




Center for
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Security
Studies

AFGHAN JIHAD & EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS





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Research &
Security
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*Pakistan-focused, Independent Questions,
Independent Answers*

Afghan Jihad & Emergence of Transnational Networks

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Acronyms & Abbreviations:

MB	Muslim Brotherhood
TJ	Tablighi Jamat
JuD	Jamaatud Dawa
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
HT	Hizbul Tahrir
ART	Al-Rasheed Trust
UN	United Nations
FIF	Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation
IIA	Ittehad Islami Afghanistan
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
SSP	Sipaha Sahaba Pakistan
CFR	Council of Foreign Relations
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
Jl	Jamaat-e-Islami
JlJK	Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu & Kashmir
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
UAE	United Arab Emirate
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICC	Islamic Coordination Council
UTN	Umma Tameer-e-Nau
WFP	World Food Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Abstract:

Beside a surge in terrorist activities, post 9/11, events have also highlighted the role of transnational Islamic charity networks and their impact on the Af-Pak region. Organizations such as Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) and Al-Qaeda have contributed to the proliferation of a certain religious ideology, also influencing already existing outfits in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This paper examines the role of Islamist networks and the influence that they drew from the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda in particular in the Af-Pak region. It also explains how local likeminded outfits used Al-Qaeda's anti-western jargon to recruit foot-soldiers and also enlist support within the society. These developments not only threw up several new local militant outfits but also helped in the creation of charity organizations which went on to serve as recruitment and financial conduits for the radical Wahabist / Salafi reformists.

As a whole these networks have assumed an alarming significance in the poorly-governed and economically struggling segments of the Pakistani and Afghan societies.

(Imtiaz Gul, and CRSS Research Fellows Amanullah Sipra, Hira Kashif and Omer Khitab Orakzai contributed to this report.)

1. Introduction:¹

Within days of a UN Resolution, slapping sanctions on the Taliban regime in November 1999, dozens of bakeries sprang up in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. The Karachi-based Al-Rasheed Trust was the prime sponsor of these bakeries, which began offering subsidized bread to the Afghans, the majority of whom lived an extremely miserable life because of a non-functional economy and a government that, because of international isolation, depended on Al-Qaeda and other Muslim charities for survival. The regime had practically no source of income, except for the dividends flowing from narcotics and informal trade with Iran and Pakistan.

These bakeries were a common sight with one or two Pakistani or Arab supervisors, mostly in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan. Almost all of them displayed the ownership of these bakeries: The Karachi-based Al-Rasheed Trust (ART). Others carried names of obscure charity organization from the Middle East with offices spread out in Kabul and other main Afghan cities.

Those were days when some aid workers had begun suspecting even the nascent Al-Jazeera TV office in Kabul for being a financial conduit for Al-Qaeda. The US administration probably also believed so, explained through the US bombing mid October, 2001, of the TV networks office situated in the upscale Wazir Akbar Khan district.

The primary purpose of this recap is to explain how non-state actors can circumvent international sanctions and even thrive by creating undeclared alliances and synergies in the name of humanitarian assistance.

The October 2005 deadly earthquake in northern Pakistan, that killed at least 73,000 people, and the devastating floods that killed over 1600 people but caused unprecedented infrastructure damages offer another example of how such non-state, and even proscribed charity networks spring into action the moment they see an opportunity.

The primary purpose of this recap is to explain how non-state actors can circumvent international sanctions and even thrive by creating undeclared alliances and synergies in the name of humanitarian assistance.

¹- I am using my books:

- The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations under the Taliban (Vanguard Publishers , Pakistan)
- The Al-Qaeda Connection, Penguin, India , and
- The Most Dangerous Place, Penguin/Viking US/UK

as the primary source for the introduction as well as the rest of the paper

Jamaatud Dawa (successor to a Pakistani but Kashmir-focused outlawed militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba) for instance employed thousands of volunteers for rescue and relief activities when the earthquake struck. They were all over with food, medicine and shelter. At places in Kashmir, the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) activists even joined hands with American and other western workers for helping the earthquake affected people.

The unprecedented floods that swept Pakistan from the hilly north to the plains of the south offered organizations such as Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation, of FIF, a charity JuD set up for its humanitarian activities, and Al-Khidmat Foundation – another Islamist charity closely linked to the religio-political party Jamaat-e-Islami, plus several other relief networks like Islamic Relief and Muslim Hands jumped into the fray to set up hundreds of tent villages and relief camps through the flood-soaked regions. It also stoked fears – both within and outside the country – that these outfits might exploit this opportunity to enlist support through their relief work. Al-Khidmat Foundation, for instance, had about 20,000 volunteers in dozens of camps from the north to the south. So did the FIF.

All were taking advantage of the space that poor governance structures and a sloppy state machinery response created. Although displacement of over 20 million people – affected directly or indirectly – along the Indus river amounted to an overwhelming challenge that most governments wouldn't be able to cope with, yet slow reaction by state institutions to the predicament of those directly affected – absence of disaster management plans and haphazard response to the consequences of gushing waters – gave non-state charities, particularly the Islamist outfits, an opportunity to demonstrate their “commitment and ability” in such situations.

Having said that, one must keep in mind that most of these charities were born out of the US-led anti-Soviet Union “jihad” in the early 1980s. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 essentially became the foundation for scores of networks which were driven by and filled with the Islamist Jihadist zeal – the medicine that the American CIA and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence used to enlist support and recruit fighters – mujahideen – from all over the world. Totalitarian governments in Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Algeria emptied their prisons to offer volunteers for the jihad in Afghanistan. At the same time private religio-political groups – influenced largely by Ikhwanul

Muslims – in these countries also lapped up the opportunity and sent in volunteers in droves to Pakistan, the launching pad for the jihadi forces. It turned into the training ground as well as the conduit for jihadis from all over the world. As a consequence, foreign Islamist networks also set up their establishments there to facilitate reception and onward dispatch into Afghanistan of their recruits. These offices, centers as well as medical and relief services, mostly from the Middle Eastern countries. Most of these organizations eventually became the financial conduits and political support base in the region for both Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian Dr. Aiman Al-Zawahiri. Both count among the first generation jihadists who brought to the region their own way of thinking; OBL exuded the Wahabist version of Islam, that had originated in Saudi Arabia in the early 1920s, and Al-Zawahiri. The latter was the last ameer of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the militant entity representing the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought. Zawahiri formally merged the EIJ into Al-Qaeda in 1998.

The merger in fact marked a new phase in the history of transnational Islamist networks; the near-simultaneous bombing attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania had already taken place on August 7, 1998, and the US reacted by sending several Tomahawk missile on Al-Qaeda-linked militant camps in Khost, eastern Afghanistan on August 20, 1998.

One must, however, also keep in mind that bin Laden alone was not responsible for introducing the Wahabist school of thought in the Af-Pak region; currently represented in Afghanistan largely by Professor Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf's Ittehad Islami Afghanistan (IIA) group and in Pakistan by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the precursor of Jamatud Dawa, owed its proliferation also to an over-ambitious American administration that germinated Muslims of the world with the spirit of jihad in Afghanistan.

In an appearance before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on April 24, 2009 secretary of state Hilary Clinton caused an almost furor by pointing to the contribution the US had made to the militant Islam in the Af-Pak region.

"But the problems we face now to some extent we have to take responsibility for, having contributed to it. Let's remember here ... the

people we are fighting today, we funded them twenty years ago ... and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union. We did not want to see them control Central Asia and we went to work ... and it was President Reagan in partnership with Congress led by Democrats who said you know what it sounds like a pretty good idea ... let's deal with the ISI and the Pakistan military and let's go recruit these mujahideen."

"And great, let them come from Saudi Arabia and other countries, importing their Wahabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union," Clinton said in what amounted to the first ever official admission of how the United States, in its zeal to beat the Soviet Union, aligned itself with forces that today have grown into an existential threat not only for the US but pose similar threats to Pakistan and Afghanistan as well.

In this context a nexus between the Al-Qaeda-linked outfits in Afghanistan and Pakistan and those operating in Chechnya, Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Indian Kashmir had already taken roots but the new-born Al-Qaeda led by bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri in the mid 1990s seemed to take like-minded religio-political outfits by storm. Almost everybody – including various Afghan mujahideen as well as Kashmir-focused jihadi groups – began looking up to the duo for inspiration and political guidance. Besides, Pakistan's right-wing political parties, particularly the Deobandi Sunni parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, a proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood philosophy, and the Jamiat Ulemai Islam found in Al-Qaeda an umbrella and in bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri mentors who would guide and help pursue their quest for a just Islamic system of governance as well as in "liberating" Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir from the occupation of foreign infidels. So the world witnessed the emergence of a cocktail comprising various Islamist shades bonded by the gel that Al-Qaeda offered i.e. a global jihad to challenge the US-led domination of the world.

This also galvanized smaller political groups across the globe and also led to the networking between Al-Qaeda and a number of those charities and relief organization that had descended on Pakistan during the 1980s either for jihad or in the name of support to the Afghan refugees.

Until the tragic events of 9/11 in the United States, Al-Qaeda-inspired groups had proliferated the region, partially also because of "acceptance

and accommodation” by the Pakistani security apparatus led by the ISI, which supported more than a dozen Kashmir-focused groups including the vicious Wahabist LeT and Tehreekul Mujahideen, the Deobandi Harkatul-Mujahideen and Jaishe Muhammad. The ISI also maintained close links with the Afghan Taliban, who had been not only hosting Al-Qaeda, the Islamists dissidents from the neighboring central Asian republic of Uzbekistan but also Pakistani militant outfits mentioned above. These outfits also operated their relief networks – both overtly and covertly, collecting funds for their militant activities as well as charity and their madrasa education system.

This constituted a lethal combination of religious philosophy, political ideology, education and humanitarian volunteerism, inspired largely by Al-Qaeda, partially by the anti-American-Israeli rhetoric of Hezbollah and Hamas, and supported by “God-fearing” Muslim traders, businessmen and philanthropists not only in the Middle Eastern countries but also in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere.

Institutional patronage and acquiescence in Pakistan also fed into the pan-Islamist, expansionist ideology of Al-Qaeda, not because the ISI necessarily believed in this, but because a number of its proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir revered Al-Qaeda and drew inspiration from it for motivating their cadres into jihad against India and the West.

This appeasement has meanwhile assumed alarming proportions, for Pakistan in particular, threatening its very existence meanwhile; almost all shades of Islamists within Pakistan form the third tier of the pyramid of militant Islam; regardless of whether dead or alive both bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri occupy the top of the pyramid, while Afghan warlords like Mulla Muhammad Omar, Gulbudin Hekmetyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani form the second tier. Various Pakistani follower organizations such as LeT (Jamaatud Dawa, different groups of Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkare Jhangvi and Jaishe Muhammad) serve as the local extensions for Al-Qaeda, a fear that has apparently dissuaded the Pakistani security establishment from launching an all-out crackdown on these networked militant groups.

A confirmation of this networking also came from the United States on September 1, 2010, when it formally designated the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a foreign terrorist outfit.

“The TTP and Al-Qaida have a symbiotic relationship. TTP draws ideological guidance from Al-Qaida while Al-Qaida relies on the TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border.” This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both Al-Qaida's global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP is a force multiplier for Al-Qaida,” Daniel Benjamin, the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter terrorism said at a press briefing in Washington.¹

In a way, the transnational Al-Qaeda not only prompted the creation of its

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They also became central pawns in Al-Qaeda's anti-Shia campaign in Pakistan; the latest incidents on September 1st and 3rd, 2010 in the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Quetta which left more than 70 people dead after Shia processions were targeted, also underlined the sectarian aspect of the current violence in Pakistan.

2. Traditional Islam in South/Southwest Asia:

Islam came to the Indian sub-continent in the 8th century with the Arab conquest of Sindh (now the fourth province of Pakistan in the South). But in the ensuing decades, besides struggles and battles for political domination among kings and sultans of the region, sufis and saints played a major role in influencing traditional Islam in south (and West) Asia. In fact, tombs of sufi saints emerged as a place of pilgrimage for the spread of Islam as well as the major means of spreading Islam and adapting it to indigenous cultural tradition in a culturally diverse society such as India.

