Where does the Afghan peace process stand right now? It probably stands in a no-man land from where many roads (options) lead out but the US seems to hold the ticket to those roads. The current and most preferred of the options is an all-out assault on Afghan insurgents to cripple them. This will, so believes Gen. David Petraeus force them into talks. The Petraeus calculus essentially rests on paralyzing the insurgents through brute force. Vice president Joseph Biden statements in Kabul and Islamabad, however, appears to be a mix of American civil-military approach; The U.S. will not leave Afghanistan completely in 2014 if Afghans still want the U.S. there, said Biden who has generally favored a less troop-intensive approach and a quicker handover to Afghans. In a marked departure from the Bush-era Pentagon approach, Biden declared that ‘It’s not our intention to govern or to nation-build — this is the responsibility of the Afghan people.’ But Biden did, however, share the Pakistan-centric belief of Petraeus. ‘It’s going to require more pressure — more pressure on the Taliban, from Pakistan’s side of the border, than we’ve been — we’ve been able to exert so far. And there are many hard days that lie ahead,’ Biden said in Kabul.

This statement underscored the message Biden brought for Pakistani leaders, including the army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, which was the most strategic in nature, and focused on the impending ‘hard days ahead’. Reportedly, the vice president came loaded with lots of carrots and an invisible stick. His visit also underscored its resolve and exposed its desperation, for the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning July. Background interviews with highly placed Pakistani officials suggest that Joe Biden, former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and the acting US AfPak envoy Frank Ruggiero (both of whom, too, were in Islamabad late last week) were told that the key to the Afghan reconciliation rested with the Afghan stake-holders and the allies shall have to refocus on where the problem lies.

Fix Afghanistan first through Afghan means and we will take care of Pakistan, was the message from Pakistani interlocutors, who are worried about the fall-out of the intensified counter-insurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan. Pakistani officials worry that if they launched a similar all-out campaign in North Waziristan in particular, it would spell more trouble for the country as a whole. Senior ministry of foreign affairs and military officials associated with the latest round of talks say the Americans hold the key to any approach that the Afghans led by President Hamid Karzai might want to take on the issue of reconciliation. But, officials insist, it was misplaced perception that Pakistan held the key to the Afghan reconciliation.

If one were to believe diplomatic sources, Biden also asked Pakistan to define a time-line as to when can the army move in to North Waziristan to neutralize what the US-NATO forces view as the biggest threat to the counter-insurgency campaign i.e. Haqqani Network. For how long can the army resist such intense pressure? Probably for not very long. But what happens if the army does unleash a new offensive in North Waziristan? Will the insurgency in Afghanistan fade away if ‘terrorist havens there’ were eliminated? No one is sure because Haqqani is just a small element in the tripodal insurgency. Based on the past experience, and in view of the spread-out insurgency in largely ungoverned border regions ´ Paktia, Paktika, Kunar and Ningarhar on the Afghan side, and Pakistani experiences in Waziristan, Mohmand and Bajaur, it is not difficult to conclude that the cross-border movement of the ideologically networked militants represents a huge challenge to the NATO as well as the Pakistan army.

Despite its recent claims of successes in Bajaur, South Waziristan and Mohmand, the army remains bogged down because of the extremely volatile conditions. Militants of Pakistani, Afghan and other origins continue to move back and forth with ease, not only because of the social space in border areas but also because the Afghan territory mentioned above is mostly ungoverned.

Success in Afghanistan will, therefore, probably remain elusive until both sides of the border were effectively guarded, if not sealed. It will have to be a real hammer-and-anvil, meaning thereby that both Pakistan army and NATO troops shall have to move in tandem on the target regions. Without a simultaneous move on both sides, a one-sided military offensive will most likely not yield any lasting victory.