Imtiaz Gul

Pakistan-US relations have once again hit a dead end. Confusion and conflict of interests appear to be at the heart of the latest round of tensions between an embattled Pakistani government and a desperate US administration. America philosopher general ´ David Petraeus ´ has upped the ante by dropping strong hints that troops under his command in Afghanistan will do all they can to intercept and kill or neutralize insurgents moving across the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The stated objective of America latest campaign is to destroy Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the border regions of Pakistan, and to stabilize Afghanistan. A more covert objective appears to be to trigger conditions that could be interpreted as tangible military success ahead of Congressional elections in November and the strategic review in December. That review will presumably focus on whether and how to gradually extricate the bulk of US forces from Afghanistan.

Pitched against these short-term American objectives are the self-perceived long-term strategic interests of the Pakistani military establishment. So far, these include resisting American desires for an all-out operation against the militants in and around North Waziristan in Pakistan tribal area. No one contests the fact that North Waziristan, a mountainous terrain spread over roughly 5000 square kilometers, and the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktia and Paktika, offer huge swathes of uncontrolled territory for insurgents– of all shades ´ Afghans, Pakistanis, Arabs, Uzbeks ´ to move back and forth for their militant activities. The question is not what one would wish to see there, but what can in fact be done.

North Waziristan currently serves as one of the major staging posts for attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated militants, including the Haqqani network. Several Pakistani militant groups ´ such as Lashkare Taiba and Lashkare Jhangvi ´ are also hiding there, under the protection of the Haqqani network.

The US Administration views this amalgam of militants as a significant source of instability in Afghanistan, where violence has tripled so far this year compared to the same period last year. Obama has suggested, according to Bob Woodward new book, that the ¿safe haven– in Pakistan represents the biggest hurdle to a decisive victory in Afghanistan. The problem is, the Pakistani military establishment believes that a head-on confrontation will do more harm than good.

So Pakistan and American find themselves locked in a war of conflicting interests; the short term US agenda for a gradual drawdown of troops is knocking up against Pakistan reluctance to become a partner to America new campaign, which is likely to create more enemies for Pakistan weak and unpopular government in the border regions. Any direct escalation by Pakistan in North Waziristan would not only antagonize dozens of wily tribes in the border region but could also trigger a retaliation among Pakistan militant networks, who have shown a growing willingness to turn their wrath on civilians. It is not unlikely that they will activate their cells to stage a new string of suicide attacks in major cities.

Militants of the vicious Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (the TTP, or Pakistani Taliban) and Lashkare Jhangvi, crucial allies and facilitators for al Qaeda in the border regions, have inflicted heavy human and material losses in roughly four dozen suicide bombings so far this year. It is understandable that Pakistanis would not want to invite more.

Reconciling the conflicting Pakistani and US policy objectives represents a formidable challenge. The alleged killing in a drone strike of the German mastermind of a ‘Euro-terror plot’ and the killing of Pakistani soldiers by NATO helicopters who crossed over into the Pakistani territory, have further complicated the relationship. The Pakistan army retaliated last Thursday by blocking NATO convoys from crossing into Afghanistan, bringing hundreds of trucks with food, fuel and military hardware to a grinding halt. It then did nothing to try to prevent the altogether predictable attacks on the convoys.

Almost two-thirds of all NATO cargo destined for Afghanistan passes through Pakistan, the shortest route for these consignments. Despite some standing arrangements with the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the US and NATO have so far used the Pakistan route to resupply its troops Afghanistan.

The torching of several dozen fuel tankers within the first week of October at different locations in Pakistan inflamed an already combustible situation. The TTP claimed responsibility for these acts of arson but analysts don–t rule out that frustrated hard-line nationalist elements within the Pakistani security establishment may have prompted these attacks.

The new rage against America is not restricted to the militants and their backers within the establishment; from right to left, almost every Pakistani is up in arms against the mounting pressure from Washington. Over two dozen drone strikes within four weeks and at least three border violations seem to have united most analysts, electronic media, columnists, politicians and members of civil society, who feel that the government must underscore its sovereignty.

Pakistani analysts believe that Gen.Petraeus has shifted the focus of war from Afghanistan to their country in an effort to suck the Pakistan army into North Waziristan. But it is highly questionable whether a frontal assault by the Pakistan army on militants in North Waziristan would bring stability to Afghanistan. Pakistan has paid a high price for America long and unpopular war across its border. The US-Pakistan relationship may not be at a breaking point, but we are most likely in for a politically hot winter.