The assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, former Afghan President and Head of the High Peace Council, seemingly a repeat of what had happened to Ahmed Shah Massod, the Northern Alliance military commander on 9th September 2001, underscores the extreme volatility of present day Afghanistan. Masood fell toassassins disguised as journalists, with explosives in their recording camera, at the height of his fight against Taliban, while Rabbani lost his life to an attacker disguised as a Taliban emissary, at a time when he had speeded up the reconciliation and peace efforts in the country.
This event could be termed as the most high-profile political assassination since the US-led invasion in 2001. And since January, Rabbani has become the seventh high-profile victim of a campaign directed against pro-government personalities. Afghan President Hamid Karazai half brother, Ahmed Wali Karazi, was also one among the seven. This represents a severe blow to the reconciliation efforts under the High Peace Council established last year by President Hamid Karzai.
The progress made by the 68 member High Peace Council was meanwhile slow, yet Rabbani made all possible efforts to initiate peace process between the government and those sections of Taliban who were willing to surrender their weapons to become a part of the political process. He had thus invited the ’emissary’ into his highly fortified Kabul home, hoping it would get him closer to the Taliban.But a cursory look at the current thought stream, particularly the emanating from the American quarters, suggests that sections among the NATO alliance may not be in total favor of the peace process involving the Taliban, as this would endanger the pro-NATO Karzai government.
Major events such as a day long siegein the heart of Kabul last week by Taliban insurgents, or the attack late last month on the British Council in the heavily barricaded capital, or recent assassination of Rabbani underline the Taliban ability to strike at will. The American administration and leadEU countries are clearly divided as to how to curb violence in favor of peace talks.The latest spoiler came from Ryan Crocker, the hard-line US ambassador to Kabul.’The Taliban needs to feel more pain before you get to a real readiness to reconcile them–– the Financial Times quotedCrocker as saying.
This statement flew in the face of the pain-staking efforts by President Karzai and the late Rabbani as both were trying their level best to reach an amicable solution for peace with Taliban.
Crocker also seems to have joined hardliners within the Obama administration such as David Petraeus, the former commander in Afghanistan, andnow the head of the CIA, all intent on inflicting more damage on the Taliban and thus force them into talks. In another interview Crocker advocated carrying on the conflict until ‘more of the Taliban are killed.’ This sounded more like a reminder of what Richard Holbrook had told us during his last visit to Islamabad (Nov 2010); we would like to talk to the Taliban from a position of strength, late Holbrook had said. This strategy has been constantly advocated by Crocker and Patraeus, unlike the US Af-Pak envoy, Marc Grossman, who has been a protagonist of negotiations and peace talks with the Taliban.
The US State Department publically stated position is contrary to what Crocker and Petraeus stand for, which further complicates the already volatile situation in the region.’What Crocker is saying is totally destructive to what we have agreed upon,–– the FT quoted asenior European official as saying. ‘His language humiliates the Taliban which is not the way to bring them to the table,––another official told the FT.A South Asian diplomat described this as a cloak and dagger strategy which will alienate Taliban further away from the efforts that aim to bring them on board. Such dichotomy in approach emboldens the irreconcilable Taliban to wait out the 2014 mass foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Their presumption, albeit quite unrealistic,is that once most of NATO troops withdraw, they could overrunKabul, as a result of which, they were reluctant to commit their future to the High Peace Council. As a consequence what flows from a) divisions within the NATO alliance, b) jingoistic statements from Crocker and Petraeus, and c) reticent and unrealistic Taliban opposition, is a complex situation fraught with more dangers and little hope even for a semblance of success for the reconciliation process. This situation calls for a rational intervention on part of all the stakeholders or this could lead to another major civil war and state of anarchy in a country which has witnessed prolonged periods of conflict.
President Obama doesnot seem to get hold over the Afghan strategy which further dampening any chances of peace. They don–t appear ready yet to leave the peace process entirely to the Afghans. They should probably heed Sherard Cowper-Coles, former British ambassador and Special Representative to Afghanistan, who offers a good advice to all in his bookCables from Kabul.
“We will need to accept, as we already have to do, that often it may be better to let the Afghan themselves to do a job badly than for us to do it for them. Even if the Afghan may be less effective, and more corrupt and inefficient, it may be wiser to let the Afghan make their own mistakes, and learn from them. However imperfect the result of such a process, they may last longer than attempts by outsider to buck the Afghan market,” writes Cowper-Coles.
The suicide attack on Rabbani has been claimed by Taliban, whose spokesman,Zabihullah Mujahid, in an interview stated:’As soon as Rabbani came three steps forward to hug Mohammad Masoom, he triggered his explosive-filled jacket killing Rabbani, [another] Taliban militant Wahid Yar and four security guards present at the house’.The bad blood between Rabbani and the Taliban had existed ever since Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud persuaded Taliban to launch an offensive against Gulbudin Hekmetyar in 1996. Hekmetyar in those days was entrenched at Chahar-Asiab south of Kabul. Both Rabbani and Massoud reportedly provided Taliban with financial resources as well, hoping that Pashtoon Taliban would serve as the nemesis of another Pashtoon warlord i.e.
Hekmetyar, and thus pave the way for their undisputed rule over Afghanistan. But once on the southern outskirts of Kabulafter ousting Hekmetyar, Taliban moved into the capital. The Northern Alliance leaders first tried to dissuade Taliban from the offensive, then put up resistance and then eventually crumbled in the face of the radical militia. That is why the Taliban had from the beginning disliked Rabbani, and were also reluctant in accepting him as an interlocutor for peace. If the claim made by Taliban is deemed as true, it would seriously put a huge dent on the peace process in Afghanistan.