The Islamic religious traditions (also) responded to different cultural situations and contexts in the course of its journey from its Arabian heartland to distant parts of the world. Islam was always an important structural basis of social identity and articulation of Muslims in a religiously and culturally diverse situation encountered in South Asia.²

Several spiritual and religious personalities – sufis and saints spread and revitalized Islam in the Indo-Pak sub-continent (as well as in Afghanistan and Central Asia) Islam with their peaceful and inspiring teachings. People, rulers in particular, who loved these men often, built beautiful structures around their tombs, mostly with adjoining mosques. These spiritual centers drew thousands of people from all over the region. Even today, annual congregations at these tombs and mausoleums constitute an important element in the lives of a big number of Muslims living in the region.

Famous Sufi saints who contributed greatly in propagating the message of Islam in the Indo-Pak sub-continent were Baba Farid (died in 1266) in Pakpattan, Nizamuddin Aulia (died in 1325) in Delhi, Shaykh Saleem Chishti (died in 1571) in Agra, Syed Ali Hamadani famous as Shah-e-Hamdan (died in 1384) in Kunar, Ahmad Yahya Maneri (died in 1371) in Maner, Muhammad Ghouse Gwaliori (died in 1562), Nur Outb Alam (died in 1415) in Pandua, Shah Maqdoom (died in 1523) in Bengal, Abdullah Shah Ghazi (died in 773) in Karachi, Syed Ali Hajwairi (died in 1077) in Lahore, Shaykh Bahauddin Zakaria (died in 1267) in Multan, Shah Shams Tabrezi (died in 1276) in Multan, Shah Yusuf Gardezi (died in 1137) in Multan, and Khwaja Moinuddin Hasan Chishti (died in 1230) in Ajmer, India.

Scholars and reformers - Mujaddid Alf-Sani, (1564–1624). He was an Indian Islamic scholar from Punjab and a prominent member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, also described as the "reviver of the second millennium", for his work in rejuvenating Islam and opposing the heterodoxies prevalent in the time of Mughal Emperor Akbar.³ He is said to have had considerable and long-lasting influence in India and to have given 'to Indian Islam the rigid and conservative stamp it bears today'.⁴

Shah Wali Allah Muhaddith Dehlvi (February, 1703 – August, 1762) also made huge intellectual contribution to Islam in South Asia. He worked for

the revival of Muslim rule and intellectual learning in South Asia, during a time of waning Muslim power. He despised the divisions and deviations within Islam and its practice in India. He is also thought to have anticipated a number of progressive, social, economic, and political ideas of the modern era such as social reform, equal rights, labor protection, welfare entitlement of all to food, clothing, housing, etc.

Shah Wali Allah in fact also tried to offset the impact of the communal teachings of Mujaddad Alf-Sani (who had resisted sull-i-kul mixing all religions into one, an idea that had been introduced by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1542-1605) to create religious harmony in his empire. After the arrival of the British into India through the commercial East India Company in the early 18th century, the company effectively began ruling India after the Battle of Plassey in 1757. In 1858, when, following the events of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, and under the Government of India Act 1858, the British Crown assumed direct administration of India in the new British Raj, which lasted until August 1947, when the British rulers agreed to decolonize India as well as conceded the creation of Pakistan comprising Muslims.

Much before the decolonization of India, however, Islam had become the primary source for political movements led by liberal Muslim leaders as well as clergy – most of them primarily pressing for recognition as an equal-rights entity of India.

But the divide between Traditionalists versus Reformists remained discernible through out these decades. The traditionalist ones accept the continuity between the founding texts and their commentaries and they take its basic principle imitation (Taqleed) that is refusal to innovate, while accepting what was said before. Its adherents follow one of the great legal schools (Shafiism, Salikism, Hanafism, Hanbalism). Its vision of the sharia is essentially legalistic and casuistic, it is sometimes connected to the popular forms of Sufis (hence the Barelvi school in Pakistan).⁵

The reformist fundamentalist, on the other hand, argues Roy, criticizes the tradition, the commentaries, popular religious practices, deviations and superstitions. It aims to return to the founding texts (Shah Wali Allah in India and Abd al Wahab in the Arabian Peninsula). This reformism generally developed in response to an external threat (the influence of Hinduism on Islam, for example) Roy maintains.

Until the early 20th century, these pursuits had largely remained peaceful but this turmoil for the Muslims of India coincided with religious uprisings in the Middle East, led by Syed Qytub and Hasan Al Banna in Egypt as well as the abolition of the Islamic caliphate in Turkey by Kemal Ata Turk in the 1930s. These transnational factors – the First World War, British rule in India, and secular movement in Turkey as well as political struggles within Egypt - essentially influenced the evolution of the Islamic thought.

The origins of today's Salafi political parties and movements (Salafi revivalism) can traced to the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, created by the school teacher Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1949) in Egypt in 1928, and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, established by Abul-Ala Maududi (1903 – 1979) in 1941.⁶

In his excellent book “The failure of Political Islam”, Olivier Roy argues that 'although the two movements developed independently, the overlapping of their themes was striking, and intellectual contacts were soon established'. It was a disciple of Maududi, the Indian Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, who undertook the translation of Maududi into Arabic and who met with Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966). The latter, an Egyptian ideologue of the Muslim Brothers, also influenced this Islamist political thought, Qutb insisted on Jihad to establish the true Muslim state, as D'awa or preaching could not by itself achieve God's dominion on earth.⁷

Qutb helped MB spawn radical Islamist groups in the 1970s but was executed by the regime of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966. Viewed against this background one can infer that the emergence of the contemporary Islamist movement developed about six decades ago, with MB and Jamaat-e-Islami providing the conceptual matrix and sociological base.

In view of local socio-political circumstances in respective regions concepts have evolved, and splits and differences have brought diversity, and thus Olivier Roy divides the current transnational Islamist movement into three geographic and cultural tendencies: the Sunni Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian subcontinent, and Irano-Arab Shiism.

“These groups are as distinct politically as they are geographically, which is why it is more appropriate to speak of an Islamist sphere of influence than of

an international union. The largest organizations are those of the Arab world's Muslim Brotherhood (MB), vaguely dependent on their Egyptian leadership but in reality organized on a national basis; several dissident and minority groups, generally influenced by the most radical ideas of Qutb have branched off from this common base (Hizb al-Tahrir in 1952, the Islamic Jihad in the 1970s, and so on). Next we find organizations on the Indian subcontinent (the various Jamaat-e-Islamis of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh), the Afghan mujahideen (Hizb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami, Ittehad-e-Islami of Prof.Sayyaf), and, more recently, the North African Islamists (the Algerian FIS, or Islamic Salvation Front; the Tunisian Nahda party) and the Islamic Renaissance Party in the former Soviet Union. This bloc has recently tended to merge with older, apolitical fundamentalist movements (the Saudi Wahabis, the Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith), thus somewhat losing definition. As for the revolutionary Shiite movement, it is the only one to have taken power by way of a true Islamic revolution; it has therefore become identified with the Iranian state, which used it as an instrument in its strategy for gaining regional power, even though the multiplicity of Shiite groups reflects local particularities (in Lebanon, Afghanistan, or Iraq) as much as it does the factional struggles of Tehran."⁸

What binds these groups together is:

- a) Call to fundamentalism to cleanse the society and enforce Sharia;
- b) Anti-colonialism;
- c) Anti-imperialism (synonymous with anti-Westernism); and
- d) Anti-Americanism.

And their obvious targets therefore are foreign banks (City Bank, American Express) foreign food franchises (KFC, McDonalds, Pepsi), World Bank and the IMF (dubbed as American tools for arm-twisting poor Muslim nations), or even governments cooperating with the US or other NATO members (Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are cases in point).

Opposition to, and condemnation of both Israel and the United States (for their policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians) is the common denominator to all these groups.

Opposition to, and condemnation of both Israel and the United States (for their policies vis-à-vis

the Palestinians) is the common denominator to all these groups. So is their grudge against the US for its invasion of Iraq and the continued presence in Afghanistan.

In this case, the Sunni groups including Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood find a common cause with the Palestinian radical Sunni group Hamas, which born out of the womb of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as mainstream Shia groups such as Hezbollah, and become mutually supportive entities.

Hezbollah ideology is based on the concept of jihad and martyrdom which are demonstrated in its acts of suicide terrorism. On November 11, 1982 Hezbollah's first suicide bomber, Ahmad Qasir, detonated himself in the Israeli military headquarters killing 76 [the Hezbollah website claims 75] officers. The day continues to be commemorated by Hezbollah as 'Martyrdom day' in Qasir's honor.⁹

Hezbollah, too, projects itself as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic movement, pursuing practical politics in a religious garb. Its relations with Iran are based on political-ideological, strategic-policy terms (pan-Islamism) and with Syria on ethno-national identity (pan-Arabism).¹⁰

Training even Sunni groups and even non-Islamic outfits such as the Tamil Tigers has been part of Hezbollah strategy to spread the schemes of martyrdom into other territories. Addressing the organization's military units in December 2002, the Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, said: 'Martyrdom operations – suicide bombings – should be exported outside Palestine. I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings worldwide. Don't be shy to do it'.¹¹

Opposition to India and its hold over the disputed Himalayan state of Kashmir is specific to Pakistani militant groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaishe Muhammad. And all these groups are meanwhile politically allied to Al-Qaeda, and have by implication become the Force Multipliers for this transnational organization, which was born out of the American-led anti Soviet-Russian jihad in the 1980s, thereby inviting Islamists from all around the world to join – all inflated with the jihadi zeal – which had instantly become a buzz word across the globe.

The Afghan war against the Soviet Union was indeed a watershed in militant Muslim revivalist movements and gave a new platform to militant Islamist groups from all over the Muslim world. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam was one of the first Arabs to join the Jihad in Afghanistan. He advocated a traditional jihad to push Christian encroachments out of all Muslim lands. Osama bin Laden (Azzam's deputy) created a common enemy against whom jihadi efforts were to be focused. Thus US troops in Saudi Arabia and later Somalia, provided the embodiment of that common enemy, thereby changing the focus of Salafi jihad to the 'far enemy the United States and the West in general'.¹²

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The American CIA had played a major role in bringing the Muslim fighters from across the world to get them trained by the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and use them as proxies against the Soviet Union.

Intelligence (ISI) agency and use them as proxies against the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in February 1989, it left its socialist proxies to deal with the mess of almost a decade. But the Kabul regime could hardly fill the vacuum and eventually fell in the face of an ascendant, though divided, mujahideen in late April 1992. The eventual chaos and factional fighting after the abrupt fall of President Najibullah turned Afghanistan into embattled fiefdoms, and thereby providing the Arab Wahabi-Salafi, Pakistani Deobandi and pro-Iran Shia groups to influence the course of events there.

Saudi Arabian Role in Development of Transnational Networks:

Saudi Arabia contributed to the spawning of Wahabist-Salafi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan in its own way; during the jihad against the Soviet Russia not only did Saudis matched America's dollar for a dollar but also funded creation of new mosques and seminaries. The Saudis' money was also used in creating – along with several others – Sipaha Sahaba Pakistan, which formed its militant wing Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that later joined the ranks of Al-Qaeda – to counter what they perceived as the Shia advances in Sunni regions.¹³

The issue of funding for militant-political organization is primarily rooted in the January 1979 Iranian Revolution, which heralded a new phase of rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh, where the monarchs feared the Iranian revolution might undermine the Saudi influence in the Gulf countries. Thus began a funding spree; as the Iranian Mullahs began exporting their revolution by setting up cultural centers and supporting Shia and like-minded organization across the region, including Pakistan as well, the Saudis, too, responded by funneling funds to Sunni and Sunni-wahabist political parties. The December 1979 Soviet-Russian invasion of Afghanistan provided the Saudis with the best opportunity to financially support religio-political parties on the one hand, and also help create political parties such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) to counter the advancing Iranian Shia influence. The Saudis had also spent nearly 4 billion dollars in supporting the anti-Russian jihad, largely supporting the Sunni and Wahabist Afghan parties fighting the pro-Moscow regime there.

