

A photograph of three men sitting at a table in a meeting. The man in the center is wearing a white shirt and a dark vest, looking towards the left. The man on the left is wearing a dark suit and a blue patterned tie, also looking left. The man on the right is wearing a military-style olive green uniform with several medals on his chest, looking down. The background is slightly blurred, showing some greenery.

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The Third Year Audit of the National Action Plan

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written and compiled by:
Zeeshan Salahuddin

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ACRONYMS

#	Acronyms	Meaning
1	AHB	Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan
2	AIB	Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan
3	AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
4	APP	Associated Press of Pakistan
5	APS	Army Public School
6	AQ	Al-Qaeda
7	ASWJ	AhleSunnat Wal Jamaat
8	ATA	Anti Terrorism Act
9	ATC	Anti Terrorism Court
10	ATI	Agricultural Training Institute
11	AUH	Ansar UI Hussain
12	BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
13	BLF	Balochistan Liberation Front
14	BLUF	Balochistan Liberation United Front
15	BMDT	Balochistan Musalla Defah Tanzeem
16	BNM	Baloch National Movement
17	BRA	Balochistan Republican Army
18	BSO-A	Baloch Student Organization Azad
19	BVS	Biometric Verification System
20	CFT	Countering Financing of Terrorism
21	CIED	Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances
22	CM	Chief Minister
23	COAS	Chief of Army Staff
24	CODE	Cursor of Development and Education
25	CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
26	CrPC	Code of Criminal Procedure
27	CRSS	Center for Research and Security Studies
28	CS	Cyber Security
29	CTD	Counter Terrorism Departments
30	CVE	Countering Violent Extremism

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31	DCC	District Coordinating Committee
32	DG	Director General
33	DIS	Directorate of Internal Security
34	ECL	Exit Control List
35	ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
36	FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
37	FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulations
38	FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
39	FIF	Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation
40	FIR	First Information Report
41	FMU	Financial Monitoring Unit
42	GB	Gilgit Baltistan
43	GoP	Government of Pakistan
44	GS	Ghulaman-e-Sahaba
45	HRCPP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
46	HRW	Human Rights Watch
47	IBO	Intelligence Based Operation
48	ICCPR	International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
49	ICJ	International Court of Justice
50	ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
51	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
52	ICT	Islamabad Capital Territory
53	ICT	Information, Communication Technology
54	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
55	IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
56	IHC	Islamabad High Court
57	IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
58	IMEI	Mobile Equipment Identify
59	IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
60	IOM	International Organization for Migration
61	IS	Islamic State
62	ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
63	ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations

64	IT	Information Technology
65	ITMP	Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan
66	JA	Jamaat ul Ahrar
67	JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
68	JID	Joint Intelligence Directorate
69	JPP	Justice Project Pakistan
70	JSMM	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz
71	JuA	Jamat Ul Ahrar
72	JuD	Jamaat-ul-Da'awa
73	JUI-F	Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam – Fazl Group's
74	KP	Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
75	LEAs	Law Enforcement Agencies
76	LeB	Lashkar-e-Balochistan
77	LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
78	LeJ-A	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alim
79	LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
80	MARS	Madrassa Audit Reporting Standardization
81	MCS	Military Court Service
82	MoI	Ministry of Interior
83	MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
84	MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
85	MSF	Maritime Security Force
86	MSO	Muslim Students Organization
87	NA	National Assembly
88	NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
89	NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
90	NAP	National Action Plan
91	NC	National Coordinator
92	NCCU	National Cyber Counter-terrorism Unit
93	NCEP	National Counter Extremism Policy
94	NFC	National Finance Awards
95	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
96	NIC	National Implementation Committee

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97	NISP	National Internal Security Policy
98	NR3C	National Response Centre for Cyber Crime
99	NSA	National Security Advisor
100	NSC	National Security Council
101	NSGI	National School of Government International
102	NUST	National University for Science and Technology
103	NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
104	OCHA	The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
105	PECB	Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill
106	PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
107	PICSS	Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies
108	PITB	Punjab Information Technology Board
109	PM	Prime Minister
110	PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz
111	PoR	Proof of Registration
112	PPC	Pakistan Penal Code
113	PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
114	PSL	Pakistan Super League
115	PTA	Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
116	PTI	Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf
117	PWD	Planning and Works Department
118	RAF	Royal Air Force
119	RN	Royal Navy
120	S/O	Son of
121	SAC	Summary Appeal Court
122	SAFRON	States and Frontier Regions
123	SCBA	Supreme Court Bar Association
124	SCC	Service Civilian Court
125	SEZ	Special Economic Zones
126	SMP	Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan
127	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
128	SSD	Special Security Division

129	SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
130	STR	Suspicious Transaction Report
131	TAJK	Tehreek-e-Azadi-Jammu & Kashmir
132	TGG	Tariq Geedar Group
133	TJP	Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan
134	TL	Tehrik-e-Labbaik
135	TLYR	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah
136	TNA	Tanzeem Naujawana-e-Ahle Sunnat
137	TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad
138	TTB	Tehrik-e- Taliban Bajaur
139	TTM	Tehrik-e- Taliban Mohmand
140	TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban
141	TTS	Tehrik-e- Taliban Swat
142	UBA	United Baloch Army
143	UK	United Kingdom
144	UN	United Nations
145	UNDP	United National Development Programme
146	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
147	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
148	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
149	US	United States of America
150	USIP	United States Institute of Peace
151	VIP	Very Important Person

INTRODUCTION

The third year of the National Action Plan (NAP) witnessed a small set of victories and significant stagnation and setbacks. Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence was the National Security Council (NSC) meeting conducted with civil and military heads on December 19, 2017, three days after the third anniversary of the Army Public School attack in Peshawar that birthed the NAP¹. The meeting, chaired by Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, was attended by Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal, National Security Adviser retired Lt Gen Nasser Khan Janjua, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Zubair Mehmood Hayat, Army Chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, Naval Chief Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, Air Chief Marshal Sohail Aman and senior officials². The most significant takeaway was that everyone felt NAP needed more work.²

THE THEMES

1. Moratorium Lifted
2. Military Courts
3. Proscribed Organizations
4. Counterterrorism
5. Sectarianism/Minorities
6. Local Conflicts
7. Seminars
8. Refugees/IDPs
9. Criminal Justice System

These nine themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP

In a nutshell this is the conundrum. Political expedience, rival mudslinging, and an utter inability to shoulder blame have become normalized in this third year, as the NAP, once an expression of combined national resolve, takes the back seat. Official rhetoric would have you believe that Pakistan has achieved great success in curbing extremism and militancy, and statistically, this is accurate. However, the progress, like the last two years, has been principally kinetic. Ideologically, Pakistan only managed to take several steps back.

What is the NAP Tracker?

This publication is an annual attempt to make sense of the noise surrounding NAP, and determine, empirically and through expert analysis, the progress Pakistan has made in its fight against extremism. The National Security Division divides the 20

1 Manan, A. (2014, December 25). Fight against terrorism: Defining moment. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/fight-against-terrorism-defining-moment/>.

2 Syed, B. S. (2017, December 19). Civil-military heads agree NAP needs more work. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1377465/civil-military-heads-agree-nap-needs-more-work>.

points of the National Action Plan into three broad categories. These include:

- Hardcore terrorism – this includes the kinetic fight, e.g., police combing operations, military operations etc. (#3, #7, #15, #16, #17, #18)
- Terrorism enablers – this includes the points that need to be addressed as they enable extremism in the country (#5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13, #14, #19)
- State enablers – this includes the fundamental changes that need to be implemented to strengthen the state’s response and resilience to extremism (#1, #2, #4, #8, #12, #20)

This report, the NAP Tracker, divides the NAP into 9 broad categories for easier digestion. These categories are as follows (corresponding NAP points are in parenthesis):

1. The lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty in Pakistan (#1)
2. The formation and running of military courts (#2)
3. A comprehensive system to curtail and stop banned outfits (#3), their operations (#7), communication networks (#13, #14), and funding sources (#6)
4. The creation and strengthening of counter-terrorism infrastructure including NACTA (#4), establishing a dedicated counter-terrorism force (#8), and other mechanisms (#15)
5. The curbing of hate material proliferation, sectarianism and instigation of atrocities against minorities (#5, #9, #18), especially on media (#11)
6. The redressal of local strife and grievances, and establishment of sustainable peace in zones of conflict, such as Balochistan (#17), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)(#12), and Karachi (#16).
7. The induction of reforms for seminaries to bring them into the mainstream (#10)
8. The rehabilitation and repatriation of both refugees from Afghanistan (#19) and internally displaced people due to security operations (#12)
9. The complete overhaul and reform of the criminal justice system in Pakistan (#20)

Each subsequent chapter addresses these nine broad themes. The data showcased is carefully sourced from primary sources (National Security Division and National Counterterrorism Authority), and secondary, publicly available sources (news).

Overall Pakistan has done remarkably well in the last three years in its kinetic fight against terrorism and extremism. According to data collected by this organization, violence related fatalities dropped in the last three years as follows:

- Decline between 2014 and 2015 – 66%³
- Decline between 2015 and 2016 – 45%⁴
- Decline between 2016 and 2017 – 21%⁵
- Overall between 2014 and 2017 – 73% (from 7,655 fatalities in 2014 to 2,057 in 2017)⁴

However, as has been the case in the last two years of the NAP's implementation, Pakistan's mechanisms and interventions for dealing with the root cause of extremism remain largely ineffective. It was hoped that with victories on the kinetic front, there would be a shift on the ideological side. However, that remains more the subject of heated debates and closed door academic discussions, and less a matter of policy. It is hoped that in the coming year, the softer side of NAP will also receive an overhaul, and there will be a shift in focus on the elements that drive radical thought.

Acknowledgements

This report was compiled and edited by Zeeshan Salahuddin, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) in the first quarter of 2018. Several authors have contributed their valuable opinion and analysis to this publication. Their names are included in the table of contents, but they bear repetition. They include Imtiaz Gul, Dr. Farhan Zahid (NACTA), Rimmel Mohyuddin, Zainab Mustafa, Moghees Uddin Khan, and Zeeshan Salahuddin.

3 Nafees, M., & Salahuddin, Z. (2015). Annual Security Report(Vol. January-December 2015). Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.

4 Nafees, M. (2016). Annual Security Report(I. Gul & Z. Salahuddin, Eds.). Retrieved February 7, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Annual-report-2016.pdf>.

5 Nafees, M. (2017). Annual Security Report(Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 5, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

PART 1: MORATORIUM LIFTED

Part 1: Table of Contents

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Number of Executions in Pakistan
- 1.3 Executions Worldwide – 2017
- 1.4 Controversies and Criticism
- 1.5 Does the Death Penalty Serve as a Deterrent?
- 1.6 Conclusion
- 1.7 An Unnecessary Death Toll - by Rimmel Mohyidin

NAP POINT 1:

Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.

This theme has been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 1: MORATORIUM LIFTED

1.1 Introduction

The first point in the NAP, and the first theme, is the lifting of the moratorium that had been in effect since 2008. Pakistan People's Party came into power in the 2008 elections, installing former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari as the President. Bhutto was a lifelong opponent of the death penalty, and in her honor, the party instated an indefinite moratorium on the death penalty in Pakistan.

Most believe the moratorium was lifted after the Army Public School (APS) attack on December 16, 2014. In actuality, the moratorium had come to an end two years prior when a former soldier, Muhammad Hussain, was hanged at Central Jail Mianwali on November 14, 2012 after being convicted of murder by a military court. The enactment of NAP drastically accelerated this process, but the moratorium had already been violated. Even after the APS attack, the first executions occurred on December 19, 2014, six days before the NAP was formally announced and adopted.

1.2 Number of Executions in Pakistan

In the three years since the NAP (December 2014-December 2018), a total of 483 individuals have been executed in Pakistan.¹ Of these, 7 were executed in December 2014, when the NAP first came into effect, 325 in 2015, 87 in 2016 and 69 in 2018. According to a report by Amnesty International, some of the individuals that were executed were juveniles at the time of the commission of the crime or suffered from a mental disability.²

This figure differs slightly for other sources. For instance, Amnesty International put the 2015 figure at 326,³ 7 fewer than the Human Rights Commission of

1 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

2 The State of the World's Human Rights, Amnesty International Report 2016/17. (2017). Amnesty International. Retrieved February 28, 2017.

3 Death Sentences and Executions in 2015. (2016). Amnesty International. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2016/04/death-sentences-executions-2015/>.

Pakistan.⁴ Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), which works on death penalty issues in Pakistan, places the 2015 figure at 327.⁵


However, the official figure for the number of people executed by the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) is 483. This is the official figure we consider for this report. The number of executions as tracked by various organizations is represented below:

Table 1.1 - Number of Executions by Different Sources					
Year	NACTA	HRW	JPP	Amnesty	Reprive
2014	0	7	7	7	7
2015	332	334	327	326	325
2016	82	85	86	87	87
2017	69	44	65	60	n/a
Total	483	470	485	480	419
Note: NACTA/HRW counts the seven executions in 2014 as part of the 2015 figure.					

4 Who has been executed? (n.d.). Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/who-has-been-executed>.

5 Number of people Executed in Pakistan since 2014. (n.d.) Justice Project Pakistan. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from <http://www.jpp.org.pk/>.

Graph 1.1: Number of Executions in Pakistan since 2014



The year 2016 saw a decline in the rate of executions in Pakistan with a total of 87 individuals executed.⁶ This trend seems to have continued in 2017, with another decline of 31%, according to Amnesty International. Bear in mind that Pakistan has an estimated 6,000 to 8,200 prisoners on death row, the world’s largest recognized death row inmate population.⁷

For a detailed opinion on the lifting of the moratorium in Pakistan, please see [Section 1.7](#), by [Rimmel Mohyuddin](#).

⁶ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Final Executions, 2016. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Final-Executions-2016.xlsx-9.pdf>.

⁷ Hashim, A. (2017, April 11). Welcome to ‘the world’s largest death row’. Al-Jazeera. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/world-largest-death-row-170411075033482.html>.

1.3 Executions Worldwide – 2017


Before the NAP, 2007 was the year with the most number of executions in the last decade in Pakistan with a 134 people executed.

#	Country	Executions
1	Iran	507
2	Saudi Arabia	146
3	Iraq	125
4	Pakistan	60
5	Egypt	35
6	Somalia	24
7	USA	23
8	Jordan	15

***Note:** Executions in China are a state secret; but human rights organizations estimate it to be in the thousands.

As seen in the table above, the top five states with the most number of executions in 2017 were all Muslim majority countries. In 2015, with Pakistan also executing 325 individuals, the total number of recorded executions reached a record high. However, in the last two years, this number has steadily declined. The total number of executions, 993, was significantly lower than the 2015 peak of 1600+. These figures do not include executions figures from countries such as China or North Korea, where executions are a state secret.

Graph 1.2: Most Number of Executions by State - 2017



1.4 Controversies and Criticism

The decision to lift the moratorium has been under significant criticism from both foreign governments and human rights activists and organizations. But perhaps the biggest controversy of 2017 was the UN Court’s orders to halt the execution of Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav.⁸

1.4.1 Kulbhushan Jadhav

In May 2017, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Pakistan to halt the execution of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian spy caught and convicted of anti-state activities in the province of Balochistan in March 2016. He had been court martialed the death sentence a month prior, in April 2017. Indian authorities repeatedly sought consular access under the Vienna convention, eventually approaching the ICJ for relief. On December 25, 2017, Jhadav’s wife and mother

⁸ Marlow, I. (2017, May 18). UN Court Orders Pakistan to Halt Execution of Indian Man. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-18/united-nations-court-orders-pakistan-to-halt-execution-of-indian>.

were allowed to meet with him in Pakistan.⁹ His execution is still pending.

1.4.2 Criticism and Clemency

Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Reprieve, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan universally condemn executions. The criticism from these organizations is well documented and covered in prior years' NAP Tracker audits.

Perhaps the most troublesome fact is that of the nearly 500 persons executed in Pakistan thus far, not one has been granted mercy or clemency by the President of Pakistan.¹⁰ The President of Pakistan possesses the constitutional mandate to pardon death row inmates from the death sentence by accepting petitions under Article 45 of the Constitution. In the last five years, the President has turned down 513 mercy petitions, 444 of which were in the fifteen months following the lifting of the moratorium.¹¹

1.4.3 Number of Inmates on Death Row

Amnesty international reports that over 8,200 are currently on death row in Pakistan.¹² Reprieve puts this number at 8,500.¹³ This figure is contradicted by Minister of State for Interior Baleeghur Rahman, who told the Senate of Pakistan in October 2015 that 6,016 prisoners were on death row in the country's jails. Either way, given the current rate, Pakistan will take three to four decades to execute all death row convicts, not accounting for any additional inmates in the said time period.¹⁴

9 Kulbushan Jadhav: Pakistan lets family meet 'Indian spy'. (2017, December 25). BBC. Retrieved February 25, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42477207>.

10 Annamaneni, K., Maniscalco, S., Thekkethala, M., Quintanilla, V., & Raja, N. (n.d.). No Mercy - a report on clemency for death row prisoners in Pakistan (Z. Z. Malik, Ed.). Justice Project Pakistan and Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School. Retrieved February 16, 2018 from <http://www.jpp.org.pk/report/no-mercy-a-report-on-clemency-for-death-row-prisoners-in-pakistan/>.

11 Khan, R. (2016, April 15). President turned down 513 mercy petitions over last five years: Interior Ministry. Dawn. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1252257>.

12 Amnesty International. (2015, March 31). Death Sentences and Executions in 2014. Retrieved February 20, 2018.

13 Reprieve - Pakistan reaches 150 hangings, amid plans for juvenile execution. (2015, June 04). Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/pakistan-reaches-150-hangings-amid-plans-for-juvenile-execution>.

14 Niaz, T. (2015, October 07). Over 6000 condemned prisoners in Pakistan. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/national/07-Oct-2015/over-6000-condemned-prisoners-in>

1.5 Does the Death Penalty Serve as a Deterrent?

The Pakistani government believes that the death penalty serves as a significant deterrent to the criminal mindset. “You’ve seen the number of terrorist attacks going down drastically,” the Prime Minister’s Special Assistant for Law, Ashtar Ausaf Ali, told Reuters. “One of the reasons is fear. Fear of being executed.”

Data suggests that terrorism and overall casualties have seen a remarkable decline since 2014. However, there is no data that suggests a correlation between executions and reduction in crime. Further, it appears that militants are in the extreme minority in the number of people executed in Pakistan.¹⁵ In fact, anti-terrorism court convicted inmates accounted for just 16 percent of the total number of executions.¹⁶

1.6 Conclusion

Executions are here to stay. The upcoming fourth year of the NAP also happens to be an election year, and the priority for all political parties and individuals is vying for various seats of power in the center and provinces.

Pakistan views executions as a deterrent for curbing terrorism and extremism, and is thus likely to continue pursuing this mandate. Despite harsh criticism, pleas from human rights organizations, and a variety of controversies concerning human rights violations, coerced confessions and juvenile sentencing, executions in Pakistan will likely continue unabated, though at a decelerated pace.

pakistan.

15 Houreld, K. (2015, July 27). Insight - Militants in minority in Pakistan execution drive, deterrent effect debated. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-executions-insight-idUKKCN0Q00WI20150727>.

16 465 executed since lifting of moratorium on death penalty. (2017, July 7). Dawn. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1343720>.

1.7 An Unnecessary Death Toll

by Rimmel Mohyidin

There is senseless kind of death toll we are now used to counting in Pakistan; the kind the government deliberately inflicts, and the numbers are terrifying. Since the moratorium was lifted on 17 Dec. 2014, there have been 488 prisoners that have been hanged to death. Some of them have included juvenile offenders. Others have been mentally ill. There are still more who have been executed only to have their corpses acquitted a year later. Many have died waiting to die.

Last year, Justice Project Pakistan released data on executions that had bad news for the pro-death penalty community. It has not deterred crime. It has been used as a political tool. And worse still, there are even suspicions that it is being used as an overcrowding solution in jails.

Pakistan has executed an average of nearly 3 prisoners a week. Bear in mind, that according to the Prisons Manual, executions may not be carried out on a Sunday or a Monday so consider that these take place over the course of just five days. It's even more disturbing to think about the frequency of these killings considering that executions are suspended for the month of Ramzan.

Until July 2017, Punjab has emerged as the overwhelming practitioner of the death penalty, accounting for 83 percent of executions, and 89 percent of death sentences in Pakistan. However, it has also witnessed only a 9.7 percent drop in murder rates from 2015-2016. Sindh, on the other hand, has viewed a drop of nearly 25 percent in the same time period – even though it carried out only 18 executions compared to Punjab's 382. This casts even more doubt on the already uncertain relationship between the death penalty and reducing crime.

Many will credit the Rangers' operation in Karachi for the remarkable progress made in lowering crime, which only serves to reinforce the notion that the death penalty has nothing to do with addressing concerns with the rule of law.

Resuming executions was widely touted as a counter-terrorism measure. It is true that Pakistan has experienced a decrease in terrorism in the past few years, but is it because we have been executing terrorists? The data reveals that less than 17 percent of all executions have been for this convicted of terrorism-related charges. In fact, the majority of death sentences have been issued by District and Sessions Courts that have no jurisdiction over terrorism.

And looking at the courts that do, i.e. the Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs), this nexus becomes even more doubtful. The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) bears a definition of terrorism so broad as to include any action or threat that may create a “sense of fear or insecurity in society.” Under this generous scope, the ATCs have convicted ‘terrorists’ for stealing cattle and even once, for flying a kite.

It is no wonder then, that research by Justice Project Pakistan has found that 88 percent of all those convicted and 86.3 percent of all those sentenced to death under the ATA were for crimes bearing no connections to terrorism.

The ATA makes the death sentences it breeds even more difficult to stomach with its required expedited trials, suspension of fundamental safeguards, admissibility of confessions in police custody and restrictions on bail. Under it, juvenile offenders are sentenced to death (like Iqbal in Mandi Bahauddin) and have been executed (like Aftab Bahadur in 2015). Under it, the victim’s family’s wishes are disregarded. If they do not want the defendant to hang, it does not matter because convictions under the ATA are non-compoundable.

Another trend that has emerged is that the use of the death penalty spikes whenever there is a terrorist attack that kills more than 5 people. In the three weeks after the 2015 Youhanabad attack in Lahore, 42 prisoners had been hanged. In the month after the 2015 attack that killed Shuja Khanzada, 26 prisoners had been hanged, and after 4 weeks of the 2015 Vehari Chowk attack in Multan 53 prisoners had been hanged. This indicates that the use of executions, like the lifting of the moratorium, is a reactionary step aimed at nothing more than appeasement but with little impact on the problem at hand.

In Punjab, there is a worrying trend that indicates that executions are being used as a means to make room in prisons that are facing overcrowding. There are almost 97,000 prisoners across jails in Pakistan that have a collective capacity of 45,000. Currently, 25 of the 27 prisons in the province are beyond capacity manifold. For every 70 prisoners added to an overpopulated jail, 1 prisoner is executed. And even one prisoner being executed for this reason is one too many.

Pakistan must introspect. Who are the people in jail, and what are the circumstances that put them on death row? Would they be in danger of being hanged if they had the means to adequately defend themselves? Is terrorism being curbed because a mentally ill man was hanged? And more importantly, when the numbers become more and more difficult to explain, how can we celebrate death and call it justice?

Rimmel Mohyidin is the Head of Communications for Justice Project Pakistan. She tweets @Rimmel_Mohyidin.

PART 2: MILITARY COURTS

Part 1: Table of Contents

- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Number of Cases and Outcomes
- 2.3 Controversies and Criticism
- 2.4 Conclusion
- 2.5 Military Courts – A Necessity - by Moghees Uddin Khan

NAP POINT 2:

Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these would be two years.

This theme has been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 2: MILITARY COURTS

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Formation of the Military Courts

The second point in the NAP, and the second theme of this report, is the establishment of military courts to try terrorists under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997. The 21st Constitutional Amendment was passed by both the National Assembly and the Senate on January 6, 2015, providing constitutional cover to the establishment of military courts.¹

The purpose of the military courts was to provide speedy trials to “hardcore terrorists”, as the legal system in Pakistan had failed to prosecute these dangerous individuals. Legal experts argue that the true purpose of the courts was an incentive to upgrade the ATA and to strengthen the criminal justice system in the country, and that this long term objective was not achieved.² Other reasons cited for the existence of military courts was a distinct lack of protection provided to judges, lawyers, prosecution and witnesses.

2.1.2 Number of Military Courts

In the first phase, nine military courts were established with three in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP), three in Punjab, two in Sindh and one in Balochistan.³ In 2015 there were 11 military courts functional in Pakistan, with the last two established in Karachi, Sindh, in August 2015 by the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS).⁴

During a high-level meeting in Islamabad to review the implementation of NAP, the government decided that the scope of military courts would be extended to cover Gilgit Baltistan (GB). It was decided that the Councils GB and Azad Jammu and

1 Rasheed, P. (n.d.). Constitution (Twenty-first Amendment) Act, 2015. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420547178_142.pdf.

2 Syed, B. S., & Asad, M. (2017, January 7). Curtain comes down on military courts. Dawn. Retrieved February 6, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1306928>.

3 Staff Reporter. (2015, January 10). Nine military courts set up. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1156104>.

4 AFP. (2015, August 26). Army Chief Approves More Military Courts. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://newsweekpakistan.com/army-chief-approves-more-military-courts/>.

Kashmir (AJK) would also adopt the 21st Constitutional Amendment to facilitate the formation of military courts.⁵ But this is something that remains pending.

