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Annual Security Report 2016
Pakistan recorded a significant decline in violence in the year 2016, continuing a two-year trend. Terrorism began losing its sway soon after the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas. The results of the kinetic operations are now quite evident and manifest in the improved security situation. However the root cause threats of extremism still linger. The militants, facing the onslaught of the military operations and the tightening of the law enforcement noose around their necks, began fleeing the country and evolved new strategies. They targeted geographical areas and population centers that were softer, least protected, and unprecedented. In addition, they deployed a wider array of improvised explosive weapons and suicide bombers despite strong resistance by the security personnel. Another major change observed was the escalation of fatalities from violence in those provinces that earlier experienced a decline while an inversely opposite trend was observed in other provinces. Violence in Balochistan spiked, while in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Sindh, it declined significantly. A large number of high profile Pakistani militants hiding in the bordering areas of Afghanistan were killed in US drone attacks during 2016. Some Pakistani as well as foreign-born descendants of Pakistani nationals, under the influence of the Islamic State (IS), took up arms in foreign countries, as a result of which they were either eliminated or arrested during security operations in their adopted countries. The assessment and reviews of all these incidents of violence are discussed in detail in this report based on the data CRSS has collected during the year from open sources, i.e., national print and electronic media. CRSS endeavors to ensure that the data is as accurate as possible within the available sources. However, it does not rule out errors and omissions, which are always a possibility in handling and working on statistics. Such mistakes,...
Stereo-Typing Pashtoons
As a Pashtoon teenager, I grew up in Punjab with some of the most demeaning cliches of Pashtoons; smugglers, money-lenders at exorbitant rates of interest, child and car-lifters were some of the most disparaging stereotypes associated with Pashtoons. Now, little past mid-50s, officials in Punjab stunned me by telling me that terrorism flows only from the lands that are inhabited by Pashtoons in the northwest of Pakistan next to Afghanistan. Ironically, Punjab tops all other Pakistani territories in terms of religious/extremist/outlawed groups density; as many as 107 of the 240 or so socio-politically lethal groups are headquartered in the province, with 71 in Lahore and around alone, including the one that is an eye-sore for Indians. Only about 21 religious parties/groups subscribe to the present political system, though most of them are primarily one-man parties. Out of this, 148 are sectarian outfits while 24 are jihadi organisations, while 12 outfits claim to work for revival of Islamic Khilafat as their objective. General Zia laid the foundations of this elaborate network of politico-religious and sectarian groups in order to promote the jihadist narratives in support of the movements in Kashmir and Afghanistan. He, on the other hand, also saw them as the essential tool for self-preservation in the face of a liberal Pakistan People’s Party and the Pashtoon nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). With state sponsorship Jhang emerged as the hub of sectarian extremism, where Haq Nawaz Jhangvi founded the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, followed by many others. Those branding Pashtoons must remember; Osama bin Laden or Dr Al-Zawahiri or Abu Bakr Baghdadi are not Pashtoons. Nor are their Pakistani followers such as Hafiz Saeed, Mulana Aziz, Abdur Rasheed Ghazi, Malik Ishaq , Maulana Masood Azhar, Farooq Kashmiri, Maulana Fazlurrehman Khalil inter alia. Nor did General Hameed Gul, the globally known political mentor of these believers in the global jihad, had anything to...