As the factional fighting in Afghanistan raged after all mujahideen leaders arrived there in April 1992, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry also intensified. The Saudis and the Pakistanis joined hands to contain the Iranian influence both in Afghanistan and Pakistan itself, by permitting and funding the mushrooming of Sunni religious seminaries all over the country. Some religio-political parties such as Jamiat Ulemai Pakistan (JUI) also counted among the main recipients of the Saudi funding, which initially also had helped the Taliban in Afghanistan.

While the Saudi funding flowed for Sunni seminaries in Pakistan, it also triggered a violent sectarian conflict throughout the 1990s, mostly centered in Central Pakistan – the Punjab – where radical Sunni (such as SSP, Lashkare Jhangvi, Jaishe Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaatud Dawa) and Shia organizations (including the defunct Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan) are headquartered.

Almost all of these organizations were banned in January 2002 but their sources of funding never really dried up. The money continues to trickle in through various sources, and this also lands in the hands of some of the militant groups. That today, most of these organization – from Karachi in the south of Pakistan to South Punjab to Waziristan in the northwest, share

objectives and are glued by the over-arching Al-Qaeda ideology, is partially also because of the erstwhile Saudi desire to exercise influence over its proxies in countries such as Pakistan, where at least 75 percent of the 175 million are Sunni Muslims.

Interestingly, the Saudi Royal family always extended help to Pakistan in critical times, such as free oil exports immediately after the latter's nuclear tests in May 1998. Cash budgetary support on several other occasions also underscored conscious Saudi efforts to keep the Iranians off Pakistan.

Saudis in fact brokered a deal with General Pervez Musharraf, allowing former premier Nawaz Sharif to leave the country and settle down in Saudi Arabia for ten years. Such interventions clearly underline the Royal family's desire to maintain clout within Pakistan. Close relations with right wing political, religio-political parties, and Sunni outfits in particular, provides the Saudis with an important tool of influence, which the United States also uses whenever it finds itself bound by the laws.

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The Pakistani ISI had its own axe to grind – craving for the so-called strategic depth in Afghanistan. It saw in Taliban a force-multiplier for itself, a force it thought should be able to counter Russian, Indian and Iranian influence. This way various militant groups emerged, guided and influenced by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, both nurturing their favourite outfits. Most of these organization derived impressions from Al-Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden was revered as the hero of the Muslims across the world, somebody who had dared the sole super power i.e. the United States and its protégé Israel.

The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s, the US-led anti-terror war in Afghanistan (Oct 2001) and the invasion of Iraq provided yet ever greater grounds to trans-nationalist movements such as Al-Qaeda to raise cadre for an organized resistance to the “US-led western imperialism.” As a consequence, a synergy or fusion of interests and

similarity of causes has emerged between the traditionalist clergy and the radical reformists – largely led and influenced by Al-Qaeda – in South and Southwest Asia, a sort of synthesis between Islamist militants and traditional Mullahs, who earlier prospered under the American largess, and now serve as direct supporters or apologists – indirect supporters – for the pan-Islamist missionaries.

This mission, basically the Al-Qaeda ideology, also resonated in a video statement by the Egyptian Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri which he issued in the context of the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict in summer 2006, Aneela Salman wrote:

'The whole world is an open field for us. As they attack us everywhere, we will attack them everywhere. As their armies got together to wage war on us, our nation will get together to fight them....The shells and missiles that tear apart the bodies of Muslims in Gaza and Lebanon are not purely Israeli. Rather; they come and are financed by all countries of the Crusader alliance. Thus, all those who took part in the crime should pay the price. We cannot just stand idly by in humiliation while we see all these shells fall on our brothers in Gaza and Lebanon'.¹⁴

The following section will now provide an overview of some of the most prominent transnational networks, including the seemingly pacifist Tabeleeghi Jamaate (the preachers). It will also explain how the Jamaat-e-Islami as well as the Tabeleeghi Jamaate also supplements the pan-Islamist agenda as espoused and peddled by Al-Qaeda and tentacles in the region. These two organizations, rooted in south Asia, served as the main local force-multiplier for Al-Qaeda and proponents of the Muslim Brotherhood.

3. Prominent Transnational Networks:

When we talk of transnational networks and their proliferation in recent decade, we basically need to focus on groups and movements that sprouted from the Islamist thought that flowed from the teachings and vision of the Egyptian scholar Hasan al Banna and the sub-continental religious thinker and leader Abul Ala Maududi, and later influenced by the Iranian revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and largest Sunni transnational movement, which has been the main source of ideological inspiration and

organizational knowledge for similar organization in the rest of the world, in the Middle East in particular.

3.1. The Arab Center:

3.1(a). Muslim Brotherhood (MB):

Founded in 1928 in Egypt by the school teacher Hassan Al-Banna, the Brotherhood's stated goal is to instill the Qur'an and Sunnah as the "sole reference point for ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community and state". Since its inception in 1928 the movement has officially opposed violent means to achieve its goals, with some exceptions such as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or to overthrow secular Ba'athist rule in Syria.¹⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood has been formally banned in Egypt since 1954, but in reality, the Egyptian government has allowed it to operate within limits since the 1970s, keeping it in check with frequent arrests and crackdowns. A more open political atmosphere in 2005, due to both domestic and international pressure, led the government to grant the Brotherhood unprecedented freedom to campaign before that year's parliamentary vote. While the group's 150 candidates officially ran as independents, there was nothing secret about their Brotherhood affiliation. Candidates held rallies, hung posters with the Brotherhood's name, and used its slogan, "Islam is the Solution."¹⁶

Its core mission is religious proselytizing through preaching and social services and the network is spread all over from Egypt to Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Tunisia which makes it a predominantly Arab-based entity. MB branches in these countries practically are subordinate to the Egyptian Centre. Literature on the subject suggests that Afghan mujahideen leader Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani adopted ideas of the MB during his studies at the Al-Azhar University in the 1950s. The MB also sponsors national organization such as the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, Justice and Charity, Morocco, Hamas in Algeria or the Movement of Islamic Youth, Malaysia, a group close to both MB and the Malaysian Jamaat-e-Islami in 1971.¹⁷

The Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda have been vocal about Islamic resistance movements in the region because of the challenge and opportunity they present to political Islam. But there is a difference, according to Marwan Bishara, a political commentator and Academic. The Muslim Brotherhood has supported various resistance movements against foreign occupation, including Palestinian Hamas (offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood), the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Islamist Iraqi resistance groups. Nevertheless, it also supported their attempts to join the political processes in their countries.¹⁸

“Al-Qaeda on the other hand, has supported only the violent expressions of these groups, and whenever they turned to politics, Al-Qaeda rejected all their political overtures as surrender to the enemies of Islam”, says Bishara.

3.1(b). Al-Qaeda:

In the last decade no other organization has influenced the political thought across the Muslim world as much as Al-Qaeda. It is the vanguard of the global Salafi movement which includes many sister terrorist groups that share the same ideology. The Salafi movement determines its mission, sets its goals and guides its tactics. Salafi ideology makes the Saudi Arabian government all un-Islamic regime, which needs to be purged of its present leaders.¹⁹

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In his declarations Al-Zawahiri adopted the historical imagery of Islamic resistance to the European crusades, describing the enemy as “the alliance of Jews, Christians and their agents and holding them responsible for “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Fatani [as transliterated], Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina”.²⁰

Al-Qaeda in Arabic means 'the base.' It is led by bin Laden and administered by a council that discusses and approves major terrorist operations. The head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the top deputy of bin Laden; Al-Zawahiri is Al-Qaeda's ideological advisor. (One must, however, bear in mind that as of September 2010, the whereabouts of bin Laden remain a mystery, while

Al-Zawahiri is most probably alive and hiding somewhere in the mountainous and lawless border region that separates Pakistan from Afghanistan). Another prominent leader was Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who established the Sunni Muslim extremist group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ and planned deadly terror attacks including beheadings of kidnapped foreigners. Praised by bin Laden as the 'prince of Al-Qaeda in Iraq' he was later killed in a US air strike near Baghdad in 2006.²¹

"Al-Qaeda grew out of the Services Office, a clearinghouse for the international Muslim brigade opposed to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the 1980s, the Services Office—run by bin Laden and the Palestinian religious scholar Abdullah Azzam—recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign mujahideen, or holy warriors, from more than fifty countries. Bin Laden wanted these fighters to continue the "holy war" beyond Afghanistan. He formed Al-Qaeda around 1988," according to the CFR document.

Today Al-Qaeda is a 'networked transnational constituency rather than the monolithic, international terrorist or organization with an identifiable command and control apparatus that it once was,' since 9/11 it has emerged as a 'nimble, flexible and adaptive entity,' demonstrating remarkable resilience and durability and claims to be stronger and more capable.²² With a hydra-headed network, Al-Qaeda shares Sunni Muslim fundamentalist views with many Islamic terrorist groups around the world.²³ It depends on its local cells for its pan-Islamist ideology.

"The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosques from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "And fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together, " and "Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God."²⁴

Interestingly Al-Qaeda propounds an intellectual concept that is not based on main schools of Islamic theology, but constructs a new ideological starting point by the application of Islamic principles to socio-political change. Its political goals are reinforced by the teachings of the Qur'an; the

Faces behind Transnationalist Networks



Osama bin Laden



Aiman Al-Zawahiri



Mullah Omer



Siraj-ud-Din Haqqani



Baitullah Mehsud



Hakimullah Mehsud



Maulvi Fazlullah



Maulana Sufi Mohammad



Mangal Bagh

organization creates a powerful imagery that is embedded in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community. Bin Laden projects Jihad as an individual responsibility incumbent on all Muslims, to avenge the innocent Muslim blood, especially that of Muslim children in Iraq and Palestine.²⁵

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Al-Qaeda has no single headquarters and works through underground cells, largely local militant networks, spread out in dozens of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Yemen, Somalia. After shifting its central command to Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, Al-Qaeda also introduced suicide bombings to both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban, as well as affiliated groups in Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa.

Daniel Benjamin, State Department Counter-terrorism coordinator, reiterated views on Al-Qaeda's outreach when he spoke at the US Institute of Peace (USIP), a Washington-based think-tank, on September 9, 2010.

"Terrorism emanating from Yemen is a major security concern for the United States, but the Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan remains an extraordinarily formidable and dangerous terrorist organization whose targeting of the United States continues despite the pressure that the group is under in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas," Benjamin said in his remarks. He was responding to a Washington Post newspaper article that suggested US government officials are now ranking Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and specifically in Yemen, as the most urgent threat to United States security; even a greater threat than the Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan.

The discussion on Jamaat-e-Islami later in this section will also explain how local parties provide a cover or serve as an apology for Al-Qaeda's global mission, despite the fact that only a limited segment of the population supports and sympathizes with Al-Qaeda; in a February 2008 poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based nonprofit group, only 24 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin Laden in 2008 as compared to 46 percent in August 2007. Similarly, Al-Qaeda's popularity dropped from 33 percent to 18 percent.

One of the major contributing factors for an unfavorable public opinion of Al-Qaeda could be the string of violence that Pakistanis have suffered, particularly since early 2007; over 2,500 people, largely civilians, killed in more than 225 suicide bombings since, with the country being branded as the most dangerous place in the world.

What distinguishes Al-Qaeda from Muslim Brotherhood is the ideological cohesion that simply transcends geography, culture, ethnicity and personalities. MB also displays its political pragmatism by taking a reformist approach to the countries where it operates. It does not oppose the democratic process, nor does it bar its members from participation in the elections, implying that, while sticking to its core mission, it also believes in peaceful pursuit of political power. This may perhaps also be the reason for regional disagreements and conflicts within the MB network.

In this regard Olivier Roy makes a very convincing argument; first of all, there are several centers: the Egyptian MB, the Pakistani Jamaat and the World Muslim League based in Saudi Arabia. From there connections and collaborations are established around a network of personal relationships, riddled with disagreements and divisions, their common denominator is not the MB ideology but the simple desire to re-Islamize the society. These networks are periodically torn apart by conflicts that set the states of the Middle East against one another.²⁶

But those groups and persons wedded to the core ideology of Al-Qaeda rarely display disagreements and are unanimous in pursuing political objectives through sheer violence such as suicide bombings. They disregard, for instance, MB's pragmatism (participation in parliamentary elections, for instance) and believe in force as the only way to Islamize the society and put an end to foreign occupation of the Muslim lands (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine).

