

THE NAP TRACKER

INTRODUCTION

The NAP Tracker initiative aims to measure the progress made on the National Action Plan (NAP), enacted on December 25, 2014, following the horrendous attack on innocent schoolchildren in Peshawar, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP). Terrorists broke into the the Army Public School in Peshawar Cantonement area of Peshawar city in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province. The targeted teachers and schoolchildren indiscriminantly, killing 132 young children in the process. The incident, the worst attack of terror in Pakistan's history, was a paradigm shift for Pakistan. In a state of national grief, the NAP emerged as a beacon of hope for a beleaguered nation galvanized by tragedy. The purpose of the document was to exact a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the threat of extremism and militancy in the country.

Up until that point, Pakistan had already suffered tremendously in the War on Terror (WoT), both in terms of infrastructure and human life. Depending on which source you quote, the loss of life is estimated between 60,000 to 82,000 souls. Civilians account for well over a third, and well over half of those figures respectively. Despite such a drastic number of individuals dying during this period, the NAP was enacted 11 years into the conflict.

Belated implementation notwithstanding, on paper, the NAP is a good start to eliminate and root out terrorism from the country. Bear in mind that the ideas presented in the NAP are neither novel, nor innovative. They have been around at least as long as this conflict, and some, such as seminary registration/reform, even longer than that. The implementation of NAP can be classified as 'extremely successful' or 'woefully inadequate', depending on the criteria used and the stakeholders quoted. This report attempts to cover both aspects of the debate.

In the wake of the NAP, 16 committees were formed to monitor progress on the NAP along a variety of vectors and parameters. These committees, their heads and members are as follows:

THE THEMES

1. Moratorium Lifted
2. Military Courts
3. Proscribed Organizations
4. Counterterrorism
5. Sectarianism/Minorities
6. Local Conflicts
7. Seminaries
8. Refugees/IDPs
9. Criminal Justice System

These nine themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

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#	Committee	Head	Member
1.	Main committee	Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister • Ishaq Dar, Finance Minister • Ahsan Iqbal, Planning Minister • Pervaiz Rasheed, Information Minister • Khawaja Asif, Defense Minister • Abdul Qadir Baloch, SAFRON Minister • Sardar Mehtab, KP Governor • Sartaj Aziz, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister • Zafarullah Khan, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
2.	Armed militias	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Aftab Sultan, Director General Intelligence Bureau • Maj. General Aamer Riaz, Director General Military Operations • Muhammad Azam Khan, Provincial Home Secretary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas • Ch. Muhammad Barjees Tahir, Provincial Home Secretary Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority
3.	Hate speech, extremist-material	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sardar Muhammad Yousaf, Minister of Religious Affairs • Ahsan Iqbal, Planning Minister • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Aftab Sultan, Director General Intelligence Bureau

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muhammad Malick, Managing Director Pakistan Television • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Syed Abdul Manan Agha, Secretary Religious Affairs & Interfaith Harmony, Balochistan • Dr. Baz Muhammad Junejo, Secretary Auqaf, Religious Affairs, Zakat & Ushr Department, Sindh • Mr. Abdullah Khan Mehsud, Secretary Auqaf, Hajj, Religious & Minority Affairs, KP • Muhammad Saqib Aziz, Secretary Auqaf Department, Punjab • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority
4.	Finances of terrorist Organisations	Ishaq Dar, Federal Finance Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ashraf Mehmood Wathra, Governor State Bank • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Tariq Bajwa, Chairman Federal Board of Revenue • Akbar Hoti, Director General Federal Investigation Agency • Waqar Masood Khan, Finance Secretary

