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How to Win in Afghanistan
Fifteen years, thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars later, the United States has failed to meet most of its key objectives in Afghanistan. Mission failed. Now what? Our current approach, if allowed to continue, guarantees a chaotic future for Afghanistan and an open door for radical Islamists in Central Asia. Such a state of affairs would herald a major strategic defeat for the United States. Islamists ultimately seek to seize control in both Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and then expand into Central Asia. A debacle in Afghanistan means we may face another global conflict. Turkey has morphed into an Islamic state, and the Gulf states are financing radical Sunni terror groups meant to encircle and contain the mullahs in Iran—including extremists in Afghanistan. Will the Islamists achieve their objectives? No, and we do not want to find out. They need to be defeated now, while the situation is still manageable. An alternative strategy can avert a strategic catastrophe later. Our incompetent efforts at Afghan nation building rest on three shaky pillars that need to be rethought: Highly centralized political decisionmaking. Pashtun control of the overly powerful central government, the national police and the Afghan National Army. Excessive deference to Pakistan’s interests and policies in Afghanistan and the region. This flawed scheme has its roots in the key events of modern Afghan history: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (in response to the 9/11 attacks) and the subsequent December 2001 Bonn Agreement to reconstitute the Afghan state structure following the war. With the defeat of the Taliban, the United States and the UN imposed Afghanistan’s first president Hamid Karzai—a Pashtun—on the Afghan people against their will. Later, during a December 2002 constitutional convention in Kabul, the United States and the “international community” forced Afghans to accept centralized governance despite much internal resistance. After Karzai’s departure from the...
In Afghanistan, Trump Will Inherit a Costly Stalemate And Few Solutions
For President Obama, the war in Afghanistan has been a matter of profound ambivalence — a strategic necessity and an unmistakable burden. He has talked about the United States’ interest in preventing the country from ever becoming a sanctuary for global terrorists. Just as often, he has spoken of ending the war and the limits of American military power, money, patience and time. Nearly eight years after Obama began his presidency with a long and contentious Afghanistan strategy review, he is leaving behind for President-elect Donald Trump a war that reflects his divided outlook. By most measures, the conflict is a stalemate. Afghan troops are fighting hard, but “the casualty rate is much higher than we would have hoped,” a senior defense official recently told reporters. Taliban forces are taking territory from the U.S.-backed government, but have not been able to seize and hold any major cities or towns. “Clearly the situation is getting worse, but not to the extent that you see the Taliban winning or the Afghan government is clearly failing,” said Andrew Wilder, a vice president and Afghanistan expert at the United States Institute of Peace. The United States’ longest and most expensive war — with the largest U.S. troop presence in a combat zone — was mostly absent from the presidential campaign. On the rare occasions Trump has spoken about Afghanistan, he has sounded as conflicted as his predecessor. Trump has said the fight against extremist groups is his foreign policy priority. But he also has said that he wants to get the United States out of the nation-building business. “I would stay in Afghanistan,” Trump said in an interview with Fox News Channel this year. “I hate doing it. I hate doing it so much. But again, you have nuclear weapons in Pakistan, so I would do it.” Not long after his election, Trump and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani discussed the U.S. military’s counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s cross-border havens in Pakistan,...