3.1(c). Hezbollah:

Hezbollah's ideology is based on the concept of jihad and martyrdom which are demonstrated in its acts of suicide terrorism. On November 11, 1982 Hezbollah's first suicide bomber, Ahmad Qasir, detonated himself in the

Israeli military headquarters killing 76 [the Hezbollah website claims 75] officers. The day continues to be commemorated by Hezbollah as 'Martyrdom day' in Qasir's honor.²⁷

Hezbollah, too, projects itself as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic movement, pursuing practical politics in a religious garb. Its relations with Iran are based on political-ideological, strategic-policy terms (pan-Islamism) and with Syria on ethno-national identity (pan-Arabism).²⁸

Training even Sunni groups and even non-Islamic outfits such as the Tamil Tigers has been part of Hezbollah strategy to spread the schemes of martyrdom into other territories. Addressing the organization's military units in December 2002, the Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, said: 'Martyrdom operations – suicide missions – should be exported outside Palestine. I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings worldwide. Don't be shy to do it'.²⁹

3.2. South/ Southwest Asian Center:

3.2(a). Jamaat-e-Islami (JI):

Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in 1941 by Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi, a prominent Islamic scholar in the subcontinent, who died in 1972. It opposed the partition of India from the very beginning but later, after the emergence of Pakistan as a new state on the world map, it changed its old stance and opted to create a constituency for itself in the new state.

Unlike other Islamic movements, Jamaat-e-Islami presents a more comprehensive, and pragmatic Islamic view, embodied by a big number of lower and middle-class, mostly educated political activists, academics and intelligentsia. Considered as the most organized political force in Pakistan, the party doesn't restrict itself to the implementation of Sharia in the country alone. It also discusses the individual and society as a whole with reference to culture, politics, economics, modern scientific education etc. JI believes in Islamic brotherhood across the world and rejects sectarianism. Unlike Tablighi Jamaat, JI stresses more on political struggle for establishing an Islamic state rather than wasting energy on individuals to make them perfect Muslims.

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan overtly runs an indigenous movement to Islamize the state. It, however, also shares Islamic political ideology and program with other political parties (such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh or Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan). At the same time it shares an ideological nexus with Al-Qaeda, and particularly with those persons and groups who were once part of the Muslim Brotherhood but are now devout activists of Al-Qaeda. This fusion gives JI the transnational character that transcends the boundaries of a particular country or region. That several Al-Qaeda linked people such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, one of the masterminds of the 9/11 events, were arrested from the houses of JI leaders in different parts of Pakistan also confirmed the nexus that has existed between Al-Qaeda and JI in Pakistan.

While part of Pakistan's mainstream politics in a Westminster democratic dispensation, the Jamaat-e-Islami clearly believes in pan-Islamism and Islamic revival in the Muslim world. It has several organization either directly under its wings or maintains contacts with them in a loose way, yet all of them are aware of how could they integrate their efforts for a greater Islamic empire as their collective cause, a vision quite synonymous to that of Al-Qaeda.

There are over a dozen organizations working either directly or indirectly under the JIP umbrella. Two of them are political; four are Jihadi and one representing a union of religious scholars. There are four youth and students organization also that identify themselves with JI or are inspired by its core ideology.³⁰

Some prominent among JI's affiliated or like-minded organizations are:

1. Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Political party)
2. Hizbul Mujahideen (Kashmir-focused militant outfit)
3. Shabaab-i-Milli (Youth wing, Pakistan)
4. Al-Badar Mujahideen (Kashmir-focused militant outfit)
5. Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (Students' wing, operating in public educational institutions)
6. Tanzeem Rabta Al Madaris (Organization of Islamic seminaries)
7. Jamiat Itehad ul Ulema (Organization of Islamic scholars)
8. Jamiate Tulaba-e-Arabiya (Organization comprising the students of seminaries)

It is a matter of fact that many of these organization run differences among themselves, yet all of them derive ideological impressions from the JI founder, Maulana Maududi, so they do have point of convergence/cohesion and hence they unite whenever needed in a particular situation. JIP supporters are more active in Middle East, Europe and America.

Funding Sources:

Ji collects funds through various means. Every member is advised to either donate part of his/ her income each year to the central fund of the party or to solicit funds from outside sources such as businessmen and affluent members of the society including academics and intelligentsia. Subordinate departments of Jamaat-e-Islami collect their own funds. The party uses natural disasters such as the October 2005 earthquake or the August 2010 devastating floods in Pakistan to mobilize funding for relief intervention in the affected areas.

The Kashmir Fund, Aid Foundation, Kashmir Saving Fund, Baitul Muqqadas Fund (created in solidarity with Palestinians), Qurtaba Fund and Martyrs of Islam Fund are some of the initiatives that denote Ji's sources of funding.

AI-Khidmat Foundation, a prominent organization under direct supervision of JIP, for instance, operates as a welfare charity – Non-governmental organization (NGO) which tries to reach and serve the victims of war or any sort of natural disaster or catastrophe happens in the country. In recent years, it has rapidly extended its operations countrywide. "According to 2001 Yearly Report of Jamaat-e-Islami, AI-Khidmat Foundation spent approximately 40 million rupees on different programs in previous year."³¹

During the August 2010 floods, the Foundation once again jumped into the fray with several hundred million rupees and thousands of volunteers to help in the relief and recovery of millions of people displaced by the ravaging waters of the Indus River.

Being a pragmatic Sunni Islamist party, the Ji also maintains good working relationship with the Shia Iran. Despite being entirely a Sunni movement, Ji is regarded as the only Sunni party that doesn't believe in sectarianism and

has no differences with Shia Muslims. It is believed that Khomeini government had repeatedly advised JI leaders to initiate the call for Islamic revolution in Pakistan but JI couldn't have a public support for this purpose.

The JI leaders often visit Iran and receive official protocol. It also extends its compliments and gratitude to the Iranian leaders visiting Pakistan. In 2002, when ex-President Khatemi was on an official visit to Pakistan, JI wanted to welcome him with at least half a million people in Lahore, however the government refused permission for the rally. Though the government stated unfavorable security situation as the reason for not allowing JI's planned protocol, it was generally believed that a big turn-out may displease the United States. JI is blamed for using Iranian money for its activities as it has closer links with the Iranian theocratic regime.

In fact Gulbudin Hikmetyar, the Hizbe Islami chief who had been traditionally close to the JI, was also rumored to had found refuge on a number of occasions in the 1990s and even after the United States unleashed the global war against terrorism in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.

In his latest post-Ramadhan messages to Muslims ahead of Eid-ul-Fitr, Hikmetyar, for instance, advised Pakistani and Iranian governments in particular not to befriend the United States at the cost of the Afghan nation.³² "Do not endanger your interests by continuing to support the war in Afghanistan", Hikmetyar exhorted the two governments.

Often, during my visits to Afghanistan in the early 1990s and early 2000, Hizbe Islami fighters would often speak of their contacts and adventures in Bosnia Herzegovina, Chechnya, and in Kashmir in particular. They used to talk particularly of al Al-Zawahiri because the original Muslim Brotherhood ideology binds the non-Arab followers with the Egyptian doctor.

JI's Kashmir Connection:

The Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu & Kashmir (JIJK) was established as an independent organization in 1952, although from the late 1930s a growing number of Kashmiri Muslims had come under the influence of its founder,

Maulana Maududi, principally through his powerful writings. The JJK presented itself as an organization committed to establishing an Islamic state in Kashmir based on the Islamic law, the Shari'at, but using democratic means of peaceful persuasion for attaining its goals."³³

However, in the late 80s JJK initiated its armed struggle against the Indian authority. In 1989, it instructed its members in the assembly to resign and join the struggle.

The JJK leaders including Sayyed Ali Gilani, its chief ideologue, allege that infidel forces like Israel, the western world and India are all united to dominate the Muslim world by hatching conspiracies and using force against them.

"Gillani argues that nationalism is a 'poisonous philosophy' which the 'enemies of Islam', foremost among whom are 'various western philosophers', who have deliberately sought to infect Muslims with rationalism so as to divide and weaken them so that they can be kept under their control. He opines that the Muslim worldwide Ummah is one, monolithic ideological community, cemented together on the basis of 'common belief (aqida) and faith (iman), which sees no differences of color, race, language, caste, tribe or family." He asserts that 'whenever Muslims have ignored the principles of Islam that see no boundaries of region they have lost their power and have become like any other community'. 'Territorial nationalism', he writes, "has proved to be the bane of the Muslims, for it has divided them into different states and, thereby, has deflected them from the task of 'changing the conditions of the entire human race."³⁴

Besides Jamaat-e-Islami-affiliated outfits in the Indian Kashmir, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehreekul Mujahideen and Harkatul Mujahideen also operate in tandem with one another and this also underscores the transnational character of the Islamist reformists who consider use of force for their objectives as a legitimate tool.

While the pan-Islamist philosophy works as the common denominator for the Al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami, the former

provides little space for women as such. The latter two are more accommodating vis-à-vis females, and in fact even support them into representative roles. The Jamaat, for instance, allows its female members to contest elections in Pakistan and also nominate them to special seats in the parliament. The MB does the same in Egypt and Jordan, and provides considerable space for women's education and their participation in politics.

3.2(b). Tablighi Jamaat:

Tablighi Jamaate is the most influential religious organization in Pakistan; it runs centers at district level where each Thursday night, their members and new-comers gather for Islamic teachings. They also arrange special congregations from time to time to attract the masses from various parts of the country.

It originated in northern India in the 1920s. At that point, even though its rhetoric focused wholly on Muslim failure and the need to draw nominal Muslims to fidelity, it was in fact one of many Muslim movements stimulated to action by aggressive Hindu attempts to "reconvert" what were seen as nominal Muslims to Hinduism. The movement took on new energy after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, most importantly in Mewat, the location of the movement's origins, where Hindus had engaged in ruthless "ethnic cleansing."³⁵

Since 1960, Tablighi Jamaat began a worldwide program, sending its small groups to every nook and corner of Pakistan, soon transcending the borders and reaching out to local and immigrant populations in the Americas, Europe and Africa.

TJ holds annual international three-day congregations in Raiwind, near Lahore in Pakistan and Tungi, Bangladesh where almost two million Muslims from across the world usually attend the gatherings. It is the second largest gathering of Muslims after the annual Hajj (Pilgrimage) at Mecca.

A scion of several generations of Ulema associated with Deoband, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944) is taken to be the founder of Tablighi Jamaat

(Sikand 2002). His idea was not to move into new arenas that were emerging for the Ulema, like politics, but to intensify the original Deobandi program of inner-looking grass roots reform of individual lives as a solution to the same problem of defending and spreading Islam.

TJ has no formal bureaucratic structure and is a highly decentralized voluntary movement with no official name. It is led by a non-charismatic leadership and is in principle averse to personality cults. The name Tablighi Jamaat has been publicly adopted but not officially used. It has no offices and no archives and there are no close-door meetings.³⁶

The participants go out on small group tours (almost 10-15 persons with a head known as Amir) to urge nominal Muslims to return to Islamic teachings, and invite non-Muslims into the fold of Islam. At the conclusion of a tour, participants should report back, orally or in writing, their experiences to the mosque-based group (local, regional, or national) from which they set out.

The Jamaat enjoys substantial popularity and wields considerable influence in a cross section of the Pakistani society. In Pakistan, it has impressed people from all walks of life including religious scholars, soldiers, rulers, politicians, scientists, businessmen, sportsmen, showbiz people, singers, doctors, engineers, students and from many other important professions.

One can gauge the TJ's pull from the fact that, although a moderate and liberal Muslim, yet Farooq Leghari, a former president of Pakistan, attended the Tablighi Jamaat's annual congregation in the mid 1990s while he still held the office. Another extreme example was Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed (R), a former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who after forced retirement in October 1999 joined the Tablighi Jamaat, and spends weeks every year in promoting the Jamaat cause.

A number of national cricketers including former captain Inzamam-ul-Haq, Mushtaq Ahmed, and Yousuf Yohanna also are currently active members of the Jamaat; Yohanna, in fact converted from Christianity to Islam because of the Tableeghi Jamaat and now uses Muhammad Yousuf as his full Muslim name.