2.1.3 Extension

Initially, the courts were supposed to be operational for a period of two years, and reached their so-called “sunset clause” on January 7, 2017. However, the courts received an extension of another two years in March, 2017.⁶

2.1.4 Offenses for Which Civilians May be Tried in Military Courts

Under the 21st amendment to the constitution, military courts have the authority to try “any terrorist group or organization using the name of religion or a sect” and carrying out violent acts, including:

- Attacking military officers or installations;
- Kidnapping for ransom;
- Possessing, storing or transporting explosives, firearms, suicide jackets or other articles;
- Using or designing vehicles for terrorist attacks;
- Causing death or injury;
- Possessing firearms designed for terrorist acts;
- Acting in any way to “over-awe the state” or the general public;
- Creating terror or insecurity in Pakistan;
- Attempting to commit any of the above listed acts within or outside of Pakistan;
- Providing or receiving funding for any of the above-listed acts; and
- Waging war against the state.

Under the Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA) of 2014, some additional offenses come under the purview of the military courts, and these include:

- Crimes against minorities;
- Killing, kidnapping, extortion, attacks or assaults on government officials, members of the judiciary, foreign officials, tourists, media personnel, social workers or “other important personalities”;
- Destruction of or attacks on energy facilities, gas or oil pipelines, aircrafts

5 Haider, M. (2015, January 13). Govt extends scope of military courts to Gilgit-Baltistan, AJK. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1156747>.

6 NA approves military courts extension. (2017, March 21). The Nation. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/21-Mar-2017/na-approves-military-courts-extension>.

and airports, national defense materials and institutions, and educational institutions; and Illegally crossing national boundaries “in connection with” any of the above-mentioned offences.⁷

2.2 Number of Cases and Outcomes

2.2.1 Performance of Civilian Courts

The case for military courts is not without merit, as the criminal justice system is stuck in a perpetual backlog, poor prosecution, deep-seated corruption, and a sheer lack of training, equipment, manpower and resources.

In January 2017, media reports revealed that there are 1.87 million pending cases in Pakistan’s courts.⁸ The apex court had 38,539 pending cases. The exact number of cases can be seen in the breakdown below.⁹


Supreme Court	38,539
Lahore High Court	147,542
Sindh High Court	93,335
Peshawar High Court	30,764
Islamabad High Court	16,278
Balochistan High Court	6,030
Punjab District Courts	1,184,551
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa District Courts	204,030
Sindh District Courts	97,673
Islamabad Courts	37,753
Balochistan District Courts	12,826
Total	1,869,321

7 Military Injustice in Pakistan – A Briefing Paper. (2016). International Commission of Jurists, Switzerland. Retrieved March 03, 2018 from <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Pakistan-Military-court-Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2016-ENG.pdf>.

8 Asad, M. (2018, January 21). Over 1.8 million cases pending in Pakistan’s courts. Dawn. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1384319>.

9 Butt, T. (2018, January 15). 1.87 million cases pending in Pak courts. The News. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/268487-1-87-million-cases-pending-in-pak-courts>.

Graph 2.1: Cases Pending in Pakistan's Courts - 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Dr. Shoaib Suddle while discussing the poor criminal judicial system of Pakistan told the Senate Committee on August 20, 2015 that conviction rate in Pakistan is only 10 percent and that too, through bribe and influence. Any moderately complex civil suit takes 20 to 30 years to be resolved by the exhausting litigation system after numerous rounds of appeals, revisions and remands.

Other main causes of poor prosecution in Pakistan and hence the dismal conviction rates are: Absence of professional autonomy, poor training, lack of access to basic data, inadequate tools to investigate in the Police Department, delay in registration of FIRs due to the reluctance of police, totally ineffective witness protection mechanism, lack of initiative on the part of state prosecutors due to insufficient financial rewards, political appointments of blue-eyed police personnel and prosecutors, un-ending reliance on old conventional tactics and barbaric sources to investigate the crime and criminal reluctance in using scientific

sources for probe etc.^{10 11}

2.2.2 Number of Cases in Military Courts and Verdicts

Since February 2015, in the first two years of the NAP, a total of 388 cases have been referred to military courts.¹² In December, 2017, in a briefing to lawmakers, the top brass of the armed forces of Pakistan shared that military courts had passed judgment on 274 terror-related cases, and 161 people had been sentenced to death as a result.¹³ Additionally, since the appointment of the new COAS, the military courts had received 160 cases to prosecute.

In March 2018, the Ministry of Defense said that the courts had handed the death sentence to 186 people.¹⁴ At the end of the second year of NAP, 153 individuals have been awarded the death penalty, and 113 have been given jail terms (mostly life sentences).¹⁵ Thus, in 2017, 33 additional individuals were given the death penalty by the military courts. To date, there has been only one acquittal.

For an in-depth discussion on the history, efficacy and future of military courts please see Section 2.5 by Moghees Uddin Khan.

10 Shah, S. (2016, March 12). Poor prosecution plays havoc with judicial system. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/104661-Poor-prosecution-plays-havoc-with-judicial-system>.

11 Staff Reporter. (2016, July 15). Criminal justice system: 'Conviction rate low as judicial system in need of reform'. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1142622/criminal-justice-system-conviction-rate-low-judicial-system-need-reform/>.

12 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

13 Guramani, N. (2017, December 19). COAS briefs Senators on National Security. Dawn. Retrieved March 19, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1377559>.

14 More than 180 convicts sentenced to death by military tribunals in Pakistan since 2015. (2018, March 18). Pakistan Today. Retrieved March 19, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/03/18/more-than-180-convicts-sentenced-to-death-by-military-tribunals-in-pakistan-since-2015/>.

15 CRSS held exclusive interviews with the NSA in December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017. The NSA leads the National Security Decision, and is responsible for the security of Pakistan. The implementation of the NAP is one of his tasks. This data was directly shared by his team.

2.3 Controversies and Criticism

2.3.1 Human Rights Organizations

The establishment of military courts has come under severe criticism. Human rights organizations have been concerned about whether the prisoners are provided due process. These criticisms are well documented and have been covered by prior years' NAP Tracker audits.

2.3.2 Supreme Court Adjudication

It was also reported in January 2017, that review petitions against about 30 convictions of the military courts are pending adjudication before the Supreme Court.

“Military courts violate Article 10 of the Constitution which gives citizens the right to an open trial” said Kamran Murtaza, President of the SCBA. He further said that he would appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision as it “violates the fundamental constitutional rights of the people.”¹⁶

In July 2017, the apex court again suspended the death sentences of two convicts.¹⁷ This was the latest in a series of halted executions, as those convicted by military courts sought apex court intervention for relief. However, considering that in August 2015¹⁸, the Supreme Court itself ruled the military courts legal and constitutional, this will likely provide temporary relief, and barring egregious due process violations, not amount to much.

2.3.3 Referral Process

Military courts also came under criticism for processing far fewer cases than

16 Shams, S. (2015, August 07). Pakistan’s military courts - a solution or a problem? Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <http://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-military-courts-a-solution-or-a-problem/a-18633959>.

17 SC suspends death sentence awarded by military court. (2017, January 19). GEO TV. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from <https://www.geo.tv/latest/150143-supreme-court-suspends-death-of-two-convicted-by-military-courts>.

18 Malik, H. (2015, August 5). Supreme Court upholds establishment of military courts. The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 02, 2018 from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/932537/supreme-court-upholds-establishment-of-military-courts/>.

initially expected. However, there are bureaucratic reasons that contribute to this. It was revealed this year that the process for referring a case to military courts is lengthy and arduous. Local police or counter-terrorism departments defer cases to the home department. The home department then reviews and refers the cases it deems fit to apex committees. These committees then send them to the Ministry of Interior (Mol). The Mol then refers the case to military courts at its discretion.¹⁹

This was further observed on November 3, 2017, when the COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa wrote a letter to Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi over lack of transfer of terrorism-related cases to the military courts.²⁰ In response, Federal Minister for Interior Ahsan Iqbal announced approval of the transfer of 29 cases to the military courts, adding that 80 more cases will be transferred after the next cabinet meeting. On November 23, nearly three weeks later, it was announced that 95 fresh terrorism-related cases were being referred to special courts for trial.²¹

2.3.4 Kulbushan Jadhav

Please see Section 1.4.1.

2.4 Conclusion

The government of Pakistan has declared military courts to be a success despite widespread and damning criticism that these courts are a parallel judicial system with a lack of openness and due process. The first half of the first year was marked by significant blowback and over shadowed by the proceedings of the Supreme Court. However, in the second half of the year, the verdicts picked up pace. In fact, the rate of convictions from military courts went up by nearly 600% in the second year, but slowed down somewhat in the third year, owing to a range of legal and technical issues.

19 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). *Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017*.

20 Ahsan says 29 cases sent to military courts after Gen Bajwa's letter to PM. (2017, November 3). *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/03/no-terror-related-case-forwarded-to-military-courts-for-past-many-months-coas-writes-to-pm/>.

21 Bhutta, Z. (2017, November 23). Govt set to send 95 cases to military courts. *Tribune*. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1565972/1-govt-set-send-95-cases-military-courts/>.

With the acute absence of any progress on criminal justice sector reforms, the argument against military courts can also be a difficult one to make. As it stands, military courts will continue their operation at least until January 2019. Legal experts believe the military courts have partially served their purpose of handing out sentences to terror suspects, but the broader goal of building momentum for justice sector reforms has largely failed.

Bear in mind that military courts are not unique to Pakistan. Many countries, including the US and UK, have used military courts due to a range of reasons and circumstances. Please see [Annex II](#) for some additional information.

2.5 Military Courts – A Necessity

by Moghees Uddin Khan

The history of military courts in Pakistan dates to 1977 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government was accused of alleged rigging in the polls and riots erupted all over the country. As a result, Article 245 of the Constitution was invoked, and military courts were set up in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab. This decision was challenged in the Sindh and Lahore High Courts and as a result the future use of Article 245 in such instances was prohibited.²²

Similarly, in 1998, the Nawaz Sharif government, through Article 245, constituted military courts, which were struck down by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Ajmal Mian writing for the majority held that the civil authorities and the security forces could not act outside the ambit of the Constitution.²³

On December 16, 2014, a day that lives in infamy in Pakistan's history, the need for military courts was cemented. The lives of 149 individuals, 133 of which were children, were taken in one of the country's most deadly and most damaging attacks.

In the aftermath, the Government through the 21st Amendment in the Constitution and through amendments to the Army Act of 1952 constituted military courts to adjudicate the most heinous terrorism-related offences. These courts were set up for two years and on January 7, 2017 the legal framework permitting these parallel courts expired.²⁴ The Government's aim/goal was to improve the anti-terrorism courts in this two-year period, failing which, the decision was made to extend the tenure of the military courts for an additional two years.

There is no real question as to why the Parliament resorted to the use of military courts in the aftermath of the APS massacre. Terrorism continues to be an ever-present plague on our society. Despite a well-equipped military, paramilitary and law enforcement apparatus defending our state, extremist violence has not ceased.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 introduced the anti-terrorism courts and can be

22 Darwesh M. Arbey vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1980 Lahore 206) and Niaz Ahmed Khan vs Province of Sindh (PLD 1977 Karachi 604).

23 Sheikh Liaqat Ali Case (PLD 1999 Supreme Court 504).

24 S. 1 (3) of the 21st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan.

considered perhaps one of the first attempts to use the mainstream criminal justice system to combat terrorism. For lack of a clear definition of terrorism and countless other issues resulting from vague drafting and re-drafting of the law, the Act and the courts were rendered completely ineffective and inefficient. The obvious causes of ineffectiveness and inefficiency are the Government's will to provide the ATC judges with proper security, provide witness protection and maintain a properly trained staff of prosecutors. For all these and many other reasons, the acquittal rate of alleged terrorists remains exceptionally high.

The amendments made by Parliament were upheld in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a trial in military courts of civilians accused of terrorism related offences who are known to or claim to be members of terrorist factions was deemed compatible with the Constitution.²⁵

Justice Azmat Saeed penned the majority opinion by stating that as long as the "salient features" of the Constitution are not compromised, Parliament has the authority to amend the Constitution. Additionally, the amendments to the Constitution and Army Act expand the jurisdiction of a court that already exists and is recognized by law. Widening the jurisdiction of military tribunals for the trial of terrorists accused of waging war against the state entails that trials must remain compliant with those criteria that maintain the forum's validity under law and must have a "nexus with the defence of Pakistan." The most important feature of the majority decision was the establishment of the right of judicial review by the High Courts and the Supreme Court.²⁶

Six judges dissented from the majority judgment by stating that a trial by military courts violated the principles of criminal justice, fair trial and independence of the judiciary as military officers were part of the executive and did not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal.²⁷

The resurgence of military courts in Pakistan also received a great deal of international criticism, particularly from human rights groups. International standards emphasize the restriction of the use of military courts to crimes committed by military officials and not civilians. Article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Pakistan is a party, states "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,

25 Military Injustice in Pakistan, International Commission of Jurists, Briefing paper, June 2016, Pg.9.

26 Sh. Azmat Saeed's majority opinion on the Military Courts Judgment, found at, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Const.P.12of2010.pdf.

27 Supra, Note 3, Pg. 10.

independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”²⁸ This Article, according to the UN Human Rights Committee applies to all courts, whether ordinary or specialized, civilian or military. It should be noted that though international law requires a court to be “independent and impartial,” there is no requirement for courts trying civilians to be civilian in constitution. Additionally, Pakistan maintains the position that as a sovereign state, it is within its right to exercise reasonable measures to address terrorism.

There are currently eleven military courts in Pakistan, three in Punjab, three in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, two in Sindh and one in Baluchistan.²⁹ Approximately 274 people were convicted by the military courts and thus far, 161 people were sentenced to death, 12 of whom were executed and 113 of whom were sentenced to life in prison.³⁰

While the use of military courts has become an unconscionable necessity for the time being, there remain several valid criticisms regarding its procedures. The process for selecting and transferring individuals from detention and from civilian custody to military courts remains unclear. Similarly, the right of judicial review is limited to errors of law and procedure. Defendants and their legal representation may, by law, be restricted from reviewing evidence used by the prosecution for reasons of national security. They may, therefore, be limited in what arguments they can provide in defense of the accused. The proceedings themselves are also in camera, preventing public scrutiny of the trial. These procedural challenges do not negate the validity of constituting military courts, but speak more to procedural challenges that should be revisited by Parliament as they work to establish a more permanent method for adjudicating terrorism-based crimes.

In developing a criminal justice system, the initial desire of every democratic state is to rely upon a well-functioning civilian criminal justice system. Pakistan’s criminal courts alone did not rise to this challenge and thus anti-terrorism courts were created as an alternative plan. The ATCs became more of a burden than a blessing for prosecuting terrorists. Thus, the state, in the aftermath of a deadly massacre on children, resorted to creating a more effective, albeit temporary, solution to its terrorism crisis. At this moment, Pakistan is at the cusp of another reform in its criminal justice system and it remains to be seen whether the use of military courts will become more permanent or whether Parliament has the

28 Id.

29 The sun has set on Pakistan’s military courts – here’s why it should never rise again, compiled from Dawn and ICJ reports by Hasham Cheema, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1306792>.

30 Id.

desire and the capacity to overhaul our civilian anti-terrorism courts.

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PART 3: PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS

Part 1: Table of Contents

- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 List of Proscribed Organizations in Pakistan
- 3.3 Controversies
- 3.4 Measures against Proscribed Organizations
- 3.5 Communication Systems
- 3.6 Terror Financing
- 3.7 Pitfalls in the Government's Approach
- 3.8 Conclusion
- 3.9 What does the term "proscribed" solve? - by Zeeshan Salahuddin

NAP POINT 3:

Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.

NAP POINT 7:

Defunct outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name.

NAP POINT 11:

Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations.

NAP POINT 13:

Communication networks of terrorists will be dismantled completely.

NAP POINT 14:

Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.

NAP POINT 6:

All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen.

These themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 3: PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS

3.1 Introduction

The third theme comprises of several points in the NAP, specifically #3, #7, #13, #14 and #6. This theme deals with proscribed organizations and banned outfits operating on Pakistani soil.

There is also significant overlap with the fourth theme, counterterrorism, and the NAP points that constitute that theme. Specifically points #3, #11, #14 and #6 all overlap.


These organizations have been engaged in terror attacks; bombings, suicide attacks, target killings, sectarian violence and propaganda that encourages hate-mongering. These banned outfits boast both a physical and online presence in the country.

3.2 List of Proscribed Organizations in Pakistan

Pakistan's interior ministry has formally banned 65 organizations in the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a tally with well over 200 organizations. However, for the purpose of this report, we will use the number from the Interior Ministry. Please also see Annex IV for a full list of officially proscribed organizations in Pakistan.

Graph 3.1: Breakdown of Proscribed/Under Observation Organizations

Breakdown of Proscribed / Under Observation Organizations - 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

3.2.1 Proscribed by the Interior Ministry


A list of proscribed organizations issued by the National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan (NACTA) and ascribed to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) identifies 65 groups as proscribed or banned organizations.¹ However, except for five outfits, the rest were proscribed prior to the imposition of the NAP. Excluding the Islamic State (IS), that was proscribed in 2015², four new groups have been

1 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). (2018). List of Proscribed Organizations. Retrieved February 21, 2018 from <https://nacta.gov.pk/proscribed-organizations/>.

2 National Desk. (2015, August 27). Pakistan officially bans Daesh. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/7624-pakistan-officially-bans-daesh>.

added to this category since NAP’s inception. They are Jamat Ul Ahrar (JuA), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alim (LeJA), Ansar Ul Hussain (AUH), and Tehreek-e-Azadi-Jammu & Kashmir (TAJK). TAJK was added in 2017.

Graph 3.2: Organizations Proscribed before and after NAP Implementation



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

3.2.2 Under Watch by the Interior Ministry

Four Organizations have been put under watch by Ministry of Interior u/section 11-D-(1) r/w Schedule-II, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.¹ These include Ghulamane-Sahaba (GS), Maymar Trust, Jamaat-ul-Da’awa (JuD), and Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF).

According to research conducted by CRSS in its own Annual Security Reports from 2015,³ 2016,⁴ and 2017,⁵ this list does not contain names of several groups that have carried out and claimed responsibility for terror attacks in the country. These groups include splinter factions of the TTP and can be found in the CRSS Annual Security Reports.

3.2.3 Proscribed under UNSCR 1267

On December 1, 2005, Pakistan enlisted two organizations, Al-Akhtar Trust, and Al-Rashid Trust under the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) number 1267. The UNSCR 1267 was adopted unanimously on October 15, 1999 and deals primarily with Taliban activities in Afghanistan.⁶ As a member state, Pakistan is required to comply, as this resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which sets out the power of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to maintain international peace and security.

This however cannot be viewed as a step towards the implementation of the NAP, as it occurred nearly a decade prior.

3.2.4 Proscribed at the Request of China

In 2013, BBC Urdu⁵ reported that Pakistan banned three additional organizations upon China's request:

1. East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
2. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
3. Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)⁷

3 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.

4 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2017, March 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2016. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2016-Final.pdf>.

5 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

6 UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999). (1999, October 15). Retrieved February 1, 2018, from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/un/5110.htm>.

7 Web Desk. (2013, October 23). Pakistan bans three extremist outfits, on orders from China - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/621400/pakistan-bans-three-extremist-outfits-on-orders-from-china/>.

Again, this step cannot be seen as one taken towards the execution of the NAP because it was taken well over a year before the inception of the NAP.

3.3 Controversies

For a detailed discussion of controversies and controversial statements in regards to proscribed organizations for the first two years of the NAP, please see the NAP Tracker audits for year one and two.

3.3.1 Chaudhary Nisar Statements

The third year of the NAP began with the then Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar addressing criticism from opposition regarding ties with Ahmad Ludhianvi, chief of the proscribed Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), by stating that everything cannot be blamed on ASWJ.⁸ This statement came at the heels of remarks made in the Senate that attempted to distinguish between “good and bad” proscribed organizations.⁹

3.3.2 Hafiz Saeed

Hafiz Saeed, who has a bounty of \$10 million on his head by the US, and is wanted by India for alleged involvement in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, was placed under house arrest in January, 2017, and his name was put on the Exit Control List (ECL), which means he cannot leave the country.¹⁰ Additional restrictions were put on him in February, and the move was fully supported by the military. In April, his detention was extended by another 90 days.¹¹ In June, the sister organization of Hafiz Saeed’s JuD, Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu & Kashmir (TAJK) was also proscribed by the Interior Ministry of Pakistan.¹²

8 Unfair to link everything to ASWJ chief Ludhianvi, says Nisar. (2017, January 14). Dawn. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1308400>.

9 Nisar stands his ground over ‘banned groups’ controversy. (2017, January 15). Dawn. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1308490>.

10 JuD chief Hafiz Saeed, four others put under house arrest. (2017, January 30). The News. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/182810-JuD-chief-Hafiz-Saeed-put-under-house-arrest-sources>.

11 Tanveer, R. (2017, April 30). Hafiz Saeed, aides’ house arrest extended for 90 more days. Tribune. Retrieved February 3, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1397762/hafiz-saeed-aides-detention-extended-90-days/>.

12 Alam, I. (2017, June 30). Ban on TAJK: Dawa leadership to meet on Monday to discuss situation. The Nation. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/30-Jun-2017/ban>.

However, all of the above was undone when Hafiz Saeed was released by the courts for lack of any tangible evidence against him, a move that was seen by many as defiance to the US. This move caused uproar in neighbor India, and concerns from the US.¹³ This was exacerbated by the fact that in August, Saeed had registered his own political party to contest elections, and the fact that despite house arrest, JuD enjoyed unhindered operations fueled by immense public support.¹⁴

3.3.3 Tehrik-e-Labbaik

The political mainstreaming of sectarian jihadists is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. The election of Masroor Nawaz Jhangvi, son of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, to the Punjab assembly is ample evidence to support this claim.¹⁵ The year 2017 saw a significant increase in radical groups dabbling in politics to drive demands. The prime example of this was by-elections being contested by Tehrik-e-Labbaik, a group that aims to carry forth the mission of Mumtaz Qadri, self-confessed murderer of sitting Punjab Governor Salman Taseer.¹⁶

3.3.4 Ehsanullah Ehsan Interview

In late April, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) barred private broadcaster Geo TV from airing an interview with former Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan.¹⁷ The interview was subsequently not aired, but it did beg the question as to why interview access was allowed to the detained terrorist despite existing PEMRA rules and NAP stipulations.

on-tajk-dawa-leadership-to-meet-on-monday-to-discuss-situation.

13 Sheikh, I. (2017, November 24). 'I am fighting for the freedom of Pakistan and Kashmir', Hafiz Saeed says after release. Dawn. Retrieved February 6, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1372612>.

14 Jamal, U. (2017, August 8). What Is Behind the Political 'Mainstreaming' of Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan? The Diplomat. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-is-behind-the-political-mainstreaming-of-jamaat-ud-dawa-in-pakistan/>.

15 Web Desk. (2016, December 1). Jhangvi wins Punjab by-election. The News International. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/169076-Jhangvi-wins-Punjab-by-election>.

16 Anwar, M. (2017, December 31). Emergence of Radical Political Groups Raises Concern in Pakistan. Voice of America. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from <https://www.voanews.com/a/radical-political-groups-raise-concern-in-pakistan/4186579.html>.

17 Mazhar, S. (2017, April 28). Muzzling Terror. Newsweek. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://newsweekpakistan.com/muzzling-terror/>.

Please also see [Section 3.8](#) for a brief analysis on why simply labeling an organization as proscribed is insufficient.

3.4 Measures against Proscribed Organizations

3.4.1 Proscription Efforts

According to The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)'s own publication, "Since 1980's, Pakistan has been witnessing a mushroom growth of religious, sectarian, militant, and sub-nationalist organizations having their own militant wings responsible for terrorist attacks and subversive activities across the country." The first step against these organizations was the formulation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) in 1997. The act gives the federal government a range of mechanisms and tools to curb the activities of such groups.

The ATA lists five restrictions that are placed on a proscribed person, or recognized office-bearers of banned organizations.¹⁸ They are as follows:

1. Passport embargo
2. Freezing of bank accounts
3. Ban on financial support, loans and credit cards
4. Arms license embargo
5. Clearance required for all recruitment efforts

This is well and good in theory, but at the implementation level, progress has been rather slow, uncoordinated, patchy, and at times self-contradictory. Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif himself called for stronger measures against banned groups in the country in September, 2017.¹⁹ "[We] should impose some restrictions on the activities of elements like LeT and JeM, so that we can show the global community that we have put our house in order," he said.


Presently, NACTA states that 8,374 individuals have been placed on the Fourth Schedule. Of these, the data of 6,949 individuals has been shared with the State

18 Proscribed Persons. (n.d.). Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://nacta.gov.pk/proscribed-persons/>.

19 Khawaja Asif calls for stronger stance against banned groups in country. (2017, September 6). Dawn. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1355968>.

Bank of Pakistan,²⁰ presumably for actions related to choking finances, and consequently 5,089 accounts have been frozen, resulting in the seizure of 157 million rupees.²¹ Additionally, 2,052 individuals are facing movement restrictions.²²

Graph 3.3: Proscribed Persons Statistics



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Despite this progress, reports continue to surface about groups such as Daesh (or Islamic State (IS)) gaining momentum in Pakistan, through interrogation of suspects arrested during combing operations.²³ However, it must be said that since the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and the subsequent Operation Raad-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan has seen a remarkable decline in violence related casualties across every region. Data compiled by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) shows a 73% decline in violence, from 7,655 fatalities in 2014 to 2,057 in 2017.^{3, 4, 5}


20 National Counterterrorism Authority. Proscribed persons. (2018, March 30). Retrieved on February 31, 2018 from <https://nacta.gov.pk/proscribed-persons/>.