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5.	Re-emergence of banned organisations	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Aftab Sultan, Director General Intelligence Bureau • Muhammad Malick, Managing Director Pakistan Television • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Hamid Ali Khan, the Interior Secretary
6.	Counter terrorism force	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ishaq Dar, Finance Minister • Khawaja Asif, Defence Minister • Maj. General Aamer Riaz, Director General Military Operations • Dr. Waqar Masood Khan, Federal Secretary Finance Division
7.	Religious persecution	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority • Sardar Muhammad Yousaf, Minister and Secretary of Religious Affairs • All Provincial Police Officers • Zafar Iqbal Awan, Inspector General of Police of Gilgit Baltistan • Malik Khuda Bakhsh Awan, Inspector General of Police of Azad Jammu Kashmir and Islamabad Capital Territory • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Syed Abdul Manan Agha, Secretary Religious Affairs & Interfaith Harmony, Balochistan • Dr. Baz Muhammad Junejo, Secretary Auqaf, Religious Affairs, Zakat & Ushr Department, Sindh • Mr. Abdullah Khan Mehsud, Secretary Auqaf, Hajj, Religious & Minority Affairs, KP • Muhammad Saqib Aziz, Secretary Auqaf Department, Punjab
8.	Madrassah regulation	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sardar Muhammad Yousaf, Minister and Secretary of Religious Affairs • Balighur Rehman, State Minister Education • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Syed Abdul Manan Agha, Secretary Religious Affairs & Interfaith Harmony, Balochistan • Dr. Baz Muhammad Junejo, Secretary Auqaf, Religious Affairs, Zakat & Ushr Department, Sindh • Mr. Abdullah Khan Mehsud, Secretary Auqaf, Hajj, Religious & Minority Affairs, KP • Muhammad Saqib Aziz, Secretary Auqaf Department, Punjab

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9.	Terrorist glorification by media	Pervez Rash-eed, Information Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister • Irfan Siddiqui, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister • Zafarullah Khan, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister • Dr. Nazir Saeed, Information Secretary
10.	Federally Administered Tribal Area reforms	Iqbal Zafar Jhagra, Governor KP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ishaq Dar, Finance Minister • Lt. General (R) Abdul Qadir Baloch, SAFRON Minister • Tariq Bajwa, Secretary Economic Affairs • Lt. General Hidayat ur Rehman, Corps Commander 11th Corps Peshawar • Mohammad Azam Khan, Chief Secretary Federally Administered Tribal Areas
11.	Dismantling terrorist communication networks	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anusha Rahman, Minister of State for Information Technology and Telecommunications
12.	Karachi operation	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ishrat ul Ibad, Governor Sindh • Qaim Ali Shah, Chief Minister Sindh • Maj. General Bilal Akbar, Director General Rangers
13.	Punjab	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Aftab Sultan, Director-General of the Intelligence Bureau • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Provincial Police Officers

14.	Sectarian terrorism	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aftab Sultan, Director General of the Intelligence Bureau • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Provincial Police Officers • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority
15.	Afghan refugees	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iqbal Zafar Jhagra, Governor KP • Lt. General (R) Abdul Qadir Baloch, SAFRON minister • Usman Yousaf Mobeen, Chairman of the National Database and Registration Authority
16.	Criminal justice reforms	Chaudhry Nisar, Interior Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arif Ahmed Khan, Interior Secretary • Maj. (R) Azam Suleman, Home Secretary Punjab • Capt. (R) Munir Azam, Home Secretary KP • Mumtaz Ali Shah, Home Secretary Sindh • Akbar Durrani, Home Secretary Balochistan • Justice (R) Muhammad Raza Khan, Intelligence Bureau and Law Secretary • Lt. General Rizwan Akhtar, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence • Joint Intelligence X, the Secretariat of Inter Service Intelligence

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The audit is for the first year of the NAP, or thirteen months to be precise. The extra month is added because the state machinery took a while to respond to such a heavy mandate, and researchers on this report felt that a 13-month audit would offer a better overall picture. The thirteen month period also allows us to look at the entire of the year 2015 during this time period. Any subsequent NAP Tracker reports will run from the 1st of January to the 31st of December the following year, and thus account for precisely 12 months.

It must also be said that this report will largely ignore any steps outside the audit period. For example, if Pakistan passed a law to amend the CrPC and ensure speedy trials in 2013, that will not be considered progress under the NAP, though it may be referenced. Further, this report, the first of its kind, is based primarily on open-source information. It is the intention of this think tank to expand the scope in subsequent annual reports.