Analysis: Iran’s Game Plan in Afghanistan
Since the nuclear agreement between Iran and 5+1 countries was signed in July 2015 and the economic sanctions were eased, Iran has become even more aggressive in pursuing its radical and hegemonic policies in the region. Its military advances in Syria, the ascendance of the pro-Hezbollah candidate to Presidency in Lebanon and the military dominance of its proxy militias in Iraq that form the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have further emboldened Iran. As a result, it has increased its support to Yemeni rebels and radical Shiite groups in Bahrain. Simultaneously, the neighboring Afghanistan has emerged as Iran’s next target to expand its influence and shape its future. In order to implement its long-term strategy in Afghanistan, Iran has increased its military support to Taliban and at the same time, counts on its own militia proxy, the Fatemiyoun Division which is made up of Afghan Shiites which was founded by Revolutionary Guards in 2013 to fight in Syria. This battle-experienced force is estimated to have more than 15,000 members and could potentially be used as an important tool to secure Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Iran and Taliban Iranian support to Taliban became more apparent in May 2016 when the group’s top leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed by US drone attack in Pakistan as he was returning from Iran. Jahan News, an Iranian outlet close to the Revolutionary Guards, confirmed that he had stayed in Iran for two months prior to his death and had meetings with Iranian officials. In May 2015, an Iranian news websites tied to the Revolutionary Guards reported that a Taliban delegation visited Iran and several editorials have been published in governmental press to justify Iran’s support to Taliban. On December 12, 2016, Iran’s ambassador to Kabul, Mohammad Reza Behrami, told Tasnim News that “Iran maintains contacts with the Taliban for control and intelligence purposes”. According to a report published by Wall Street Journal on June 11,...
Afghanistan: Returnee Crisis Situation (January 12, 2017)
Highlights - In 2016, almost 620,000 undocumented returnees (249,832) and registered refugees (370,102) returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan. The overwhelming majority – 93% (577,454) – returned since July. - In the last month, no registered refugees have returned following the winter pause in UNHCR’s repatriation programme. Undocumented returns have also slowed, with 2,243 arriving between 1 and 10 January. - CHF partners NCRO and Relief International commenced cash distributions for food and shelter to 4,763 undocumented returnees in Behsud, Jalalabad and Sorkhrod districts on 27 December 2016 following extensive coordination to avoid de-duplication with other partners. Cash for winter assistance provided by AfghanAid to 1,847 undocumented returnees started on 5 January 2017, along with post distribution monitoring supported by members of the OCHA Humanitarian Financing Unit. -Reports of two groups of mixed returnee families settling in camp-like situations in Gamberi (500) and Khairokahil (300) districts in Laghman province are being followed up by partners with an inter-agency assessment planned for 15 January. To date, provincial authorities in Laghman have prevented the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those settled in Khairokhail, while only mobile health services, emergency latrines and water trucking (the latter of which stopped on 15 December) has been provided to those in Gamberi. Initial visits to both sites indicates that returnees are living in makeshift shelter and in need of winterisation support. - Following a sudden surge in pediatric admissions to Nangarhar Regional Hospital in early January – 197 children were admitted within 24 hours – the Department of Public Health (DoPH) has called for urgent additional support in the form of beds, equipment, personnel and medical supplies. While temporary measures have been put in place to ease overcrowding, including the allocation of a portion of the casualty ward to accommodate an extra 30-40...
A US Report Says Afghanistan Forces Still Aren't Ready To Secure The Nation Alone
A U.S. report published last week suggests Afghan forces are still not capable of securing the country by itself, which puts it at risk of once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) lists high-risk areas for the nation, including corruption, limited capabilities of security forces and a lack of sustainability. A U.S. report published last week suggests Afghan forces are still not capable of securing the country by itself, which puts it at risk of once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) lists high-risk areas for the nation, including corruption, limited capabilities of security forces and a lack of sustainability. "Reconstructing Afghanistan has been the largest expenditure to rebuild a single country in our nation's history." As of August 2016, 63.4 percent of Afghan districts were under government control, a drop from 72 percent as of fall 2015. The report claims corruption continues to weaken the nation's military and the government's ability to generate popular support against insurgent groups. "A lack of emphasis on planning and developing related strategies means the U.S. military and civilian agencies are at risk of working at cross purposes, spending money on nonessential endeavors, or failing to coordinate efforts in Afghanistan," the report claimed. It also pointed to the still-thriving narcotics industry in Afghanistan. Many terrorist groups are funded by the opium trade. Despite $8.5 billion in counternarcotics efforts, the U.S. has not been able to curb that trade. See full report here. Disclaimer: Views expressed in the article are not necessarily supported by CRSS.
