By Imtiaz Gul
Kabul and Kandahar do not appear to be fully aligned on the issue of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What initially seemed to be Kandahar’s position that the matter did not concern them has since shifted. There are now indications that the Taliban are open to engagement through Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, reportedly to prevent further attacks inside Pakistan. This change has drawn attention to internal dynamics within the Afghan leadership and raised questions about whether there is real policy coherence between Kabul’s administrative institutions and Kandahar’s supreme authority.
Differences between Kabul and Kandahar over militant groups have added to the sharp decline in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, including Pakistan’s decision to conduct cross-border strikes. Islamabad maintains that Afghan authorities are responsible for preventing attacks launched from their territory and frames the issue as one of sovereign obligation. The Taliban, however, deny direct responsibility and point to the complex security environment they inherited. Competing narratives and growing mistrust continue to strain bilateral ties.
Estimates suggest that roughly 23,000 national and foreign militants from various groups remain active in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, managing the TTP threat amid uncertain operational conditions and limited leverage over Afghan authorities has become a central security concern. As a result, the TTP now dominates the broader bilateral agenda.
Since August 2021, Pakistan has sought to build confidence and has repeatedly urged Afghan authorities to curb TTP activities. Diplomatic engagement has continued through bilateral channels, as well as meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh. In some discussions, it was suggested that violence attributed to the TTP may involve other actors operating behind the scenes. These differing assessments have complicated efforts to develop a shared understanding of the threat. The absence of a mutually agreed monitoring or verification mechanism has further slowed progress and prolonged uncertainty.
For the Taliban leadership, the key question is whether concerns raised by Pakistan and other regional actors require a policy reassessment. Any recalibration would involve balancing internal ideological constituencies with the practical demands of governance and regional diplomacy. Whether Kabul can exercise effective control over all armed elements within Afghanistan remains central to this debate.
At the same time, assumptions that Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are fully aligned are increasingly being questioned. Observers point to internal differences within Afghanistan’s leadership and the broader challenge of moving from insurgency to governance.
Border regions such as Mohmand, Waziristan, and Bajaur continue to face security threats, reflecting the persistence of militant networks and cross-border links. Pakistani authorities have also detained more than a thousand Afghan nationals for illegal residence across the country. These developments underpin that the TTP issue remains at the heart of bilateral friction, linked to internal Afghan divisions and wider regional instability.
Pakistan–Afghanistan relations stand at one of their lowest ebbs in recent years. Preventing further escalation will require sustained dialogue and clearer lines of accountability. It will also require practical arrangements capable of verification rather than rhetorical assurances. Whether Kabul and Kandahar can reconcile their positions on militant groups, and translate alignment into measurable action, will shape the trajectory of the relationship. The outcome will depend not only on political will, but on the coherence of authority within Afghanistan itself.
If the present drift continues, both sides risk sliding into a pattern of reactive measures and public recriminations, with little strategic clarity. For Pakistan, the costs would be measured in recurring violence and domestic instability. For the Taliban leadership, the costs could include deeper diplomatic isolation and diminished space for regional engagement. The choices made in Kabul and Kandahar in the coming months will therefore carry consequences well beyond the immediate dispute over the TTP, influencing the broader security landscape of the region.
