Following Donald Trump’s return to power, Pakistan has regained significant prominence in the foreign policy strategy of the United States. During the presidency of Joe Biden, Washington tended to distance itself from South Asia – particularly from Pakistan. Under Trump, however, U.S. engagement with the region has gradually intensified once again. On June 18 and August 10, 2025, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Asim Munir, paid an official visit to the United States, marking the most substantial diplomatic dialogue between Washington and Islamabad since July 2019. Soon after, on September 25, 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited the White House, signaling the revival of active political engagement and the gradual restoration of mutual trust between the two sides.
Historical Ally
Historically, relations between the United States and Pakistan have largely been of an allied nature. Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, the two countries have repeatedly cooperated within various military and strategic frameworks, including SEATO and CENTO. The United States provided Islamabad with military and economic assistance, viewing Pakistan’s territory as a vital strategic foothold – especially during the Soviet-Afghan War. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Pakistan’s importance surged once again, serving as a key logistical base for U.S.-led counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. However, the bilateral relationship has long been characterized by alternating phases of cooperation and estrangement: ties weakened during the Vietnam War, after Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, and again following the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011. During the Biden administration, Pakistan was primarily viewed through the prism of nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, and extremism. Under Trump, however, bilateral dialogue has been revitalized. Washington expressed explicit support for Islamabad’s counterterrorism operations against Baloch separatists and formally designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist organization. Thus, the oscillating nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations reflects a distinctive cyclicality, in which phases of tension are repeatedly replaced by renewed strategic convergence.
Geostrategic Significance
Pakistan stands as a regional nuclear power and a politically influential actor. Unlike many other states, Islamabad demonstrates the capacity to take clear and independent positions vis-à-vis major centers of global power, functioning as an autonomous subject of geopolitical processes. A key component of Pakistan’s geostrategic value lies in its maritime infrastructure – the ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Pasni – which provide direct access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. These ports are of particular interest to the United States as potential gateways to the Eurasian economic space. Notably, negotiations held in October 2025 regarding U.S. access to Pasni Port, located just 112 kilometers from Gwadar, underscored Washington’s long-term strategic intentions to deepen its partnership with Islamabad.
The China Factor
In 2015, China and Pakistan launched the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at $62 billion, as one of the flagship projects of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of CPEC, China modernized the port of Gwadar, securing direct maritime access to the Indian Ocean. In September 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif paid an official visit to Beijing, where an $8.5 billion investment agreement was signed under the second phase of CPEC, providing for the expansion of industrial zones across Pakistan.
The United States views China’s growing influence in Pakistan as a strategic challenge. Washington’s renewed engagement with Islamabad appears driven by a desire to prevent Pakistan’s economic overdependence on China and to contain Beijing’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean basin. Meanwhile, Pakistan pursues a policy of diversification and multi-vector diplomacy, avoiding excessive alignment with any single partner. In September 2025, Islamabad signed a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, expanded economic ties with Russia through large-scale grain and flour imports, and simultaneously strengthened its strategic dialogue with the United States.
The Afghanistan Factor
The United States has also renewed its focus on Afghanistan, complementing its engagement with Pakistan. Throughout 2025, U.S. envoys Zalmay Khalilzad and Adam Boehler visited Kabul four times. In September 2025, President Donald Trump declared, “We are trying to get back Bagram Air Base”, confirming that Afghanistan continues to hold strategic significance for Washington.
If the U.S. indeed seeks to reestablish a presence in Afghanistan, such a strategy would likely proceed through Pakistan, which has historically served as Washington’s primary logistical and political conduit to Kabul. This approach would be consistent with the earlier “Af-Pak” concept, under which the U.S. viewed Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single interconnected strategic theater. The renewed political and military engagement with both countries in South Asia thus suggests a potential return to elements of that earlier framework.