A US Report Says Afghanistan Forces Still Aren’t Ready To Secure The Nation Alone
A U.S. report published last week suggests Afghan forces are still not capable of securing the country by itself, which puts it at risk of once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) lists high-risk areas for the nation, including corruption, limited capabilities of security forces and a lack of sustainability. A U.S. report published last week suggests Afghan forces are still not capable of securing the country by itself, which puts it at risk of once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) lists high-risk areas for the nation, including corruption, limited capabilities of security forces and a lack of sustainability. "Reconstructing Afghanistan has been the largest expenditure to rebuild a single country in our nation's history." As of August 2016, 63.4 percent of Afghan districts were under government control, a drop from 72 percent as of fall 2015. The report claims corruption continues to weaken the nation's military and the government's ability to generate popular support against insurgent groups. "A lack of emphasis on planning and developing related strategies means the U.S. military and civilian agencies are at risk of working at cross purposes, spending money on nonessential endeavors, or failing to coordinate efforts in Afghanistan," the report claimed. It also pointed to the still-thriving narcotics industry in Afghanistan. Many terrorist groups are funded by the opium trade. Despite $8.5 billion in counternarcotics efforts, the U.S. has not been able to curb that trade. See full report here. Disclaimer: Views expressed in the article are not necessarily supported by CRSS.
The Dilemma Surrounding Afghanistan
The three deadly attacks in Afghanistan on January 11 took the lives of nearly 70 people including five diplomats of the United Arab Emirates at a time when there was a traditional lull in the fighting in winter. But the attacks on the parliament staff in capital Kabul and Helmand, which were claimed by the Taliban and the officials blamed the Taliban for the third in Kandahar, could be seen as Taliban’s tactics to penetrate into highly secured areas and to expose the fragile security. The attacks could also be seen as an attempt by them to mount pressure on the Afghan government and the international community just ahead of the inauguration of Donald Trump who will face the Afghan crisis as one of his foreign policy challenges. Donald Trump will have several options: either to maintain the status quo, send more troops or to reduce the current level of nearly 9,000 American troops, who are part of about 15,000 foreign troops. President Obama, who has left the Afghan problem for Trump, had admitted last month that foreign troops could not eliminate the Taliban. The attacks shattered Afghanistan and the regions soon after senior Chinese, Pakistani and Russian diplomats gathered in Moscow to offer support for the reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban, besides showing concerns at the emerging threat of the IS from the Afghan soil. The rippling effects of the December 27 trilateral consultation continue to unravel the government and policymakers in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan President’s Deputy Spokesman, Dawa Khan Menapal, told the American Mashaal Radio after the Moscow meeting that Kabul will not accept any decision without its input and advised the countries to deal with the Afghan government tactfully. He was refereeing to the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting in which Russia and China confirmed their “flexible approach to delisting Afghan individuals from the UN sanctions lists as their contribution to the efforts aimed at launching...
Coal Energy: at What Cost?
Minister of Planning and Development Ahsan Iqbal recently informed the parliamentary committee on CPEC that Thar coal would be used for electricity for the next 400 years and that two transmission lines were being installed at Mariari — one to Lahore, and another to Faisalabad, which will be connected to the national grid, benefiting all parts of the country. He also stated that some 11,000 MW of electricity will be added to the national grid by 2018 with the help of the biggest energy investment in the history of Pakistan under CPEC. It will be great news if Pakistan can get rid of power outages in major cities. But the bad news is that over 8,000 MW of this energy will come from coal — major source of carbon emissions in China itself. What consequences will the coal-fired plants, particularly in central Punjab have, usually enveloped by smog in December? China, which surpassed the US in carbon dioxide emission in 2007 becoming leader in world pollution, is already reeling from the impact of the coal energy. In 2014, for instance, Chinese scientists compared the toxic haze to a “nuclear winter” that “has started slowing down photosynthesis in plants.” And recently in December 2016, environmental protection officials called on the government to issue red smog alerts for 23 cities in northern China. Beijing officials had already issued a red alert after warnings of a build-up of toxic air pollution during cold weather. An additional nine industrial cities had also been advised to issue the lowest-level orange alert. In fact, images of school children taking exam in an open football stadium enveloped in a dense cloud of noxious pollution, which triggered the smog “red alert” on December 20, went viral on the social media. Taking cognisance of the choking smog, Chinese officials began taking its environmental problems seriously in the year 2014. They struck a deal with the US to reduce the rate of its carbon emissions by 2030. Statistics from the Chinese National...