21 NACTA. (2018, January 1). National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA) Achievements - 2018. Email to CRSS.

22 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017 .

23 Gishkori, Z. (2017, March 3). Daesh gradually gaining ground in Pakistan. The News. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/189914-Daesh-gradually-gaining-ground-in-Pakistan>.

Graph 3.4: Overall Decrease in Violence in Pakistan – 2014 vs. 2017



3.4.2 Proscribed Organizations and Watch Lists


The Ministry of Interior believes that most proscribed organizations do not have radical annexes and the Ministry does not intend to take action against such groups. According to the Ministry, it would be illogical to instantaneously act against all banned outfits.²⁴ As has already been mentioned, under the NAP, along with the Islamic State there are four additional organizations that have been added to the proscribed list, while four others have been added to the watch list.

3.4.3 Combing Operations by Security Forces

NACTA details the following statistics regarding efforts against militant outfits, armed gangs and proscribed outfits:

²⁴ Khan, I. A. (2015, January 11). Govt to act against 'violent banned outfits' only. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1156321>.

Graph 3.5: National Action Plan Enablers: Combing Operations and Arrests




The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Task	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Baloc.	ICT	GB	AJK	FATA	Total
Combing	108668	60807	39085	1760	940	1141	498	602	213501
Stop and Search	3838735	116600	2887	17169	12424	4729	4006	172	3996722
Arrests	21698	77218	189508	9194	4546	690	1667	1551	306072
IBOs*	2062	239	1164	8992	280	22	43	80	12882
Helpline	2945	215	299	57	197	4	18	8	3743
Intelligence Shared	408	991	1290	614	185	172	164	1285	5109

*Intelligence-Based Operations

Graph 3.6: National Action Plan Enablers: Intelligence-Based Operations




3.5 Communication Systems

3.5.1 Communication Systems – Mobile SIMs

Under the National Action Plan, the government began the process of verifying mobile SIMs in the country. According to the figures released by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority's (PTA) Annual Report 2015, out of the 215.4 million SIMs that were verified in total 98.3 million SIMs had been blocked by the authorities under the Biometric Verification System (BVS). This number of blocked SIMs has not changed since.

Graph 3.7: SIM Re-Verification Statistics (in millions)²⁵



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

The efficacy of this step can perhaps best be summarized by the last point in NACTA’s 2017 summary, which states that a meeting has been called of all relevant stakeholders to address the issues of the re-emergence of illegal SIMs.²⁶

A positive step has been the establishment of a dedicated complaint cell managed by PTA (complaint@pta.gov.pk). Using this email, any citizen can send an email to report any erroneous activity in BVS by mobile service providers. Citizens are also encouraged to send an email if their phone was lost or stolen, to block their International Mobile Equipment Identify (IMEI).²⁵

Between December 2014 and December 2017, mobile services were shut down on 19 separate instances to “prevent untoward incidents”. This step treats symptoms, but not the root cause of the problem, and has little efficacy. Mobile services were

²⁵ Note that this graph is from last year’s report. However, the numbers have not changed since.

²⁶ Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

suspended on the following dates during this period:

1. March 23, 2015. Pakistan Day Parade²⁷
3. August 14, 2015. Independence Day²⁸
4. September 6, 2015. Defense Day (Islamabad)²⁹
5. October 23 and 24, 2015. Youm-e-Ashura³⁰
6. November 27, 2015. Abdul Aziz sermon, former cleric Red Mosque (G-6, G-7, Islamabad)³¹
7. December 18, 2015. Red Mosque administration protest (Islamabad, Rawalpindi)³²
8. March, 20, 2016. Pakistan Day Parade Rehearsal (Islamabad)³³
9. March, 23, 2016. Pakistan Day Parade (Islamabad)³⁴
10. March 27-30, 2016. Mumtaz Qadri Protests (Islamabad, Rawalpindi)³⁵
11. March 28, 2016. Lahore Bombing Aftermath (Various)³⁶

27 (2015, March 23). Mobile, internet services suspended for parade. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/23-Mar-2015/mobile-internet-services-suspended-for-parade>.

28 (2015, August 13). Cellular services suspended in Islamabad ahead of Independence Day. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/937276/cellular-services-suspended-in-islamabad-ahead-of-independence-day/>.

29 (2015, September 03). No cell phone service on 6th. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/03-Sep-2015/no-cell-phone-service-on-6th>.

30 Web Desk. (2015, October 20). Mobile services to be suspended in 68 districts on Muharram 9, 10, Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/national/20-Oct-2015/mobile-services-to-be-suspended-in-68-districts-on-muharram-9-10>.

31 Ali, K. (2015, November 28). Cellphone service 'suspended'. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1222836>.

32 Rana, S. (2015, December 18). Cellular services restored after temporary suspension in parts of Islamabad. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1012238/cellular-services-suspended-in-parts-of-islamabad/>.

33 Web Desk. (2016, March 21, 2016). Mobile phone service suspended in Islamabad for Pakistan Day parade rehearsal. Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/03/21/mobile-phone-service-suspended-in-islamabad-for-pakistan-day-parade-rehearsal/>.

34 APP/Web Desk. (2016, March 23, 2016). Military parade to mark Pakistan Day held in Islamabad. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1071013/pakistan-day-celebrations-kick-off-with-military-parade/>.

35 News Desk. (2016, March 28). Qadri supporters continue sit-in for second day outside Parliament. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1074165/pro-qadri-supporters-continue-sit-in-for-second-day-outside-parliament/>.

36 Hassan, D. (2016, March 28). Pakistan in mourning as toll from Lahore bombing rises. The Boston Globe. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/03/28/pakistan-mourning-toll-from-lahore-bombing-rises/AlmcD1wKwaWe3QAEEJHM/story.html>.

12. August 14, 2016. Independence Day (Islamabad)³⁷
13. September 5, 2016. Defense Day (Rawalpindi)³⁸
14. October 19-21. Ashura Processions (Various – 42 cities)^{39 40}
15. November 21, 2016. Imam Hussain Chehlum (Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, GB)⁴¹
16. March 23, 2017. Pakistan Day (parts of Islamabad)⁴²
17. September 30, 2017. Youm-e-Ashura (most parts of the country)⁴³
18. November 30, 2017. 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal (Sindh)⁴⁴
19. November 6-27, 2017. Faizabad Protests (countrywide, various)

This suspension of mobile phone services was challenged in in the Islamabad High Court (IHC). The IHC, in turn, put the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and three private telecom service providers in connection with petitions against frequent suspension of mobile phone service in the federal capital. The petition argued that service may only be suspended at the threshold statutory requirement of issuance of “Proclamation of Emergency” by the President.⁴⁵ There has been no further development on this front, and while mobile suspensions have declined, they still occur quite predictably. NACTA also believes that the suspension does

37 Altaf, A. (2016, August 13). Independence Day: Cell service to be suspended in capital till noon. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1161243/independence-day-cell-service-suspended-capital-till-noon/>.

38 Raja, M. (2016, September 06). Mobile phone services suspended in Rawalpindi. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1176709/defence-day-mobile-phone-services-suspended-rawalpindi/>.

39 Mansoor, H. (2016, September 29). Govt decides to suspend cellphone, internet services on Ashura. *Dawn*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1287002>.

40 Correspondent. (2016, October 11). Cellular service to be blocked in 42 cities. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1196926/muharram-security-cellular-service-blocked-42-cities/>.

41 Firdous, I. (2016, November 21). Cellular services suspended in parts of Pakistan. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1238106/cellular-services-suspended-parts-pakistan/>.

42 Pakistan Day: Fervour with a side of roadblocks, phone closure. (2017, March 24). *Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1364244/pakistan-day-fervour-side-roadblocks-phone-closure/>.

43 Ashura security: Cellular services suspended in most parts of country. (2017, September 30). *ARY News*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://arynews.tv/en/mobile-phone-services-suspended-in-some-parts-of-country/>.

44 Mobile phones to go silent in Sindh. (2017, November 30). *Samaa*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/11/mobile-phones-go-silent-sindh/>.

45 Shehzad, R. (2016, April 26). Mobile service suspension: PTA, service providers put on notice. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1092273/mobile-service-suspension-pta-service-providers-put-on-notice/>.

reduce the chance of a terror attack.

3.5.2 Communication Systems – Print and Electronic Media

Points #11, #13 and #14 of the NAP are relevant when looking at government efforts against the glorification of proscribed organizations through communication networks, i.e. print, electronic media and the internet.

Electronic Media

In November 2015, nearly a year into the implementation of NAP, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) ordered a blackout of all coverage pertaining to proscribed activities.⁴⁶ Geo TV in April 2017 complied to a PEMRA directive, prohibiting it from airing an interview with former Taliban spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan.⁴⁷ In November 2017, all channels were taken off air to prevent coverage of the Faizabad protests, led by controversial cleric Khadim Rizvi.⁴⁸

Print Media

There is no regulatory authority for print media. The combined All Pakistan Newspaper Society (APNS) and the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE) act as a de-facto alliance of newspapers but there is no check and balance over the coverage or glorification of terror groups or activities in certain print outlets. This remains a major problem and there exists no tangible solution to manage it.

In September 2017 a draft bill was proposed that places restrictions on print media and restrict freedom of press. Called the Pakistan Print Media Regulatory Authority (PPMRA) Ordinance 2017, the proposed bill was universally rejected by journalists who threatened stage-ins and hunger strikes.⁴⁹ According to the

46 AFP. (2015, November 03). PEMRA orders blackout of proscribed groups - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/984060/media-coverage-pemra-orders-blackout-of-proscribed-groups/>.

47 GEO TV barred from airing interview with Ehsanullah Ehsan. (2017, April 27). Tribune. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1395014/pemra-bars-geo-tv-airing-ttp-ex-commander-interview/>.

48 Hussain, J. (2017, November 25). News channels go off air, Facebook and YouTube blocked in parts of Pakistan. Dawn. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1372804>.

49 Correspondent. (2017, September 11). Govt proposes law to gag print media. The Express Tribune. Retrieved March 02, 2018 from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1502802/govt-proposes-law-gag-print-media/>.

proposed measures, the government may suspend publication for 16 days, close offices, impose Rs1 million fine and order imprisonment of up to six months. Printing licenses would be renewed annually, pending review from a committee of 12, comprised of 4 journalists and 8 government-appointed individuals. There has been no update on the PPMRA since.

3.5.3 Communication Systems – Online

Tat’heer Drive

NACTA has launched Tat’heer, a multi-pronged cyber counterterrorism drive which includes mapping of radical content available on internet/social media.⁵⁰ In NACTA’s own words: “The Tat’heer drive intends to achieve its goal by setting up a specialized National Cyber Counter-terrorism Unit (NCCU) with the following capacities:

1. “Technological Cyber-security Analysis by employing Software Engineer(s) and developing state of the art software (like web spiders/ crawlers, natural language processors and classifiers etc). That can sniff radical or extremist content on internet and social media,
2. “Internet Patrol Capacity which can glean through potentially extremist content and report it for blocking (through PTA) and/ or penal action under Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (FIA, NR3C, Cyber Crime Wing).
3. “Develop and Disseminate Counter-narrative and project moderate values through academia, intelligentsia, cyber-activists, consultants and NACTA’s Committee on Counter-narrative thereby reclaiming space in cyber-space vis-a-vis radical and extremist propaganda.”

In addition, NACTA is also developing iOS and Android apps for Tat’heer.

While this is a solid initiative to try to get a sense of the extremist presence online, and the various tools used to indoctrinate and recruit, a scathing report in Dawn reveals debilitating weaknesses in Pakistan’s efforts to curb online extremism.⁵¹ The report, launched in April 2017, showed that of the then 64 banned organizations, 41 were present online in the form of hundreds of pages, groups and individual

⁵⁰ Tat’heer Drive. (2017, October 12). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://nacta.gov.pk/tatheer-drive/>.

⁵¹ Banned outfits in Pakistan operate openly on Facebook. (2017, September 14). Dawn. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335561>.

user profiles.

Surfsafe Portal

Another step by the state is to establish Surfsafe® Portal, designed to help report extremist or hateful content.⁵² There is currently no data available as to how this portal has been used to curb online extremism. This is not to say the state is incapable of muzzling content online, as the state has proven alarmingly capable of shutting down online content that it finds unpleasant.

Internet Access Freedoms

Coupled with the introduction of 3G and 4G services, Pakistan is experiencing massive growth in the field of telecommunications. This is also something that comes with its own set of challenges as regards the NAP.

Freedom House, an NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights, published its 2017 annual study of internet freedom around the world. The report examined the civil liberty, freedom and censorship trends in Pakistan over 2016-2017. It claimed that internet penetration was at 15.5% for a population of 193.2 million, and for the sixth consecutive year, Pakistan was labeled 'not free'.⁵³ On the scale, Pakistan scored 71/100 where 0 = most free and 100 = least free. The report detailed significant obstacles to access, limits on content, and severe violations of users' rights. This is a direct consequence of policies that curtail freedom and civil liberties.

'Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill 2015' (PECB)

A major contributing factor is that the PECB was passed in August 2016 by the National Assembly. This was considered a major achievement as the government was seen to have come up with an effective legal tool to tackle more comprehensively the activities of proscribed organizations through the electronic media.⁵⁴ However this law has also come under strong criticism by human rights activists, politicians, Information Technology (IT) specialists and civil society

52 Surfsafe Portal. <https://surfsafe.pk>.

53 Pakistan Country Profile. (2017). Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/pakistan>.

54 Khan, Raza. (2016, August 11). Cyber crime bill passed by NA: 13 reasons Pakistanis should be worried. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1276662>.

experts who label it a violation of Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan that guarantees freedom of speech and expression, as well as freedom of the press to the people of Pakistan.

Blocked websites

The second year audit of the NAP showed 933 URLs that has been blocked by the government because they contained content that was anti-state, or extremist in nature. No such figure is available for the third year.

In December, it was also reported that 937 URLs have been blocked by the Ministry of Information Technology, including 10 websites of banned organizations.⁵⁵ By simple mathematical deduction, the government blocked a grand total of four URLs in 2017. Coupled with the fact that 41 of the banned organizations still have extensive and easily accessible online presence, this area needs significant revamp and recalibration.

3.6 Terror Financing

3.6.1 Terror Financing – Sources

Terror financing remains a significant hurdle to overcome for Pakistan. Former NACTA Chief Hamid Khan along with Interior Secretary Shahid Khan, while briefing a parliamentary committee in June 2015, stated that labeling an organization as proscribed alone was ineffective as this did nothing to impede the financial supply lines of these groups.

Apart from foreign funding, some other sources of terror financing include abductions, charities, drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling, and robberies.⁵⁶ Animal hides are also a source of terror financing in Punjab and Sindh and Balochistan with billions of rupees being earned through the sale of these hides every year.⁵⁷

55 Guramani, N. (2017, December 09). Govt blocks 937 URLs, 98.3m SIMs under National Action Plan. Dawn. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1375535>.

56 Javed, A. (2013, September 27). Strict check on terror-financing key to end terrorism. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/laohore/27-Sep-2013/strict-check-on-terror-financing-key-to-end-terrorism>.

57 Hussain, A. (2015, September 24). MQM among 293 parties permitted to collect animal hides on Eid. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/09/24/city/>

It also didn't help that despite taking significant steps, Pakistan remained on the radar of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog tracking terror financing.⁵⁸

3.6.2 Terror Financing – Steps

The Pakistan Center for Philanthropy is a NACTA-mandated portal that lists safe charities that people can donate to under religious obligation or personal motivation.⁵⁹ The database can be searched geographically, alphabetically and thematically. The 11 categories listed include:

- Arts, Culture, Humanities
- Animal Rights
- Community Development
- Education
- Environment
- Health
- Disaster Risk Management
- Microfinance
- Human and Civil Rights
- Water and Sanitation
- Research and Public Policy

The following is additional steps taken by the state to curb terror financing, according to the NACTA 2017 report.⁶⁰

A model law was drafted for the facilitation and regulation of charities based on recommendation number 5 of the sub-committee on choking terror financing. The purpose of the law is to ensure that every penny is accounted for. However, this is merely a draft and with elections looming in August 2018, will likely not see the light of day until 2019, if at all.

A national task force on choking financing of terrorism was formulated, which is a coordinating body with over 20 federal and provincial organizations.

karachi/ mqm-among-293-parties-permitted-to-collect-animal-hides-on-eid.

58 Syed, B. S. (2017, July 01). Pakistan still on radar of terror financing watchdog. Dawn. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1342535>.

59 The Pakistan Center for Philanthropy. (n.d.). Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://pcp.org.pk/pagestyle.php>.

60 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.


There is regulation of cross-border currency, and effective regulation of branchless/ internet banking. However, there is no tangible data shared to support this claim, or explain what this means precisely.

Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) have been formulated in all provinces and regions, and within the CTDs, specialized units for Countering Financing of Terrorism (CTF units) are being developed.

A major cause for concern has been the Hundi/Hawala system that allows for traceless monetary transactions between individuals and/or organizations. Money laundering and Suspicious Transaction Reports are other elements that are of some concern to the authorities. Regarding these, the following progress has been made in up to 2017.


Table 3.2 - Choking Terror Financing		
Hundi Hawala	Cases	919
	Arrests	1209
	Recovery*	1489.9
Anti-Money Laundering	Cases	426
	Arrests	574
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STUs)	Converted into Cases	49
	Closed	48
	Under Process	110
	Total STRs received from FMUs	207

Graph 3.8: Choking Terror Financing – Hundi Hawala




The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Graph 3.9: Choking Terror Financing – Anti-Money Laundering



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Graph 3.10: Choking Terror Financing – Suspicious Transaction Reports



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

3.7 Pitfalls in the Government's Approach

The government has devised legal as well as practical tools to tackle the menace of terrorism and terrorist organizations. Still, the overall results are far from encouraging. Loopholes in the government's actions/performance against the banned organizations can be gauged from the following major incidents and reports.

3.7.1 Quetta Commission Inquiry Report

The Quetta Inquiry Commission Report revealed serious pitfalls in the government's dealing with proscribed organizations. The Commission was established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to conduct a detailed inquiry of the suicide attack on

Quetta's Civil Hospital in August 2016 which killed 74 people.

Among other findings of the report, two revelations were strikingly alarming in this respect.⁶¹ First, the report regretted the fact that some of the organizations enjoyed unfathomable freedom in carrying out their activities even if they had been proscribed. The case at hand is that of ASWJ that held public meetings while the government displayed outright indifference. The Commission noted that making the matter worse, Interior Minister Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan held a meeting with Ahmed Ludhianvi "the head of three banned organizations (SSP, Millat-e-Islamia and ASWJ) heard his demands and conceded to them as per media reports."

Second, despite the fact that there was ample evidence to declare Jamatul Ahrar, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Al- Almi and Jundhullah as banned terrorist organizations, the government dithered on the decision. It not only illustrates the discrepancies in government policies but also shows the inefficiency of state institutions.

3.7.2 Reemergence of Banned Outfits

The challenge of dealing with terrorist organizations is two-fold. Point 7 of the NAP states that banned outfits will not be allowed to resurface under any other name. The government seems to be struggling on this count. Many banned outfits have resurfaced "under pseudonyms and new aliases all the while challenging the state's authority."⁶² Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) that was banned in 2002 and then in 2003 has been active under the new name of Millat-e-Islami.

Similarly, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan (TJP) are banned organizations but have been carrying out their activities without any effective checks and control of the state. The latest in this string of events is the registration of Hafiz Saeed's political organization, and the establishment of TAJK.

61 Iqbal, N. (2016, December 16). Damning indictment of govt inaction against militant bodies. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1302637/damning-indictment-of-govt-inaction-against-militant-bodies>.

62 Tanoli, Qadeer. (2016, June 8). Banned groups continue to resurface under new name". Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1118483/weak-enforcement-banned-groups-continue-resurface-new-names/>.

3.8 Conclusion

The government's attempts to reign in proscribed organizations have seen moderate success, but a lot is left desired. Banned organizations seem to be exceptionally prolific in the online space, hold public events, and members contest elections without consequence. The Fourth Schedule list, which is regularly updated, is not universally enforced. The problem, as is often the case in Pakistan, is not the lack of laws or regulations, but enforcement and strict adherence to the rule of law.

The confluence of these factors creates a safe zone for these organizations to exist, operate and prosper. If Pakistan wants to be seen as a normal state by the rest of the world, it will have to cut all ties with such organizations, and move forward with zero tolerance for anti-state activities, within and without Pakistan.

3.9 What does the term “proscribed” solve?

by Zeeshan Salahuddin

The word proscribed has become a part of the national vocabulary of Pakistan. Despite its extended usage, few understand what the term actually means. Common sense dictates that certain actions should follow the proscription decision; freezing assets, monitoring communication networks, closely observing members, disallowing public gatherings or rallies, and discontinuing all operations. There exists no specific, agreed-upon mechanism after banning any organization, and actions taken are at the behest of the Interior Ministry with no sense of consistency. Former NACTA Chief Hamid Khan, along with Interior Secretary Shahid Khan, while briefing a parliamentary committee in June 2015, said that the implementation of NAP along banned outfits was not at the pace it needed to be. They also said that the act of banning a group was largely ineffective.

In fact, of the 60 banned organizations, all proscribed before the APS tragedy, nearly all were operating in the country unimpeded. The assets of these proscribed organizations, some on the list for 13 years, were finally frozen in January, 2015.⁶³ “The assets of all the banned outfits have been frozen,” Foreign Office spokesperson Tasneem Aslam said in her weekly press briefing. Nearly a year into the implementation of NAP, in November 2015, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) ordered a blackout of all coverage pertaining to proscribed activities, a fact that in of itself shows the impunity with which said organizations continued to operate.⁶⁴

Three additional factors, among many others, impede the necessary steps to be taken to deal with proscribed groups.

First, there is significant opposition from within the government. As an example, despite JuD being added to the watchlist, Minister for Defence Production Rana Tanveer Hussain raised objections, stating that it was a charity organization, and not engaged in any terror activities.

Second, there are massive communication gaps within the system, as exemplified

63 Web Desk. (2015, January 22). Assets of all banned outfits, including Jamaat ud Dawa, frozen: FO - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/825732/assets-of-all-banned-outfits-including-jamaat-ud-dawa-frozen-fo>.

64 AFP. (2015, November 03). PEMRA orders blackout of proscribed groups - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/984060/media-coverage-pem-ra-orders-blackout-of-proscribed-groups/>.

by the refusal of Inspector General of Islamabad Police to disallow rallies of proscribed organizations, stating that he had not been communicated any formal list of banned organizations.

Third, several organizations, post-proscription, simply reform under a near umbrella and continue operating. In January, 2015, it was reported that up to 23 banned organizations were operating in the country under different names. The government, historically, has had some difficulty tracking reformed groups.

The government needs to seriously re-evaluate its strategy on dealing with proscribed outfits. An agreed upon set of steps need to be implemented without prejudice or bias. The sympathizers need to be brought to task, within the government and without, and political pointscoring or pressure tactics need to take a back seat to stability and security.

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PART 4: COUNTER-TERRORISM

Part 4: Table of Contents

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- 4.2 Decline in Violence in Pakistan
- 4.3 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
- 4.5 CPEC Security
- 4.6 Conclusion
- 4.7 Future of NACTA amid NAP and NISP - by Dr. Farhan Zahid

NAP POINT 3:

Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.

NAP POINT 4:

NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.

NAP POINT 8:

Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.

NAP POINT 15:

No room will be left for the extremism in any part of the country.

NAP POINT 11:

Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and social media.

NAP POINT 6:

All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen.

These themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 4: COUNTER-TERRORISM

4.1 Introduction

The fourth theme comprises of several points in the NAP, specifically [#4](#), [#8](#), and [#15](#). This theme deals with the issue of counter-terrorism efforts in Pakistan.

There is also significant overlap with the third theme pertaining to banned outfits and the NAP points that constitute that theme. Specifically points [#3](#), [#6](#), [#11](#), and [#14](#) all overlap. The overlapping points have been addressed by the previous chapter and will not be covered here.

4.2 Decline in Violence in Pakistan

4.2.1 Overall Decline

Pakistan once again ranked in the top five countries most affected by terrorism according to the Global Terrorism Index 2017, but people killed by terrorism reduced by 12% to 956 deaths worldwide.¹ According to the Center for Research and Security Studies' Annual Security Report, data between 2014 and 2017 shows an over 73% decline in violence-related fatalities, from 7,655 fatalities in 2014 to 2,057 in 2017.^{2, 3, 4}

1 Global Terrorism Index, 2017. Retrieved February 25, 2018 from <http://globalterrorismindex.org>.

2 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.


3 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2017, March 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2016. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2016-Final.pdf>.

4 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018, March 18). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved March 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

The comparative provincial data below depicts this further.

Province/Region	2014	2017
Balochistan	752	489
Sindh	2193	455
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	3400	436
Punjab	307	469
Khyber Puktunkhwa (KP)	941	192
Gilgit Baltistan (GB)	3	0
Islamabad	48	16
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)	6	0
Total	7650	2057
Percentage difference:		73.1%

Graph 4.1: Violence-Related Deaths in Pakistan by Region – 2014 vs. 2017



The only exception is Punjab with an alarming percentage rise in violence-related deaths, which is problematic for the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N).

Of the top five districts with the highest fatalities, three were provincial capitals – Karachi (337), Lahore (149) and Quetta (128). In Punjab, there was a 10% increase in violent related fatalities from 2016, with 469 fatalities in 2017. Balochistan (489) had the highest number of fatalities, followed by Punjab (469), Sindh (455) and the FATA (436). The largest change was observed, once again, in KP, where fatalities dropped from 357 in 2016 to 192 in 2017: a decline of 53%.