Popular pop singers Junaid Jamshed, Ali Haider and Najam Sheeraz offer another few extreme examples of how the Jamaat can influence individuals usual considered irreligious; at the height of their singing careers, the three prolific artists fell under the influence of the Tablighi Jamaat and now, besides pursuing either recitation of religious songs and hymns or other business such as branded men's wear in the case of Jamshed, they preach Islam. Jamshed also conducts TV programs from the Tablighi perspective.

Despite its pacifist stance, TJ has appeared on the fringes of numerous terrorism investigations. It gained much public and media attention, particularly in the UK when it announced plans for construction of Europe's largest mosque. With its international headquarters in Nizamuddin, Delhi, TJ has several national headquarters to coordinate its activities in over 80 countries and has a significant presence in North America, Europe, Africa and Central Asia. Britain has remained a major focus of the movement."

"TJ has been facing a lot of criticism by other Deobandi factions of Islam, especially those in the business of Jihad; their contention is that this non-resistant and consistently expanding humanitarian outfit should also gear up for Jihad, one of the compulsory tenets of Islam. The party elders generally avoid responding to criticism from outside though they are forthcoming to questions within the party."³⁷

Secular forces in Pakistan criticize TJ for its radical outlook and teachings. They allege that TJ is providing fertile ground to militancy in Pakistan and elsewhere. The famous book '*Fazail-i-Amaal*' written by a Tablighi scholar, Maulana Zekaria, is filled with the stories of Jihad, its importance and eternal rewards for Jihad. However TJ has sustained its non-political and non-violent stance.

Critics, On the other hand, argue that politics is not merely about the state and the ballot box. There is, in addition, the direction that the Tablighi Jama'at has more recently assumed in Pakistan. Gaborieau points out that both in Pakistan and Bangladesh the Tablighi Jamaat has an interface with the political establishment. He argues that the dividing line is not between political and apolitical Islamic movements but between two ways of conceiving politics. While the Islamists work through the nation state, there

are other groups who think beyond borders 'putting politics most often in parentheses they first build individuals and institutions, which over time may exert a more lasting political influence'.³⁸

The TJ has no visible sources of financing. It solely depends on charities and donations by members or otherwise. Donors are strictly prohibited from displaying their financial support. According to a Tablighi worker, showing off your financial support in God's way may corrupt your purpose and thus you lose the essence of Islamic practice.³⁹

Part of the western media term TJ as having a great potential for Jihad. They point to the voices from within which, after more than 80 years of this quiet revolution, now tend to envision a more active role for the Jamaat to purge the world of what they perceive as "infidelity and injustices" and thus pave way for a Sharia-based society.

That is why critics meanwhile brand the Tablighi Jamaat as the biggest group of apologists for the radical Wahabi/Salafi Islamists. Their preaching may primarily revolve around an emphasis on practicing Islam, yet their messaging is largely loaded with the anti-western, self-pitying rhetoric so typical to Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, both of whom believe that the entire world is conspiring against the Muslims, and thus declare jihad as the ultimate answer to these conspiracies.

In fact, the Tablighi Jamaat offers a safe refuge to all shades of militancy as well; during a visit to Pakistan's wild and embattled South Waziristan region, for example, the Pakistani security forces found a diary, probably a visitor's notebook, in the compound of a seminary that militants had been using for political brain-washing of activists from all over Pakistan. Written in Urdu, Pakistan's national language, the diary contained comments and memoirs of many militants who had transited through this camp. At least a dozen notes related to the writer's visit to Raiwind, the TJ's Pakistan headquarter on the outskirts of Lahore, the country's second largest city. Almost all spoke of a great "spiritual sojourn and great emotional experience" at Raiwind, which clearly suggested that Muslims across the board hold the place in great reverence, and it thus also becomes an almost unassailable hide-out if somebody wanted to escape law or interrogation for some time. Here, the

zealots sink themselves in meditation for weeks, disconnecting themselves from the outside world, an experience they believe elevates them much closer to God. And this form of meditation also provides a shelter to fugitives from law and to those who are averse to the socio-political system and conditions in Pakistan.

3.2(c). Dawat-e-Islami:

Dawat-e-Islami is another strand of the Tablighi (preaching) thought, founded in 1984 by Maulana Ilyas Qadri, a Bareilvi Sunni scholar. The DI was apparently intended for diluting the growing influence of Tablighi Jamaat (Deobandi), most importantly in the Punjab province.

Dawat-e-Islami also routinely sends out its delegations on preaching missions but it lacks the global appeal of the Tablighi Jamaat. It is mainly restricted to Pakistan's central Punjab and southern Sindh province. The importance given to Maulana Ilyas Qadri's book '*Faizan-e-Sunnat*' in Dawat-e-Islami is the same as that given to Maulana Zakaria's book '*Fazail-i-Amaal*' in the Tablighi Jamaat".⁴⁰

Though Del's sphere of influence is limited, yet its message is global in nature. Del collects its funds from the local businessmen, traders, landlords etc; however it gets substantial financial support from the Bareilvi diasporas in USA, UK and other parts of Europe and Middle East as well.

3.2(d). Jamaatud Dawa (Lashkar-e-Taiba):

Jamaatud Dawa represents the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought, drawing ideological, political and financial support from Saudi Arabian sources. Ahl-e-Hadith followers practically don't believe in any Fiqh, and that is the only thing that distinguishes them from the Deobandis." Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought is affiliated to Salafi Islam, known for its fierce opposition to Sufism and to the established schools of Islamic jurisprudence, insisting that Muslims must go back to the original sources of inspiration - the Qur'an and the Hadith - the sayings and reports of the acts of the Prophet Muhammad. The broad thrust of their beliefs remains the same among the majority of Arabs in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Qatar, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and

Kuwait. They share the same philosophy, for instance of jihad, and that is why they all praise Osama bin Laden and his led Al-Qaeda.⁴¹

Markaz Da'awat-ul Irshad ('The Center for Preaching and Guidance'), which has its social and doctrinal roots in Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought, was set up at Muridke near Lahore in 1986 by two Pakistani university professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, and, took the jihadi scene by storm particularly in the 1990s, with its vicious militant campaign in the Indian-controlled Kashmir. The Markaz Da'awat-ul Irshad complex, where the JuD is headquartered, is spread over several blocs, meant for religious education. The JuD also runs several hundred schools in the Punjab and some parts of the southern Sindh province.

Following the government ban on six militant organizations in January 2002, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Markaz Da'awat-ul Irshad renamed itself to Jamaatud Dawa, with the main players remaining the same. That is why Jamaatud Dawa and LeT are considered as two sides of the same coin.

The organization's headquarters in Muridke, a small town at some 30 km distance from Lahore, is a sprawling complex spread over 160 acres with a residential colony, two model schools -- one each for girls and boys and a university Al-Dawat-al-Irshad. The students attending the university also learn horse-riding. Hundreds of them pass out every year, and hundreds more are swelling their ranks, essentially those driven by the LeT's ideology of leaving and living for God."

Jamaatud Dawa also radiates a global message that synchs in with the stated mission objectives of Al-Qaeda.

Eyesore for Outsiders:

Particularly since the late 1990s, JuD (formerly Lashkr-e-Taiba) has been a major irritant in India's relations with Pakistan. The former dubs the Wahabi outfit as "Pakistan army's first line of defense," which it says has carried out terrorist attacks not only in Kashmir but also elsewhere in India. As far back as 1998 the LeT had launched and eventually executed the concept of Fidayeen Attacks (commando raids on specified targets with the objective of

killing and get killed). Several such strikes including one on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, and the almost simultaneous multiple bloody acts of violence in Mumbai on November 26th, 2008, bore the hallmarks of such Fidayeen attacks.

In fact, the November 26, 2009, strikes, including those on the Taj and Oberoi Trident hotels in Mumbai—eleven in all—once again shook the entire region. The three-day carnage was the work of several attackers who had traveled from the port city of Karachi in Pakistan. These acts of terror provided Indian officials and the media with another opportunity to point a finger at the ISI. The electronic media in India whipped up a frenzy that aroused fears of yet another war between the two now nuclear-armed nations.

On December 10, 2008 India formally requested the United Nations Security Council to designate JuD as a terrorist organization. On December 11, 2008 the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on JuD, declaring it a global terrorist group. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the chief of JuD declared that his group would challenge the sanctions imposed on it in all forums. Pakistan's government also banned the JuD on the same day and issued an order to seal the JuD in all four provinces, as well as Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The United States also designated JuD as a foreign terrorist group posing threat to its security.

In January 2009 the JuD spokesperson, Abdullah Muntazir, stressed that the group did not have global jihadist aspirations and would welcome a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. He also publicly disowned LeT commanders Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Zarrar Shah, who have both been accused of being the masterminds behind the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The JuD and affiliated organization remain one of the primary concerns for India and its operations in Pakistan under various names continue to dog the Pakistan-India relations. Their bilateral dialogue has also practically remained stalled over Pakistan's alleged insufficient action against JuD's "India-specific terrorist network inside Pakistan." The latter says it has done what was needed to curb terrorism emanating from the JuD/LeT ranks, yet outsiders remain skeptical of the claims and believe the JuD/LeT - ISI nexus remains intact.

In view of the history of its strained relations with India, Pakistan is hedging its bets, so runs the argument by the detractors.

The JuD, through various local organizations in Europe and Americas, is also well-networked, and uses its jihadist appeal as well as reverence for the cause of Al-Qaeda to mobilize funds. Its cooperation with different jihadi networks in Pakistan, Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir also lends it a transnational character. Although based in central Pakistan, the JuD is very well-connected with Afghan militants outfits such as the Haqqani network, that operates in areas between Pakistani Waziristan and Eastern Afghanistan.

Pakistani security officials view this nexus with ever increasing concern. While they may listen to us and refrain from violence in Kashmir, their growing relationship with Arab, Afghan and other groups have become a formidable challenge, a senior ISI official told CRSS.⁴²

This also amounted to an expression of helplessness vis-a-vis an organization that had been considered a handy pawn in Pakistan's Kashmir policy but now, because of its contacts with transnational groups, seems to have grown out of control.

3.2(e). Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP):

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistan Taliban Movement, emerged as a powerful new entity in 2007 in the context of a series of military operations—U.S. led missile strikes on the one hand and an incursion by the Pakistan army into the Mehsud area of South Waziristan on the other. Until then, most of its component groups were loosely organized, with ties to the Afghan Taliban.

Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US drone strike on August 5, 2009, and Hakimullah Mehsud became his successor later that month. Initially, a forty-member central shura (assembly), comprising representatives from all seven FATA agencies guided the organization. Its leaders met regularly until the death of Baitullah Mehsud but a spike in US drone attacks as well as the Pakistani military operation in South Waziristan disrupted the organizational command structure, forcing them to disperse in various directions for shelter.

The TTP employs modern, more lethal techniques, operates in most of Pakistan's lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan with the help of a number of Taliban groups, most of them wedded to anti-Americanism and determined to enforce the Sharia. Its creation marked a new and more threatening development, arising out of a realization among most local and foreign militants that they needed a central command figure who could transcend tribal differences. In Baitullah Mehsud, followed by Hakimullah Mehsud they found a unifying force. Inspired by Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, most militant groups in the tribal regions – also called Federally Administered Tribal Areas – share a common ideology and are opposed to the international coalition against terrorism. Driving foreign forces out of Afghanistan and enforcing the Sharia wherever possible is their shared goal. They also want Pakistan to end its cooperation with the U.S. and NATO forces based in Afghanistan, and demand sharia must replace the existing legal system, which these militants condemn as “corrupt and repressive.”

Proof of the TTP's involvement in Afghanistan—and of the close association between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP—came in early June 2008, when about eighteen militants belonging to the TTP fell to air strikes by coalition forces on militant positions in Afghanistan's Helmand province. All eighteen were from Makeen village in the Waziristan agency.

