The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by NATO to Kabul for talks. Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration, has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus, commander-in-chief of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan, claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and “soften up” the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its Af-Pak policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then.
The Taliban as well as the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. Pakistan has signaled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner by taking on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, and by permitting expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory. Washington also wants Pakistan to overcome its “obsession” with India’s presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms.
The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signaled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation, re-supply and recruitment opportunities. Pakistan responded ambiguously.
It reacted furiously and closed down the main supply route for supply convoys for US forces in Afghanistan for ten days and extracted an “apology” from the US. But it kept open the Chaman supply route ´ trade point situated in south of Pakistan border with Afghanistan ´ and did nothing to interrupt US drone and other operations from bases on its territory. Moreover, the ten-day interruption did not affect US military operations in Afghanistan, and normal supply operations were resumed much before any real impact could develop. The US conveyed its message.
Subsequently, during the third round of the strategic dialogue held in Washington in the third week of October, the US announced an extension of the FMF (Foreign Military Financing) programme for another five years with a 30-per-cent increase ´ subject to Congressional approval. The caveat of denying assistance to military units allegedly involved in human rights violations is pure insult, given Wikileaks’ revelations of systematic human rights abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were deliberately overlooked by the US military command. Although President Obama has made clear he has no intention of assisting the Pakistani military against India, the Indians fret about the possibility of an increased conventional capability for Pakistan. They are also apprehensive that tensions go heighten if another Mumbai were to happen and be traced back to Pakistan.
Obama reiterated his warning of a “retribution plan” to take out all the estimated 150 training camps for the militants in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Area] should another New York-like incident (Faisal Shehzad, May One) occur that is traced to Pakistan. So while the US has provided Pakistan security assurances, the India-US “nutcracker” threat remains the defining parameters within which Pakistan has to work out its Afghan options and strategies.
One major question being asked is as to what does Pakistan want in Afghanistan? Most observers agree that while Pakistan may have ready formulations but it lacks clear vision and strategy. It talks of friendly and stable Afghanistan, but it is not clear whether it means a pliant Afghanistan or a well disposed Afghanistan? Some say this means an Afghanistan that does not have much truck with India. Otherwise, Islamabad could face a nutcracker situation. However, the nutcracker situation already exists on a much larger scale.
Here a question arises that, despite differences over the issue of (a united) Pakhtunistan (that Pashtoon nationalists on both sides of the border have been dreaming of) etc., when has Afghanistan ever threatened Pakistan during the periods of tension or conflict with India? Never indeed simply because Afghans pride themselves on having resisted “Big Brothers” since much before they even became a country. They seem to passionately believe in the Persian proverb: Sag bash, biradar-e-khurd mabash. (Be a dog, if you please, but don’t be a younger brother.) Pakistan policymakers over Afghanistan just do not know how to hit the right note with their Afghan brethren.
Pakistan needs to address Afghan concerns and perceptions. If, instead, Islamabad rejects Kabul as mistaken or hostile, it will thus leave the field open to countries that are indeed unfriendly to it. This does not mean Pakistan has no legitimate concerns that require discussion. It only means they are best taken up within a context of improved Afghan perceptions about Pakistan policies.
Pakistan Taliban experience should have taught it eye-opening lessons; the militia was able to dominate Afghanistan only because of the Pakistani support. They were seen in Afghanistan as Pakistani proxies. Their governance alienated Afghan opinion and turned it against Pakistan. India was guaranteed that any post-Taliban government would be anti-Pakistan and pro-India. This was a major strategic defeat for which Pakistani policymakers were responsible. In trying to impose “strategic depth” Pakistan only made it available to its adversary. A stable and independent Afghanistan that has no fear of Pakistan (which is different from having no differences) is the best “strategic depth” Pakistan can ask for.
America’s war in Afghanistan ´ now Obama’s war ´ is in its tenth year. Obama says he wants to begin to thin out his combat forces and to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghans from July 2011 and to complete the process by 2014, which is unlikely. However, in aid of this objective he has intensified and expanded the war into Pakistan. Obama’s advisers see the “cancer” of terrorism as primarily located in Pakistan, which is accordingly the main battlefield in the war against it. Gen Petraeus believes counterinsurgency has to be a long war to be successful. But Obama, reading the mid-term polls, does not want to go to the American people in 2012 for a second term with more troops in Afghanistan than he inherited.
Americans fear that the Taliban ´ informed and abetted by Pakistan ´ will decide to wait it out until the political situation in the US lends an irreversible momentum to their troop withdrawals. Accordingly, Petraeus wants to degrade the resistance capability of the Taliban as quickly as possible. This is where the US sees the Pakistani military as an indispensable partner and, simultaneously, a “dishonest partner” that is “living a lie” by playing both sides of the fence. By increasing the costs of such “double dealing” the US wants to change its “calculus.”
The Americans realize this will require helping Pakistan overcome its “obsession” with India. They also realize this is almost impossible as far as the Pakistani military is concerned, since India is its bread and butter and is “in its DNA.” Moreover, the military is seen as the only “can-do” institution in Pakistan that is ready and able to do America’s bidding ´ at a price, a price that America, incidentally, is determined not to pay in full. So, in return, the Pakistani military remains determined not to play in full either the role assigned it by the US.
But this is not a contest between equals. The US has many more options than Pakistan ´ especially a misgoverned, fragile and dependent Pakistan that lacks the will to be healthy and sustainable. For the US, the dysfunctional state of Pakistan underlines more than ever the strategic importance of its relationship with India.
What is the solution? Briefly, realize Pakistan strategic potential by rationalizing its domestic, Afghan and India policies. If the military is the problem, it has to become the solution ´ and not by taking over. Yes, it can fulfill its responsibility to the nation without threatening the democratic process.
(Contributed by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, member Advisory Board, CRSS).