The primary sources of violence that resulted in fatalities included encounters with law enforcement (495), gun violence (399), suicide attacks (298), and bomb explosions (144). Despite the overall decrease, sectarian violence escalated dramatically, with a 32% increase overall. A total of 319 individuals lost their lives to sectarian violence in 2017, as opposed to 241 in 2016.

Internationally and domestically, terrorism has witnessed a decline. Daish lost territory in Iraq and Syria, while Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) lost its sanctuaries in the tribal regions of Pakistan. However, territorial loss does not translate to complete elimination, as they continued sporadic attacks throughout the year. Domestically, religious parties in favor of the militants either openly supported the Taliban or provided support in elections for the candidates who were considered to be affiliated with some banned outfits. Blasphemy accusations witnessed a sharp rise in the country involving social activists, media persons, and political party leaders like Imran Khan. A sit-in at Faizabad by a newly formed religious party, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYR) was also in opposition to altering blasphemy laws.

The shrinking operational space for militant groups has forced them to change their tactics, thus complicating and testing the security response. Militants also changed their focus to try and inflict damage that would legitimize their presence. Violence along neighboring borders increased significantly. The cross border attacks by the Afghan-based militants revealed that a majority of them were Pakistani militants who had crossed borders during the Zarb-e-Azb operation. Additionally, of special consideration is the target killing and battering of media persons in various incidents across the country.

4.2.2 Major Attacks in 2017

Several places of worship, or religious shrines were targeted in 2017.⁵ Prominent among them was the attack on Lal Shahbaz Qalandar shrine in Sehwan, which left 88 dead and was claimed by the Islamic State (IS). At least 343 others were wounded. An Imambargah in Parachinar, Kurram Agency was targeted, leaving 23 dead and 73 injured. This attack on the Shia community was claimed by Jamaatul Ahrar (JA). At least 21 people were killed and another 30 injured at Pir Rakhel Shah Shrine, Jhal Magsi in October. IS claimed responsibility for this attack as well. Finally, the Bethel Memorial Methodist Church in Quetta was attacked in December, resulting in 10 deaths and 50 injuries.

Civilians also bore the brunt of militant and terror attacks in 2017. Parachinar markets were targeted with major attacks twice. First, 25 people were killed and 87 injured by a timed IED device in January. Two banned groups – the LeJ-A and the Sheheryar Mehsud-led Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan faction – claimed responsibility for the attack. Second, Turi Bazaar was targeted by twin blasts that claimed 67 lives and left over 200 injured in June. The attack was claimed by the LeJ-A.

Much like the prior attacks on educational institutions, four burqa-clad gunmen in possession of suicide vests stormed the hostel of Peshawar's Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) on December 1. At least 9 people were killed and 37 injured in the attack, which was claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

As mentioned above, Punjab saw a marked increase in violence in this year. This was partly due to three attacks aimed at security forces in the provincial capital of Lahore. In February, at least 13 people were killed and another 85 injured on Mall Road in Lahore when a suicide bomber attacked a protest in front of Punjab Assembly. JA claimed responsibility. In June, on Ferozepur Road in Lahore, a motorcycle bomb targeted security officials, killing 26 and injuring 58. A census team in Lahore was also attacked in April, killing 6 and injuring 19. The TTP claimed responsibility for both attacks.

Besides these major attacks, senior police officials were targeted in Balochistan, Karachi and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, while army officials were targeted extensively in Balochistan.

⁵ 2017 in review: Major terror attacks to strike Pakistan this year. (2018, February 28). Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1379162>.

4.2.3 Counterterrorism Operations

Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad

On February 22, 2017, a major offensive was launched across the country to eliminate the threat of terrorism, tighter border control, and consolidating the gains of the 2014-launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb. This initiative, called Radd-ul-Fasaad, has active participation from both military and civilian law enforcement organizations, as well as the Ministry of Interior.⁶ The term literally means “elimination of source of discord”. The Operation was also a response to Operation Ghazi, launched by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar earlier in the month, resulting in 21 major and minor attacks (please see Annex VI: February 2017 Terror Attacks).

Other major features of this operation were broad spectrum security by Rangers in Punjab, continuation of operations in Karachi, Balochistan and FATA to eliminate militants, and nationwide disarmament and explosive control. As a result, law enforcement agencies reported seizures of large caches of weapons from urban areas, arrests of members of gangs and banned outfits, as well as apprehending would-be suicide bombers.⁷

In December, while briefing lawmakers on national security, Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Sahir Shamshad Mirza shared that since the launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, 1,249 combing and intelligence-based operations (IBOs) had been conducted in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).⁸ In addition, 31 major operations had been carried out in the region. In Punjab, 13,011 operations were carried out, of which 7 were major operations. Meanwhile 1,410 operations were conducted in Balochistan, of which 29 were major operations. Of the 2,015 operations conducted in Sindh since the start of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, 7 were major operations. For further details on the progress in Punjab (as detailed in point #15 of the NAP) please see Section 6.6 Punjab.


6 Pakistan Army launches ‘Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad’ across the country. (2017, February 22). Dawn. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316332/pakistan-army-launches-operation-radd-ul-fasaad-across-the-country>.

7 Ali, J. (2017, April 22). US human rights report takes aim at ‘abuses’ in 200 states. The Daily Times. Retrieved on February 28, 2018, from <https://dailytimes.com.pk/231014/us-human-rights-report-takes-aim-at-abuses-in-200-states/>.

8 Guramani, N. (2017, December 19). COAS briefs Senators on National Security. Dawn. Retrieved March 19, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1377559>.

The DGMO said that 18,001 IBOs were conducted in total. He added that 4,983 search-based operations were conducted, and 19,993 weapons were recovered.


Graph 4.2: IBOs across Pakistan after Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

A major source for decline in violence in Pakistan has been the improving situation in Karachi. Although the city was once considered a hub for political/religious militancy and urban crime, Karachi's security situation has improved dramatically since 2014. Data collected by the CRSS Annual Security Report of 2017 confirms these trends. Target killing alone fell from 1,671 fatalities in 2013 to 84 in 2017. Meanwhile, terrorism incidents have also reduced drastically in the last two years.


Graph 4.3: Target Killing Statistics in District Karachi – 2013-2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

In the briefing to lawmakers, the DGMO shared that since the Rangers’ operation began in Karachi in 2013, 8,780 suspects have been handed over to the police, 12,105 weapons have been seized and 1,948 terrorists have been apprehended. He also added that 154 abductees had been freed from captivity and 154 kidnappers arrested. He shared that 24 soldiers had also been martyred in that time.

Graph 4.4: Progress in Karachi since Rangers' Deployment in 2013



The briefing was undertaken by the military after criticism that it does not take civilian leadership into confidence about the operations and was viewed as a positive step. This was the first time in six years that military leadership had briefed lawmakers in Pakistan.

Please also see [Section 3.4.3 Combing Operations by Security Forces](#).

4.3 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

4.3.1 Progress on NACTA

NACTA Revamp

The revamping of the latent NACTA was initiated by the Prime Minister on December 28, 2014. In order to achieve the intended results, the then PM stressed on sound coordination between the provincial and federal governments and the law enforcement agencies. However, progress on this was largely glacial and did not bear much fruit. The bulk of the direct counter-terrorism operations in the country have been carried out by the military, with assorted raids by police forces in various provinces.

In January 2017, in an exclusive interview with CRSS, the National Coordinator of NACTA, Ihsan Ghani, stated that contrary to common perceptions, the National

Counter Terrorism Authority in the last 3 years had grown and performed its functions as per Section 4 of the NACTA Act, 2013. NACTA itself claims that the organization has been successfully operationalized.

NACTA Offices

One of the biggest criticisms of the state regarding NACTA has been that there is no space dedicated for NACTA offices, and that the organization was split into three separate locations in the capital. NACTA’s NAP Review states that two buildings in G7 Sector in Islamabad earmarked to house the various components of NACTA, and they are currently being renovated and refurbished.⁹

NACTA Funding

In addition, in 2017/2018, Rs. 1,643.019 million was approved, though only Rs. 530.839 million has been released.

Table 4.2 - NACTA Budget and Revisions - 2013 - 2017			
Year	Original Budget	Revised Budget	Total budget
2013-14	95.000	-	95.000
2014-15	92.040	-	92.040
2015-16	100.337	1110.652	1210.989
2016-17	109.424	1450.000	1559.424
2017-18		530.839 (released)	1643.019
Note: All units are in millions of rupees.			

However, this contrasts with an APP report from February 21, 2017 that states the government released an amount of Rs. 1.4 billion (Rs. 1,400 million), for NACTA. This information was shared by State Minister for Interior Baligh-ur-Rehman in a meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on Interior and Narcotics Control.¹⁰ Further, in the 2017/2018 budget, only Rs140 million of the total allocation of Rs91.18 billion for internal security and law and order was earmarked for NACTA.¹¹ These three sources make the financing of NACTA a very convoluted subject.

9 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

10 Rs1.4bn released for Nacta. (2017, February 21). The Nation. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/21-Feb-2017/rs14bn-released-for-nacta>.

11 Mukhtar, I. (2017, May 27). With peanuts for Nacta, law & order given Rs91 billion. The Nation. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/27-May-2017/with-peanuts-for-nacta-law-order-given-rs91-billion>.

NACTA Human Resources

The following is the status of human resource recruitment, which began in 2016. There has been no further update on human resources since.

Table 4.3 - Human Resource Position of NACTA		
Grade	June, 2013	December, 2016
17 through 22	14	31
1 through 16	58	73
Total	72	104

NACTA JID

In the 2017 interview, the National Coordinator stated that the Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) is the most sensitive and integral component of the National Counter Terrorism Authority and is part of the process to strengthen NACTA for its full functionalization. The 2018 NAP Review document states that the JID is now being staffed, and has received the first office building as well as initial group of officers. In February, Brigadier Imran Mushtaq was revealed to head the JID.¹²

4.3.2 Progress by NACTA

Note: Please also see Section 4.7: Future of NACTA amid NAP and NISP, by Dr. Farhan Zahid, NACTA.

National Coordination and Reviews

The National Coordinator Ihsan Ghani informed CRSS that NACTA has introduced new initiatives within both provincial and federal bodies and has been monitoring the implementation of NAP.¹³ Below is a list meetings held to review NAP by various stakeholders. Of note is the fact that the prime minister, interior minister, minister of state, and interior secretary chaired no reviews the entirety of 2017. National Coordinator Ihsan Ghani chaired two meetings, and the other NACTA NAP meetings in 2017 were conducted at the provincial level.

¹² Gishkori, Z. (2017, February 21). Brig Imran to head Joint Directorate of Intelligence. The News. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/187832-Brig-Imran-to-head-Joint-Directorate-of-Intelligence>.

¹³ CRSS Exclusive Interview with National Coordinator Ihsan Ghani on January 18, 2017.

Table 4.4 - Meetings at the Federal/Provincial Level¹		
Chaired by	2016 (and prior)	2017
Prime Minister	3	0
Minister for Interior	5	0
Minister of State for Interior	1	0
Chaired by Secretary Interior	1	0
Chaired by NC NACTA	22	2
Provincial Apex Committees	42	19
Total Meetings Held	74	21

Madaris' Mainstreaming, their Registration and Data Forms

This point is covered in greater detail in Chapter 7: Seminaries. In summary, NACTA's progress has not seen much movement past the milestones of prior years, in that NACTA developed Madaris data and registration forms in consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), and other federal and provincial stakeholders with the objective that only registered madrassas be allowed to operate in the country. According to the National Security Division, several high-level meetings have been conducted in 2017 with the purpose of driving reforms and mainstreaming. Please see Part 7: Seminaries for details.

Development of National Narrative (NCEP)

According to National Coordinator Ihsan Ghani, the draft for the national narrative on combating extremism was developed over 18 months in consultation with "academia, Ulema and the media".¹⁴ This draft was submitted to the government in October, 2017, despite being finalized in January, after a national conference held on the 14th and 15th.¹⁵ Officially, it is called the National Counter Extremism Policy (NCEP).

In a report published by Dunya News, the NCEP would bar individual and groups from issuing *fatwas* that label someone an unbeliever, obligate religious leaders to promote interfaith harmony, take strict action against false blasphemy

¹⁴ NACTA submits draft of national narrative to govt. (2017, October 31). Tribune. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1545683/1-nacta-submits-draft-national-narrative-govt/>.

¹⁵ National narrative on extremism finalised. (2018, January 31). Tribune. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1622499/1-national-narrative-extremism-finalised/>.

accusations, close madrassas with ties to extremism, bind charity organizations to register and maintain updated records, and remove religious entity from the national identification cards.¹⁶

The Express Tribune also lists consistency in the national education system, FATA reforms, provincial parity, good governance, bridging the trust deficit between citizen and state, and prison reforms as additional goals of the NCEP.¹⁷

Formally, NCEP lists the following as the mandate:

- a. **Rule of law and service delivery:** Evaluation of weakness of state agencies and their strengthening to respond vigorously against organized crimes and violence for upholding rule of law, and ensure public service delivery
- b. **Citizen Engagement:** Meaningful community and citizenry engagement in social development activities at gross-root, tehsil, level.
- c. **Media Engagement:** To turn the media into 'battlefield' to defeat the militant and extremist ideas through disseminating national counter extremist narrative, and denying media access to extremists ideologies.
- d. **Integrated Educational Reforms:** The policy framework contains guidelines for preventing violent extremism through renewed educational policies and carrying out reforms at provincial and federal levels to defeat extremist narratives.
- e. **Reformation, Reintegration and Renunciation:** Rehabilitation of individuals previously joined terror groups and de-radicalization of those involved in violent extremism. It also deters that the erstwhile hostile environment is now in control of the state. It delineates political freedom, guaranteeing fundamental rights of citizens and putting in place basic socio-economic needs of the people. The policy has recommended a number of measures for rehabilitation of those individuals previously involved in militancy.
- f. **Promotion of Culture:** The policy framework has underlined the need for cultural revival through following initiatives:
 1. Promotion of Theatre

¹⁶ Pakistan's new national narrative to ban kafir fatwas, slash column of religious identity from CNIC. (2017, December 18). Dunya News. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/419596-Pakistan's-new-national-narrative-to-ban-kafir-fatwas,-slash-column-of-r>.

¹⁷ Tanoli, Q. (2017, September 10). NACTA devises policy to curb militancy at grass-roots level. Tribune. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1502378/nacta-devises-policy-curb-militancy-grass-roots-level/>.

2. Promotion of Music & other Performing Arts
3. Encouraging folklore and traditional culture
4. Preservation of archaeological sites and tangible culture
5. Inculcating cultural principles and priorities into the young generation
6. Documentation and promotion of intangible culture
7. Promoting diversity of culture through film, radio & TV programs
8. Protecting culture of neglected and minority communities
9. Restore & protect endangered cultures, cultural heritage sites, crafts and languages
10. Promoting the pluralistic face of Pakistan at international level

If adopted and implemented, this narrative will be a very strong step towards putting the country on a path of inclusivity and tolerance, upholding coexistence and maintaining and celebrating diversity.

Measures against Proscribed Organizations

Please see Section 3.4 Measures against Proscribed Organizations.

Geo-mapping

In addition to geo-mapping seminars, NACTA also coordinated with the Balochistan and Sindh police departments and the Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB) to geo-map the provincial capitals of Karachi and Quetta. The two cities have a long-standing history of urban crime, terror attacks, and stark violence. NACTA claims this exercise will in monitoring and surveillance of both cities, intelligence data gathering, and responding and pre-empting potential terror threats.

International Liaison

The NACTA Act of 2013 empowers the organization to keep liaison with international organizations for facilitating cooperation anti-terrorism and countering extremism.¹⁸

¹⁸ NACTA. (2018, January 1). National Counter-terrorism Authority Achievements - 2018. Email to CRSS.

The UK National School of Government International (NSGI) conducted idea-exchange sessions with officers of NACTA and provinces on policy formulation process from March 13th to 17th, 2017. Further the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) assisted NACTA in the formulation of the NCEP.

In November, 2017, NACTA and the United National Development Programme (UNDP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in enhancing youths' resilience, empowerment and their engagement, being an integral component of the newly framed NCEP.¹⁹

Youth Engagement

In addition to the MoU signed with UNDP above, NACTA has identified 46 universities, both public and private, across the country and contacted their administrations where National Coordinator NACTA Ihsan Ghani delivers his lectures on 'Peace and Tolerance – Youth Centrality'. NACTA wants to continue this process for seminaries, although presently, there is no list of preferred seminaries to work with.

Research Division

NACTA claims to have carried out a range of research projects, with several other research projects in the pipeline. The first, "Measuring indigenous change in madrasshs [in Pakistan]", was completed by Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), Islamabad. "Terror Financing in Pakistan" was also completed in 2017. Neither is available on the NACTA website yet.

The NACTA 2018 report also details the following research initiatives:

- Madrasa Audit Reporting Standardization (MARS) program initiated to facilitate financial monitoring of madrassas
- Production of 17 policy papers on topics relevant to counter extremism and counter terrorism g in collaboration with Centre for International Peace and Stability at the National University for Science and Technology (NUST)
- Groundwork to formulate policy on chemical/biological warfare

¹⁹ NACTA, UNDP sign MoU to empower Pakistani youth. (2017, November 24). Tribune. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1567722/1-nacta-undp-sign-mou-empower-pakistani-youth/>.

- Study underway to understand prison overcrowding in partnership with Cursor of Development and Education (CODE) Pakistan, with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Study underway to determine effects of extremism in educational institutes

Cyber Security and Information, Communication Technology (CS/ICT) Wing

Please see Section 3.5.3 Communication Systems – Online.

Choking Terror Financing


Please see 3.6.2 Terror Financing – Steps.

Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs)

CTDs have been established in all provinces and federal territories, and staffed as shown in the following table. Please bear in mind that these number have not changed since the second year audit of the NAP Tracker, and as such, cannot be considered part of the progress made in 2017.

Table 4.5 -Counterterrorism Department Strengths by Province/ Region - 2017		
Department	Required	Present²
Islamabad Capital Territory	1000	500
Punjab	1500	1182
Sindh	1000	728
Balochistan	1000	1000
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2200	2200
Gilgit Baltistan	200	168
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	500	260

Graph 4.5: Counterterrorism Department Strengths by Province/Region – 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

4.5 CPEC Security

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project with the investment of billions of dollars is said to be a game changer that could stimulate the growth of both states and lead to the development of the entire region.

There are however, many security issues linked to the CPEC project. Earlier, under the support of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Uighur militants from the Xinjiang province in Western China targeted the inhabitants of China, whereas the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant organizations in Pakistan have been targeting its citizens.

2017 Updates

The year began with the story that China had handed over two ships to the Pakistan Navy at Gwadar port for CPEC maritime Security.²⁰ Commander of Pakistan Fleet Vice Admiral Arifullah Hussaini received the ships, which have been named after two nearby rivers Hingol and Basole. A few months later in May 2017, it was announced that Pakistan was beefing up maritime security to secure territorial waters in the face of new challenges posed by India.²¹

Also, in January, updated numbers on the Special Security Division (SSD) being set up for CPEC protection were announced in a notice by the interior ministry.²² The force previously had 13,060 dedicated members, which was updated to 13,700. However, it is unclear to date which sub-category these additional 640 members will be inducted (see graph below). Bear in mind that while the SSD guards CPEC along the route, there is a separate 1,300-strong force to guard the Gwadar Port alone, called the Maritime Security Force (MSF).²³


20 Securing CPEC sea route: China hands two ships to Pakistan Navy. (2017, January 16). Tribune. Retrieved February 25, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1296266/securing-cpec-sea-route-china-hands-two-ships-pakistan-navy/>.

21 Pakistan boosting maritime security to counter Indian threat to CPEC. (2017, May 16). The Nation. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/16-May-2017/pakistan-boosting-maritime-security-to-counter-indian-threat-to-cpec>.

22 Special Security Division established to secure CPEC. (2017, January 22). Tribune. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1303428/special-security-division-established-secure-cpec/>.

23 '15,000 military personnel protecting CPEC'. (2017, February 21). Dawn. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316040>.

Graph 4.6: CPEC Security Personnel Deployment Breakdown



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

In March 2017, the government announced that in anticipation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) being set up in the second phase, offices of the civilian Intelligence Bureau will be set up along the route to help protect the CPEC investment.²⁴ In April 2017, it was reported that Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa Chief Minister Pervaiz Khattak had approved the setting up of a separate 4,200-strong

²⁴ Monitoring: Govt to establish IB offices to ensure CPEC security. (2018, March 20). Tribune. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1664307/2-monitoring-govt-establish-ib-offices-ensure-cpec-security/>.

security force to protect CPEC and non-CPEC foreign investment projects.²⁵

The Faizabad protests ruffled some feathers in China, as President Mamnoon Hussain in late November phoned his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping, assuring him that CPEC will not pass through the Faizabad Interchange.²⁶ The year ended on a good note with the Chinese re-affirming their faith in Pakistan, stating that they believe Pakistan will do everything in its power to protect and safeguard the CPEC initiative.²⁷

Pre-2017 Updates

The military states that Pakistan's security forces have dismantled the ETIM with Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged this initiative during a visit to Pakistan in April 2015. He praised the efforts of the Pakistani military and labeled it a solid step toward the peace and stability in the region. He promised to stand by Pakistan in all its activities against terrorism.

Later in November 2015, Pakistan and China agreed on a four-layer security plan meant for the over three thousand kilometer long trade route connecting the Xinji-ang province to the Gwadar sea port. Since the civilian government has assigned the task of protecting the Chinese to the Pakistan Army and Navy, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) assured the protection of the Chinese working in Pakistan. About 32,000 security personnel will provide security to 14,321 Chinese workers who have been working in 210 different projects across Pakistan. Over three thousand policemen, 740 Askari security guards, 4,100 private security guards, and 900 Rangers, would safeguard different projects related to CPEC.²⁸

In September 2016, it was reported that 14,503 security personnel had been deployed thus far to guard the 7,036 Chinese working on the CPEC project.²⁹

25 K-P approves special force for CPEC. (2017, April 13). Tribune. Retrieved February 23, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1382217/k-p-approves-special-force-cpec/>.

26 CPEC won't run through Faizabad Interchange, China reassured. (2017, November 29). Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 23, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/29/cpec-wont-run-through-faizabad-interchange-china-reassured/>.

27 China believes Pakistan will continue to ensure security for CPEC. (2017, December 11). GEO TV. Retrieved February 23, 2018, from <https://www.geo.tv/latest/171749-china-believes-pakistan-will-continue-to-ensure-security-for-cpec>.

28 Ghiskori, Z. (2015, November 01). Economic corridor: Pakistan, China agree on four-layer security - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/983033/%20economic-corridor-pakistan-china-agree-on-four-layer-security/>.

29 Pakistan Deploys 15000 Security Personnel to Guard 7000 Chinese Working on China Pakistan

In December, 2016, it was also reported that the Navy was raising its own unit, dubbed Taskforce-88, for CPEC security.³⁰

4.6 Conclusion

Overall there seems to be significant progress on the counterterrorism front. The kinetic operations conducted across the country seem to have gained a lot of ground. While other mechanisms, such as choking finances and communications seem to have mixed results. Undoubtedly, the noose has been tightened around armed militias and terror outfits, and a prime example of this is multiple groups clamoring to take responsibility for terror attacks.

There are two problems here. First, as always, these kinetic measures are finite and they will eventually plateau out. The state really needs to reevaluate the root cause behind terrorism and deploy mechanisms to address it. The NCEP is a good step in this direction, but it has been in formulation for over two years now. Second, state enablers need to be bolstered, empowered and emboldened to allow Pakistan to tackle this menace more effectively and efficiently.

Insufficient financial resources and lack of government initiatives are causing delays in the functioning of NACTA and execution of the NAP. The current state of funding for NACTA is extremely volatile. If the government truly wishes to see the organization succeed, they will have to get serious about funding, staffing, housing and training of NACTA and its employees.

In addition, the government's stance on NACTA seems to shift with the direction of the wind. For instance, in August 2017, Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal proclaimed that NACTA had failed to implement NAP.³¹ However, in September, 2017, this was completely upended by a spokesperson of the Interior Minister who stated that NACTA was effectively implementing NAP.³² Considering the review meetings

Economic Corridor. (2016, September 12). China Topix. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/100551/20160912/pakistan-deploys-15000-security-personnel-to-guard-7000-chinese-working-on-china-pakistan-economic-corridor.htm>.

30 Task Force-88: Navy raises force for CPEC, Gwadar security. (2016, December 14). Tribune. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1262606/task-force-88-navy-raises-force-cpec-gwadar-security/>.

31 Mukhtar, I. (2017, August 23). Nacta failed to effectively implement NAP: Ahsan. The Nation. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/23-Aug-2017/nacta-failed-to-effectively-implement-nap-ahsan>.

32 NACTA effectively implementing NAP in cooperation with provinces: Interior Ministry

in 2017, there also seems to be a distinct lack of buy in from the government in the progression and evaluation of the NAP, and NACTA's role in it. The apex courts could mandate quarterly reviews by either the prime minister or the minister for interior.

Finally, while the progress thus far is tangible, without reforms in both civilian law enforcement and the criminal justice system, it is fleeting and impermanent at best.

spokesperson. (2017, September 30). The Nation. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/30-Sep-2017/nacta-effectively-implementing-nap-in-cooperation-with-provinces-interior-ministry-spokesperson>.