The India Factor
U.S. policy in South Asia remains fundamentally pragmatic: Washington seeks to develop relations with both Pakistan and India. India, however, acts as a more cautious and autonomous player. Despite active engagement with the U.S. through the QUAD dialogue, New Delhi continues to maintain cooperative relations with Moscow and Beijing through forums such as the SCO and BRICS. India’s longstanding adherence to a non-aligned foreign policy – rooted in its role as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement – contrasts with Pakistan’s readiness to assume explicit geopolitical stances and participate in military alliances. This strategic openness arguably makes Islamabad a more attractive partner for Washington under current conditions. A further source of tension in U.S.-India relations stems from India’s sharp increase in imports of Russian oil. In 2024, India imported nearly $53 billion worth of Russian crude, conducting transactions in rupees, dirhams, and yuan rather than in U.S. dollars – thereby undermining the dollar-based settlement system. In response, President Trump in 2025 ordered the doubling of the 25% tariff on Indian goods.
The “Mineral Corridor”?
In 2025, Pakistan attracted renewed global attention for its previously underappreciated but highly promising reserves of copper, gold, lithium, cobalt, and other rare-earth elements. The Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum, held in April 2025 in Islamabad, generated strong interest from the United States. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif noted that full-scale development of Pakistan’s mineral resources – estimated to be worth trillions of dollars – could transform the country’s economic landscape.
The primary region of rare-earth production lies in Balochistan Province, home to the Saindak and Reko Diq copper deposits, both operational since the early 2000s. Additional deposits of lithium, neodymium, praseodymium, and antimony have been identified in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in northern Pakistan. The Reko Diq project is a joint venture between Barrick Gold and the Government of Pakistan, involving investments exceeding $2 billion. Potential financiers include the U.S. Export-Import Bank, IFC, ADB, Export Development Canada, and JICA. The project’s first phase envisages processing 45 million tons of ore, with an estimated mine life of 80 years. Industrial-scale production is scheduled to begin in 2028, coinciding with the projected global surge in demand for copper used in green technologies.
In September 2025, the U.S. company US Strategic Metall (USSM) and Pakistan’s largest mining organization, the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), signed a $500 million contract. Minerals such as neodymium, praseodymium, and copper – essential for missile systems, radar, drones, and other defense technologies – make this collaboration strategically significant for the U.S. defense sector. On October 2, 2025, Pakistan officially dispatched its first shipment of rare-earth samples to the United States, including antimony, copper alloy, neodymium, and praseodymium.
At the same time, Afghanistan is also emerging as a potential source of mineral wealth. Should U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in this sector expand, it could eventually extend to Afghanistan as well, paving the way for the establishment of a “mineral corridor” across the Durand Line, linking resource-rich areas of the two neighboring states.
Pakistan’s Motives
In 2025, Pakistan faced a series of acute national security challenges. The Kashmir crisis escalated in May, followed by a wave of terrorist attacks in Balochistan during the summer, coinciding with intensified operations against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). In October, government forces engaged in active combat with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Against this backdrop, safeguarding national security became Islamabad’s paramount priority. The Pakistani leadership has actively sought to strengthen external partnerships, aiming to secure international support for domestic stability. Within this framework, the United States is viewed by Islamabad as a potential partner capable of bolstering the country’s defense capacity and internal security apparatus.
Perspectives
The renewed engagement between the United States and Pakistan signals the return of American business and investment to the region. In this context, particular emphasis may be placed on the Trans-Afghan Transport Corridor, the TAPI gas pipeline, and the CASA-1000 energy transmission project – all of which were originally promoted by Washington as instruments for integrating Central and South Asia.
Conclusion
Despite ongoing geopolitical rivalries and the implementation of large-scale economic initiatives, counterterrorism remains at the core of U.S. military and security policy. In August 2022, the U.S. eliminated Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda. In March 2025, American intelligence, in coordination with Pakistani security services, captured M.Sharifullah, a member of ISIS-Khorasan and one of the planners of the August 2021 attack in Kabul, which killed 13 U.S. soldiers.
The continued activity of groups such as ISIS-Khorasan, TTP, BLA, and al-Qaeda ensures that Pakistan and Afghanistan remain focal points for the Pentagon’s strategic attention. Regardless of which political party governs in Washington, counterterrorism endures as a consistent element of U.S. strategy in South Asia. This reality underscores that the security of the region continues to be perceived by the U.S. administration as a key determinant of its global strategic agenda.
Islomkhon Gafarov, PhD in Political Science, Policy Analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Senior Lecturer at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Kodirjon Gulomov, Associated Researcher at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Akhrorbek Abdurakhmonov, Associated Researcher at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.