CICIR-CRSS Rountable on CPEC, Sino-Pak Relations Conducted in Islamabad
The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) held a joint roundtable briefing with China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) on the subject of “New Geopolitics and the Region”. Imtiaz Gul, the head of CRSS and Hu Shisheng, director of CICIR, were the main speakers of the event. Among the other speakers were former Federal Finance Secretary Waqar Masood, Ambassador Mian Sanaullah, Ambassador Qazi Hamyun, Economist Syed Husaini, and Engineer Arshad Abbasi. Hu Shisheng shared his thoughts on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the policies of the new American President Donald J. Trump. He said that CPEC was not only a mega project but the pilot-project of China’s “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative. Given the massive nature of the project, Pakistan and China should expect that challenges will also be enormous. CPEC is very important for China and it would never like it to fail as some countries may wish so. He said one basic goal of China is to help its ‘all-weather’ friend Pakistan stand economically on its own footing. The pre-CPEC relations between the two countries were military and political in nature. Mr. Shisheng observed that as China was suffering economic overcapacity, it was compelled to export part of industrial capacities to countries like Pakistan. Industrial zones under CPEC are supposed to play crucial role in the respect. He noted that as the guiding principle of China’s OBOR initiative was inclusiveness, CPEC can be connected to Iran’s Chabahar port. This policy of China stands in contrast to the India’s approach of excluding and isolating Pakistan from regional initiatives and platforms. About the Trump’s policy towards the region, Shisheng said that the new US President will scale back American engagement in Afghanistan and consequently the responsibility to deal with Afghan issue will fall on the regional countries like China, Pakistan etc. Ambassador Mian Sanaullah discussed Trump’s South Asia policy....
Russia and Pakistan’s Reluctant Romance
State-to-state relationships are not grounded in emotions. These are based on shared interests. No one is a friend or a foe forever; the convergence or divergences of mutual interests decide the nature of the relationship between two countries. Though, the relations between Russia and Pakistan have remained turbulent over the years, they have been warming up over the last decade with top political and diplomatic rendezvous. Moscow is reaffirming its assertion in its immediate domain and beyond, whereas Islamabad is seeking new avenues of opportunities lessening its reliance on the United States in particular, and the West in general. Between 1947-50 and 1965-69, the two countries were engaged in the spheres of trade, education, and cultural exchanges. The 1996 Tashkent Summit between Pakistan and India also materialized due to the labors of Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin. Pakistan Steel mills remain a towering reminder of well-intentioned Pak-Russo bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the Soviet efforts were diluted by Soviet Union itself when Soviet condemnation of Pakistan's position in the 1971 war with India deteriorated bilateral relations, and many people of Pakistan assumed that the August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation encouraged India’s invasion of East Pakistan. Ensuing Soviet arms sales to India, amounting to billions of dollars on concessional terms, strengthened this argument. The USSR also kept vetoing each resolution regarding the East Pakistan situation that Pakistan brought to the United Nations. During the cold war, Moscow-Islamabad relations had seen many ups and downs. Incidents such as Soviet Union support for Afghanistan on Pashtunistan issue and the U-2 episode shuddered the mutual trust. The two sided relations experienced a nose dive and touched the lowest ebb during 1980s Soviet’s occupation of Afghanistan, in which Pakistan sided with United States - the Soviet’s Cold War arch rival to obstruct the...
Russia and Pakistan's Reluctant Romance
State-to-state relationships are not grounded in emotions. These are based on shared interests. No one is a friend or a foe forever; the convergence or divergences of mutual interests decide the nature of the relationship between two countries. Though, the relations between Russia and Pakistan have remained turbulent over the years, they have been warming up over the last decade with top political and diplomatic rendezvous. Moscow is reaffirming its assertion in its immediate domain and beyond, whereas Islamabad is seeking new avenues of opportunities lessening its reliance on the United States in particular, and the West in general. Between 1947-50 and 1965-69, the two countries were engaged in the spheres of trade, education, and cultural exchanges. The 1996 Tashkent Summit between Pakistan and India also materialized due to the labors of Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin. Pakistan Steel mills remain a towering reminder of well-intentioned Pak-Russo bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the Soviet efforts were diluted by Soviet Union itself when Soviet condemnation of Pakistan's position in the 1971 war with India deteriorated bilateral relations, and many people of Pakistan assumed that the August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation encouraged India’s invasion of East Pakistan. Ensuing Soviet arms sales to India, amounting to billions of dollars on concessional terms, strengthened this argument. The USSR also kept vetoing each resolution regarding the East Pakistan situation that Pakistan brought to the United Nations. During the cold war, Moscow-Islamabad relations had seen many ups and downs. Incidents such as Soviet Union support for Afghanistan on Pashtunistan issue and the U-2 episode shuddered the mutual trust. The two sided relations experienced a nose dive and touched the lowest ebb during 1980s Soviet’s occupation of Afghanistan, in which Pakistan sided with United States - the Soviet’s Cold War arch rival to obstruct the...