4.7 Future of NACTA amid NAP and NISP

by Dr. Farhan Zahid, NACTA

It is evident that the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) has been able to sail through its inception phase and trying times. Contrary to common perception the under-resourced and under-staffed organization has been able to meet several milestones set in its mandate during last four years.

The federal government established NACTA in 2008 with a *raison d'être* of developing a liaison among various intelligence gathering agencies both civil and military. The federal government body is mandated to collate, analyze and disseminate the collected intelligence to relevant quarters. The authority is the primary body to formulate counter terrorism, counter violent extremism strategies of the country.

The organization remained dormant and partially dysfunctional for several years before it geared up for its assigned job coupled with other responsibilities as mandated in its act passed by the parliament in 2013. Last four years have been extraordinary as NACTA has been able to devise and formulate several strategies i.e. National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-18, National Counter Extremist Policy (NCEP) and National Narrative. Contrary to its critics the organization, though, still not fully functional, but has been able to get itself on track amid stumbling.

The aim of this article is to analyze and assess the future of NACTA and its role in combating terrorism and extremism as outlined in NAP and NISP.

NACTA and NISP

NACTA's first measure venture was to devise the very first internal security policy strategy termed as National Internal Security Policy 2014-18. The policy was tasked to NACTA by the Cabinet to functionalize NACTA. An understaffed and resource-starved NACTA haphazardly devised the NISP in 2014 an year marred by waves of terrorist incidents across the country. The 2014 also witnessed the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb by Pakistani military against Islamist militants in tribal districts of Pakistan to uproot a number of TTP factions. NISP did not turn out to be a comprehensive and concise document as it was envisioned but it did include number of policy initiatives:

- Revamping of criminal justice system
- Capacity building and modernization of police and other law enforcement forces
- Strengthening of border control mechanism and de-weaponization
- Establishing high security prisons in all provinces and federal territories
- Establishment of Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) for better coordination among intelligence community
- A federal level Rapid Response Force
- Measures for cyber security and misuse of social, print and electronic media by miscreants
- Mainstreaming of religious seminaries in Pakistan

NACTA worked over these policy initiatives and have been able to achieve most of these. The Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) was established under NACTA's wings though it is still in the making as its passing through its recruitment phase. NACTA has also proposed measures for revamping of criminal justice system in Pakistan. De-Weaponization drive as per the advice of NACTA, has already started in the provinces and at federal government level. Moreover remaining policy initiatives such as main streaming of religious seminaries, integrated border management and cyber space security have been adequately dealt at NACTA. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for crowded places is being formulated, and issues related to counter financing of terrorism are being dealt by NACTA's Counter Terrorism and Counter Financing of Terrorism (CFT) directorates. Hence we could see a number of policy measures have been well tackled at NACTA as envisioned in NISP. Overall keeping in view of the meager resources, both human and material, the performance level is much more than satisfactory.

NACTA and NAP

While NACTA had endeavored NISP in early 2014 as the primary counter terrorism policy tool, the parliament adopted 20-point National Action Plan after the APS tragedy in December 2014. Most of the NAP agenda items were in confluence with the NISP, hence, it was more of a reinvigoration of NISP while adding some more meaningful agendas. In fact one of the agenda items of NAP was about strengthening of NACTA.

At the moment the monitoring of NAP implementation is being done at three levels: by the National Security Division headed by National Security Advisor Lt General (r) Nasser Janjua, CVE directorate off NACTA and at Ministry of Interior. Despite this NACTA remains the primary body for monitoring NAP because of its

mandate and being a policy and research unit of the federal government. The CVE directorate of NACTA collects data on NAP and advises the government in this context.

As far as the strengthening of NACTA is concerned under NAP, the implementation of this agenda item is still at a nascent stage.

Future of NACTA as envisioned in NAP and NISP

Despite its growing importance and improving performance there are critical tasks ahead for NACTA. Strategies or policy measures are subject to review after regular intervals. This also allows policy organizations to assess and analyze the impact of these policy measures. NACTA has an uphill task to review the policies i.e. NAP and NISP and this would ascertain the future role of NACTA in Pakistan's fight against extremism and terrorism. Of course NACTA is the primary body to formulate and monitor the implementation of strategic policies like NAP and NISP and the review of these policies would greatly enhance NACTA's role in future.

The poorly drafted NISP was formulated when NACTA was not fully functional and NISP remained subject of criticism for many years by academia and intelligentsia because of its poor drafting, content and data. NISP was formulated at a time when NACTA was going through its nascent phase. The NISP was adopted for four years and now its subject to be reviewed after its expiry in 2018. There is a dire need to engage subject matter experts, policy makers, and practitioners in consultative sessions for the review of NISP. A number of issues discussed in NISP such as revamping of criminal justice system, mainstreaming of religious seminaries, and establishment of maximum security prisons are required to be re-assessed and their implementation process during last four years must be analyzed. The capacity building of law enforcement forces remains a critical issue, and similar is the issue of cyber security. Both issues need quality assessment by NACTA and reincorporated in reviewed NISP. Future of NACTA would also depend upon an active and fully functional Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) as envisioned in NISP. The JID would be a key determinant in assessing NACTA's future performances. This would only be possible if intelligence community both civil and military decide to work in tandem, hence, NACTA would have a partial role in its successful functioning of JID since its not an intelligence gathering body.

The review of National Action Plan (NAP) is also due. The one-page NAP was drafted by the All Parties Conference at Prime Minister House in the aftermath

of Army Public School terrorist incident in which 132 children were slaughtered by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Fazalullah Faction) on December 16, 2014. NAP was a bit reactive and formulated after a one-day long conference when vengeful passions ran high. Now after monitoring NAP implementation for last four years NACTA could review and assess problems with implementation mechanism of NAP and revise its agenda items keeping in view of the changing times and scenario. A quality review of NAP review would also provide roadmap for NACTA itself in order to draw future outline of its course of action. A number of agenda items of NAP need to be reassessed such as Karachi Operation. It is pertinent to know whether the said operation has been able to curb the activities of Islamist terrorist organizations in Karachi or it was mainly against the militant wings of political parties. The need is to assess the impact of NAP implementation on terrorists getting space at print, electronic and social media, hate speech and hate material issues, terrorist financing, and resurfacing of terrorist organizations with new names. Therefore, an accurate and honest review of NAP would be required in order to bolster the standing and embolden the credentials of NACTA.

Conclusion

NACTA was established to coordinate efforts of law enforcement and intelligence community, and to frame counter terrorism strategies for the country. The organization faced criticism and critics and subject matter experts lashed it out for its slow progress. Contrary to the claims of its critics the body has been able to perform if not all and deliver at a number of fronts. The framing of NISP, NCEP, National Narrative and number of other policy initiatives are indeed feather in NACTA's cap. The challenge would be to critically review and revise the previous policy measures for setting direction for NACTA in upcoming years. The NAP implementation mechanism, and NISP's stated agendas would require assessments and analysis from experts and practitioners and NACTA ought to take the relevant individuals on board in order to set a future course of action. Keeping in view of the progress of NACTA it appears that the organization would likely to strive through and pave its way for achieving its goals.

Dr. Farhan Zahid earned his PhD in Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium. Dr. Zahid has authored more than 100 research papers and articles. He writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al-Qaeda-linked groups, ISIS, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, jihadi ideologies and the Afghan Taliban. He has also authored three books "Roots of Islamic Violent Activism in South Asia", published by Narratives (2014), "From Jihad to al-Qaeda to Islamic State", published by Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), 2015; and "The Al-Qaeda Network in Pakistan", published by Narratives (2015). He tweets @farhanzahidCT.

PART 5: SECTARIANISM

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- 5.3 Blasphemy Laws
- 5.4 Government Progress against Spreading Hatred/Sectarianism
- 5.5 Conclusion
- 5.6 How Pakistan Institutionalized Discrimination against Minorities
- by Zeeshan Salahuddin

NAP POINT 5:

Strict action against the literature, newspaper and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism and intolerance.

NAP POINT 9:

End of religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured.

NAP POINT 18:

Action against elements spreading sectarianism.

These themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 5: SECTARIANISM

5.1 Introduction

The fifth theme studies sectarianism and the state's attempts to curb it. It is an amalgamation of several points in the National Action Plan, specifically #5, #8 and #18, and covers minorities' rights. There is some overlap with Part 3: Proscribed Organizations, and Part 4: Counterterrorism. Minority rights and government action is also covered in this section.

5.1.1 Background

According to the NACTA 2017 review, "The spread of terrorism and establishment of powerful militant groups in Pakistan was a direct result of the rampant and unrestrained expression, publication and promotion of extremist ideas and intolerance as part of the mainstream discourse. Due to this phenomenon, sectarian violence became a mainstay of Pakistani society since the late 1980s."¹ While this is an extremely simplified version of events, the end result remains the same. Sectarianism also exacerbated after the War on Terror.

Recruitment for a lot of jihadi and terror organization relies heavily on religion-based hatred of groups deemed non-Muslim by the Sunni-majority. These include Shias, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and a range of other smaller sects and religions. Perhaps the best way to exemplify this trend is the fact that despite violence decreasing steadily in the country over the last three years, sectarian violence has increased. For example, data collected by the Center for Research and Security Studies shows a 20% reduction in violence-related fatalities between 2016 and 2017, but a 35% *increase* in sectarian violence.²

Major causes for sectarian violence include incitement by religious leaders, particularly through the misuse of loudspeakers during sermons, institutionalized discrimination, biased curriculum, and the abuse of controversial laws.

1 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

2 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

5.1.2 Minorities in Pakistan

Christians face a range of atrocities including sexual assault, harassment and forced conversions in some parts of the country. Dozens of Christians are charged under the blasphemy laws. In the 64+ attacks perpetrated against the Christian community, several churches were targeted.

The Ahmedis constantly face humiliation, threats to life and property and this is aggravated by the fact that the Second Amendment to the 1973 Constitution declared Ahmedis non-Muslims. Ahmedi places of worship face constant threat of attacks.

Hindus remain a target of abduction, forced marriages, and the kidnapping and rape of Hindu girls. The curriculum taught in schools paints them as the enemy, tying them closely with the state's antagonistic narrative as regards India.

The minority that faces the worst of attacks is the Shia community. In the last three years, even though minority casualties have reduced by more than half, incidences of violence against Shias have risen.

5.2 Violence against Minorities - 2017

5.2.1 Major Attacks

A week prior to Christmas, 4 suicide bombers attacked a church in Quetta, killing 9 innocent Christian men, women and children, and injuring 56. In October, Arslan Masih, 14, was beaten to death by sic policemen in Sheikhupura, and in August, Sharoon, 17 was killed by a classmate for drinking from a glass that fellow Muslim students used to drink from.

In the first 10 months of 2017, at least 14 Hazaras were murdered. Since Between 2002 and 2017, at least 2,679 Shias have been killed in sectarian violence. In 2017, a 14-year-old Kalash girl was forcibly converted to Islam and subsequently ran back to her community. In response, Kalash homes were attacked, and the police failed to provide substantive protection.³

³ Mughal, A. A. (2018, 25 January). On the catalogue of injuries faced by religious minorities in Pakistan. Open Democracy. Retrieved March 24, 2018, from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/afab-alexander-mughal/on-catalogue-of-injuries-faced-by-religious-minorities-in-pakistan>.

Suicide attacks, bomb and IED explosions were the most common methods used to carry out sectarian violence in the country. Out of the total 298 victims of suicide attacks, 162 were targeted because of their faith. 84 people lost their lives to bomb explosions that had targeted religious communities. The other fatalities were from IED explosions (25), gun violence (24), armed attacks (7), violent clashes (3) and others.⁴

The sectarian attacks were claimed by the banned militant outfits, with Daish and LeJ-AA spearheading. A total of 126 fatalities were claimed by Daish, 95 by LeJ-AA, and 64 by JuA and TTP-Shehryar Mehsud group. Out of the 319 fatalities only 32 have not been claimed by militant outfits.

5.2.2 CRSS Data

A more than a 35% increase in fatalities in sectarian violence is visible in 2017 as compared 2016.

Table 5.1 - Fatalities in sectarian violence is visible in 2017 as compared 2016


	2014			2015			2016			2017			
Region	F	I	T	F	I	T	F	I	T	F	I	T	Total
Sindh	230	68	298	178	131	309	42	46	88	101	158	259	954
FATA	35	31	66	31	76	107	36	23	59	149	359	508	740
Baloch.	86	153	239	33	31	64	73	101	174	51	113	164	641
Punjab	23	24	47	27	99	126	79	251	330	9	0	9	512
KP	60	104	164	33	63	96	17	2	19	7	0	7	286
Others	6	98	104	2	1	3	0	0	0	2	4	8	113
Total	440	478	918	304	401	705	247	423	670	319	634	955	3,246
Legend:	F = Fatality												
	I - Injury												
	T = Total												
	Others = Islamabad, AJK, GB												

Data collected by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) shows that sectarian violence claimed about 1,310 lives (and left some 1,936 injured) during the last four years. The province of Sindh had the highest number of sectarian

4 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>

fatalities (551), followed by FATA (251), Balochistan (243), Punjab (138), and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (117). The capital of the country, Islamabad, also suffered 8 fatalities. FATA faced the highest number of injured people in sectarian violence (489).^{5, 6}

Graph 5.1: Sectarian Violence Fatalities – 2013-2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018


The total number of casualties from violence in 2017 stood at 4,131 out of which 2,057 individuals died and 2,074 were injured.⁷ Of these, 955 casualties (319 dead, 636 injured) were a result of sectarian violence.

5 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.

6 Europe External Policy Advisors.(n.d.). Status of Religious Minorities In Pakistan. Retrieved February 25, 2018, from http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/EP_Hearing_Pakistan/Fact_Sheet_Minorities_in_Pakistan.pdf.

7 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

Graph 5.2: Sectarian Violence Targets in Pakistan by Group – 2016 vs. 2017



In 2017, Shias once again faced the brunt of the attacks with 166 fatalities, followed by Sufis (115), Shia Hazaras and Christians (12 each), and others.

5.2.3 NACTA Review


While the NACTA final achievements document makes no mention of progress against hate speech and sectarianism, the Cultivating Peace documents mentions a few data points. The report claims that “strengthening sectarian amity has remained a consistent effort by the Government which has resulted in abatement of sectarian terrorism”.⁸ According to the report, in the last seven years (excluding 2017), 674 incidents of sectarian terrorism were reported. Their breakdown is as follows:

Year	Sectarian Incidents
2011	70

⁸ Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

2012	185
2013	127
2014	176
2015	79
2016	37
2017	22

Graph 5.3: Number of Sectarian Incidents between 2011 and 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

However, as seen in the data shared prior, while the number of incidents has decreased, the number of fatalities has increased in the last year by 35% owing to major sectarian attacks.

The report also claims that sacrilegious content and fiery speeches that can lead to sectarian discord, “have been banned”. The state is also ensuring the banning of the use of loud-speakers and sacrilegious literature.

5.2.4 Positive End to the Year 2017

Two incidents helped a tumultuous year on a positive note.

First, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared on December 5, 2017 that minority faith groups should feel their rights are the most secure in Pakistan.⁹ “They [those belonging to minority faiths] should feel as if they are given special considerations compared to ordinary citizens in Pakistan,” added Justice Ejaz Afzal.

Second, the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa participated in the Christmas festivities on December 25, 2018.¹⁰ According to Dawn, “He wished the Christian community Merry Christmas and acknowledged the role of the community not only in the creation of Pakistan but also its progress.”

5.3 Blasphemy Laws

The blasphemy laws in particular can be systematically abused to target minorities and incite religious hatred but there has been some progress towards starting a dialogue as regards reform.

Unfortunately, Pakistan took several steps back in protecting minorities from the misuse of these laws. According to the world report on the status of human rights by Human Rights Watch, at least 19 people await execution on death row, convicted on blasphemy charges, while hundreds of others await trial, most of them members of religious minorities.¹¹

It likely doesn't help that the then Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar stated in March 2017 that blasphemers were enemies of humanity.¹² This was followed up by a mass broadcast text message by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority in May 2017 stating that uploading and sharing blasphemous content is

9 Bhatti, H. (2018, December 5). Minority faith groups should feel their rights are the most secure in Pakistan: Supreme Court. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1374695>.

10 Yasir, A. (2018, December 26). Army chief participates in Christmas festivities. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1378860>.

11 World Report 2018 – Pakistan. (2018). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved March 23, 2018 from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/pakistan>.

12 News Desk. (2017, March 16). Blasphemers are enemies of humanity, will not be tolerated: Nisar. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1357049/blasphemers-enemies-humanity-will-not-tolerated-nisar/>.

a punishable offense, and that citizens should report such content.¹³

Significant Blasphemy-related Cases

Five significant incidents regarding blasphemy also occurred in 2017.

First, in January 2017, blasphemy accusations were used as a muzzling tool to silence individuals protesting the abduction of five bloggers from various parts of the country.

Second, in April, 2017, a mob lynched and shot dead 23-year old student Mashal Khan over blasphemy accusations.¹⁴ At the time of writing this report, of the 58 people under trial for his murder, 1 was handed the death sentence, 5 were given life sentences, 25 were convicted of lesser offences, and 26 were acquitted.¹⁵

Third, in May, 2017, a 10-year old boy was killed in a tussle when a mob tried to reach a man in police custody in Balochistan.¹⁶

Fourth, in June, 2017, a counterterrorism court in Punjab sentenced Taimoor Raza to death for committing blasphemy on Facebook.¹⁷ The online debate which led to his arrest in 2016 was later revealed to be with a counterterrorism agent. It was the first ever case in which a death sentence was awarded for content over social media.

Finally, in November 2017, Islamist political party Tehrik-e-Labbaik (TL) launched a protest, choking the capital inroads at the Faizabad Interchange in Islamabad. TL was protesting a change proposed in the Elections Bill 2017, which changed the word “oath” to “declaration”. The protest lasted three weeks,¹⁸ and was terribly

13 Reporter. (2017, May 10). PTA launches drive against blasphemous content. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1332222>.

14 Pakistan student killed over ‘blasphemy’ on university campus. (2017, April 17). BBC. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39593302>.

15 Mashal Khan case: Death sentence for Pakistan ‘blasphemy’ murder. (2018, February 7). BBC. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42970587>.

16 AFP for Guardian. (2017, May 4). Boy, 10, killed in attempted blasphemy lynching in Pakistan. The Guardian. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/04/10-year-old-boy-killed-attempted-blasphemy-lynching-pakistan>.

17 Pakistan: Death penalty for blasphemy on Facebook. (2017, June 12). Al Jazeera. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/pakistan-death-penalty-blasphemy-facebook-170612052000251.html>.

18 Hussain, Zahid. (2017, November 15). The Capital Under Siege. Dawn. Retrieved February 28,

managed by the state, including a ban on social media,¹⁹ and media coverage of the sit-in. Clashes broke out on November 25, 2017, which resulted in 6 deaths and over 200 injuries. This resulted in protests breaking out in other parts of the country as well.²⁰ Finally, a deal was struck the next day, after the army was called in,²¹ in which the bill was scrapped, and the Minister for Law and Justice resigned.²² The Islamabad High Court came down hard on both the government and the army for the mismanagement of the issue, calling the sit-in a “terrorist act”.^{23, 24}

5.4 Government Progress against Spreading Hatred/Sectarianism

Regarding point #5 in the NAP, the NACTA review cites several data points as success stories. According to the report, 1,373 cases regarding hate speech, or publishing hate material, have been registered, 2,566 persons have been arrested and 70 shops have been sealed.²⁵

Table 5.3 - Government Progress against Spreading Hatred/Sectarianism			
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Cases Registered	2337	0	0
Arrests	2195	265	106
Equipment Confiscated	2472	620	235
Shops/Premises Sealed	70	0	0

2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1370547/the-capital-under-siege>.

19 Warraich, F. A. (2017, November 27). Activists assail blanket ban on social media. The Nation. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/27-Nov-2017/activists-assail-blanket-ban-on-social-media>.

20 Ullah, I & Shahzad, M. (2017, November 25). Protests break out across the country after Faizabad crackdown. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1568114/1-protests-break-across-country-faizabad-crackdown/>.

21 Pakistan army called on to stop ‘blasphemy’ clashes in Islamabad. (2017, November 25). BBC. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42124446>.


22 Abbas, N. and Rasmussen, S. E. (2017, November 27). Pakistani law minister quits after weeks of anti-blasphemy protests. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/27/pakistani-law-minister-quits-zahid-hamid>.

23 News Desk. (2017, November 27). IHC judge comes down hard on govt, army over Faizabad operation. Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/27/who-is-the-army-to-adopt-mediators-role/>.

24 Asad, M. (2017, November 25). Islamabad High Court declares Faizabad sit-in ‘a terrorist act’. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1372696>.

25 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.


Graph 5.4: Government Progress against Sectarianism – Hate Speech – 2015-2017



Additionally, 18,790 cases have been registered pertaining to misuse of loudspeakers, 19,530 persons have been arrested, and 7,479 pieces of equipment confiscated.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Cases Registered	9164	6315	3311
Arrests	9340	6658	3532
Equipment Confiscated	2596	1791	3195

Graph 5.5: Government Progress against Sectarianism – Misuse of Loudspeakers – 2015-2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

There are two problems here. First, when we look at the data by year, it is evident that progress on this front is slowing down. For example, of the 70 shops sealed, all 70 were sealed in the first year, between December 2014 and December 2015. Similarly, all hate speech cases were registered in the first year. There are zero new cases for year two or three. Second, the outcome of these thousands of cases for both hate speech and the misuse of loudspeakers is not available. In the absence of this data, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of this deterrent.

5.5 Conclusion

The government response to sectarianism in Pakistan has been traditionally weak, a convenient loophole that is exploited by sectarian groups vying for legitimacy. Pakistan’s constitution and legislations have come under enormous local and global debate for marginalizing the minorities as well. The constitution has gone through several amendments over the year introducing legislations that

overlooked the country's minority population.

The addition to Pakistan Penal Code for criminalising and punishing blasphemy related offences has also lead to vigilantism and vandalism against the minorities. Where before 1986 there were only 16 blasphemy-related cases registered in the country, the number has gone close to 1400 cases in three decades.

Pakistan is among many UN member states to have signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, yet political and civil rights, especially for the minorities, are becoming a rarity. The constitution forbids any minority member from seeking or taking any high state level position on grounds of religion.

All this considered, including lip service on how minorities should feel most protected, the fact of the matter is that Pakistan is currently facing a religious purification; moving towards a state where a certain brand of Islam would only be practiced with limited or no space for the "others".

5.6 How Pakistan Institutionalized Discrimination against Minorities

by Zeeshan Salahuddin²⁶

A newspaper advertisement in Bannu, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa recently called for applications for the *khakroab* position. This is the official term for a sweeper, a member of the janitorial staff. Historically, because of institutional racism and religious persecution, this role has been almost exclusively reserved for Hindus, and especially Christians. The advertisement, in the column labeled “religion”, listed Hindu, Balmiki (a sect of Hinduism), Christian and Shia.

The ensuing rage on Twitter and other social media was immediate. The resulting apology was swift, and predictably spun to feign sincerity and innocence. But even then, they only apologized for using the word “Shia”. Congratulations Shias, you have been upgraded to first class citizens.

There are so many thing wrong with this picture, that it is difficult to determine a starting point.

First, how did this advertisement ever get past the approval process? Second, how did the newspaper itself not object to such open discrimination, not just against Hindus and Christians, but also the fact that it tacitly labels Shias as non-Muslims? Third, and perhaps most importantly, why was there even a need to drag religion into a job posting? The answer to all three is simple. We have come to accept that such positions will only be applied for (and subsequently granted to) Christians and Hindus, as it is beneath our collective, imagined station. And this was no accident; it was deliberate, because it is considered common practice.

This is the state of affairs in contemporary Pakistan. A provincial government that touts itself on inclusion and tolerance, and wants to set the new standard for both politics and governance in Pakistan, allows this to fly under its nose. Even when the apology is issued, it completely ignores Christians and Hindus, because honestly, who cares, right?

During the coverage of the PSL recently, a comedian on television said the following verbatim to showcase his patriotism: “I am ready to do anything for Pakistan, I will even become a *choora*”. A *choora* is a derogatory term for a Christian *khakrob*,

²⁶ Originally published in The Daily Times, March 24, 2017.

and this statement elicited thundering applause from the studio audience. What a great man, he is willing to sink all the way to the level of a *choora* to save Pakistan! No one questioned the logical inconsistency. No one questioned the deep-seated racism and hatred for minorities. No one questioned the comedian on this exceptionally insolent and crass claim.

The racism continued in various forms on the program. A short while later, the comedian asked a former cricketer, a question about Chris Gayle. He asked whether Gayle feels disgusted when he looks at his own black hands. Surely it must cause nausea when he is eating. Tactfully, the guest stayed quiet on the issue, and the show moved on as if nothing had happened. The comedian, however, looks quite pleased with himself, for he had cleverly snuck in both religious discrimination and racism into the affair, and no one had been the wiser.

All of this is normal, but it should not be. All of this is accepted, but it should not be. Within our so-called liberal bubbles, we feel secure that we clamored over social media. But the dirty secret of social media is that most of what is said on social media is not seen by most people. It is not sufficient to just tweet a picture of the newspaper. As citizens, we need to hold our leaders more accountable. Make calls to their office, write letters to their secretaries, send emails with demands for a better apology, and a promise to refrain from tinting a job posting in religious racism ever again.

