Five bloody incidents since middle of December betray have left a trail of over 80 deaths, mostly of thesecurity personnel, and rocked Pakistan military and civilian security apparatus.
First came the confirmation early January of the executions by militants of at least 25 para-military troops;ten had been abducted in a raid in Orakzai agency on Dec 21st, and fifteen of them kidnapped next day in amid-night armed raid on their post in Tank.
On January 10, as many as 35 deaths in a car bomb that ripped through a bus terminal in the town ofJamrud in Khyber agency, also included mostly FC men and government officials. Authorities in Peshawar believe the latest attack could be the work of the TTP in retaliation against the pro-government Zakhakhel tribe for the killing by Pakistani security forces of a TTP commander, Qari Kamran, in Khyber last week. They had gone missing in a clash with the militants in Upper Orkzai Agency.
On Jan 11, at least 14 personnel of the Frontier Corps died in an ambush by armed men in the Nawano areaof Turbat district late on Wednesday night, an act that the banned Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) owned up.Official sources said the FC men were on duty in two vehicles on a road in the Nawano area, some 200kmsouthwest of Turbat town, when the gunmen, hiding in nearby mountains, attacked them from three sideswith rockets and automatic weapons.
On the 14th Jan, a policeman, three civilians and four bombers were killed in a militant attack – ostensiblyon a suicide mission – at the offices of the District Police Officer (DPO) in Dera Ismail Khan. Some sourcessaid that four militants who were in police uniforms scaled the wall of the office of the district revenueofficer and then jumped inside the compound of the DPO offices. This was reminiscent of the twocommando raids on the Manawan Police Training School, Lahore in March and October respectively, whenarmed militates attacked the centre, took some people inside hostage and engaged the security forces forseveral hours.
This string of attacks suggests the revival of an old pattern i.e. target the security forces to demoralize themwhich then plays out negatively on the common citizens– psyche. Essentially creating demoralization, panic,a sense of insecurity and uncertainty. These attacks also serve as a stark reminder that despite statisticalimprovements i.e. almost 24 percent decline in the number of terrorism incidents during 2011, Pakistanremains hostage to radical anti-state purported Islamist militants, led by the vicious Tehreeke TalibanPakistan(TTP), and apparently inspired by Al-Qaeda. Violence in the first two weeks of 2012 simplyunderscores the perilous security conditions that still prevail in northwestern parts of Pakistan and amplifythreats that come from a mobile enemy.
Based on the statistics ´ compiled by the Centre for Research and Security Studies as well as the date puttogether by the Home Departments of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and Balochistan ´ one had hoped that 2012might see further improvement in the security landscape; during the course of 2011, 354 major terroristattacks 24 suicide strikes that claimed 388 lives, were registered. These included 160 police and para-military personnel. The number of human losses off suicide attacks in 2010 stood around 444.
Last year, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ´ spread over about 27,200 sq.kilometresbordering Afghanistan ´ remained embroiled in the military-militant hostilities. Known abroad as the world’most dangerous place,’ FATA is home to some of the most lethal militant organization like the Tehreek eTaliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkare Islam, and the Afghan Haqqani Network ´ which,according to US military and intelligence officials, are the local supporting arms of Al Qaeda.
The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan Army media wing, speaks of almost 473military/para-military deaths during 10 major and 38 minor operations against Taliban militants in thevolatile tribal regions during 2011. Also, 711 civilians were killed and 1548 other injured as a result ofmilitant attacks in those areas. Cumulatively, last year, as many as least 725 people(roughly 324 securitypersonnel and over 400 civilians) fell to terrorist strikes all over the province, including the successivesuicide attacks on an FC Fort at Shabqadar near Peshawar on May 13th that claimed almost 100 lives on May13. Cities such as D.I. Khan, Tank, Peshawar, Bannu, and Kohat bore the brunt of the violence, ostensiblyperpetrated by TTP and its affiliates.
Peshawar was the most volatile area of the region where 143 reported attacks left 188 people dead and 456others injured, followed by Charsada with 41 attacks, killing 110 people and injuring 208 others. Hanguremained third on sheet where as many as 21 terrorist attacks left 94 people dead and 170 others wounded.Khyber, Mohmand, Kurram, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies were the most affected areas by militancy in FATAwhile Kohat, Peshawar, Charsadda and Mardan districts of KPK were among the frequently hit areas.
As far the fresh spate of violence in the new year, they raise many questions about the state ofpreparedness and pre-emptive competence of the security forces.
Helplessness of the personnel present at a particular location is understandable if suddenly attacked byhundreds of men. But what is mind-boggling even for a commoner is the question how can the police or thepara-military simply turn into a sitting duck when taken by surprise?
Militants obviously don–t parachute from the air. Nor do they jet-fly into the target compound ´ undetectedby any of the police or FC security barriers. Why can these armed bands be detected and intercepted whenthey are heading toward the target. Don–t we have electronic surveillance and ground intelligence which cancaution those being targeted into action? If the police and the FC still lack these capabilities and are notequipped with the non-intrusive,pre-emptiveelectronic facilities and if their human intelligence gathering inas volatile regions as Bannu, D.I.Khan, Karak and Kohat is still not responsive enough to the threats thatalways loom around them, this then leaves one wondering as to whether they would be able to tame thebeast of terror at all.
Shortcomings
Based on recent discussions with government officials in Peshawar, one can easily infer that the counter-terror efforts are still beset with numerous shortcomings, and require far more attention and resourcesthan are being dedicated at the moment. And this places certain limitations on the ability of the civiliansecurity apparatus.

1. Attacks on pylons/gas pipelines/public places in KP and Frontier Regions continue to hurt public interestand instigate public anger against the government (a notorious militant tactic)
2. Militants’ supply of weapons and money continues and intelligence agencies are still clueless as to whereexactly these resources are coming from (laser guns for target killings of strict commanders/officers, alsoapparently used in the aforementioned attack on the FC Fort in Tank)
3. Public disinterest and lack of cooperation. Most people don’t report the presence of aliens, although thesituation in Malakand and Swat region has turned around, with a lot of militants being arrested on tips bylocals
4. Poor governance and poverty continue to cast shadows on counter-terror efforts. Certain people withinthe community take aliens – potential terrorists – as paying guests, without knowing who they actually are
5. Security forces continue to remain under-strength
6. Insufficient monetary resources
7. Deficiency of electronic surveillance devices
8. Legal restrictions (under the Anglo-Saxon Law), whereby this legal framework restricts quickadministrative action (we cannot fire first, says a senior police official)

In this context, it seems that the counter-terror war, and by implication the counter-radicalisation efforts,require a greater and more coordinated response, backed by administrative, financial and technicalresources as well as a legal framework. Obviously, such an approach also runs the risk of giving a “carteblanche” to a force that is known as one of the most corrupt institutions. But finding a balance betweenefficient use of available resources and preventing their abuse is not impossible. All we need is the civilianand military cooperation and a consensus on how to supplement each other, rather than pursuing samegoals with a narrow institutional outlook.