In this report, there are nine themes, and each theme may be comprised of one or more points in the NAP. This categorization can be found at the beginning of each individual section in a text box to the right. The concluding chapter contains policy recommendations on a way forward.

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NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: A COMMENT

by Dr. Shoaib Suddle

The Pakistan government launched a twenty-point counter-terrorism National Action Plan (NAP), apparently with the consensus of military and major political parties, in the aftermath of December 16, 2014 tragedy when terrorists targeted Army Public School, Peshawar, killing 140 people, mostly young students. Indeed, NAP was regarded a game changer in the nation's long fight against terrorism.

Addressing a high-level meeting on January 21, 2015, the Prime Minister vowed to mobilize *all* state resources to ensure *letter and spirit* implementation of NAP. He said the leadership and the nation stood united to wipe out terrorism and the terrorists would not find any safe havens on the soil of Pakistan. "The terrorists were the enemies of stability and harmony and every step would be taken for their complete elimination," the Prime Minister said on February 23, 2015.

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the political elite's rhetoric over the past one year, the key aspects of NAP have remained marred by poor implementation and less than professed outcomes. The sluggish performance in critical areas like revamping and reforming criminal justice system; appointing joint investigation teams, special prosecutors and special trial courts under the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014; strengthening and activation of NACTA; establishing Joint Intelligence Directorate; taking Karachi operation to its logical conclusion; dismantling terror infrastructure; choking terror financing; dismantling radical ideologies leading to extremism and terrorism; regulating and monitoring foreign funding of seminaries; effectively deactivating proscribed organizations / sectarian networks; and reforming seminaries curriculum has clouded even the Zarb-e-Azb and associated intelligence-based operations.

There are a number of reasons for the lackluster performance of NAP. First, the required funding for prompt implementation of NAP was neither worked out nor earmarked at the time of its launch. No plan, much less a plan as gigantic as NAP, can hope to make a difference without adequate and sustained funding.

Second, no timelines were specified for implementing specific aspects of NAP. Nor were respective roles and responsibilities of federal and provincial governments and other stakeholders clearly delineated. This resulted in avoidable confusion and, resultantly, poor interagency coordination.

Third, the potentially efficient and effective counterterrorism tools – joint investigation teams, dedicated specialist prosecutors and trial courts, reverse burden of proof - provided under the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 and made part of

21st Constitutional Amendment have yet to become operational. The result is that hardly any convictions of arrested terrorists or their aides have taken place other than in the military courts.

Fourth, a successful Karachi operation of late has gone out of steam thanks to criminalization of politics and politicization of law enforcement afflicting Pakistan's weak governance structures.

Fifth, much talked about reform, funding control and monitoring of seminaries is not backed by reliable data listing particulars of teachers and seminaries that have actually been brought to justice or proceeded against for aggressively pursuing extremist agenda. Nor have details of those receiving foreign funding been made public. The result is that the skeptics are unconvinced about the real efficacy of NAP.

Sixth, real time institutionalized sharing of intelligence between relevant stakeholders is a far cry from what NAP's purpose was.

Seven, NACTA is still struggling to stand on its own two feet. The Board of Governors of NACTA, with Prime Minister as its Chairperson, is statutorily required to meet at least once every quarter. The Board hasn't met even once over the past three years. This explains where NACTA fits on the government's priority radar.

Eighth, inadequate and anachronistic public safety capacity has remained a big debilitating factor. Likewise, reinvention and revamping of police station, the basic police unit, and medium to long-term criminal justice reform need higher priority on the NAP trajectory.

Last but not least, without strong political will the task of bringing about urgent transformation of counterterrorism narrative and strategy will remain illusory. What is needed is sincere, impassioned and robust implementation of NAP by a bold and trending political and public safety leadership. Without total ownership and unflinching commitment and sustained resolve to delegitimize extremist ideology and dismantle terrorist infrastructure, the existential threat to Pakistan's peace and stability will not be tamed sooner.

Dr. Shoaib Suddle is a veteran police officer who has served multiple Inspector General posts. He is the foremost police and CrPC reform specialist in the country. He can be reached at dsuddle@gmail.com.