The Lisbon Summit of 2010 had set 2014 as the deadline for the withdrawal of foreign security forces from Afghanistan. But US defence secretary, Leon Panetta stated on February 1, 2012 that US would end its combat role in Afghanistan by the mid of 2013 and ‘—switch to an advice and assist role with the Afghan army.’[1] Though later on, he tried to rephrase his message through spin of words, yet, the jest of the matter remains unchanged; the financial crisis at home is dictating the US administration to work out cheaper engagement options beyond 2013.
Moreover, the latest National Intelligence Estimate, a compilation based on the input from 16 US intelligence agencies including the CIA, suggests that ‘— war in Afghanistan is mired in a stalemate—.’[2] The report also warns that security gains, achieved as a result of US troops– surge are severely jeopardized by the lack of progress at socio-economic fronts and blessing of safe havens in Pakistan tribal region for the Taliban.[3] Against this backdrop, the US has opened up its arms to embrace Taliban. In an interview with Newsweek on December 19, 2011, US vice president, Joe Biden astoundingly underlined that ‘— the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That critical. There is not a single statement that the president has ever made in any of our policy assertions that the Taliban is our enemy because it threatens U.S. interests.’[4] This was clearly indicative of what Washington was upto. And it was most probably to the context of already existing contacts between US and Taliban representatives, which eventually culminated in the establishment of a Taliban representative office in Qatar in January 2012. Biden statement was in fact the precursor to initial confidence-building talks between the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marc Grossman and the Taliban representatives led by Tayyab Agha, stationed in the tiny Gulf state of Qatar.. It is important to note here that US kept the Afghan President Hamid Karzai in the loop and briefed him about the talks afterwards.[5]
Thus, to counter the US move to engage Taliban, bypassing Pakistan and Afghanistan; Pakistan hosted a trilateral summit involving Afghanistan and Iran in Islamabad on February 16-17, 2012 to discuss the latest regional developments. After the summit, leaders of the three countries pledged for a regional solution of the Afghan conflict and backed Afghan led political reconciliation with the Taliban. This was an ostensible move on the part of Pakistan and Iran to express their concerns over the abstruse US outreach with the Taliban. In consequence, conflict of interests between the regional players and US motives has further muddled the security environment in the region and poses daunting challenges to end the Afghan conflict peacefully.
Since the change of heart on the part of US political leadership vis-à-vis Taliban and the grim outlook for NATO counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan vividly suggest that Western powers, following the course of great powers who invaded Afghanistan during 20th century are going to leave the country to the Afghanis. A peep back into the past is worth considering; US-led NATO stated goal of the invasion of Afghanistan in Oct 2001 was to ‘dismantle and deny Al-Qaeda safe havens in the country’, so that it may not launch attack against Western states once more.. But later on NATO kept on digging deep to implant Western values in Afghanistan and sought to change its social, cultural and ideological fabric by parroting a ‘nation-building narrative.’ Former British ambassador to Kabul, Sherard Cowper-Coles also talks about this ‘nation-building project’ in his book Cables from Kabul. This was an ideal goal which has exacted a heavy financial and physical price ´ more than $600 billion so far, without creating a semblance of peace and reconstruction. Today, all the efforts to initiate and realize political reconciliation in Afghanistan are being carried out to redistribute the shares of pie among the stakeholders in the country. It could have been done earlier, most probably at a far less human and material cost. Now, there are chances that with the history of eleven years of mutual hostilities in the still raging insurgency, NATO and Taliban might find it relatively difficult to compromise on fundamental conflicting issues; such as issue of complete withdrawal of NATO troops, status of Afghan government in post-NATO era etc. Meanwhile, Northern Alliance and non-Pashtun groups, who have gained unprecedented and undue influence in Kabul in the absence of Taliban, will find it difficult to redraw power equation and forego their newfound political clout.
Thus the odd positioning of warring Afghan factions and precipitated NATO efforts to exit the country could potentially push Afghanistan into post-Soviet withdrawal era scenario, where Afghan ethnic tribes and ideological foes came to each other throat, and consequently the rule of the might prevailed. Stability of the present government will always be tenuous, given the fact of its sour relations with the ultimate fixer, Pakistan, and credibility and legitimacy gap among the Afghan people. In sum, the maxim ‘the more it changes, the more it remains the same’ truly depicts the situation in Afghanistan. And Afghanistan will, this time, sink the credibility of NATO, against the backdrop of historically rubbing the nose of great powers in the past century. Yet the NATO campaign will serve as strenuously effective example for the great powers that ideological and political wars cannot be won solely by employing military means. And modern day warfare is all about time; one who fails to read time, emerges as the ultimate loser.
The preceding scenario, however, will hold true only if the Taliban stick to their maximalist position; total withdrawal of foreign troops and no US-run military bases. Herein lies a silver-lining; by 2014, the Afghan National Army and Police will count over 300,000. Its annual budget, according to Karazai government estimates, would run up to $10 billion annually. Meanwhile, according to another report by Reuters, US spent $22 billion in the past two years for training and expected to shoulder the bulk of four billion US dollars per year, which the Afghan force will require to operate in 2015 and beyond.[6] According And if the US-NATO member countries promise the Taliban and other Afghan interlocutors to continue footing that bill that might work as a quid pro quo and the Taliban might soften their opposition to the American military bases in Afghanistan. But whether that happens, especially if Pakistan, China and Iran ´ all good regional friends – remain apprehensive of the American presence in Afghanistan, remains to be seen. Since the launch of the Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 the US-led nations spoke of transition. Now, over a decade and with the deadline for ending their ‘combat role,’ these nations have begun of ‘transformation’ of Afghanistan through economic and security assistance. This transformation, however, is predicated on the success of the US-Taliban talks. How far can they go and what concessions would both conceded to each other is still open-ended.
[1] Alex Spillius, ‘US aiming to end combat role in Afghanistan next year, Leon Panetta says’, The Telegraph, February 1, 2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9055806/US-aiming-to-end-combat-role-in-Afghanistan-next-year-Leon-Panetta-says.html
[2] Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, ‘U.S. intelligence report on Afghanistan sees stalemate’, Los Angeles Times, January 11, 2012, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-intel-afghan-20120112,0,3639052.story
[3] Ibid.
[4] Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Joe Biden On Iraq, Iran, China and the Taliban’, December 19, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/18/joe-biden-on-iraq-iran-china-and-the-taliban.print.html
[5] Barney Henderson, ‘Top US envoy met Taliban leaders in Qatar’, The Telegraph, February 8, 2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9069764/Top-US-envoy-met-Taliban-leaders-in-Qatar.html
[6] ‘Afghan-US strategic partnership talks falter’, Daily Time, March 6, 2012.