by Imtiaz Gul
Executive Director CRSS Imtiaz Gul takes a look at the dilemmas faced by Pakistan in counter radical ideology and violent extremism, labels five reasons for why there is such clamor over the implementation of NAP, and suggests possible ways forward.
The public outrage over yet another “security lapse” (Bacha Khan University terror attack[1]) made complete sense. It marked the fourth consecutive terror strike within a week (Khyber Agency, Quetta, Charsadda) leaving over four dozen innocents killed. These incidents of violence justifiably shocked everyone because of the considerable decline in acts of terror in 2015. Much of the fury from politicians and intellectuals was directed against the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP)[2]. Most critics equated the attack to a sheer failure of NAP.
Frankly, the NAP essentially is a reiteration to strictly enforce existing laws, to work on improving security conditions and to address major drivers of religious extremism. At no point did this framework promise total elimination of terrorism per say. Nor did it rule out future terror strikes.
Why then the fuss and frustration over “napping” NAP then?
Gains since December 2014
On the face of it, Pakistan can claim considerable successes in its anti-terror campaign since the adoption of NAP in December 2014 after a terrorist assault on the Army Public School in Peshawar. As many as 144 children and their teachers were killed and the incident literally galvanized the entire nation, resulting in the unanimous adoption of NAP. It followed on the heels of the Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in June 2014 in North Waziristan after a brazen terrorist assault on the Karachi airport. This operation dislodged the Taliban and their allies from North Waziristan. A good number of them succeeded in slipping out to Afghanistan, other tribal areas and mainland Pakistan.[3] The government claims to have arrested over 11,700 terrorists, handlers and facilitators, and killed thousands in operations across the country. Most importantly, the army has extended the government writ to regions which until recently were known as “no-go areas.”
A meaningful critique of NAP probably requires a better comprehension of the possible drivers of the current instability and to ask ourselves if Pakistan has a real long CT strategy.
Firstly, poor or superficial understanding of the nature of terrorism that is stalking parts of Pakistan translates into unqualified criticism.
Secondly, tall claims of “gains” against terrorist networks by both the military and civilian leadership serve as the another major contributory factor of anger because such claims raise public expectations
Thirdly, tardy and unconvincing actions of the civilian law enforcement agencies against criminal syndicates as well as religious conglomerates that are running thousands of madrassas, supplemented by tens of thousands of mosques across the country. Similarly, illegal structures in the name of mosques, even encroaching public properties, spew unchecked, toxic, often anti-democratic and anti-state speech from the pulpit, which feeds the sense of helplessness and despondency.
Fourth, the frustration is a direct result of the assumption that terrorist forces such as TTP and Daesh are perpetrating terrorism for a sacred religious cause.
Fifth, people at large and many analysts often overlook, or underestimate the trans-border nature of violence; for them it is either driven by the anti-West Al-Qaeda or Daesh or their Pakistani and Afghan auxiliaries. The other trans-border dimension is directly linked to the country’s relations with India and Afghanistan.
Let us be clear; NAP at best is a basic counter-terrorism (CT) framework i.e. – a roadmap for establishing the write of the state. It reiterates to strictly enforce existing laws and address root-causes of both terrorism and religious extremism.
Secondly, even if Pakistan had a CT strategy, its effectiveness – not success – would be inextricably linked to two pressing external factors i.e. India and Afghanistan and the nature of relations with them. While internal factors such as sectarian acrimony, free field for jihadi outfits, poor state response to hate speech, little action for mainstreaming the seminaries and their curricula inter alia do constitute formidable challenges for enforcing the rule of law, external factors exploit these internal conditions to in precipitating violence.
At the heart of this triangular are the Afghan Taliban and the Kashmiri militants; both jihadist groups continue attacking Indian and Afghan interests and thus remain primary sources of indictment of Pakistan’s discourse on terrorism.
Sources of acrimony and suspicion
Two examples; Taliban claimed responsibility for the January 20 attack on a bus carrying employees of Afghanistan’s prime TV channel TOLO in Kabul.[4] The incident shook most of the Afghan intelligentsia and politicians to the extent that President Ashraf Ghani had to tell a TOLO delegation that “those responsible for these attacks will have no place in this society, they are neither Muslim, nor human nor Afghans.”[5]
Ghani of course was alluding to the Taliban, whom his government and other members of the Quadrilateral Mechanism set up in December at the Heart of Asia Conference at Islamabad are wooing for reconciliation talks. And all Afghans believe the attackers (Haqqanis and Mansoor’s Taliban) operate out of sanctuaries in Pakistan.