Ruthless attacks on Pakistani military and government targets offer ample evidence that while publicly the TTP wants to counter U.S. hegemony; it also wants to keep Pakistani forces on tenterhooks. It also has joined hands with Al-Qaeda to stage devastating suicide bombings since mid 2007 – killing government officials, military and intelligence officials, women and children across the board – which has turned TTP as a major source of instability – beside the anti-Shia radical Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Pakistan's security establishment treats the TTP as its public enemy number one for its string of vicious attacks all over Pakistan. But on September 1, the United States also formally designated the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan as a foreign terrorist. Daniel Benjamin, the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism formally announced it at a press briefing, thereby making the TTP the latest addition a list of 47 such organization banned under the Executive Order 13224.⁴³

"The TTP and Al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship. TTP draws ideological guidance from Al-Qaeda while Al-Qaeda relies on the TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border." And U.S. Ambassador-at-large for Counter-terrorism Daniel Benjamin explained, "This mutual cooperation [between the groups] gives TTP access to both Al-Qaeda's global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP is a force multiplier for Al-Qaeda."

Benjamin also described the duo of Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur-Rehman – the TTP top two leaders - as "dedicated terrorists who are attempting to extend their bloody reach into the American homeland."

The TTP caught the U.S. lawmakers' attention after failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad pleaded guilty in June of contacts with the TTP. Shahzad warned of "more strikes on the United States until it leaves Muslim lands." He told the judge he had undergone five days of bomb-making training during a 40-day stay with the Taliban in Pakistan, between December 9 and January 25.

Earlier in January, about a week after the deadly December 30 suicide attack on CIA's Forward Operating Base Chapman in eastern Afghanistan, a video showed Hakimullah Mehsud sitting to the left of Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the Jordanian doctor who ended up killing seven CIA officials including the base chief, a mother of three young children, five men, and another young woman. The emergence of the video instantly turned Hakimullah Mehsud into CIA's prime target -- if he was not already -- because his group had apparently first hosted al-Balawi and then facilitated his onward journey into Afghanistan to hook up with the CIA.

This incident, followed by the Shehzad confessions in New York several months later, also betrayed TTP's transnational character. It simply reinforced earlier analysis that the TTP had become part of a network that transcends Waziristan and Afghanistan, and had begun colluding with Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Haqqani Network (Waziristan and eastern Afghanistan), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as well as Pakistani auxiliaries of Al-Qaeda i.e. Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

3.2(f). The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Factor:

This dissident Islamist group from the central Asian republic of Uzbekistan also qualifies as a small transnational entity with fierce allegiance to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri in particular. It had enjoyed the Taliban hospitality until the fall of the Islamist militia in December 2001. Regardless of their exact numbers, which vary between 500 -1,000, most of the ferocious Uzbek militants had moved into the Waziristan region led by Tahir Yuldashev. These IMU militants faced little problem in finding support and shelter amongst the Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen in and around Wana. Yaldashev soon became a star-speaker at mosques in the Wana region; the administrative headquarter of southern Waziristan.

Once well-entrenched, Yuldashev founded an organization Mohajireen-o-Ansar, to pursue his agenda, which essentially converged with that of Al-Qaeda's.

Yuldashev's revered status took a hit when his vigilantes began targeting Pakistan army and government officials since late 2006. These anti-Army strikes turned the Uzbeks from revered heroes to villains. The pro-government Ahmedzai Wazir Taliban commander Mullah Nazir disapproved of targeting the Pakistani army and civilians.

This led to bloody fights between Mulla Nazir's men and the Uzbeks in March 2007, and eventually forced the IMU zealots to take refuge in the Baitullah Mehsud dominated area Meshud as well as North Waziristan, where Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the Haqqani Network provided shelter to the Uzbek radicals.

Most intelligence and local sources agree that this organization has indeed morphed into a lethal non-Arab Al-Qaeda entity; from the late 1990s, when they opened their first training camp near Mazare Sharif in northern Afghanistan, to their escape to South Waziristan from the US-led Operation Anaconda, most of the Uzbeks from the former Soviet Central Asian republics are probably now making their last stand in a region that is under sharp CIA focus because of the presence of all the Al-Qaeda driven militant outfits there. Yuldashev reportedly fell to an American drone attack late last year, but there has been no independent confirmation of his death yet.

3.2(g). Hizbul Tahrir (Party of Liberation):

Hizbul Tahrir emerged from the western cosmopolitan London and later descended into the Pak-Afghan region. Its origin can be traced back to Palestine Islamic movement in 1953. Founded by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar and appeals court judge from Palestine, the organization reportedly operates in about 40 countries from Africa to Asia to Europe to Russia. Although officially non-violent, its ideas are very radical, especially since it advocated the immediate re-establishment of the Caliphate."⁴⁴

Hizbul Tahrir is active today in Western Europe and the United States, but it is banned in most of the Muslim countries.

Hizbul Tahrir has a unique and different set of ideology with its global objectives. It believes that the Islamic Umma is a single unit of its operations. It strongly rejects nationalism and its members are supposed to fight for Umma, essentially not for the state, they belong to. So far the organization has avoided using militant or Jehadi terminologies and has restraints on launching any sort of armed struggle in the oppressed Muslim nations.

More specifically, Hizbul Tahrir envisages a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced en route to establishment of the first Islamic state, i.e. Cultivation of individuals, Interaction with the Umma (2nd stage), and establishment of an Islamic state and implementation of Islamic laws generally (3rd stage).

Within the broader context of transnational Islamic mobilization, Hizbul Tahrir falls, rather ambiguously, under the category of the neo-fundamentalist camp as opposed to the Islamist camp. Hizbul Tahrir does not favor the idea of seizing the state and then forcing society to accept Islam; rather it prefers to persuade society to accept its ideas, which it is assumed, would then lead inevitably to a change in regime.⁴⁵

In the context of the questionable war on terror since October 2001, the Hizb acted quickly to launch its operations within Pakistan through a very aggressive anti-US campaign that also targeted former president Pervez Musharraf and his successor Asif Ali Zardari. Almost daily, the Hizb sends out

SMS messages as well as emails and fax-statements to newspapers, columnists, writers and TV journalists and urges them to "correct their path, shun the US friendship and follow the Quran." It uses occasions such as Muslim traditions of Ramadhan, Eidul Fitr or 9/11 anniversaries to spread a narrative that is identical to other Islamist networks such as Al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood.

Its sub-offices in different countries are also using the web for information and its media offensive.

In countries where the party is outlawed, Hizbul Tahrir's organization is said to be strongly centralized, with its central leadership based in Palestine. Underneath its center are "national organizations or wilayas, usually headed by a group of 12, control networks of local committees and cells." The basic unit of the party is a cell of five members, the leader of which is called a mushrif. Only the mushrif knows the names of members of other cells.⁴⁶

But it continues to operate in the UK, albeit with a heated ongoing debate as to why it be banned for its radical views; following the July 7, 2005 London bombings, for instance, the British government announced its intention to ban the organization but abandoned the ban. According to *The Independent* Blair "shelved the ban after warnings from police, intelligence chiefs, and civil liberties groups that it is a non-violent group, and driving it underground could backfire, and according to the *Observer* because the Home Office believed a legal ban would not stick. (Sources: the London High Court ruling which said distribution of pamphlets carrying criticism of the government does not entail terrorism.⁴⁷

Pakistani authorities face similar dilemma when dealing with the messaging of the Hizb. But because of questionable enforcement of fundamental rights to speech and political action, they find it relatively easier to block Hizb activities such as press conferences or ban their rallies – as and when necessary.

There is hardly any no obvious office of Hizbul Tahrir in Pakistan and Afghanistan because the US designated it also as foreign terrorist organization. Nevertheless, through its electronic messaging it seems

omnipresent in Pakistan. Its zealot members are mostly those from Pak-Afghan diasporas in the Europe particularly the United Kingdom. Dr Abdul Qayyum reportedly has been the head of Hizbul Tahrir in Pakistan. In the late 90's Hizbul Tahrir was more visible organization in the major cities of Pakistan. Its members under Dr. Abdul Qayyum used to arrange open gatherings and meetings with an over propaganda campaign, yet after designation as a terrorist outfit, it relies more on SMS and emails or telecommunication from numbers which are usually one-way i.e. you cannot dial in, or get a "your desired number is currently switched off" when you dial in.

What, however, makes the Hizb a very formidable challenge is its radical outlook and the narrative that it shares with trans-national organization. It may be non-violent yet its statements easily feed into frustrations of common and ignorant Pakistanis; frustrated with the current political system, these Pakistanis often tend to sympathize, if not express support, with Hizb or similar organization for their "valiant position vis-à-vis the United States and other aggressors."

In Afghanistan, the organization remained at low profile, mainly because the Taliban government was not too much impressed by them, nor do they allow them to openly demonstrate as Taliban strongly believed in Jihad against the Northern Alliance while Tahrir was opposed to it.⁴⁸

Although limited in its impact in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Hizbul Tahrir indulged in Central Asia as well. It became active in Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s. It is believed that the Jordanian missionaries who came to preach Islam in Central Asia established the first cells of Hizbul Tahrir in Uzbekistan." By the late 1990s, Uzbekistan had become the hub of Hizbul Tahrir's activities in Central Asia and Islam has deeper roots there than, for example, in neighboring Kazakhstan."⁴⁹

4: Role of Charities / Auxiliary Transnational Networks:

The anti-Soviet Union jihad not only introduced militant Islam to south and south West Asia but also heralded a new era in the region. Scores of non-governmental organization began pouring in with the stated objective of

helping Afghan refugees and treating wounded mujahideen. Arab Islamist networks also encouraged and or supported local supporters and sympathizers into setting up their own charities which went on to serve as financial conduits first for Muslim Brotherhood and then Al-Qaeda.

The way these organizations came into being and became crucial facilitators for Al-Qaeda leaves little doubt that without them, Osama bin Laden and his group would not have been able to proliferate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

By implication they can also be called as auxiliary transnational networks, including similar Pakistani charity organization with close links to Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

The roots of the contemporary radicalization and support to terrorism can be traced back two decades to the organizational lessons of the Soviet-Afghan war. The time a number of sympathetic NGOs provided various kind of assistance which proved to be invaluable in the long-term struggle. By clothing their militant activity with charitable ideals, radical militants discovered that they were able to maintain their level of efficiency while working with very few restrictions on an international level.⁵⁰

The Danish paper provides an excellent view of how charities grew in the shadow of the Afghan jihad and became critical links for funneling funds to jihadist networks in the region. "As the 1980s drew to a close, thousands of idealistic Islamic fundamentalist volunteers arrived in Pakistan, often with no local guide or requisite accommodations. At the time, several wealthy Arabian Gulf charitable organizations, under the guise of aiding Afghan and Pakistani refugees, stepped forward to help channel the jihadi recruits where they were most needed. These wealthy NGOs – sponsored by a number of prominent Gulf businessmen – provided weapons, guesthouses, and travel papers to needy members of the quickly-coalescing Al-Qaeda movement. Medical ambulances belonging to the Saudi Red Crescent and other fundamentalist-run relief groups were even diverted to bring Arab mujahideen ("holy warriors") back and forth from combat operations. By clothing their militant activity with charitable ideals, Arab-Afghan leaders including Osama Bin Laden discovered that they were able to slip below the radar of many global intelligence agencies."⁵¹

Signboards of these organizations were visible all around in Peshawar, which most of these charities used as a regional hub. It was hard to miss them whenever we traveled to the Pak-Afghan border town of Torkham. Arab and Arab-European charities were mostly settled in residential areas such as would pass by settlements such as Tehkal Bala, University Town or Hayatabad – all of them located along the Peshawar-Torkham road.