Monopolizing the Legitimate Use of Force in Afghanistan: The Way Forward
Afghanistan’s security apparatus, even after 15 years of NATO presence, is still fragile. Nothing is hindering Taliban to launch on and off destructive offenses in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the year 2017 is instigating multiple terror attacks in Afghanistan; Major Afghan cities were traumatized by consecutive deadly assaults thereby tens of people were killed and wounded. The first happening this January 2017 shook Kabul with twin blasts near the Afghan Parliament in a congested area which killed at least 50 people and more than 100 wounded including Rahima Jami, a member of parliament from Herat province. The second attack in southern Afghanistan, at a guesthouse belonging to the governor of Kandahar province killed 11 with five United Arab Emirates’ diplomats and wounded 18 others. SIGAR’s latest report released on January 30, 2017 revealed deadly figures of up to 19,000 terrorist attacks occurring in the last 10 months at the hands of the Taliban and ISIS insurgents compared to only 700 counter-insurgency operations by Afghan Security Forces in Afghanistan. This exhibits the magnitude of the security challenge that the Afghan Government is faced with. Encountering such relentless terrorist offensives by insurgents, impairing the authority of the Afghan Government, Kabul has once again turned to old school rules by engaging pro-government militias to counter Taliban and ISIS. The effort is anticipated to ultimately mobilize thousands of Afghans especially from the northern region of the country to confront Taliban in areas where the Afghan military and police forces are losing ground or have had little presence. This kind of strategy to turn to irregular forces is stirring up apprehensions of discordant conflicts and civil dissension in a country still haunted by the civil strife of the 1990s in which fighting militia leaders ripped the country apart. In Afghanistan, regimes have, since long before the existing chapter of the conflict, depended on the parallel...
CHINA WATCH [FBERUAR 21-27] CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC) SECURITY
Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed said that in order to provide security to CPEC projects, the government has deployed 15,000 military personnel. India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar visited Beijing and held strategic dialogue with China. Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif dismissed the notions of conspiracy by the United States or the West against CPEC. China has expressed its support for Pakistan’s newly-launched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudray stated that CPEC would help achieve the core objectives of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). President of the Balochistan National Party (BNP-M) Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal has said that he sees no benefit for his province from the implementation of the CPEC projects. CPEC’s Security: Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, revealed that in order to provide security to the projects under CPEC, the government has deployed 15,000 military personnel under the Special Security Division (SSD) and Maritime Security Force (MSF).[1] He said that “[T]he SSD is a force that will provide security to 34 CPEC related projects, while MSF will safeguard the Gwadar port and other coastal areas of the country.” These forces will work under the interior ministry and in coordination with the provinces. The SSD was formulated with the primary goal of ensuring the security of foreigners working on the CPEC projects. As Pakistan has been waging an internal war against the militancy for more than a decade, protecting the foreigners – especially thousands of Chinese involved in different projects across the country- becomes a priority and a challenging task. The recent resurgence in terrorist attacks in Pakistan that have killed more than hundred people has made such security measures all the more important. China-India Talks: India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar visited Beijing and held strategic dialogue with China. Mr. Jaishankar said that he told...
IS in Afghanistan: How successful has the group been?
