The surge would not help Pakistan: The new US plan is not likely to produce results that might allow the US to begin a phased withdrawal by July 2011 because this brings with the prospect of more civilian casualties (already close to 50 percent Afghans say they have been directly or indirectly affected by the military-militant conflict). The pullout plan has already triggered a heated debate in Washington with Robert Gates, the defense secretary suggesting the timeline was open to review by December 2010. It would certainly be interesting to see whether the Obama plan works wonder on the civilian side ´ the promise of working with local leadership, governors and the civil society (if one exists in Afghanistan). But if viewed against this the American perceptions of Pakistan listed above, the implications of the US surge in Afghanistan for Pakistan are likely to be pretty serious. Holbrook had charted this journey to serious implications ´ the shifting of war theatre to Pakistan ´ in March, when Obama announced the controversial Af-Pak Strategy. Escalation in conflict in the border areas ´ ground offensive in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan plus increased aerial and drone strikes (for which Robert Gates had already secured additional funding) in Waziristan, will mostly likely result in more violence in mainland Pakistan, thereby also straining the US-NATO supply routes from Karachi to Torkham and to Chaman. This stretch would not only suck in additional Pakistani security forces but also add to the cost of cargo which will mount after all the 30,000 additional US soldiers arrive in Afghanistan.
Apprehensions about Pakistan: If plugged together, a total of six perceptions form the basis of the broader American belief that Pakistan is the source of all trouble in Afghanistan:

1. Safe havens in Pakistan fuel the Afghan insurgency (Waziristan)
2. Al-qaeda and Taliban leadership is hiding in Pakistan (Quetta and FATA)
3. Terror groups attacking India, Afghanistan and US-led troops are using Pakistani territory ( Kashmir, Muridke near Lahore, Quetta and North Waziristan)
4. Sections of the Pakistani military establishment maintains contacts with, and supports, some of the groups (Lashkare Taiba, al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network in North Waziristan)
5. Pakistan nuclear weapons could fall in the hands of extremist elements , and
6. The military establishment continues to hold sway over the civilian government

Even a cursory look, at the abovementioned points, makes it abundantly clear that Pakistan and its military in particular remains the prime suspect, and thus the likely target as the US troops– build up begins in Afghanistan by the turn of the year.

Outline of the American mindset: The American-led NATO mission in Afghanistan began with the stated objective of denying al Qaeda a safe haven. President Barack Obama restated that in his Dec 1 speech; overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. He said: ‘We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan.’ With 100,000 troops in Afghanistan at an estimated yearly cost of $30 billion, it means that for every one al Qaeda fighter, the U.S. will commit 1,000 troops and $300 million a year. Obama also made it clear: ‘we cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear.’ A day after this policy statement, Fareed Zakaria (Editor Newsweek) mentioned during a CNN discussion that the real source of trouble in Afghanistan lies in Pakistan i.e. Quetta Shura. Later on December 6, the Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke dropped the first of the strong hints what amounts to the ‘unfolding of the new plan.’ Holbrook told Fareed Zakria in a CNN interview that ‘safe havens in Pakistan’ were a problem bigger than corruption and chaos of Afghanistan.

Taken together ´ from Obama to Hilary Clinton to Richard Holbrook to Admiral Mike Mullen to Senator John Kerry to Fareed Zakria ´ they all sing in unison when pointing fingers at Pakistan as the most troublesome link in their Af-Pak equation and thus deserving greater attention. In Holbrooke words: “to me the most important issue for our success is dealing with the sanctuary in Pakistan.”

US-Pakistan are troubled partners: The entire American leadership as well as its CIA-led establishment continues to vent doubts about Pakistan nuclear program and systematically circulating fears of extremists laying their hands on these weapons of mass destruction for attacking American interests. This hysteric projection on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal ´ coupled with the string of news and rumors on the activities/presence of private security agencies such as Xe (ex Blackwater) and DynCorp ´ obviously give way to suspicions and fears within Pakistan. These also stoke more anti-US American emotion, also within the security establishment as many wonder why the Americans would sound weary of the army and its affiliated organizations despite over eight years of cooperation on and around the Durand Line in addition to the inland cooperation that resulted in scores of al Qaeda operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeeri and so on. With the military already committed in Swat, Bajaur, and South Waziristan, involving several divisions, it would not be unexpected if the army also heads toward North Waziristan (where the Haqqani network is reportedly located). If pressured further by the US or in case of any future operation at some other location inside FATA, this could dent the credibility that the army has won through its operations. The spike in military activity inside Afghanistan ´ Paktia, Paktika, and Helmand ´ will most likely accelerate the militant movement across the Durand Line, thereby straining the already stretched army ´ traditionally concentrated on its eastern border facing about six Indian strike corps.

Pakistani politicians should shine ´ now: Unfortunately, the government in Islamabad is pre-occupied with the fall-out of issues such as the amnesty law (National Reconciliation Order). The president is embattled and surrounded by controversies resulting from the NRO; the prime minister is too meek to take charge as the de jure and de facto chief executive. Both top civilians seem to lack a vision that could help in extricating the country from the looming crisis ´ or at least put it on the path to crisis-management. The army ´ as has been the case in the past ´ will only do fire-fighting. Its crisis-management is limited to tactical solutions, largely devoid of politico-strategic vision even if it sincerely wanted to take the country to new horizons. Unless the politicians lead the country from the front, coordinate with the armed forces, forge a consensus response to the Obama Plan and convey it with one voice, Pakistan perilous journey, compounded by the ever changing tactics of the invisible enemy, will continue.