This practically brings the quadrilateral efforts because both governments have traded and rejected allegations which culminated in the summoning of the acting Afghan envoy to the foreign office for a protest.
Secondly, within hours of the assault on the Pathankot airbase on January 2, Syed Sallahuddin, the chairman of the Kashmir-focused United Jihad Council (UJC) currently living in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack. He also chided Pakistan for improving relations with India saying “Friendship with India and advocating Kashmir cause can’t go hand in hand.[6]
This is precisely what the Indian government says; terror and talks cannot go hand in hand. This also hands New Delhi a stick with which it batters Pakistan’s “counter-terror commitments” all over the world. The latest being the joint statement after the meeting between the visiting French President Francois Hollande and his host PM Narendra Modi.[7]
Condemning the recent terror attacks in Pathankot and Gurdaspur in India, the two countries reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring to justice their perpetrators and the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai…
Seizing the opportunity, Modi said the “global community needs to act decisively against those who provide safe havens to terrorists, who nurture them through finances, training and infrastructure support.”
Why shouldn’t India demand custody of, or access to Sallahuddin for interrogation on the Pathankot incident? Why should not world snub Pakistan’s commitment to “terror elimination” if characters such as Sallahuddin, sitting in Pakistan, claim responsibility for acts of terror in India?
The entire CT debate then boils down to continuing to distinguish between good and bad Taliban. As long as the good ones and their socio-political supporters sense sympathy from within state security structures, the narrative on CT will remain questionable.
Global mistrust in Pakistan’s CT campaign and finger-pointing by neighbours will stop only if Pakistan removes and neutralizes all sources of direct or indirect interference in Afghanistan and India.
Much of the good work in the social sector Pakistan has been doing in Afghanistan, for instance, loses out to the perception that it is not doing enough to prevent Taliban terrorists from killing “our women and children.”[8]
Pakistan’s current CT policy relies mostly on the hard power of the military. Little effort, it seems, is going into revamping the legal justice system, police reforms and prioritization of education on a war footing. Given the insufficient political will to free the police of political interference, expedience of mainstream political parties and little attention on the fundamentals required for social cohesion, it is quite possible that once the military eases this pressure, NAP could fall into disarray.
Why? Because mainstream political parties are driven more by electoral considerations than by strictly going after those spitting venom against the state and its neighbours. Mere lip-service against terrorism hardly matters where tough decisions are required.
The discourse on CT must be anchored in the primacy of across-the-board rule of law, rejection of private militias, and indiscriminate action against all those challenging the writ of the government in and outside the geographical frontiers of Pakistan.
In the last two years, Pakistan has made considerable gains against terrorist groups, systematically fractured the TTP – once called the existential threat. This is also supported by over 50 per cent decline in incidents of violence in 2015. Both the civilian and the military leadership has also forged an unusual unity in the counter-terror efforts. The campaign, however, is still beset by several policy and operational gaps.
However, what Pakistan is battling at the moment are the symptoms i.e. religio-political extremist groups, including some five dozen banned outfits, which serve as the social support and shelter system even for terrorists. A centrally coordinated mechanism to deal with terrorism and religious extremism issues is still missing. Nor is there a coordinated narrative on what sort of Pakistan the entire leadership stands for.
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[1] http://tribune.com.pk/story/1030957/timeline-of-deadliest-insurgent-attacks-in-pakistan-2/
[2] http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Presentations/National_Action_Plan_NACTA_Pakistan.pdf
[3] http://tribune.com.pk/story/1033423/pakistans-tryst-with-counter-terrorism/
[4] http://www.businessinsider.com/deadly-explosion-outside-russia-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-2016-1
[5] http://www.tolonews.com/en/video/nightly-news
[6] http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/01/05/news/kashmiri-militants-claim-air-base-attack-as-india-mulls-options-on-pak-talks/
[7] http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/full-text-of-joint-statement-issued-by-india-france/article8151255.ece
[8] Afghan National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar told a CRSS delegation in Kabul on December 22, 2015.