Amid a rise in attacks in Afghanistan attributed to the so-called Islamic State (IS), the BBC's Dawood Azami examines what kind of threat the militant group poses in the conflict-hit nation and the wider region. How much territory has IS captured? IS announced the establishment of its Khorasan branch - an old name for Afghanistan and surrounding areas - in January 2015. It was the first time that IS had officially spread outside the Arab world. Within a few weeks, the group appeared in at least five Afghan provinces, including Helmand, Zabul, Farah, Logar and Nangarhar, trying to establish pockets of territory from which to expand. It was the first major militant group to directly challenge the Afghan Taliban's dominance over the local insurgency. Its first aim was to drive Afghan Taliban fighters out of the area and it also hoped to evict Taliban ally al-Qaeda from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, or absorb its fighters. Yet despite efforts to energise battle-weary militants, IS struggled to build a wide political base and the indigenous support it expected in Afghanistan. Instead, it made enemies of almost everyone, including the Afghan Taliban. In the first half of 2015, IS managed to capture large chunks of territory in eastern Nangarhar province. This became the de facto "capital" principally for two reasons - its proximity to the tribal areas of Pakistan, home of IS Khorasan's top leaders, and the presence of some people who follow a similar Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islam to IS. IS is also trying to get a foothold in northern Afghanistan, where it aims to link up with Central Asian, Chechen and Chinese Uighur militants. But it has largely been eliminated from southern and western Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and military operations conducted by Afghan and US/Nato forces. It has also lost territory in eastern Afghanistan in recent months. But it still has control over some parts of Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, where it plans attacks and...
Drone Warfare: Afghanistan, Birthplace of The Armed Drone
Using drones to carry out targeted killings has become an integral part of the United States’ ‘war on terror’. Afghanistan in the late 1990s was the laboratory where the US developed armed drones as it searched for a way to deal with Osama bin Laden who was then ordering attacks on American targets from his safe haven in Kandahar. At that time, Washington was uneasy about ordering an assassination, especially one likely to result in civilian casualties. After 9/11, such doubts disappeared and it embraced drones, using them to carry out targeted killings of Islamist militants in many countries. In this first of two dispatches, AAN’s Kate Clark looks at armed drones in Afghanistan. A second dispatch will look at the expansion of America’s targeted killing by drone programme in the war on terror and asks whether Afghanistan might in the future see a US ‘drone-only’ or ‘drone-mainly’ mission of the sort seen in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Bin Laden and the birth of drone warfare The project to create armed drones grew out of the need felt by Washington to eliminate the threat posed by bin Laden. In the late 1990s, he was orchestrating attacks on American targets while living under Taleban protection. US options were limited by a presidential standing order banning assassinations (1) which meant the CIA was legally bound to plan an operation with detention as its sole aim. Additionally, CIA officials were worried about the women and children living in bin Laden’s compound – visible on satellite footage – who would be harmed if the capture operation turned into a firefight. “[CIA officers,” reported Steve Coll, “found themselves pulled into emotional debates about legal authorities and the potential for civilian casualties…” (2) (p 393) In 1998, bin Laden ordered attacks on two American embassies in east Africa and Washington responded with Cruise missile strikes on training camps in Khost (which it said was an act of self-defence, not an assassination attempt). Even after...
As China enjoys Pak seafood, India feels Beijing’s presence
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is changing life in China’s Northwest Xinjiang Uyghur region, bringing something special to the region: seafood from Pakistan. This little bonus is being shipped by container trucks through the corridor, which currently accounts for two percent of the total trade between the two countries; and more goods are expected to come through CPEC from the Middle East and Africa. That’s certainly a good return for China’s enormous investment in the project, which some experts call the Marshall Plan for Pakistan. “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been described as a Marshall Plan for Pakistan,” says Marko Dimitrijevic, author of Frontier Investor. “It is a $51 billion, 15 year project that will ultimately create a 2,000 kilometre highway/railway/pipeline route from Western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, knocking over 10,000 kilometres off the current sea route for Middle Eastern oil to China; a high-speed railway from Karachi to Lahore to Peshawar; and over 26,000 MW of electric generating capacity.” CPEC is part of China’s ambition to write the rules of the next stage of globalisation and help Beijing sustain growth—a good prospect for investors in Chinese equities, which have been lagging behind those of neighbouring India over the last five-year period. This piece originally appeared in The News, February 27, 2017. Original link. Disclaimer: Views expressed in the article are not necessarily supported by CRSS.
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I am also a member of National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Information and Broadcasting. Recently, we held a meeting with the Director General of Radio Pakistan and we told them to initiate such local programs (like Constituency Hour) in regional languages to educate and inform people. Even Indian Radio can be heard in FATA which is being used for propaganda purposes and must be closed. Therefore, we should launch some standard and quality programs like CRSS that will change the taste of the listeners.