Changing Ties
The Indo-US strategic partnership has been a source of constant tension in Pak-US ties in recent years. The US has pursued ‘de-hyphenation’ ie dealing with Islamabad and New Delhi relatively independently of each other. Central to this has been its hands-off approach on contentious Pak-India issues. Donald Trump has excited the Pakistani policy space by hinting at his willingness to reconsider the US line. Pakistani officials in touch with Washington have been trying to determine if Trump will actually consider a more proactive effort to improve Pak-India ties. While there’s no definitive answer, one can point to factors that will influence the Trump White House’s final policy. President Obama’s experience is a starting point. Candidate Obama was explicit in promising a regional approach to South Asia during the 2008 campaign. His reasoning confirmed an appreciation of the link between Pak-India tensions and their fallout on Afghanistan: to solve Afghanistan, one needs improvement on the Pak-India front. The Indians shot down his idea and US policy recoiled to its de-hyphenation default. A tougher US line is on the cards for Pakistan. First, the Washington policy establishment is even more solidly committed to opposing US involvement in Pak-India issues than it was eight years ago. I have challenged the wisdom of this stance given that it contradicts US interest in South Asia. But few accept the proposition. Still, some in Pakistan hope that the Trump team may be less worried about defying Washington’s establishment. Perhaps. But a new administration with multiple policy positions seemingly at odds with this establishment would have to pick its battles carefully. Non-priorities like Pak-India may be ones to sacrifice. Second, Trump’s position on China will complicate things. If Sino-US competition accentuates, India will be even more important as a counterweight to Beijing. India’s leverage over the US would increase, and it will demand that Washington put...
CPEC: Lessons from History
How does one get a grip on the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its associated investments without any hard information except for the hype? In the absence of any mechanism for credible evaluation I suggest we hold it up against a historical parallel and see what emerges by way of tentative conclusions. Some discussion grounded in real experience may be better than taking sides in the dark. Around the turn of the 20th century, the British invested vast sums of money in the part of the subcontinent that now comprises Pakistan. Amongst these investments were the network of canals and barrages, the post and telegraph, and roads and railways. All included it would have likely added up in real terms to be bigger than the $56 billion associated with CPEC. What came of all that investment and what economic transformations did it sustain? At the macro level, Pakistan remains a desperately poor country with around a third of its population struggling to survive below the poverty line. Almost half the population is functionally illiterate without access to safe water and sanitation or adequate healthcare. Stunting, malnutrition and infant and maternal mortality are at levels considered unacceptable in the rest of the world. The sobering conclusion would be that even if the investments had huge economic payoffs, extremely venal governance ensured that while some people became phenomenally rich very few of the benefits trickled down to the majority in any meaningful sense. What came of all the colonial-era investment and what economic transformations did it sustain? Notwithstanding the issues of governance and distribution, which remain as critical now as then, the question remains: did the investments have huge economic payoffs? Even to speculate intelligently on the question one would need to disaggregate the investments and consider them separately. Take the canal colonies and the barrages. I believe most people would accept that the outcomes were...
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I am also a member of National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Information and Broadcasting. Recently, we held a meeting with the Director General of Radio Pakistan and we told them to initiate such local programs (like Constituency Hour) in regional languages to educate and inform people. Even Indian Radio can be heard in FATA which is being used for propaganda purposes and must be closed. Therefore, we should launch some standard and quality programs like CRSS that will change the taste of the listeners.