Karzai holds talks with Hizb-e-Islami ´ at last:
The news on President Hamid Karzai ‘preliminary talks’ with a delegation of the Hizb-e-Islami, (March 22nd), should be a welcome development in the overall regional context. The HI in fact represents an erstwhile radical Islamist, and a political, force, which very well knows how and when to bend when it comes to talking power or the share in it. Official sources announced that President Karzai met with Qutbuddin Helal, a former deputy prime minister and the current deputy of Gulbadin Hekmetyar, Ameer of HI and one of the most wanted men by the NATO and US-led war coalition in Afghanistan.
Brief introduction on Hekmetyar:
HI Ameer, Gulbudin Hekmetyar has a history of fighting the foreign occupation forces and the puppet regimes in Kabul for over three decades now. Hekmetyar charmed a whole lot of young Mujahideen in April 1990, when the then defense minister Shahnawaz Tanai, joined him in an abortive coup against Dr. Najibullah. At that point in the history of Afghanistan, HI boasted that the ‘final victory ‘ was just a few hours away but the events then showed, that hour of glory never embraced Hekmetyar. But nevertheless, his charm, charisma and fabled image continued to impress and inspire a whole new generation of Mujahideen. After the fall of Najibullah and entering into Chaharaasiab south of Kabul exactly two years later, Hekmetyar went on to join another socialist, Gen. Rashid Dostum, to take on mujahideen comrades Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood, until he joined the Mulla Omar-led Taliban. He also had been in regular contacts with Tehran, and had also enjoyed huge privileges once as the ‘blue-eyed boy of the Pakistani establishment.’ Being an ethnic Pashtoon, Hekmetyar and the likes of him had always been an automatic choice for Pakistan, which had always craved for a friendly government in Kabul. Hekmetyar has reportedly maintained a working relationship with segments of the Pakistani establishment, and this also means that he has been fighting more for political power than an ideology embedded in Islam.
Timing of the talks is important:
Karzai choice of Hezbe Islami ahead of the reconciliation process through the April 29 Jirga in Kabul had been a foregone conclusion. The world largely does not know but the truth is that as many as 49 former Hezbe Islami leaders and activists currently sit in the Woolasi Jirga ´ Afghanistan National Assembly. Some of them even occupy important posts in the government and some in provinces. Those who know the HI (akin to Pakistan Jamaate Islami and both are followers of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement that had originated in Egypt) had a hunch for quite some time that the HI followers might eventually play an important role whenever it came to political wheeling-dealing. Also that Afghan President has been offer olive branch to his ‘Afghan brothers’ to join him to build their nation.
Hekmetyar grew stronger since 2001:
Known as a thoroughly pragmatic warlord, and out of power parleys since the Taliban regime sidelined him and Karzai declined to talk to him all these years, Hekmetyar concentrated on the northeastern regions, battling Afghan and foreign forces, and successfully keeping then on the run or in a futile chase to capture him. Hekmetyar has proven more intelligent and cleverer than the apparatus of the American and NATO forces who have failed to net him for nearly a decade.
Despite having been sidelined, his power, influence and appeal to both ethnic Pashtoons as well as a few segments of other ethnicities have not waned. Hekmetyar, as an expert politician, kept his militancy and politics parallel to each other and effectively used one of the two at the right time. He probably understands the pulse of the region better than any other active in his country at the moment and therefore, did not hesitated to enter in a political power sharing parley the moment the environment seemed conducive.
Importance of talks for Afghanistan:
Until now, HI has been part of the tripodal insurgency in Afghanistan that comprises the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the Hezb itself, which has largely focused in northeastern Afghanistan. If the HI-Karzai talks make any headway, that would mean in the short run:

1. diffusion of the insurgency (separation of Hezb from the triangle of insurgency);
2. removal of the protective umbrella that the Hezb has so far provided to Al Qaeda (AQ) operatives in Afghanistan; and
3. creation of a substantial wedge between AQ and many of its those local supporters who might also want to board the power bandwagon ahead of the peace Jirga in April.

But if these ‘preliminary contacts’ are taking place with the consent of Mulla Omar, the long-term implications would be utterly different, with severe consequences ´ for AQ at least because the US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal and other US military officials have also been talking of separating AQ from the Afghan combatants as part of their latest counter-insurgency effort. As of now, the HI seems to be touting the same conditions as put by Mulla Omar but these could be merely bargaining positions. Among the most important conditions that the HI presented to President Karzai, two are worth observing:

1. HI has proposed the formation of a transitional government from which a new president would be chosen.
2. All of the foreign forces should be removed from Afghanistan.

It is obvious that both of these conditions would be unacceptable either to Karzai or to the US-led Coalition and therefore, it would be interesting to see as to whether Hekmetyar and Mulla Omar, who would remain the most vital link the Afghan insurgency, drop the pullout of foreign forces as a precondition altogether. This seems less likely but HI mere entering a political dialogue with the Afghan President indicates that he and Taliban are willing to give politics a chance.
Political importance of talks: Just like the Jamaate Islami of Pakistan, the HI remains one among the most organized political forces in a country that is still reeling under the consequences of three decades of war and still lacks organized political parties, HI could become a major political force again. If it eventually joins the bandwagon, it would in the long run weaken the thus far tripodal insurgency, yet given Mulla Omar centrality to the Taliban movement, it would still be a challenge for all the stakeholders to reconcile all the components of the militancy that is still raging, and has been quite vicious since the additional US troops began landing in Afghanistan. It is about time that the US and its allies start thinking out of the box of the occupational mentality and begin a political process of reconciliation in Afghanistan. It is no secret that the blind use of brutal force has not only destroyed an already-destroyed country but has also destabilized the whole region, including a nuclear power, Pakistan.