Discrimination against minorities seems to be the true national sport of Pakistan. In our textbooks, in our daily social upbringing, we are lead to believe that non-Muslims are lesser beings, second-class citizens meant for janitorial jobs, indifferent attitudes, and universal disdain. This institutional racism has crept into every crevice, every pore, and every corner of Pakistani society. It is our responsibility, as conscientious citizens to keep to in check, to challenge it, and to demand a better environment for everyone as equal citizens, as afforded by Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

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PART 6: LOCAL CONFLICTS

Part 6: Table of Contents

- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 FATA Reforms, Rehabilitation and Regression
- 6.3 Punjab
- 6.4 Karachi Operation
- 6.5 Balochistan Insurgency

NAP POINT 12:

Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.

NAP POINT 16:

Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.

NAP POINT 17:

Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.

These themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 6: LOCAL CONFLICTS

6.1 Introduction

The NAP also attempts to address local conflicts and this chapter focuses on NAP points 12, 15, 16 and 17 which correspond with the on-going conflicts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (#12), Punjab (#15), Karachi (#16), and Balochistan (#17).

Conflict resolution in FATA is being sought through a combination of driving out militants under Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and a FATA Reforms Committee which has recommended judicial reforms and merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

Although Punjab, for the most part, remained free of any major local conflicts, a string of attacks in early 2017 prompted the state to address growing concerns regarding militancy safe havens in Punjab, and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad was also launched in the same month.

The Karachi operation, previously under under Zarb-e-Azb and now under Radd-ul-Fasaad, is also continuing and there has been a documented, dramatic decline in violence. However, concerns are emerging over the issue of extrajudicial killings as an accepted part of the sprawling metropolis' law enforcement regime.

The state is attempting to control the security situation in Balochistan, particularly the Baloch insurgents, and addressing the many grievances of the historically neglected Baloch people, with mixed results. Violence in the province also declined considerably during 2017.

6.2 FATA Reforms, Rehabilitation and Regression

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a joint military offensive conducted by the Pakistan Armed Forces against various militant groups including the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Al-Qaeda (AQ), Jundallah and the Haqqani Network. The operation was launched on June 14, 2014 in North Waziristan but has since expanded to include urban pacification operations in the port city of Karachi in the Sindh province. The operation had 30,000 soldiers on

the front lines and was launched following the breakdown of negotiations with extremist elements and a brazen attack on the Karachi airport.¹

6.3.1 Operational Progress in 2017

Khyber – IV

In addition to Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, the military also launched operation Khyber-IV on July 16, 2017 to deny the Islamic State (IS) or Daish, a foothold in the FATA region.² The operation was conducted in Rajgal Valley (also known as Tirah Valley), which falls inside the boundaries of three agencies: Kurrum, Khyber and Orakzai, and extends into Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province. Phase one was said to complete on July 26, 2017.³ The operation was concluded on August 21, 2017.⁴ The dramatic rise of fatalities in Kurrum is a direct result of this extensive operation.

Data Collected by CRSS

FATA has seen considerable progress in terms of reducing violence-related fatalities in the last several years running. According to data collected by this think tank, there were 3,371 fatalities in FATA alone in 2014, which dropped to 1,917 in 2015,⁵ further to 495 in 2016,⁶ and further still to 426 in 2017.⁷ This is an overall reduction of over 85%.

1 Salahuddin, Z. (2014, August 29). PAKISTAN: COUNTERING INSURGENCY. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/08/29/pakistan-countering-insurgency.

2 Operation Khyber-4: Offensive launched to deny Da’ish foothold in FATA. (2017, January 16). Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1459312/radd-ul-fasaad-army-launches-operation-khyber-agencys-rajgal-valley/>.

3 Operation Khyber-IV: Phase-I completed as troops capture strategic peak. (2017, July 23). Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1464496/operation-khyber-iv-phase-completed-troops-capture-strategic-peak/>.

4 Army announces conclusion of Operation Khyber-4 in wide-ranging press conference. (2017, August 21). DAWN. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1352986>.


5 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.

6 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2017, March 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2016-Final.pdf>.

7 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

Agencies	2014	2015	2016	2017
North Waziristan Agency	1,790	814	189	29
Khyber Agency	1,184	752	151	74
South Waziristan Agency	84	98	17	26
Kurrum Agency	27	90	27	198
Orakzai	125	74	1	13
Mohmand	98	51	101	68
Bajaur	63	38	9	28
Total	3,371	1,917	495	436

Graph 6.1: FATA Fatalities Comparison – 2014 - 2017



In 2016 the Pakistani Air Force and the Army (which manages Operation Zarb-e-Azb), focused on securing the country’s borders to prevent terrorism from flowing in. As FATA falls on Pakistan’s Western border with Afghanistan, it remained a key geographical area of focus. In partnership with law enforcement agencies (LEAs),

the military continued to conduct operations to root out and prevent terrorism and violence in this region.

6.3.2 FATA Reforms Progress in 2017

For a detailed discussion on the history of FATA reforms, please see Annex VIII: History of FATA Reforms.

The FATA Reforms bill has a tumultuous year culminating in some positive developments. The bill was stalled in May, then reintroduced in both September⁸ and December. In December, both Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI) head Imran Khan⁹ and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa throw their weight behind the FATA Reforms Bill.¹⁰

On December 12, 2017, the government inexplicably pulled the bill from the National Assembly's (NA) agenda causing a walkout of the entire treasury bench in protest.¹¹ The proverbial monkeywrenching was due to Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam – Fazl Group's (JUI-F) Fazl-ur-Rehman's reservations with the bill, who could be convinced by neither the Prime Minister, nor the COAS, to budge on his stance.¹² This impasse persisted in the NA for nearly two weeks.

On December 20, 2017, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi again met with the FATA Supreme Council,¹³ continuing a long series of consultations with relevant

8 Tanoli, Q. (2017, September 15). Bill introduced in parliament to extend top court, IHC's jurisdiction to FATA. Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1507394/bill-introduced-parliament-extend-top-court-ihcs-jurisdiction-fata/>.

9 Hussain, D. (2017, December 10). Imran demands K-P, FATA merger before 2018 polls. Tribune. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1580525/1-imran-demands-k-p-fata-merger-2018-polls/>.

10 Army throws weight behind FATA reforms. (2017, December 13). Tribune. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1583145/1-army-supports-fata-mainstreaming-line-tribal-peoples-desire-gen-qamar/>.

11 Tanoli, Q. (2017, December 12). Uproar in NA as govt pulls FATA reforms off agenda. Tribune. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1581895/1-uproar-na-govt-pulls-fata-reforms-off-agenda/>.

12 Haq, R. (2017, December 20). FATA reforms bill: PM, army chief fail to win over Fazl. Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1588175/1-pm-army-chief-fail-win-fazl/>.

13 The "FATA Supreme Council" was formed by Fazl-ur-Rehman and includes representatives of Grand Tribal Jirga (under the banner of JUI-F) to talk to the government and political parties on the future status of the tribal areas.

stakeholders.¹⁴ The purpose of these consultations is to find a mutually agreed upon way to mainstream the region and extend the ambit of the constitution and courts to FATA, but it bore no fruit.

Finally, on December 26, 2017, Dawn reported that “The high-powered National Implementation Committee (NIC) on Fata Reforms has endorsed the merger of tribal regions with northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and agreed that Islamabad would make a policy statement in this regard.”¹⁵ While Fazl remains characteristically stubborn on the issue, it appears that the center, and the ruling parties in all four provinces are determined to move ahead, at least in rhetoric.

Two things need to happen here to see this dream turn into a reality. First, the government must stick to the will of the majority and pass the reforms bill swiftly. Second, the government must work with provincial heads to rework the National Finance Awards (NFC), and fund the development of FATA so the bill can be followed through with tangible, meaningful change.

6.3.3 Internally Displaced Persons

Please see Section 8.3.3: IDPs – Rehabilitation Plans.

6.3 Punjab

6.3.1 Violence in Punjab


In 2017 469 fatalities and 269 injuries were reported in Punjab due to violence, which constitutes for approximately 23% of the total violence-based fatalities in the country. This was the highest number of fatalities reported in Punjab in the last five years. For reference there were 328 fatalities in Punjab in 2015, and 424 in 2016. Effectively, violence in the province has nearly quadrupled since 2013, which is especially troubling considering a 73% overall decline countrywide.

14 Saeed, A. (2017, December 21). Deadlock persists as Abbasi meets Fata Council. The Nation. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/21-Dec-2017/deadlock-persists-as-abbasi-meets-fata-council>.

15 Khan, I. (2017, December 26). Historic decision on Fata-KP merger taken. DAWN. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1378852>.

Year	Fatalities	Injuries
2014	307	342
2015	328	319
2016	425	282
2017	469	269

Graph 6.2: Violence-Related Casualties in Punjab – 2014 - 2017



6.3.2 Government Efforts in Punjab


Although the overall situation in Punjab is relatively peaceful as compared to other regions, Southern Punjab is home to two radical sectarian groups. These groups, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangavi, are held responsible for various extremist activities, including religious and sectarian violence.

The NACTA internal report acknowledges a legacy factor in nurturing some of

these groups in the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁶ The report also acknowledges that Punjabi militants have strong ties with both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Several kinetic steps have been taken by the government of Punjab, spearheaded by the Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) to curb these groups and activities. They are detailed below, as shared by Punjab Home Department:

Type of Activity	Frequency
Total Combing Operations Conducted	91,666
Total Stop and Search Operations Conducted	3,239,078
Total Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs)	3,384
Terrorists Hanged under PPC	400
Terrorists Killed in Encounter with Police/CTDs/LEAs	275
Terrorists Arrested by Police/CTDs	897
Terrorists Entered in Digital Databanks of police/CTDs	68,957
Total Activists Arrested	1,238
Total Leadership Arrested	258
Total Terrorists under Surveillance under 4th Schedule, ATA	1,297

Graph 6.3: Punjab Home Department Statistics - Counterterrorism



There is no further context or clarity given for the statistics above, and they raise a lot of questions. For example, independent data confirms that convicted terrorists only account for about 16% of the executions of inmates on death row. However,

¹⁶ Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

this table shows that all 400 executed in Punjab were terrorists, which is an overstatement. Further, who were the “activists” and “leadership” arrested? What is the status of the arrested “terrorist”? Have cases been registered against them? Are they pending trial? These and many related questions remain unanswered.

6.4 Karachi Operation

6.4.1 Violence in Karachi

Karachi, despite a dramatic yearly decline in overall violence in the country, remains the most violent district of Pakistan. By some estimates, Karachi’s population exceeds 24 million, larger than the continent of Australia. It is a sprawling urban metropolis, plagued by urban street crime, violent political militancy, and in recent years, infiltration by the Pakistan Taliban.

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the leading political party in Karachi has been blamed for creating and facilitating political issues in the city for many years. Political militancy has afflicted Karachi, resulting in tens of thousands of target killings – a term that signifies political or religious underpinning to someone’s murder. Terms like *namaloom afraad* (unknown individuals) were used as a popular moniker in the city to signify unrest or disruption caused by violent, organized groups of individuals. Both target killings and public disruptions have been curbed significantly in the last two years, but they remain an issue.

There are widely circulated conspiracy theories that unrest in Karachi is driven by external factors. The state must work on ensuring that the situation is not worsened by hostile intelligence agencies operating in the city, and the youth are not fueled to pick up arms against the state.

It is therefore appropriate that the current security operation in Karachi is being carried out in cooperation with the Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Police, the Counter Terrorism Department (supported by the Ministry of Interior), Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies. Tasks assigned to the Rangers have been particularly successful. The goal of this operation, as with others, is to minimize violence and crime in the city, and to this end, they have been extremely successful.

However, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. While target killings and urban crime has declined sharply in the city, extrajudicial killings are on

the rise. In September 2016, Human Rights Watch urged that law enforcement agencies halt torture and extrajudicial killings as a mechanism to curb crime.¹⁷

6.4.2 Ranger's Deployment in Karachi

Rangers are a paramilitary force under control of the Ministry of Interior, and their primary task is to guard, defend and secure borders in peace time as well as war time, provide and maintain security in war zones and areas of conflict and maintain law and order which includes aiding the police.

The Rangers Karachi operation was inaugurated by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 5, 2013 to rid the city of crime, political militancy and violence.¹⁸ A new sense of urgency was observed in January 2015 when the PM called a high-level meeting on the law and order situation in Karachi.¹⁹ There was a clear shift in mandate, as just over a month later, political militancy, a long-standing source of extreme violence in the city was targeted in Karachi. Rangers raided the headquarters of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), arresting absconders and recovering banned, unlicensed weapons.²⁰ Both sources of violence in Karachi, religious militancy and political militancy, were being targeted.

Two years later, the Rangers announced the completion of phase one, with the second phase to commence from August 14, 2015.²¹ The Rangers operation in Karachi continues at the time of writing this report.

6.4.3 Outcomes of Karachi Operation

17 AFP. (2016, September 26). HRW urges Pakistan to halt torture, killings by police. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1188614/rights-group-urges-pakistan-halt-torture-killings-police/>.

18 Tunio, H. (2013, September 04). Karachi law and order: Rangers to launch operation in two days - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/600064/karachi-law-and-order-rangers-to-launch-operation-in-two-days/>.

19 Khan, F. (2015, August 10). PM summons high-level meeting on law and order situation in Karachi tomorrow - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/%20story/829573/pm-summons-high-level-meeting-on-law-and-order-situation-in-karachi-tomorrow/>.

20 Salahuddin, Z. (2015, April 15). A New Turn for Pakistan's Fight Against Militancy. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/>.

21 Khan, F. (2015, August 10). First stage of Karachi security operation complete: Rangers - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/%20first-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/>.

Prior to his retirement, in November 2016, Former Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif stated that the operation should continue until peace has been restored in Karachi completely.²² His replacement seems keen to continue this legacy, as the Karachi operation in 2017 was bookended by military statements at the start and end of the year. In January 2017, the COAS stated that the Karachi operation would continue unabated,²³ while in December, Rangers Director General (DG) Major General Muhammad Saeed stated that the campaign in Karachi had borne fruit.²⁴

Data Collected by CRSS

Data collected by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) shows that despite the violence in FATA, Karachi remained the most violent and volatile district in Pakistan the last several years running. However, the level of violence has reduced by nearly 80% in Sindh, from 2,186 violence-related fatalities in 2014 to 455 in 2017. Meanwhile in Karachi, the level of violence has reduced by over 83%, from 2,023 violence-related fatalities in 2014 to 337 in 2017.


Year	Fatalities	Target Killings
2017	337	84
2016	474	183
2015	1,040	387
2014	2,023	1,363
2013	2,000	1,671

22 Agencies. (2016, November 9). Karachi operation to continue till complete restoration of peace: COAS. Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 21, 2018, from <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/11/09/karachi-operation-to-continue-till-restoration-of-peace-coas/>.

23 Karachi op to continue unabated: COAS. (2017, January 20). Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/01/20/karachi-op-to-continue-unabated-coas/>.

24 Rangers DG says positive results have come out of Karachi operation. (2017, December 13). Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/12/13/rangers-dg-says-positive-results-have-come-out-of-karachi-operation/>.

Graph 6.4: Sindh Fatalities/Target Killings Comparison – 2013 - 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

The NACTA report also corroborates these numbers. It states that from 2008 to 2013, 9,322 people were killed in Karachi, 708 cases of kidnapping for ransom were reported, 29,477 four-wheeled vehicles, and 109,078 two-wheeled vehicles were stolen along with 104 cases of bank robberies. Traders and industrialists were forced to pay Rs. 80-100 million per day to extortionists. By all accounts, before the Rangers operation, Karachi was a city choked by political and religious militancy, urban street crime, and citywide strikes.

Data Collected by NACTA

The NACTA report also reports that there is a 97% reduction in target killings. CRSS data shows a 95% reduction in target killings from 1,671 in 2013 to 84 in 2017. It further states an 87% decrease in murder rate, 52% decrease in robberies, 62% reduction in kidnapping cases, 84% reduction in extortion, and a 72% reduction in bank robberies.

Graph 6.5: Percentage Reduction in Crime in Karachi - NACTA



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018


Data Reported in Media

It was revealed through media reports that ending in 2017, the Rangers’ operation had achieved the following during four years of operations:²⁵

Table 6.5 - Rangers’ Performance in Karachi - 2014 - 2017	
Operations Conducted	11,400
Arrests	8,955
- Terrorists	1,978
- Target Killers	1,615
- Extortionists	612
- Kidnappers	163
Weapons Seized	12,147
Rounds of Ammunition Seized	767,319

²⁵ Perwaiz, S. B. (2017, December 17). Karachi operation review paints a mostly rosy picture. The News. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/256961-karachi-operation-review-paints-a-mostly-rosy-picture>.


Graph 6.6: Rangers’ Performance in Karachi – 2014 – 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Table 6.6 - Rangers’ Performance in Karachi - Street Crime - 2017	
Street Criminals Arrested	928
- Dacoits	475
- Drug Peddlers	325
- Gamblers	38
- Pickpockets	12
- Snatchers	10

Graph 6.7: Rangers' Performance in Karachi – Street Crime – 2017




The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Metric	2013	2017
Four-wheeled Vehicles Snatched/Stolen	5,489	1,377
Motorcycles Snatched/Stolen	28,000+	25,000
Mobile Phones	33,000	28,164
Terrorism Cases Reported	57	0
Extortion Cases	1,524	52
Kidnapping for Ransom	174	13

Graph 6.8: Changes Due to Rangers' Operations – 2017 – 2018

Rangers' Performance in Karachi
Snatchings, Terrorism, Extortion, Kidnappings
2014 – 2017



6.5 Balochistan Insurgency

6.5.1 Violence in Balochistan


According to data collected by this think tank, Balochistan was the most violent province in Pakistan for the second year in a row with 489 fatalities,²⁶ albeit a 40%

²⁶ Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2018). CRSS Annual Security Report – 2017 (Z. Salahuddin, Ed.). Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2017-7.pdf>.

decrease from 805 fatalities last year.²⁷ This figure is also lower than 2015 (719), 2014 (752) or 2013 (948).²⁸

Year	Number of Fatalities
2017	489
2016	752
2015	719
2014	752
2013	948

Graph 6.9: Balochistan Fatalities Comparison - 2013-2017




27 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2017, March 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2016. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2016-Final.pdf>.

28 Nafees, M., Gul, I., & Salahuddin, Z. (2016, February 26). CRSS Annual Security Report - 2015. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <http://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Security-Report-2015.pdf>.

A significant drop in security operations was evident in Balochistan as the number of outlaws eliminated in such operations dropped from 256 in 2016 to 120 this year. However, other forms of violence also appeared to be declining in the provinces. The incidents of terrorism went up significantly. Cross border attacks by the Afghan based militants also emerged as a serious threat in the province (table B2). Of the 26 suicide attacks in the country, 10 were reported from Balochistan leaving 106 people dead, while 89 people lost their lives because of target killings and 48 dead bodies were found from various locations in the province.

Table 6.9 - Balochistan fatalities from violence - 2016 vs. 2017		
Nature of violence	2016	2017
Security operations	256	120
Target killings	197	104
Militant attacks	264	150
Other Terrorism	61	70
Killings after kidnapping	16	10
Cross Border attacks from Afghan/Iran forces	1	23
Others	11	12
Total	816	489
Note: Other for 2017 includes accidental explosion, failed security operation, custodial deaths.		

Graph 6.10: Balochistan Fatalities From Violence - 2016 vs. 2017




Civilians were the largest group of victims in the province. The number was lower than last year, (377 to 264), but their percentage of the total victims increase from nearly 47% to 54%. Militants and insurgents witnessed a significant drop in the number of fatalities this year. It is important to share this data as Balochistan has the highest percentage of security and government official casualties compared to any other province or region in the country.

Table 6.10 - Identities of victims of violence in Balochistan - 2016 vs. 2017		
Militants/Criminals	2016	2017
Militants	127	107
Criminals	14	8
Insurgents	109	11
Foreigner - Militants	4	0
Foreigner - Criminals	1	0
Total Militants/Criminals	255	126
Percentage of total fatalities	31.7%	25.8%
Government/Security Officials	2016	2017
Security official	161	98
Government official	12	1
Total Government/Security Officials	173	99
Percentage of total fatalities	21.5%	20.3%
Civilian	2016	2017
Civilian	367	227
Politician	8	6
Media personnel	0	1
Religious party	2	28
Foreigners	0	2
Total Civilians	377	264
Percentage of total fatalities	46.8%	54.0%
Cumulative total	805	489

Graph 6.11: Identities of Victims of Violence in Balochistan - 2016 vs. 2017

Balochistan Victims of Violence
2016 vs. 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

For a detailed backgrounder on the Balochistan insurgency, counterinsurgency, missing persons, and reconciliation, please see **Annex IX**.

6.5.2 Balochistan Reconciliation Efforts in 2017

The NACTA internal reports accepts that “one of the major reasons behind the current state of affairs has been state’s apathy in education and literacy, and the lack of the Baloch voice heard in other parts of Pakistan”.²⁹ In situations such as these, exploitative forces such as sectarian and separatist ideologies take root, especially if supported by foreign powers. However, the heavy-handedness of the state in dealing in with insurgents, especially in the form of the missing persons in Balochistan has only exacerbated the situation.

NACTA statistics state that more than 2,000 suspected separatists have surrendered to security forces, though it is unclear during which period. In return, they are offered government amnesty and a government job. The report also claims that

²⁹ Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

hundreds of Baloch students have been granted scholarships by universities in Punjab. It is unclear how this helps improve the situation in Balochistan, as it is tacit acceptance of sorry the state of education in Balochistan.

In December 2017, it was also revealed that Nawabzada Gazain Marri, son of the late Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri would end his self-exile, return to the country, and join mainstream politics, as he felt that this was the best way to serve the people. The state and NACTA showcase this as a major victory point. However, Balochistan politics and administration has always been under the control of corrupt Baloch leaders, more concerned with lining their pockets than helping the people.

The NACTA report also cites several steps that existed (or began) long before the implementation of the National Action Plan. These include the *Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan* (AHB) package, which was started in 2009. The statistics are as follows:

Table 6.11 - Balochistan Youth Statistics under AHB since Inception	
Inducted in top educations institutions	13,200
Completed education	580
Recruited in Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)	67
Recruited in Civil Defense Department	3
Recruited in Planning and Works Department (PWD)	68
Recruited in Utility Stores Corporations	70
Recruited in Planning and Development Division	7
Recruited in Anti-Narcotics Force	50
Recruited in Ministry of Defense	3

THE NACTA report also claims that 6% employment quota for Balochistan has been reserved in offices such as the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). However, there is no information on how much of this quota has been filled.

Most notably, in November 2017, the *Khushhal* (prosperous) *Balochistan* package was announced, aimed at the development of the province.³⁰ The initiative is designed to improve the socio-economic development and security situation

³⁰ Khushhal Balochistan plan launched. (2017, November 24). The News. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/248249-khushhal-balochistan-plan-launched>.

across the province. Additionally, the federal government also announced a 10-year, Rs. 20 billion package for development in Balochistan, to elevate it be at par with other developed areas in the country.³¹

³¹ Zafar, M. (2017, November 14). PM unveils 10-year uplift scheme for Balochistan. Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1558306/1-centre-fund-half-every-uplift-project-balochistan-pm/>.

PART 7: SEMINARIES

Part 7: Table of Contents

- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Number of Seminaries in Pakistan
- 7.3 Government Progress
- 7.4 Funding / Financing of Seminaries
- 7.5 Obstacles
- 7.6 Conclusion
- 7.7 Why do parents in Pakistan send their children to seminaries? - by Zeeshan Salahuddin

NAP POINT 10:

Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.

This theme has been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 7: SEMINARIES

7.1 Introduction

The seventh theme looks at the controversial topic of seminaries or madrassas, as addressed by the tenth point in the National Action Plan (NAP). This point pertains to the registration and regulation of religious seminaries.

The registration of madrassas, put simply, is still pending. The goals of the government, as explained by the National Security Advisor (NSA) Lt. Gen. (ret'd) Naseer Khan Janjua, is to integrate these “lost sons and daughters of Pakistan” back into the mainstream and provide them opportunities and mechanisms to become productive members of society.¹ The practical side of this is understandably much more involved and the National Security Division is at the epicenter of these efforts.

Even if the government and Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP² – the coalition of *wifaqs*³) agreed to undertake madrassa reforms, the decision would have to be implemented both in letter and spirit. If they do not proceed carefully, this will be the latest in a long series of attempts to reform madrassas.⁴

7.2 Number of Seminaries in Pakistan

NACTA’s former National Coordinator’s statement about Pakistan’s inability to determine the exact number of seminaries has some merit. Since seminaries are religious institutions that work independently of government control, the exact number of seminaries that operate in Pakistan is unclear and this is one of the biggest obstacles to their regulation.

There are many figures quoted when it comes to determining the number of

1 Remarks by Guest of Honor National Security Advisor (NSA) Lt. Gen. (ret'd) Naseer Khan Janjua. (2018, January 30). Address presented at “Role of Madrassas: Assessing Parental Choice, Financial Pipelines, and Recent Developments in Religious Education in Pakistan and Afghanistan” in Kehkashan Hall, Serena Hotel, Islamabad.

2 ITMP is an umbrella organization of madrassas or seminaries. This is one of the two bodies that keeps tracks of the number of seminaries, the other being the Ministry of Religious Affairs.


3 A *wifaq* is an umbrella body for all seminaries from a particular school of thought. There are five *wifaqs* in Pakistan.

4 Please see Annex VII: Understanding Seminaries.

seminaries in Pakistan:

- The findings of the Quetta Commission Enquiry Report⁵ state that there are 26,465 seminaries in the country, as determined by writing letters to the five *wifaqs*.⁶ However, only 11,852 seminaries are registered.
- Another estimate puts this number at more than 35,000.⁷
- NSA Nasser Khan Janjua has mentioned a figure of 38,000.¹
- The NACTA internal report estimates the number at 22,000.⁸

Graph 7.1: Number of Seminaries in Pakistan by Source



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

5 Supreme Court of Pakistan. (2016). Quetta Inquiry Commission Report. Islamabad: Supreme Court of Pakistan. Retrieved February 16, 2018 from http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/QuettaInquiryCommissionReport.pdf.