Back in 1996 the Wall Street Journal quoted a declassified US government report which alleged that “approximately one third of ... Islamic NGOs support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections.” The US Congressional 9/11 Commission report also concluded that “entire charities” under the control of “Al-Qaeda operatives... may have wittingly participated in funneling money to Al-Qaeda.”⁵²

These organizations played a critical role in the Arab-Afghan terrorist infrastructure by laundering money originating from bank accounts belonging to Bin Laden and his sympathetic patrons in the Arabian Gulf, providing employment and travel documents to Al-Qaeda per-sonnel worldwide, and helping “to move funds to areas where Al-Qaeda was carrying out operations.”⁵³

According to a U.S. Justice Department brief on the subject:

[Al-Fadl] understood from conversations with Bin Laden and others in Al-Qaeda that the charities would receive funds that could be withdrawn in cash and a portion of the money used for legitimate relief purposes and another portion diverted for Al-Qaeda operations. The money for Al-Qaeda operations would nevertheless be listed in the charities' books as expenses for building mosques or schools or feeding the poor or the needy.⁵⁴

Standing orders were left by Bin Laden to keep all transactions involving the charitable groups in cash only; by this method, these NGOs were manipulated as a secret laundry to make Al-Qaeda's financial network virtually invisible. The charities would then create false documentation for the benefit of unwary donors, purportedly showing that the money had actually been spent on orphans or starving refugees. According to some former employees of these organizations, upwards of 50% of their total funding was secretly diverted directly to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.⁵⁵

In Europe and North America, Muslim NGOs would come to serve an additional role in indoctrinating new generations of international jihadists. According to a 1996 French intelligence memorandum, "these charities – screens for Islamic groups like...the Egyptian. Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya permitted a very large recruitment among young volunteers; under the notion of jihad, they provided 'humanitarian' support for the indoctrination of the youth [and it worked] so well that numerous French converts to Islam joined the ranks of Islamic extremists."⁵⁶

The first known Arab-Afghan jihad cell on US soil led by American-born operatives was partly financed by the Sudanese charity Third World Relief Agency.⁵⁷

Much of the funding responsible for underwriting international Muslim charities has originated from the Arabian Peninsula – and in particular, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A well informed Saudi figure boasted to the Washington Post, "No one can control the flow of money from Saudi Arabia... It is not one person – it is a thousand. We are here. Money comes to us from inside Saudi Arabia. We have private talks with businessmen. Sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, but it comes."⁵⁸

A January 23, 2002 staff report in the Los Angeles Times also provided good insight into how Al-Qaeda used different channels for its financial transactions to Afghanistan and elsewhere for its activities of advocacy, training and execution of threats against U.S and western interests.

"Until Sept. 11 Osama bin Laden's terrorists in Afghanistan used the Persian Gulf crossroads of the United Arab Emirates as their lifeline to the outside world. Poor oversight in the loose federation of seven tiny sheikdoms allowed Bin Laden's Al- Qaeda network and Taliban agents to set up clandestine arms-trading and money-laundering operations, according to accounts from American, United Nations, Afghan and U.A.E. sources," the paper said in its investigative report. Largely based on the findings of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it spoke even of a nexus between Russian, African and Afghan businessmen, financiers and philanthropists for the financial transactions to Afghanistan."

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spoke even of a nexus between Russian, African and Afghan businessmen, financiers and philanthropists for the financial transactions to Afghanistan.

“In the emirate of Sharjah, the paper said, Afghanistan-based militants linked up with Victor Bout, a Russian arms dealer accused of repeatedly violating United Nations weapon sanctions. And millions in Al-Qaeda funds cascaded through the freewheeling financial institutions of the neighboring emirate of Dubai.”

Terrorists used a Somali warlord's money exchange, an Islamic bank once headed by the emirates' finance minister and currency houses that touted their ability to wire \$1 million abroad overnight. The U.S. investigation into the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon already has exposed trails leading back to the U.A.E.

More than \$120,000 was channeled through emirate bank accounts to suicide pilot Mohamed Atta and other suspected hijackers. The suicide attacks finally prompted U.A.E. officials to crack down on Al-Qaeda and its front ventures. But the sudden burst of urgency followed years of passivity. The U.A.E. was one of only three countries that maintained diplomatic relations with the now-toppled Taliban regime.

Despite quiet but persistent prodding by U.S. and other Western diplomats, the Emirates' ruling elite was hesitant to reckon with the growing terrorist presence, nor did western governments realize the gravity of the situation.

From late 1996 on, Afghan and Emirates sources said, the volume of Arianna and charter flights from Sharjah to Kandahar increased to as many as three to four flights a day.

But whether these flights carried arms, ammunition and chemicals was a subject of speculation as most of the information on the nature of consignments by the Los Angeles Times came from officials of the interim government, and Northern Alliance sources.

Yet, there was no doubt that the Taliban – hosts of Al-Qaeda – used Pakistani channels, like the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Afghan embassy in

Islamabad, to acquire urgently needed spares for the fleet of Arianna Airlines – the three Boeings and the five AN-24s they had purchased in the Gulf in 1998. Some of the documents had originally been addressed to the CAA and a couple of private firms in Karachi.

The UN sanctions barred Arianna from international flights and had also frozen more than \$200 million worth of funds of the Afghan Aviation Ministry in a Geneva bank account. The funds were used occasionally by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for necessary maintenance work and the installation of a new Air Traffic Control system in Kabul in January 2001.

During this time, the Arianna was kept operational with the help of spare parts whose financing was routed and managed via Pakistan.

The Afghan Arianna and Air Cess had faced no pressure to curtail their operations until 1999, when the United States and United Nations began imposing sanctions on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The emirates complied with the sanction on Arianna in 2000, but the Taliban's business contacts in Sharjah found ways to keep flying, the LAT reporters say.

Some of the NGOs suspected of having served as conduits for the Arab money meant for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were:⁵⁹

1. Islamic Coordination Council (ICC). Based in Peshawar, the ICC was headed by Dr. Ahmad Elyasonosi. Dr. Ahmad, who had been living in the town with his family for several years, was also the head of the alliance of all Arab NGOs in Pakistan.
2. Islamic Relief Agency headed by Jaffar Abdullah Makki.
3. Saudi Red Crescent Society, Peshawar. Sheikh Saleh Mohammed was the director of the society.
4. Islamic International Relief Organization based in Peshawar and headed by Moad Al-Batahiri.
5. Qatar Charity Society. Headed by Sulaiman Al-Hawamida, who lived in Islamabad but had his office in Peshawar.
6. World Assembly of Muslim Youth. It was headed by Mohammed Mustafa.

7. Al-Jannat Dawa Islami, Peshawar.
8. Kuwait Joint Committee, Peshawar.
9. Afghan Support Committee, Peshawar.
10. Al-Wafa, run by a Palestinian national Sheikh Abdul Aziz.
11. Al-Rasheed Trust (ART), Karachi.
12. Umma Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), Islamabad.
13. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), Muridke, Lahore.

Most of these NGOs were run by Kuwaiti, Saudi and Jordanian nationals, many of them settled in Peshawar. Among them was a former Osama bin Laden associate, Abdullah Ezam, a Jordanian who was killed in a bomb blast in Nov. 1989.

When the coalition began bombing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in October, 2001, Pakistani religious-political organization took to the streets to express solidarity with their friends in Afghanistan, almost all Arab NGO workers were asked to move to Islamabad for security reasons. Many were even asked by the authorities to leave the country.

By January 2002, however, the majority of these people had returned to their bases in Peshawar and resumed their activities, keeping a low profile. Interestingly, the Pakistani and American authorities had until then failed to establish any linkage between these organizations and the Al-Qaeda network.

Moneychangers in Peshawar's bustling Qissa Khani bazaar also played an important role in the financial transactions from Pakistan and the Middle East to Afghanistan.

According to one trader in Peshawar, these NGOs and religious outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen used the Hundi system – a system in which verbal instructions and mutual trust are the key elements to transfer the money from and to anywhere in the world. Anybody wanting to send money to another destination gets in touch with private money traders who then ask their trading partners at the other end to issue the required funds to the intended beneficiary. Besides being efficient, the system offered better exchange rates.

As of 2010, most of these organizations had apparently vanished, and the majority of their top management either left Pakistan, or living in a very low-profile, practically in hiding with locals – either supportive or sympathetic to them.

4.1(a). Pakistan-based Charities:^{II}

After the war on terrorism began unfolding in October 2001, Al-Rasheed Trust, the Umma Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), and the Lashkar-e-Taiba became special targets, not only because of their anti-America, Anti-India and Pro-Taliban missions, but also because of their frequent contacts with the Taliban embassy in Islamabad. Mulla Abdus Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador, and his deputies courted scores of such volunteers, including those from the Islamic Relief and Dr. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood of the UTN.

In all, the U.S. government had by December 20, 2001 designated 158 individuals and organization, including those mentioned above. As far assets frozen under the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001, Francis Taylor, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Counter-terrorism told a symposium of Executives' Club, Chicago on March 14, 2002 that approximately \$ 34 million in terrorist assets had been frozen in the United States, while another \$ 70 million frozen elsewhere in the world.

4.1(b). Al-Rasheed Trust:

Al-Rasheed Trust was the first Pakistan-based non-governmental organization involved in relief work outside the country too. Though established in February 1996 by Rasheed Ahmed, the Mufti-e-Azam (Grand Mufti – a Muslim religious scholar who holds the authority to issue decrees on socio-political and economic issues concerning the Muslim society), its major intervention was seen when it started setting up bakeries in Afghanistan following the World Food Program's (WFP) decision to halt its bakeries' operation in June 2001. The UN body had been feeding a big number of destitute and widows in Kabul and other major towns."⁶⁰

WFP had taken the step in response to the Taliban regime's refusal to allow

^{II} Primary Source: Imtiaz Gul, Chapter on Financial Conduits for Al-Qaeda in *The Unholy Nexus; Pakistan-Afghan Relations under Taliban*, Vanguard, Lahore, 2002)

the hiring of female surveyors to verify who was receiving the highly subsidized bread on old ration cards. "The United Nations had tried even in July 2000 to recruit some 600 female surveyors for the purpose but the Taliban ministry for planning responded with a flat ban on employment of women by the United Nations or its affiliates. The WFP did resume its cheap-bread-bakeries' program by the end of June 2001, but the standoff with the Taliban had meanwhile given the Al-Rasheed Trust an opportunity to expand its influence across Afghanistan."⁶¹

The WFP did resume its cheap-bread-bakeries' program by the end of June 2001, but the standoff with the Taliban had meanwhile given the Al-Rasheed Trust an opportunity to expand its influence across Afghanistan.

Since 1996, the trust official said, the organization had been carrying out relief operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir (both Indian and Pakistani-held parts of the valley), Chechnya and Palestine. The humanitarian operations were conducted with individual contributions of Muslims all over the world, mostly from Arab countries.

In fact it set up a central office in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood of Kabul, where Taliban officials and religious clerics would converge to discuss strategies for food distribution and relief operations. "Central Office of the Committee of the Ulema (Scholars) of Afghanistan" in fact had become a symbol of the assistance that was flowing into a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan from Pakistan and the Middle East.

Many journalists visiting Kabul during those days would spot young Arabs and Africans popping in and out of this office, either riding bicycles, or the pick-up trucks that had become the most commonly used vehicle for combat operations since the war against Soviet-Russians began in the early 1980s.

Besides the bakeries, the trust established 15 medical clinics and dug 38 wells in Jalalabad, Kandahar and Kabul. Arshad said they had been assisting Afghans regardless of their religion or ethnic affiliation. "We have been assisting about 35,000 widows of men affiliated with the Northern Alliance. Taliban consider them their enemies but we do not," he said.

"Neither we have permanent donors nor we go for raising funds for our operations, but people come to our offices and give their contributions," said Trust's Director Operations Mohammed Arshad, while talking to *The Friday Times* in 2002. Arshad said the other source of income was books and the weekly magazine "Zarb-e-Momin" which has a circulation of more than "one hundred thousand".

This magazine had been launched a year before the establishment of the trust, followed by a daily 'Islam'. Both publications were obviously pro-Taliban, appreciative of bin Laden and his outfit, and anti-American and anti-Jews. It used to carry articles by people like Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of the now-banned Pakistan-based militant outfit Jaishe Mohammed."

In 2000, for instance, the Trust sent 750,000 dollars in cash to Chechnya alone, alleging that aid sent to Chechnya through the United Nations (described as the enemy) never reached Chechen Muslims. "Such were the conditions when we came to the aid of Chechen Muslims and delivered the desperately needed donations sent by their sympathizers, their Muslim brothers," a spokesman of the trust said. The funds were handed over to the head of an unidentified religious party of Chechnya, headed by Sheikh Omer Bin Ismail Daud and Zelim Khan Anderbayer, the former Chechen president."⁶²

Following a major ban on several militant organization and their affiliates in Pakistan in 2002, the ART activities came to a halt for a while but it resumed its work as well as publication of newspapers after a year or so under the title of Al-Ameen Trust.