The American Surge ´ Problems for PakistanIsmamabad, January 2, 2010

The surge would not help Pakistan: The new US plan is not likely to produce results that might allow the US to begin a phased withdrawal by July 2011 because this brings with the prospect of more civilian casualties (already close to 50 percent Afghans say they have been directly or indirectly affected by the military-militant conflict). The pullout plan has already triggered a heated debate in Washington with Robert Gates, the defense secretary suggesting the timeline was open to review by December 2010. It would certainly be interesting to see whether the Obama plan works wonder on the civilian side ´ the promise of working with local leadership, governors and the civil society (if one exists in Afghanistan). But if viewed against this the American perceptions of Pakistan listed above, the implications of the US surge in Afghanistan for Pakistan are likely to be pretty serious. Holbrook had charted this journey to serious implications ´ the shifting of war theatre to Pakistan ´ in March, when Obama announced the controversial Af-Pak Strategy. Escalation in conflict in the border areas ´ ground offensive in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan plus increased aerial and drone strikes (for which Robert Gates had already secured additional funding) in Waziristan, will mostly likely result in more violence in mainland Pakistan, thereby also straining the US-NATO supply routes from Karachi to Torkham and to Chaman. This stretch would not only suck in additional Pakistani security forces but also add to the cost of cargo which will mount after all the 30,000 additional US soldiers arrive in Afghanistan.
Apprehensions about Pakistan: If plugged together, a total of six perceptions form the basis of the broader American belief that Pakistan is the source of all trouble in Afghanistan:

1. Safe havens in Pakistan fuel the Afghan insurgency (Waziristan)
2. Al-qaeda and Taliban leadership is hiding in Pakistan (Quetta and FATA)
3. Terror groups attacking India, Afghanistan and US-led troops are using Pakistani territory ( Kashmir, Muridke near Lahore, Quetta and North Waziristan)
4. Sections of the Pakistani military establishment maintains contacts with, and supports, some of the groups (Lashkare Taiba, al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network in North Waziristan)
5. Pakistan nuclear weapons could fall in the hands of extremist elements , and
6. The military establishment continues to hold sway over the civilian government

Even a cursory look, at the abovementioned points, makes it abundantly clear that Pakistan and its military in particular remains the prime suspect, and thus the likely target as the US troops– build up begins in Afghanistan by the turn of the year.

Outline of the American mindset: The American-led NATO mission in Afghanistan began with the stated objective of denying al Qaeda a safe haven. President Barack Obama restated that in his Dec 1 speech; overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. He said: ‘We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan.’ With 100,000 troops in Afghanistan at an estimated yearly cost of $30 billion, it means that for every one al Qaeda fighter, the U.S. will commit 1,000 troops and $300 million a year. Obama also made it clear: ‘we cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear.’ A day after this policy statement, Fareed Zakaria (Editor Newsweek) mentioned during a CNN discussion that the real source of trouble in Afghanistan lies in Pakistan i.e. Quetta Shura. Later on December 6, the Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke dropped the first of the strong hints what amounts to the ‘unfolding of the new plan.’ Holbrook told Fareed Zakria in a CNN interview that ‘safe havens in Pakistan’ were a problem bigger than corruption and chaos of Afghanistan.

Taken together ´ from Obama to Hilary Clinton to Richard Holbrook to Admiral Mike Mullen to Senator John Kerry to Fareed Zakria ´ they all sing in unison when pointing fingers at Pakistan as the most troublesome link in their Af-Pak equation and thus deserving greater attention. In Holbrooke words: “to me the most important issue for our success is dealing with the sanctuary in Pakistan.”
US-Pakistan are troubled partners: The entire American leadership as well as its CIA-led establishment continues to vent doubts about Pakistan nuclear program and systematically circulating fears of extremists laying their hands on these weapons of mass destruction for attacking American interests. This hysteric projection on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal ´ coupled with the string of news and rumors on the activities/presence of private security agencies such as Xe (ex Blackwater) and DynCorp ´ obviously give way to suspicions and fears within Pakistan. These also stoke more anti-US American emotion, also within the security establishment as many wonder why the Americans would sound weary of the army and its affiliated organizations despite over eight years of cooperation on and around the Durand Line in addition to the inland cooperation that resulted in scores of al Qaeda operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeeri and so on. With the military already committed in Swat, Bajaur, and South Waziristan, involving several divisions, it would not be unexpected if the army also heads toward North Waziristan (where the Haqqani network is reportedly located). If pressured further by the US or in case of any future operation at some other location inside FATA, this could dent the credibility that the army has won through its operations. The spike in military activity inside Afghanistan ´ Paktia, Paktika, and Helmand ´ will most likely accelerate the militant movement across the Durand Line, thereby straining the already stretched army ´ traditionally concentrated on its eastern border facing about six Indian strike corps.

Pakistani politicians should shine ´ now: Unfortunately, the government in Islamabad is pre-occupied with the fall-out of issues such as the amnesty law (National Reconciliation Order). The president is embattled and surrounded by controversies resulting from the NRO; the prime minister is too meek to take charge as the de jure and de facto chief executive. Both top civilians seem to lack a vision that could help in extricating the country from the looming crisis ´ or at least put it on the path to crisis-management. The army ´ as has been the case in the past ´ will only do fire-fighting. Its crisis-management is limited to tactical solutions, largely devoid of politico-strategic vision even if it sincerely wanted to take the country to new horizons. Unless the politicians lead the country from the front, coordinate with the armed forces, forge a consensus response to the Obama Plan and convey it with one voice, Pakistan perilous journey, compounded by the ever changing tactics of the invisible enemy, will continue.