6 Iqbal, Nasir. (2016, December 18). Qazi Isa commission decries lack of reliable data about seminaries. Retrieved on February 16, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1303026>.

7 Aalam, Iftikhar. (2016, July 14). Accord on Madrassa reforms struck. Retrieved on February 16, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/national/14-Jul-2016/accord-on-madrassa-reforms-struck>.

8 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

7.3 Government Progress

7.3.1 Closed Seminaries

In February, the progress on closing illegal or problematic seminaries seemed positive, but closer inspection revealed several problems. The Interior Ministry revealed that 2,372 ‘suspected’ seminaries had been shut down.⁹ However, of these, 2,311 were from Sindh alone. In other words, only 61 seminaries were shut down in the entire rest of the country. Thirteen had been shut down in KP, two in Punjab and one in Balochistan.

In May, 2017, it was also shared that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) would target seminaries over illegal foreign students, a move that was positive, but bore no fruit past the announcement.¹⁰

7.3.2 Geo-tagging and Registration

Per the NACTA internal report, Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Punjab and Sindh have completed their geo-mapping on agreed parameters. The progress in the remaining provinces is as follows: Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP), 95%; Balochistan, 80%; and FATA, 90%. The report also states that geo-mapping of all religious places of worship has also been undertaken.¹¹ This information has not changed since at least February 2017.

ICT

The most troubling news from the capital was that seminaries outnumber public schools by a wide margin.¹² The report shared that there are 374 madrassas in the federal capital, and most them were unregistered; while 348 public schools (191

9 Syed, A. (2017, February 18). 2,327 ‘suspected’ madrassas shut down countrywide, NAP implementation documents reveal. Geo News. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <https://www.geo.tv/latest/131542-2327-suspected-madrassas-shut-down-countrywide-NAP-implementation-documents-reveal>.

10 Awan, I. (2017, May 24). FIA to target seminaries over illegal foreign students. The Daily Times. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <https://dailytimes.com.pk/9948/fia-to-target-seminaries-over-illegal-foreign-students/>.

11 Musftaq, I., & Khan, U. M. (Eds.). (n.d.). Cultivating Peace - National Action Plan (NAP) - Review December 2017.

12 Abbasi, K. (2017, March 18). Religious seminaries outnumber schools in Islamabad. Dawn. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1321167>.

primary, 60 middle and 97 high schools), came under the capital's school system. Per one estimate, some 25,000 students are studying in these 374 madrassas, of which 12,000 are local, and the rest hail from outside of Islamabad.


Sindh

Per a report in November 2017, the madrassa tally in Sindh is as follows:¹³

Location	Total	Closed	Operational	Unaccounted
Karachi	3,733	623	3,110	0
Hyderabad	2,201	910	1,291	0
Mirpur Khas	1,301	281	750	270
Sukkur	1,956	420	1,256	280
Larkana	1,112	75	1,037	0
Total	10,303	2,309	7,444	550

13 Over 2000 unregistered seminaries shut down in Sindh. (2017, November 28). Dunya News. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/416565-Seminaries-geotagging-gets-completed-in-Sindh-More-than-2000-unregiste>.

Graph 7.2: Status of Seminaries in Sindh



KP

A scathing report on KP seminaries revealed that the government seems oblivious to literally thousands of seminaries.¹⁴ The report claimed that the *wifaqs* showed 6,733 seminaries in the province, but only 3,000 or so were registered with the government. Furthermore, the government had no idea about the number of students at any of the seminaries they were aware of. The fact that the total number of seminaries seems to oscillate between 22,000 and 38,000, this is a very troubling development.

Punjab

In Punjab, though the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) completed the geo-

¹⁴ Ashfaq, M. (2018, March 18). Govt seems oblivious to thousands of seminaries. Dawn. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1395122>.


tagging the details of this have not been made public so far.¹⁵ Punjab has not only geo-tagged 13,788 seminaries but has also tagged 62,676 mosques and 3,925 minorities' places of worship.

In February, it was revealed that 299 of these 13,788 seminaries were involved in sectarianism or terrorism.¹⁶ The list has been broadly divided into three categories, as depicted below.

Table 7.2 - Categorization of Seminaries in Punjab		
Category	Description	Number of Seminaries
A	present/former student/teacher involved in terrorism/sectarianism	56
B	facilitators of terrorism/sectarianism	233
C	not involved in terrorism/sectarianism	13,499
Total		13,788

15 Asghar, M. (2016). Geo-tagging of seminaries in Punjab. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1288563>.

16 299 madrassas involved in terrorism, sectarian activities in Punjab. (2017, February 28). Dunya News. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/377005-299-madrassas-involved-in-terrorism-sectarian-act>.

Graph 7.3: Categorization of Seminaries in Punjab

Balochistan

In a shocking revelation, Balochistan's minister for home and tribal affairs, Sarfaraz Bugti, shared that there were thousands of Afghan Taliban students were studying in seminaries across the province.¹⁷

In Balochistan, there are 3,290 seminaries (3,264 from the Sunni sect and 26 from the Shia sect). Around 3,000 of these are registered, but some estimate that the total number of registered and unregistered seminaries in Balochistan is nearing 10,000.¹⁸ These seminaries are primarily funded by donations also known as *saddqa*, *zakat* and *khairaat*. There are 3,910 foreign students and 160,000 local students in these seminaries. The Balochistan government has cancelled the visas of 3,552 foreign students and set up a District Coordinating Committee (DCC).

17 Iqbal, A. (2017, February 27). Thousands of Afghan Taliban studying in Balochistan: provincial minister. Dawn. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1317271>.

18 Shah, S. A. (2017, May 21). Balochistan govt to register all madressas with education department. Dawn. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1259791>.

Sexual Abuse Allegations

In November, an Associated Press investigation revealed that sexual abuse was rampant in Islamic schools in Pakistan, and that it was systemic, endemic problem.¹⁹ WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

7.3.3 Official Statements

NSA Gen. Nasser Khan Janjua

While addressing a gathering in January 2018, the NSA said that seminary reform is a problem of human resource development, and that is how it must be framed. He added that we must be considerate to these 3.5 million children in an estimated 38,000 madrassas; they are also sons and daughters of Pakistan, and we should want them back with open arms as productive members of society.²⁰

He stated that people working on madrassa mainstreaming had decided in principle that the children in religious seminaries will also study the same syllabi being taught in conventional schools along with religious education. He added that they had almost completed the process of reforms and were now in the process of getting constitutional support for implementation. He ended by saying that we are always willing to work within a cooperative framework with all parties, but we cannot approach this through a negative prism.

In a prior interview with the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), he stated that seminary reforms involve: a) registration of seminaries b) updating the curriculum c) equivalence certificates, and d) to have *wifaqs* registered as examination boards, *or*, to bring them under the education boards for mainstreaming.²¹

19 Gannon, K. (2017, November 21). Sexual Abuse Is Pervasive in Islamic Schools in Pakistan. Associated Press. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-11-21/sexual-abuse-is-pervasive-in-islamic-schools-in-pakistan>.

20 Remarks by Guest of Honor National Security Advisor (NSA) Lt. Gen. (retd) Naseer Khan Janjua. (2018, January 30). Address presented at "Role of Madrassas: Assessing Parental Choice, Financial Pipelines, and Recent Developments in Religious Education in Pakistan and Afghanistan" in Kehkashan Hall, Serena Hotel, Islamabad.

21 CRSS held exclusive interviews with the NSA in December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017. The NSA leads the National Security Decision, and is responsible for the security of Pakistan. The implementation of the NAP is one of his tasks.

He also noted that after the 18th amendment, the onus of implementing seminary registration lies primarily with the provincial governments and that under this amendment considerable power had been delegated from the center to the provinces.

Federal Minister for Interior, Ahsan Iqbal

In September 2017 Federal Minister for Interior Ahsan Iqbal said that NACTA will monitor all education institutions to ensure extremist thought is not being spread through their campuses.²² In October 2017, he also stated that all provinces and regions ‘must register mosques, seminaries’.²³

COAS Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa

The year also ended with the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa calling for widening the scope of madrasa education.²⁴

7.4 Funding / Financing of Seminaries

The financing system of madrassas added to the difficulty of proposed reforms. The country has a large shadow economy, and the madrassas are a small part of it. They function through cash couriers and charity seeking initiatives, rather than making transactions through banks. The Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) is an entity authorized with scrutinizing possible cases of money laundering and terror financing.

Foreign funding from “Role of Madrassas”

A recent publication on the role of madrassas resulted from the collaboration between the Royal Danish Defence College and the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security

22 Web Desk. (2017, September 09). Nacta to monitor educational institutions, says interior minister. ARY News. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from <https://arynews.tv/en/nacta-monitor-educational-institutions-says-interior-minister/>.

23 Associated Press of Pakistan. (2017, October 26). Provinces ‘must register mosques, seminaries’. The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1541536/1-provinces-must-register-mosques-seminaries/>.

24 Shahid, S. (2017, December 08). Army chief calls for widening scope of madressah education. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1375246>.

Studies (PICSS), both from Pakistan, and the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) from Afghanistan. A major finding of the study not initially anticipated related to the financial pipelines of the madrasas in Pakistan, which – contrary to widespread belief – are not heavily funded from abroad but mainly funded by donations from local communities in Pakistan. This is especially troublesome, as the common notion is that problematic madrassas are being funded by “foreign powers.” It must, however, be said that the study does not distinguish between local donations and donations that were made locally but sent by relatives abroad.

Please also see section [3.3.7 Terror Financing – Steps](#).

7.5 Obstacles

The foremost obstacle is the term reform itself. The word has been off-putting to stakeholders, as it implies there is an inherent problem. There has been significant movement to relabel this as madrasa mainstreaming or madrasa evolution, which is a step in the right direction.

Second, as madrasa have become synonymous with centers of extremism and extremist thought, there is a tendency to club all seminaries in this category. Additionally, madrasa teachers and administrations are acutely aware of the public perception, which is admittedly skewed and often exclusively maligns madrassas. This also creates a barrier between the government efforts and madrasa representatives. This factor, coupled with the religious rights’ stance that this is an attack on Islamic education, makes things very difficult for uniform reforms.

There is also inconsistency in reform policy. Registration should be done under a proper act, and not on an ad-hoc basis, preferably under the education department. An entirely separate government body to deal with madrassas would also be helpful, but the lack of it only leads to further confusion, mixed messaging and inconsistency. There is also disagreement between the government’s vision of reforms, and the madrasa representatives’ vision of reforms.

Finally, registration, regulation and monitoring are promising ideas on paper, but without explicitly formulated mechanisms and staff, this will remain a pipedream.

The aforementioned government body would be critical in this regard, complete with proper incentivization, benchmarks, and concerted efforts to alleviate a sense of deprivation.

Please also see Section 7.7: Why do parents in Pakistan send their children to seminaries, by Zeeshan Salahuddin.

7.6 Conclusion

The government is still in the process of negotiating reforms with relevant parties in the madrassa sector. The efforts to geo-tag, register and shut down seminaries are not well-coordinated and seem to be more ad-hoc in nature.

As may be evident, this is a monumental task, and with new seminaries being opened every day, as well as non-uniform, inconsistent action against seminaries, it remains one of the toughest tasks in the NAP. The government is taking its time to bring every stakeholder on board, and in the long-term that is the correct strategy.

However, pressure from the religious right and internal finger-pointing all serve to delay and derail the process. Additionally, seemingly haphazard and inconsistent implementation of the NAP points (financing, regulation, curriculums, and hate speech) as they pertain to seminaries also creates loopholes in the system. Pakistan has still not begun the process of inclusion of sciences, English and other subjects in the seminary curriculum.

7.7 Why do parents in Pakistan send their children to seminaries?

By Zeeshan Salahuddin

A Brief History

Initially, madrassas were centers of education, both religious and secular. They earned the title of “trust institutions” over time, as they provided social services to poor families, such as food, shelter, clothing and free education. Part of the reason for the rise in seminary education and housing was the state’s failure to address the basic needs of the population. Parents, who made less than two dollars per day, started seeing madrassas as a beacon of hope, a way to help the family survive, where their children could learn to read and write, be clothed and fed, and have a roof over their heads.

This is the central argument upon which rests the severe backlash from the religious right, whenever the state of Pakistan attempts to regulate seminaries.

This harsh reality has allowed the scope and scale of madrassas to grow and morph over time.

Over the course of time, funding became an issue as madrassas expanded. Religious seminaries have enjoyed overt financial backing from various Muslim states. A Wikileaks cable suggests that an estimated \$100 million makes its way annually from the Gulf States to seminaries in Pakistan. Ostensibly, this is to support continued religious education and social services. But analysts have long suspected that some part of these finances make their way to funding militancy.

Militant Connection?

The idea that madrassas are “incubators of violent extremism” took hold after 9/11, and the US pressured General Pervaiz Musharraf to take some action over the schools. While numerous reports, including the Annual Status of Education Report Pakistan, claim that there is no connection between seminaries and militancy, several facts work against this notion.

The most overt and public display of the strength of madrassas was the Red Mosque standoff in 2007, where armed students engaged in a hostile and bloody standoff with state authorities for several days. Further, both the NAP and the NISP

call for the registration, regulation and reform of madrassas, a tacit acceptance that a problem exists.

Further, a Brookings Institute research report in 2010 claimed that 82% of students in Deobandi seminaries see the Taliban as role models. Another Brookings Institute report claims that the real problem lies in a handful of hardline seminaries.²⁵ Finally, the government has disclosed that nearly 80 working seminaries in Pakistan are receiving foreign monetary aid of up to three hundred million rupees.²⁶

Why do parents in Pakistan send children to madrassas?


The Center for Research and Security Studies conducted some research to determine the family demographics in various regions of Pakistan and why they continue to send their children to seminaries.²⁷ To answer this question, only families that had sent at least one child to a seminary were engaged. A total of 558 families were surveyed in 14 cities across Pakistan.

25 Winthrop, R., & Graff, C. (2010, June). Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links Between Education And Militancy In Pakistan. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/pakistan-education-winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf.

26 Ghiskori, Z. (2015, January 29). Year 2013-14: 80 seminaries received Rs300m in foreign aid - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/829407/year-2013-14-80-seminaries-received-rs300m-in-foreign-aid/>.


27 Salahuddin, Z, Dad, G., & Kousary, H. with Vestenskov, D. (ed.). (January 2018). The Role of Madrassas – Assessing Parental Choice, Financial Pipelines and Recent Developments in Religious Education in Pakistan & Afghanistan. The Royal Danish Defense College, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Graph 7.4: Geographical spread of cities selected



Surveys were conducted in parts of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan (represented by Quetta) and the Northern Areas (represented by Gilgit). The study determined that the average monthly income of these households was relatively low at approximately Rs. 23,161.25, to sustain approximately 3.7 children and potentially other family members.

Schools are geographically accessible, and approximately 84% of the representative families stated that they were satisfied with the amenities available there. However, only approximately 1.79 children per household attended schools, while the rest attended seminaries.

Graph 7.5: Reasons for not Sending Children to School

Various reasons have been provided by the surveyed families as to why they send their child(ren) to seminaries. However, there are two dominating themes, which are outlined below:

Financial Stress

Seminaries are generally free of cost and have the potential to provide their students with free or inexpensive accommodation and food. This is a major attraction for parents who wish to educate their children, while relieving financial and household stress on the family. Since most seminaries offer dormitories, this further alleviates the pressure on the family.

Preference of Religious Education

A large population of Pakistan is, undoubtedly, passionate about Islam, the Quran and their studies. Families take immense pride in their

children becoming religious scholars and/or *Hafiz-e-Quran* (individuals who memorize the entirety of the Quran) and believe that facilitating seminary/religious education to their children is a means of earning a higher stature in the eyes of God.

The financial status of these households combined with a general devotion to religion appears to be the motivating factor for parents to send their children to seminaries instead of schools.

Zeeshan Salahuddin is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies. He can be reached at zeeshan@crss.pk and [@zeesalahuddin](https://twitter.com/zeesalahuddin).

PART 8: IDPs and REFUGEES

Part 8: Table of Contents

- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Refugees
- 8.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- 8.4 Conclusion
- 8.5 Afghan Refugees: Still a Simmering Issue - by Imtiaz Gul

NAP POINT 12:

Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.

NAP POINT 19:

Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.

These themes have been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 8: IDPs and REFUGEES

8.1 Introduction

Point #12 and #19 in the NAP and eighth theme deals with the displaced persons and refugees, respectively.

8.2 Refugees

8.2.1 Refugees - Numbers

National Security Advisor (NSA) Lt. Gen. (ret) Naseer Khan Janjua in a private interview with CRSS stated that while certain aspects of the Afghan refugee crisis are politicized and mishandled, the consensus is that they should return to their homeland.¹ This sentiment is held universally by nearly all mainstream political figures and parties.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gauges 1,391,921 refugees in Pakistan as of January 31, 2018.² 34% out of these refugees live in refugee camps and 66% live among the population.³ According a report by Al - Jazeera TV, Pakistan still hosts the third biggest outcast populace of 1.6 million, while Jordan (2.7 million) and Turkey (2.5 million) host the positions first and second.⁴

Pakistan has 582 refugees from other countries as well.²

1 CRSS held exclusive interviews with the NSA in December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017. The NSA leads the National Security Decision, and is responsible for the security of Pakistan. The implementation of the NAP is one of his tasks.

2 UNHCR. (2018, January 28) UNHCR Pakistan: Refugee Update. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://unhcrpk.org/>.

3 UNHCR. (2016, August 31). UNHCR Pakistan Refugees Overview – August 2016. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from http://unhcrpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Pakistan_Refugees_Overview_August16_Ver1.pdf


4 Al-Jazeera. (2016, October 4). Ten countries host half of world's refugees: report. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ten-countries-host-world-refugees-report-161004042014076.html>.

8.2.2 Refugees – Regional Distribution

Roughly 50% of the Afghan refugees are children, according to the UNHCR. Women and children combined make up for about 72%. The gender divide is 56% males, 46% females. The breakdown of refugees by region is as follows:

Region	Refugee Population
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa	800,729
Balochistan	317,612
Punjab	159,584
Sindh	63,152
Islamabad	33,162
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	13,795
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	3,882
Gilgit Baltistan	5

Graph 8.1: Refugee Population by Region - 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

Since 2002, 4,312,733 Afghan refugees have repatriated from Pakistan with UNHCR's assistance. The key findings for such high number of repatriation are:

1. no longer feeling of welcome to stay
2. strict border control
3. happy/content to return

148,692 people repatriated between 1 October and 31 October 2016 alone which is likewise the most elevated number of returns in October since 2002. The daily average number of returnees in October was around 5,700, an upsurge to the average approximately 4,600 daily returns in September.⁵

8.2.3 Refugees – Repatriation Figures

According to UNHCR, between April and November 2017, 59,020 Afghan refugees (PoR⁵ card holders) voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan. Of these the clear majority, 87% were repatriated from Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Balochistan, 10% from Punjab, 4% from Sindh, and 1% from Islamabad. This is a massive reduction from the 380,000 figure of 2016, that resulted from forced mass deportations due to worsening relations between the two countries.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) claims 82,019 refugees and undocumented Afghans returned or were deported to Afghanistan between January and August 2017, implying that thousands are getting forcibly deported every year.⁶


The repatriation trends over the last few years are as follows:

Year	Voluntary Repatriation
2008	282,496
2009	51,290
2010	109,383
2011	52,096
2012	82,684
2013	31,224
2014	12,991
2015	58,211
2016	381,275
2017	59,020

5 The Proof of Registration (PoR) card is a legal document that proves the individual has formally registered their status with the authorities, and ostensibly, provides protection from extortion, harassment, and arbitrary arrests.

6 International Organization for Migration Country Office for Pakistan (2017, September). Quarterly Newsletter – September 2017. IOM. Retrieved March 2, 2018, from https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/mission_newsletter/file/IOM_Pakistan_Quarterly_Newsletter_Sept_2017.pdf.

Graph 8.2: Voluntary Repatriation Trends for the Last Decade



The process of repatriation has accelerated due to multiple factors:

- doubling of UNHCR’s repatriation grant to returnees,
- stricter controls on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border,
- uncertainty among Afghan refugees regarding GoP-issued Proof of Registration (POR) card extensions and future legal status,
- anti-refugee sentiment among Pakistanis,
- loss of economic opportunities due to harassment and intimidation by host populations, and
- extortion by/corruption of local authorities.

8.2.4 Refugees – Current Status

The Government of Pakistan (GoP) is dedicated to continuing repatriation of all Afghan nationals. However, in 2017, it was recognized that the constant renewal of PoR cards (for the six time in 2017, in total), is a source of much angst and strife for the refugee population.

Afghan Cards

In July 2017, GOP launched a pilot program register undocumented Afghans, estimated between 600,000 to 1,000,000.⁷ Under Pakistan Foreigner’s Act, this new step will award Afghans “Afghan Citizen” cards, allowing then legal stay while their documentation is sorted, and thus providing some protection against arbitrary arrests, extortion and harassment. The six-month registration program was the result of three years of negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s governments, intermediated by UNHCR. It was reported in October 2017, that nearly 100,000 refugees had registered under this scheme.⁸

PoR Cards

The PoRs for Afghan refugees ran out on December 31, 2017. They were renewed until January 31, 2017, despite a recommendation by Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) to extend their validity for one additional year.⁹ In February, they were renewed again for two months, as the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan struggled to improve ties.¹⁰

7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). (2017, July 21). UNHCR welcomes registration of a million undocumented Afghans in Pakistan. UNHCR. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5971c8904.html>.

8 1lac Afghan refugees registers last month: NADRA. (2017, October 3). The Nation. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/03-Oct-2017/1lac-afghan-refugees-registers-last-month-nadra>.

9 Afghan refugees likely to get sixth extension in their stay. (2018, January 1). Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/afghan-refugees-likely-get-sixth-extension-their-stay>.

10 Ali, S. (2018, February 1). Pakistan extends Afghan refugees’ repatriation deadline. The Nation. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://nation.com.pk/01-Feb-2018/pakistan-extends-afghan-refugees-repatriation-deadline>.

Arrests and Detentions


Refugees continue to face arbitrary arrest and harassment by authorities. According to UNHCR, 46,856 Afghan nationals were provided legal assistance in 2017 by the Legal Assistance and Aid Program. This included 3,477 arrests, of which 3,475 were released. It must be said that this trend had reduced significantly in the last year except for a sudden spike in February 2017, when 1,872 individuals were arrested.

8.2.5 Refugees - Worldwide

UNHCR reports 65.6 million individuals were displaced by the end of year 2017. This is the highest recorded number of displacements on record. This includes 22.5 million refugees (17.2 million under UNHCR mandate, and 5.3 million Palestinian refugees registered by United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)), and 10 million stateless people.¹¹

¹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). (2018). Statistical Yearbooks: Figures at a Glance. UNHCR. Retrieved March 25, 2018, from <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>.

Graph 8.3: Number of Registered Refugees Worldwide



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018


Nearly 55% of the world’s refugees come from just three countries: 1.4 million from South Sudan, 2.5 million from Afghanistan, and 5.5 million from Syria. Turkey has now far bypassed Pakistan as the country with the most number of refugees. The top six countries hosting the largest refugee populations are as follows:

Country	Refugee Population
Turkey	2,900,000

Pakistan	1,400,000
Lebanon	1,000,000
Iran	979,400
Uganda	940,800
Ethiopia	791,600

Graph 8.4: Countries with the Largest Refugee Populations

Countries with the Largest Refugee Populations - 2017



The NAP Tracker, The Center for Research and Security Studies, 2018

For an exhaustive discussion on the issue of refugees in Pakistan, please see [Section 8.4](#) by Imtiaz Gul.

8.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

8.3.1 IDPs – Current Status

According to the statistics of UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Pakistan, around 5.3 million people remained displaced since 2008, 5.05 million of these have returned including roughly 0.2 million people

who repatriated in 2017 alone.¹² This now leaves roughly 0.25 million internally displaced persons.


OCHA reported that around 332,413 displaced families have returned to their homes until December 31, 2017.¹³ The process of rehabilitation started back in 2008, the same year displacements began. Another big push for rehabilitation came in March 2015 by the GoP. The breakdown for returning families by agency is as follows:

Table 8.4 - Rehabilitated Families by FATA Agency	
FATA Agency	Rehabilitated Families
Khyber	96,958
North Waziristan	91,311
South Waziristan	74,590
Kurram	40,757
Orakzai	28,797

12 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2017, September 30). Pakistan: Displacements and returns in KP and FATA 2008 - 2017. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-displacements-and-returns-kp-and-fata-2008-2017-30-september-2017>.

13 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2017, December 31). PAKISTAN: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns. UNOCHA. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://reliefweb.int/map/pakistan/pakistan-kp-and-fata-areas-displacement-hosting-and-returns-31-march-2018>.

Graph 8.5: Rehabilitated Families by FATA Agency



8.3.2 IDPs – Causes

The primary causes of displacement include insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence. In June, 2014, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb, designed to root out militancy permanently from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and adjoining regions. This has contributed greatly to the displaced persons crisis. History effectively repeated itself, as a similar operation in 2009 had also displaced some 3.4 million people. Other causes include natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes.