5: Conclusion:

If the comprehensive 9/11 Commission Final Report and papers such as the one by Evan F. Kohlmann of the Danish Institute for International Studies, (2006), or continued activities of Islamic outfits mentioned in the preceding section – charities and auxiliary transnational networks – were any indicators, one can presume that the seeds were sowed with the US-led jihad against the Soviet Union spawned, and the war against terrorism in 2001 inspired and reinforced a global Islamist network – from Asia to Africa, Europe and Americas.

Despite the intense public focus on the role of Islamic charitable groups in financing and recruiting for terrorism following 9/11, those same organizations nonetheless clearly continue to be manipulated by Osama Bin Laden and his global extremist allies. Given the underlying complex web of financial and personal relationships, such agile front groups are notoriously difficult to clean out or shut down. It is a challenge that has largely defied past efforts aimed at addressing it, including the much-lauded “central collecting agencies” supposedly established by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors. Indeed, when the CIA outlined a number of suggested strategies in 1996 for combating the infiltration of Islamic charities, all admittedly featured inherent drawbacks. However, according to the CIA report, “when applied consistently... the most successful [tactic] in halting illegal activities within NGOs is arresting individual members for terrorism or other illegal acts.”⁶³

While this may point to successes in the war against radical religious networks disguised as Charities and welfare organization, the cases of Al-Ameen Trust (ex Al-Rasheed Trust), Al-Khidmat Foundation (Jamaate Islami's charity), the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (of Jamaatud Dawa/Lashkare Taiba) or similar charities working for Jaishe Muhammad and other religious-political or radical organization underscore that the Islamist networks continues to work. While parent organization like Al-Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood legitimize violence for political objectives, and Jamaat-e-Islami offers a combination of force plus political struggle through parliamentary representation for a Sharia-based Islamic society, free of foreign influences the broader narrative does overlap; an anti-western

ideology, rooted in the US-UK role in the Middle East, the unquestioned support for Israel (as manifested in former prime minister Tony Blair's book.⁶⁴ Blair says in the book, for instance).

Islamist networks feed off views such as those expressed by Blair, as well as off the US-led NATO policies on Iraq or Afghanistan, thereby justifying the means they apply (suicide bombings or other means of violence).

Islamist networks feed off views such as those expressed by Blair, as well as off the US-led NATO policies on Iraq or Afghanistan, thereby justifying the means they apply (suicide bombings or other means of violence). The ideology underlying their mission statement and the operations of Islamist charities – auxiliary transnational networks – are also inherently inter-twined with world view of lead transnational Islamist networks. They essentially live off one another, and, if outlawed, would always find ways to reemerge under different identities. Politically, this combination

of transnational political networks and charities has also largely upstaged traditional Islam in south Asia; while these outfits clearly represent a minority view within the Pakistani, Indian or Afghan society, they do instill fear in the hearts and minds of the majority Sunni as well as Shia populations in these countries, with the consequence that there is little open condemnation of Al-Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood or their allies – the auxiliary networks. The violence perpetrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or similar organization in the tribal and northwestern areas of Pakistan for the past few years, or militant propagation and intimidation of opponents practiced by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaishe Muhammad or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Central Pakistan, southern Punjab in particular, also underline a systematic approach of these organization to instill fear in the areas where the writ of the state is minimal and they could operate with relative freedom.

To justify their missions, these networks also exploit controversies such as the 12 caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005, or “Everybody Draw Mohammed Day” protest on the FACEBOOK Network by U.S. cartoonist Molly Norris of Seattle, Washington in support of free speech, specifically in opposition to

those who threaten violence against artists in May 2010 , or the abortive attempt by an American pastor Terry Jones in early September 2010 to publicly burn the Qur'an in Gainesville, Florida, on the ninth anniversary of the September 11 attacks.

Whereas the situation warrants comprehensive monitoring and stringent finance-tracking mechanisms to minimize, if not prevent altogether, the exploitation of non-profit NGOs by radical Islamist and terrorist groups, bureaucratic oversight of religious networks disguised as NGOs must also accompany these mechanisms. If one were to learn from the consequences of the US overkill (extremely strict and almost provocative Homeland Security measures, for instance), and knee-jerk reaction to everything that sounded Arabic or Muslim immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the oversight must be thoughtful, non-provocative and as non-intrusive as possible to avoid resentment among the community the target NGO is associated with.

This alone, however, probably will not be enough to deal with the ability of the transnational networks to influence societies and prey on them with their ideology, or resurrect their auxiliaries under new identities one way or the other. A major counter-measure must revolve around creating and promoting understanding of the dominant majority of Muslims, who are by and large non-violent and firm believers in Islam's fundamental messages of peaceful coexistence. Need for engaging the Muslims and thus preventing from falling victim to the narrative of Al-Qaeda and its auxiliaries, therefore, requires a concerted and collective effort by lead nations. Only engagement and a dispassionate discourse on sensitive issues that relate to, and affect, the lives of the large majority of Muslims can help in countering the religiously-wrapped political appeal of transnational networks.

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If the United States and other NATO countries, particularly in Central Europe kept pressing on enforcement through ever-stringent administrative

measures, they will continue to lag behind in the struggle to shut down these potentially lucrative avenues of international terrorist recruitment and financing. Not only this, and this is a much graver challenge facing us all, western countries will find it increasingly difficult to stop, or even contain, disgruntled Muslims, second and third generation youth in particular, from walking into the trap the transnational Islamist networks have laid out in these countries, exploiting the extremely emotional issue of Palestine as well as internal socio-economic imbalances facing the Muslim community. In this regard, the British Government's initiative IMIB i.e. I am Muslim, I am British could be cited as a good example where the government proactively engaged the Muslim community and particularly focused on the British Muslim Youth. As opposed to the open society that Britain has ensured, the French ban on the veil or Swiss prohibition on the construction of minarets of the mosques, would certainly not help and would rather further radicalize the Muslim youth who see it as the government's transgression on the Muslim way of life. Largely among the Muslims all over the world, the United States is seen as the starter of the most recent social and political trends against the Muslims the world over from body-checks to singling the Muslim passport holders aside for more detailed security checks which many Muslims find humiliating. The governments and States could demonstrate more inclusion, and not exclusion, of the Muslim population. Engagement with the Muslim communities would help; ostracizing them would not.

Notes:

Ahle-Hadith:

Ahl-e-Hadith and Wahabis are one and the same thing. They follow Abdul Wahab Najdi, so people call them Wahabi, which they deem derogatory and prefer to be called Ahl-e-Hadith.

Although Salafi's follow Ibn Tamiyya and Abdul Wahab, which Ahle Hadith / Wahabi follow, but there are some differences between them, but mostly these three terms Salafi / Wahabi / Ahle Hadith are used inter-changeably.

Barelvi:

Barelvi is a movement of Sunni Islam originating in the Indian subcontinent. The Barelvi movement was started in 1880 to defend contemporary traditionalist Islamic beliefs and practices from the criticisms of reformist movements like the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith. The movement in British India was shaped by the writings of Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi (1856–1921).

Everybody Draw Mohammed Day

It was apparently a protest in support of free speech, specifically in opposition to those who threaten violence against artists who draw representations of the Prophet Muhammad. It began as a protest against censorship of an American television show, South Park, "201" by its distributor, Comedy Central, in response to death threats against some of those responsible for the segment. Observance of the day began with a drawing posted on the Internet on April 20, 2010, accompanied by a text suggesting that "everybody" create a drawing representing Muhammad, on May 20, 2010, as a protest against efforts to limit freedom of speech.

U.S. cartoonist Molly Norris of Seattle, Washington, created the artwork in reaction to Internet death threats that had been made against cartoonists Trey Parker and Matt Stone for depicting Muhammad in an episode of South Park. Depictions of Muhammad are explicitly forbidden by a few hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) though not by the Qur'an. Postings on RevolutionMuslim.com (under the pen name Abu Talha Al-Amrikee; later

identified as Zachary Adam Chesser) had said that Parker and Stone could wind up like Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker who was shot to death by a Muslim extremist Muhammad Bouyeri in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004.

Deobandi:

A Deobandi is an individual, who follows the methodology of the Deoband Islamic movement. The movement began at Darul Uloom Deoband (a madrasah or seminary) in Deoband, India, where its foundation was laid on 30 May 1866.

Fidayeen Attacks:

Commando raids on specified targets with the objective of killing and get killed, a concept introduced by Lashkar-e-Taiba in 1998, and practiced in the Indian-administered Kashmir.

Hasan Al-Banna:

Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) an Egyptian political and religious leader. He is the founder of the Muslim brotherhood and one of the pioneers of today's Islamic revival.

Quran Burning Controversy:

The 2010 Qur'an-burning controversy arose when pastor Terry Jones of the small, Christian non-denominational Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida, United States, planned to burn copies of the Qur'an on the ninth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, which he called International Burn a Koran Day. The planned Qur'an desecration event was widely condemned by politicians and religious groups. Following and outrage and protests by Muslims all over the world. Alarmed by the possible consequences, the U.S. President Barack Obama and several other leaders in the West also warned against any such attempt. Jones eventually cancelled the event in the face of pressure from all over.

Salafi:

The term is generally used to refer to the first three generations of Muslims: the Sahaba (Companions of Muhammad), the Tabi'un ("Followers") and the Tabi' al-Tabi'in ("Those after the Followers"). Salafis view the first three generations of Muslims, who are Muhammad's Sahaba, and the two succeeding generations after them as examples of how Islam should be practiced. The principal tenet of Salafism is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his Sahaba, but that undesirable innovations have been added over the later centuries due to materialist and cultural influences. The term Salafism is sometimes used interchangeably with "Wahhabism".

Sayyid Qutb:

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was an Egyptian writer, educator, and religious leader. His writings about Islam and especially his call for a revolution to establish an Islamic state and society greatly influenced the Islamic resurgence movements of the 20th century.

Syed Abul Ala Maududi:

Syed Abul Ala Maududi (903-1979) a Sunni journalist, theologian, Muslim revivalist leader and political philosopher, and a major 20th century Islamist thinker. He was also a prominent political figure in his home country (Pakistan). He was also the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamic revivalist party.

Sufism:

Sufism is a mystical-ascetic approach to Islam that seeks to find divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. Sufism and Islamic law are usually considered to be complementary, although Sufism has been criticized by Salafi – a sect that remains strict to the practices of the first three generations of Muslims – for what they see as an unjustified religious innovation.

Sufi:

Sufism or Tasawwuf is, according to its adherents, the inner, mystical dimension of Islam. A practitioner of this tradition is generally known as a Sufi. Another name for a Sufi is Dervish.

Wahhabi:

Wahhabism is a conservative Sunni Islamic sect based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who advocated to purge Islam of what he considered innovations in Islam. Wahhabism is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. It is often referred to as a "sect" or "branch" of Islam, though both its supporters and its opponents reject such designations.

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About CRSS

Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] is an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan advocacy, program implementation and research organization whose endeavours are aimed at promoting an informed discourse on crucial social-political, economic and security issues confronting Pakistan. CRSS strives to realize its goals through a vast array of activities such as widely disseminated analyses on national and regional issues, advocacy and program implementation on important issues and problems, research reports, and workshops/seminars on critical policy issues across the country.

The weekly, quarterly and annual reports the CRSS has published since its inception in January 2008, deal with national and regional political and security issues. These reports covered crucial areas of Pakistan's geo-political situation to security issues in the region and domestic affairs.

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In addition, Center also holds monthly Discussion Forums on current important national issues, with the primary objective of collecting opinions and comments from various stake-holders, including key serving and former policy-makers, bureaucrats, and intelligentsia. The reports of the Discussion Forums are compiled and published in the form of a book titled 'Discussion Forum' (in 2009 and 2010).

In February, 2011, the CRSS successfully implemented a clean-drinking water scheme in the Chaarsadda and Nowshehera districts of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, with hand-pumps at 20 different locations. The Netherlands Embassy provided the financial support for the project as part of its post-flood recovery and rehabilitation efforts.

More importantly, the Centre continues to work together with the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Germany in areas of security and governance. The Centre is indebted to the Stiftung for the crucial support it has provided to the Centre since its creation to-date, and hope to continue working together on issues of democratisation and security.

The Centre has also worked with The Asia Foundation on a "Freedom of Information" project, while it actively collaborates with the United States Institute of Peace (for public advocacy on regional security issues such as Afghanistan and India.)

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