among Afghan Hindus is predominantly Pashtun". Over the years, Hinduism in Afghanistansurvived and thrived in Pashtun-dominant provinces, resulting in a confluence of cultures that combines practices and rituals of the region. "If you go up the hill, there is another small temple of the Sherawali," says Ramnath, referring to the Hindu goddess Durga by one of her many names. "It was said that years ago, a white river of milk flowed down from the foot of the statue of the goddess to Kabul. This is how this place got its name joy-e-sheer, which translates to 'stream of milk' from Dari," Ramnath tells as the men gather quietly in one of the rooms over a cup of tea. Ramnath, like many Afghans, only uses one name. "Of course, those are reminiscent tales of the past. Who can tell how much of that legend is true?" he adds. A history of diversity and repression Afghanistan's history is full of such anecdotes and lore about a substantial thriving community of Hindus and Sikhs who have called this...
The Decline of Afghanistan’s Hindu And Sikh Communities
Hidden in plain sight, on a poorly lit busy road, the exteriors of the Asmayee temple are deceiving - a plain, old building that could easily be confused for any other building in Kabul. In contrast, the mosque next door stands out with its beautiful, intricate architecture. The call for evening prayers from the mosque intertwines with the sounds of the Hindu chants resonating from within the halls of the temple. Several finely dressed, middle-aged women, move in and out of the many rooms of the vast temple complex, offering prayers and lighting candles. There are seven rooms built in a circle that serve as the temple for the various Hindu goddesses and gods, and one expansive hall, colourfully decorated and covered in Persian carpets, that serves as the community prayer room. The women celebrate separately from the men. There is also a separate dining hall and community kitchen for the men and women who come to the temple. Ramnath, 25, explains that "this is because the culture among Afghan Hindus is predominantly Pashtun". Over the years, Hinduism in Afghanistansurvived and thrived in Pashtun-dominant provinces, resulting in a confluence of cultures that combines practices and rituals of the region. "If you go up the hill, there is another small temple of the Sherawali," says Ramnath, referring to the Hindu goddess Durga by one of her many names. "It was said that years ago, a white river of milk flowed down from the foot of the statue of the goddess to Kabul. This is how this place got its name joy-e-sheer, which translates to 'stream of milk' from Dari," Ramnath tells as the men gather quietly in one of the rooms over a cup of tea. Ramnath, like many Afghans, only uses one name. "Of course, those are reminiscent tales of the past. Who can tell how much of that legend is true?" he adds. A history of diversity and repression Afghanistan's history is full of such anecdotes and lore about a substantial thriving community of Hindus and Sikhs who have called this...
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I am also a member of National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Information and Broadcasting. Recently, we held a meeting with the Director General of Radio Pakistan and we told them to initiate such local programs (like Constituency Hour) in regional languages to educate and inform people. Even Indian Radio can be heard in FATA which is being used for propaganda purposes and must be closed. Therefore, we should launch some standard and quality programs like CRSS that will change the taste of the listeners.