8.3.3 IDPs – Rehabilitation Plan

Federal Minister for Finance and Revenue Mohammad Ishaq Dar informed the National Assembly on March 16, 2016 that a comprehensive rehabilitation plan has been devised for the dignified return of IDPs by the Government of Pakistan.¹⁴ He said that a cell has also been set up in Economic Affairs Division for their welfare. A proposal is also under consideration for the payment of a lump sum amount to IDPs for construction of houses.

An amount of 80 billion PKR has been specified in rehabilitation plan and World Food Program has also disbursed 20 billion PKR among IDPs. With just 0.25 of the 5.3 million displaced persons remaining, it is hoped that the rehabilitation process will be completed in 2018.

8.4 Conclusion

Despite controversy, the Government of Pakistan is convinced that Afghan refugees returning to their host country is in the broad interests of both nations. The repatriation efforts spiked tremendously in 2016 and dropped down to normal levels in 2017. It is expected that this repatriation rate will slow down further in 2018, due to the bulk of the political will focused on elections. However, given the volatile situation in the region, this process could also accelerate in the wake of an untoward incident. It seems that the government is least concerned with assimilation and integration of refugees in the larger population.

With 0.25 million IDPs remaining at the end of 2017 and rehabilitation efforts underway, it is expected and hoped that these individuals will be successfully returned to their homes. However, two factors threaten this process. First, the military continues to flush out remnant pockets of militants in the border regions, which inevitably displaces population. Second, returning home for many is no longer a viable option, as they have no mechanism to support their families. This is a critical flaw in the rehabilitation plans that needs to be comprehensively addressed.

¹⁴ Samaa News. (2016, March 18). Govt has comprehensive plan to rehabilitate IDPs: Dar. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2016/03/govt-has-comprehensive-plan-to-rehabilitate-idps-dar/>.

8.5 Afghan Refugees: Still a Simmering Issue

by Imtiaz Gul

One major irritant in the Pakistan-Afghan relations is the recurring theme of the refugee's plight. Every single incident involving an administrative step or misstep against refugees, or a high-level statement on the issue, particularly those urging them to return to Afghanistan feeds into the already battered image of Pakistan.

Every "adverse" action results in yet another negative story on Pakistan, thereby further diminishing whatever little goodwill there exists for the country.

While the anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan is driven and fuelled by certain lobbies as part of a geo-political tit-for-tat, there is little doubt that an absence of comprehensive, long-term strategy has also fed into the negative toxic narratives on Pakistan.

Pakistan abruptly closed the Afghan border eight times between February 2017 and February 2018, causing difficulties to people and businesses on both sides. (Do you know why they closed it 8 times – sorry should have asked in the first round but it seems to need an explanation)

The country has also failed to develop a long-term policy on Afghan refugees and has been unable to enact any legislation to address the issues of refugees including those from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Nepal.

Even the new policy measures including an apparently liberal visa regime for Afghans - approved by the federal cabinet in July 2017 – could not translate into a medium-to-long term policy. Its implementation has been lackluster doing little to mitigate refugees' plight.

For over a decade, ever since the UNHCR led a voluntary repatriation programme, refugees residing in Pakistan have been getting a yearly extension. Every year, officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan and UNHCR get together to discuss the issue and eventually agree on a new deadline. This process is accompanied by uncertainty among Afghans living in the country until the agreement on the extension is announced.

And the same happened in late 2017; the government made an unbelievably

strange announcement in late December 2017 that the refugees' stay would be extended just for 30 days. It was followed by another extension for two months until March 31, probably best explaining the typical lackadaisical, thoughtless and lopsided policy, particularly, when Islamabad keeps reiterating its commitment to the principle of "voluntary repatriation."

It also exposed the transient decision-making in Islamabad, devoid of any consideration for the consequences of such decisions.

Following a meeting with the Afghan refugee and repatriation minister and UNHCR representatives at Istanbul in early November, Pakistan had reportedly agreed to extend the stay of about 1.4 million Afghans in the country until December 31, 2018. But the January 3 decision on the shortened extension stunned almost everybody.

Afghanistan's refugees and repatriation minister, Sayed Hussain Alami Balkhi, who had been all praise for Pakistan's generosity on the issue after last year's agreement on extension, was also taken by surprise by this news.

At the same time, as many as 100,000 new Proof of Registration (PoRs) cards – a document that allows refugees to stay here legally – were blocked for security concerns.

All the announcements in early 2018 sparked fears and triggered a new wave of concern among the Afghans living here, while also providing more ammunition to people across the border to fire at Pakistan through media interviews.

Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

Pakistan currently hosts 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees. During 2017, at least 860,000 Afghan citizens, living here without Proof of Registration (PoR) Cards, were also registered under a separate Afghan citizenship program.

The registration of these Afghans commenced in August 2017 jointly by the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the UNHCR and was supposed to have concluded by the end of February 2018.

These people at this point are being issued cards to their status as Afghan citizens,

which will eventually enable them to return to Afghanistan in order to obtain Afghan passports, valid Pakistani visas, and then being able to come back here as legal migrants, or residents, or workers.

A third group of Afghans, who are not registered as refugees or Afghan citizens, reside in Pakistan and work principally in urban areas, such as Karachi and Lahore. According to Pakistan government's estimates, this category could involve up to 400,000 Afghans. They are neither documented, nor known to the local law enforcement agencies. Their presence here is thus deemed illegal.

UNHCR View on Afghan Refugees

UNHCR's mandate only applies to the first group i.e. the 1.4 million registered refugees.

UNHCR's Pakistan representative Ms. Ruven Menikdiwela told the delegates of the CRSS-led Pak-Afghan Track 11 that while the Afghan embassy looks at it more holistically in terms of the entire Afghan population here, UNHCR perspective is lot more limited.

Refugees, or illegal migrants, the very presence of Afghans in large numbers in Pakistan and high incidence of terrorism in the country has led to a general perception among the masses that as if these two issues were somehow intertwined. But Menikdiwela refuted this as misconception.

Refugees, according to the definition of legal conventions, are civilians caught up in a humanitarian situation. The vast majority of Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan peacefully and contributing to its economy. They have fled for reasons of conflict and persecution and deserve international protection, which the government of Pakistan has very generously provided to them for the last 40 years, according to Menikdiwela.

The UNHCR has found no concrete evidence that the refugee villages have ever provided safe havens to terrorists. However, that being said, UNHCR is a non-political organization and cannot vouch for the integrity of every single individual among the 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees, she explained.

She added that in case if the Government of Pakistan does have concrete evidence

against any individual in the 1.4 million registered Afghan refugee population that they are complicit in acts of terror, the government should deal with them under the law. This is because terrorists cannot seek refuge in refugee villages. UNHCR is clear in its position that it would never provide cover to terrorists masquerading as refugees.

Menikdiwela acknowledged that Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan – for nearly four decades - is one of the world’s most protracted refugee situations.

UNHCR’s position is that the preferred long-term solution for the Afghan refugees is their voluntary repatriation to their own country. But this return has to be voluntary, gradual and in conditions of safety and dignity while also being sustainable. UNHCR also recognizes that the conditions at this point in Afghanistan are not conducive to a mass-scale return of 1.4 million people and the economy of Afghanistan cannot absorb such a massive inflow. This sentiment has been expressed at the highest levels of the government in Afghanistan as well.

The UNHCR representative also underscored that Pakistan’s contributions to the refugees issue has “not being sufficiently recognized by others.”

Plan by SAFRON on the Repatriation of Afghan Refugees Presented to Cabinet

Despite the short deadlines for the UNHCR-led voluntary return programme, the cabinet tasked the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions to come up with a repatriation plan.

The plan was subsequently reviewed and approved in February 2017. The UNHCR also endorsed the plan which provides the registered refugees with three options:

- 1) Encouraging voluntary return to Afghanistan;
- 2) Those refugees who wish to remain in Pakistan should obtain an Afghan passport from the Afghan embassy and consulates in Pakistan as well as obtain a Pakistani visa from the embassy/consulates in Afghanistan. Then they can reside here legally as either unskilled labourers, as white collar workers, as students, or for health reasons.
- 3) The main income earner in the family can be permitted to remain in Pakistan on a work visa while the rest of the family is encouraged to return to Afghanistan and subsist on the remittances provided by the main

bread-earner in Pakistan.

The second category of Afghans, that include the newly registered 860,000 Afghan citizen cardholders, will be required to return to Afghanistan during the validity of their cards and furnish themselves with Afghan passports and valid Pakistani visas before returning to Pakistan.

The third group of Afghans that reside in Pakistan illegally and who do not fall in either of the two previous categories, would, if apprehended, be deported immediately. This, UNHCR believes, is the sovereign right of every government to deal with any illegal migrant within its borders, according to Menikdiwela.

As part of the Pakistan government plan – also agreed upon by the Afghan government and the UNHCR - the refugee cards will be extended till the 30th of June, 2018.

However, UNHCR believes this timeframe is not sufficient for 1.4 million people to make up their minds and leave for Afghanistan.

Government of Pakistan Policy and Measures

Federal Minister for SAFRON, Gen (R) Abdul Qadir Baloch told the Beyond Boundaries Tack 11 delegates at Islamabad in February 2018 that after the 9/11 incidents of terrorism, some pull factor within Afghanistan resulted in the return of nearly 2.5 million Afghan refugees. Many camps in Pakistan housing those refugees were therefore closed down.

As of March 2018, the minister said, only 30% of them lived in camps/refugee villages, while the 70% had moved out of the camps and majority had gone away from the border areas to settle around urban centers of Pakistan.

Karachi houses the majority of these refugees, followed by Peshawar and Quetta, while some live and work in interior Punjab - Sialkot, Sargodha, Faisalabad - and the capital Islamabad.

In the camps they are not being taken care of any more. However, they are provided with water, health facilities and education, to a small extent. Many of them are involved in various economic activities including farming and construction.

Afghans that sought refuge in Pakistan mainly moved to agriculture and cattle farming when they left refugee camps. But most of the young Afghans in Pakistan did not adopt the trade of their parents, particularly the Afghans that were born here and grew up around urban areas.

They find it difficult to pursue careers in agriculture or work as laborers in Afghanistan, and hence could face serious problems after their return to their home country.

However, SAFRON is in direct talks with its counterparts in Afghanistan who have stated that agricultural land and cattle farming options are available for the returning Afghans.

Baloch said the current Government of Afghanistan has been far more serious about the refugees issue and has established a 15-member cabinet on refugees which is doing a lot of work for their repatriation.

Pakistan is also demanding that Afghanistan should make some policies that are refugee specific, such as having a job quota for the returning Afghans.

Humanitarian Issue

The government of Pakistan has been treating the issue of Afghan refugees as a purely humanitarian problem, said the SAFRON minister Baloch. That is why successive governments have consciously tried to keep refugees and political relations apart. He also pointed out that the people of Pakistan and security authorities have had no serious complaints from the refugees as far as terrorism was considered.

However, Pakistan has limited resources and its economy has also been strained because of the large refugee population. Unfortunately, the international community never really acknowledged this major contribution of Pakistan toward Afghanistan. Nor does it talk about the issue the way it did until a few years ago, the minister lamented.

“Internationally this humanitarian problem is not being attended to in the way that it should have been....it is a huge burden and the numbers are too big for Pakistan which itself is beset with serious resource constraints,” the minister said.

He said all facilities in Pakistani schools, colleges and hospitals are also available to the Afghan refugees at no extra cost. Pakistan has also provided 3,000 scholarships to Afghan students in different Pakistani educational institutions.

Additionally, admissions under another 3,000 scholarship programme have commenced, which means a total of 6,000 scholarships for Afghan nationals had been provided, he added.

Pakistan, he recalled, made a commitment to UNHCR in 2012 in a tripartite agreement that the return of the Afghan refugees will be voluntary and will be with dignity and honor.

The international community at the time made a commitment of \$600 million to be given to Pakistan to be spent over a period of three years in areas, called Raha, where the refugees live.

However, even after the passage of 5 years Pakistan has received only \$180 million, leaving a huge hole of \$420 million. Apart from accentuating the hardship for the refugees and their repatriation, the absence of funds may also cause unrest within the refugee population, he said.

In 2016, UNHCR provided a repatriation package which included \$200 per returning refugee. When the new UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi came to Pakistan, he agreed to double this package, to \$400.

Under this plan, 640,000 Afghans voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in 2017. Of those, 70% have reported to be satisfied with their living conditions back home.

The refugee issue, unfortunately, has become extremely politicized. During an early January cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, not a single minister spoke in favour of the refugees. Nor was the SAFRON minister Baloch allowed to make his presentation on the subject. This was the result of US president Donald Trump's negative tweet on Pakistan on January 1.

The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more, Trump said in a tweet on January 1.

This tweet drew flak and rage from most Pakistanis who thought it was a public condemnation of a country that has borne most of the brunt of two US-led adventures in Afghanistan i.e. the anti-Soviet jihad and the war on terror.

No body within the government and the military establishment has a plausible answer as to why not Afghans born in Pakistan be at least given a timeless permanent residence if not citizenship?

Little do the core decision makers realize that vested interest in Afghanistan and elsewhere would want the refugees issue to stay alive this way. This arms them with a whip that they keep using all over to drag Pakistan's name in the mud.

While Afghan officials lobby for extensions of the refugees' stay here, many others internally want to exploit this issue to paint Pakistan in bad light.

All these years many officials – both military and civilian – have parroted a stereotypical narrative on refugees, giving an impression as if they are linked to crime and terrorism, to make a case for their return to Afghanistan.

But, as pointed out by Baloch, in a meeting with an Pak-Afghan Track 11 delegation in late February, not a single refugee has been found involved in any act of terrorism.

Why then bracket them with terrorism and make a case for their repatriation?

Pakistan clearly needs a long-term refugee policy. It shall have to apply both the humanitarian as well as the political prism to look at Afghans and other illegal migrants, instead of clubbing them with terrorists and criminals.

It is an issue that keeps becoming a source of negative publicity for Pakistan.

Imtiaz Gul is a prominent security analyst and media personality, who heads the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad as Executive Director. He tweets at @vogul1960.

PART 9: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR REFORMS

Part 9: Table of Contents

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9.5 Legal and Procedural Roadblocks to Terrorism Prosecution in Pakistan

- by Zainab Mustafa

NAP POINT 20:

Reforms in criminal courts systems to strengthen the anti-terrorism institutions including provincial CIDs.

This theme has been derived from the 20 points of the NAP.

PART 9: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR REFORMS

9.1 Introduction

Our ninth and final theme explores the final point in the NAP, reforms in the criminal courts system to facilitate better implementation of rule of law and speedier access to justice. One of biggest criticisms of Pakistan's fight against terrorism is its inability to prosecute and convict terror suspects.^{1 2} Further, at the time of the 21st amendment being passed (and the formation of the military courts), the government had committed to bring reforms in the criminal justice system within two years so as to avoid military courts in future.

The problem here is that this is point number 20, in a list of 20. The second item in a list will never be as important as the first. The last item in the list this long and exhaustive is practically guaranteed to never see the light of day. The point in the NAP, three years later, has seen little to no movement. In Section 9.3 below, NACTA's progress on this front has been shared, and it leaves much to be desired. It seems that unlike hangings and military courts, which produce tangible (and thus boastable) numbers, criminal justice sector reforms will remain a very low priority.

9.2 The Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan

Code of Criminal Procedure, the most comprehensive bill on proceedings of criminal courts in Pakistan, contains all the procedures and provisions which are necessary to regulate the working of criminal law courts in the country. All criminal courts work under this act and it has a central role in the Pakistan legal system.

Criminal law in Pakistan and the procedural codes that are followed, are very different in their application from the criminal law that is followed in the developed world. Pakistan's criminal justice system needs to be understood in the context of the society and the region's history. Most of the criminal laws in Pakistan were introduced by the British Empire. The Code of Criminal Procedure

1 Staff Reporter. (2016, July 15). Criminal justice system: 'Conviction rate low as judicial system in need of reform'. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1142622/criminal-justice-system-conviction-rate-low-judicial-system-need-reform/>.

2 Gul, I. (2016, May 17). Reforming the justice system. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1105109/reforming-the-justice-system/>.

(V of 1898) and the Penal Code (XL of 1860) both of which were implemented in the colony are still by and large the prescribed statutes followed by the courts for criminal cases in Pakistan.

The shortfalls of PPC and CrPC are dire. Radical changes are required for revamping of the existing criminal justice system of Pakistan. Despite the growing urgency of reform, Pakistan's police, and indeed the whole criminal justice system, still largely functions on the mandate of "maintaining public order" rather than undertaking contemporary crime.

9.2.1 Pending Cases in Pakistan's Courts


In January, 2017, it was media reports revealed that there are 1.87 million pending cases in Pakistan's courts.³ The apex court had 38,539 pending cases. The exact number of cases can be seen in the breakdown below.⁴

Table 9.1 - Cases Pending in Pakistan's Courts - 2017	
Supreme Court	38,539
Lahore High Court	147,542
Sindh High Court	93,335
Peshawar High Court	30,764
Balochistan High Court	6,030
Islamabad High Court	16,278
Punjab District Courts	1,184,551
Sindh District Courts	97,673
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa District Courts	204,030
Balochistan District Courts	12,826
Islamabad Courts	37,753
Total	1,869,321

3 Asad, M. (2018, January 21). Over 1.8 million cases pending in Pakistan's courts. DAWN. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1384319>.

4 Butt, T. (2018, January 15). 1.87 million cases pending in Pak courts. The News. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/268487-1-87-million-cases-pending-in-pak-courts>.

Graph 9.1: Cases Pending in Pakistan’s Courts - 2017



Dr. Shoaib Suddle while discussing the poor criminal judicial system of Pakistan told the Senate Committee on August 20, 2015 that conviction rate in Pakistan is only 10 percent and that too, through bribe and influence. Any moderately complex civil suit takes 20 to 30 years to be resolved by the exhausting litigation system after numerous rounds of appeals, revisions and remands.

Other main causes of poor prosecution in Pakistan and hence the dismal conviction rates are: Absence of professional autonomy, poor training, lack of access to basic data, inadequate tools to investigate in the Police Department, delay in registration of FIRs due to the reluctance of police, totally ineffective witness protection mechanism, lack of initiative on the part of state prosecutors due to insufficient financial rewards, political appointments of blue-eyed police personnel and prosecutors, un-ending reliance on old conventional tactics and barbaric sources to investigate the crime and criminal reluctance in using scientific

sources for probe etc.^{5 6}

9.3 Progress on Legal Reforms

In May 2016, the National Assembly passed a criminal justice system amendment bill, which detailed the following stipulations:

- Introduce a vaguely framed offence that makes wounding religious feelings through words (including using loudspeakers) or gestures punishable with one to three years imprisonment;
- Increase the minimum sentence for “forced marriage” from three to five years imprisonment if the victim is a minor or a non-Muslim;
- Increase the sentence for police officers guilty of “neglect/violation of duty” from three months to three years imprisonment;
- Make convictions on the basis of “modern techniques” lawful (previously the law gave the court discretion to allow evidence based on modern techniques to be produced);
- Introduce a new crime of “lynching” in the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997, punishable with three years’ imprisonment; and
- Introduce long imprisonment sentences (five to seven years) for people who provide “false information” in criminal cases where the prescribed penalty is life imprisonment or death sentence, and one fourth of the sentence in other cases.⁷

Objectively they are all good amendments to the law. Collectively, they are woefully inadequate to address the many failings of the criminal justice system in Pakistan.

On September 3, 2016, a sub-committee was set up to ‘thoroughly consider the impediments in implementation and execution’ of various points of National Action Plan.

5 Shah, S. (2016, March 12). Poor prosecution plays havoc with judicial system. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/104661-Poor-prosecution-plays-havoc-with-judicial-system>.

6 Staff Reporter. (2016, July 15). Criminal justice system: ‘Conviction rate low as judicial system in need of reform’. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1142622/criminal-justice-system-conviction-rate-low-judicial-system-need-reform/>.

7 Military Injustice in Pakistan – A Briefing Paper. (2016). International Commission of Jurists, Switzerland. Retrieved March 03, 2018 from <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Pakistan-Military-court-Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2016-ENG.pdf>.

This committee was assigned the task to thoroughly consider the obstacles in the implementation of these points; NAP-1 (Execution of Convicted Terrorists), NAP-2 (Special Trial Courts) and NAP-20 (Revamping of Criminal Justice System).^{8 9} The fact that this committee was set up 21 months after the enactment of the NAP is indicative of the seriousness of the government's overall attitude towards legal reforms.

From April 10-14, 2017, NACTA brought together specialized expert groups for a sub working group of federal core groups to finalize the recommendations proposed by provinces, GB and AJ&K. The resultant document contains the recommendations for revamping the criminal justice system in the following manner.

- a. Sector-wise recommendations (Police, Prosecution, Prison, Parole/Probation and Judiciary)
- b. Law reforms by above sectors
- c. Administrative policy, procedures, rules and reforms
- d. Organizational reforms

NACTA claims this document has been circulated to all stakeholders in the federal and provincial, GB and AJ&K governments.¹⁰ In mid-September, it was reported that these recommendations have been presented to Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi for approval.¹¹ There has been no update on this front since then.

9.4 Conclusion

Progress on Legal Reforms

To say that progress on this front has been glacial would be a massive

8 Staff Reporter. (2016, September 04). Sub-committee to consider NAP impediments. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from, <http://nation.com.pk/national/04-Sep-2016/sub-committee-to-consider-nap-impediments>.

9 Abbasi, A. (2016, October 05). Criminal justice system to be overhauled. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/155038-Criminal-justice-system-to-be-overhauled>.

10 NACTA. (2018, January 1). National Counter-terrorism Authority Achievements - 2018. Email to CRSS.

11 Ahmadani, A. (2017, September 19). PM to approve NACTA recommendations to revamp criminal justice system. Pakistan Today. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/09/19/pm-to-approve-nacta-recommendations-to-revamp-criminal-justice-system/>.

understatement. Understandably, revamping the entire criminal justice sector is no small feat and will take coordination and buy-in from every stakeholder. However, this is no excuse for the massive delays, such as simply forming a committee to provide oversight and guidance. With elections looming in mid-2018, this will take a backseat to electioneering, campaigning, polls and the inevitable fallout from the formation of the new government, if the elections themselves are not delayed.

All things considered, as the 20th and last point in the NAP, this pint has seen minimal effort, and will likely see no progress in most of 2018. It will be up to the new government to pursue this mandate, if it falls within the ambit of their priorities.

9.5 Legal and Procedural Roadblocks to Terrorism Prosecution in Pakistan

by Zainab Mustafa

In Pakistan, the primary substantive law that governs counter-terrorism measures is the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA). The ATA is a special law under which special courts were established to try scheduled offences of terrorism. By virtue of being a special law,¹² the ATA has an overriding effect on any other general laws. This rule is provided for in Section 32,¹³ of the ATA, which states that where there are no provisions provided in the ATA, the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C) come into force.¹⁴ This is why the trial procedure for Sessions Courts,¹⁵ as laid down in the Cr.P.C, is the same procedure followed by the Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs).

The court trial procedure, commencing from the registration of a First Information Report (F.I.R) in a terrorism case to the filing of an appeal against a final judgment of an ATC, suffers from various legal challenges. One of the most significant challenges that the ATCs face is the inundation of ‘ordinary criminal cases’ in these courts. This is due to the ambiguity surrounding the definition of terrorism stipulated under Section 6 of the ATA. The criteria often applied by judges is to determine whether the act “created terror in the public” i.e. the effect of the unlawful action. To further compound this problem, the interpretation of what terror is, has to be applied by the police in order to register an F.I.R, who are unfortunately not well-versed with the law.¹⁶ Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, in a seminal judgment, provided a correct interpretation.¹⁷ Unfortunately, subsequent

¹²*Lex specialis derogat legi generali* is a legal principle according to which a law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law that only governs general matters.

<https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-specialis/>

¹³ The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, Section 32:

“Overriding effect of Act. -1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law but, save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, apply to the proceedings before a special Court, and for the purpose of the said provisions of the Code, a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions.

2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in subsection (1), the provisions of section 350 of the Code shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Court, and for this purpose any reference in those provision to a Magistrate shall be construed as reference to (An anti-Terrorism Court).”

¹⁴ *Syed Nawaz Hussain v. State*, 2014 PCrLJ 1256.

¹⁵ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Chapter 22A Trials Before High Courts and Courts of Session.

¹⁶ Interview with ATC Prosecutor, (May 2017).

¹⁷ *Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court II, Gujranwala*, PLD 2004 LHC 199, “*Terror and*

judgments have not followed the same interpretation.¹⁸ A recent judgment of the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the ambit of terrorism, and has warned against the use of ATA over 'non-terrorist actions', in line with Justice Khosa's reasoning.¹⁹ However, in the majority of cases the decision is normally based on how serious ('heinous') the offence purportedly is, and whether it amounts to spreading fear in the public, thereby adding to the burden of the ATCs.

As mentioned earlier, the police are not well versed with the law, and this lack of legal knowledge damages the prosecution's case. Due to the police's limited legal knowledge, many procedural defects are committed such as delaying the lodging of an F.I.R, improperly registering the F.I.R, misidentifying the roles of the accused and nominating an unnecessary number of persons as the accused. Although the investigation commences with the registration of an F.I.R, there is an overreliance on its importance with consequently little attention paid to the actual crime scene. All these oversights significantly damage the prosecution's case and contribute to the high rate of acquittals in ATC cases.

Additionally, potential human rights abuses are prevalent while arresting suspects, as well as under the remand procedure of ATA. These violations mostly arise due to the failure to follow the proper procedures (excessive use of force, fake encounters, inconsistent case diaries, etc.) and the misapplication of the relevant provisions.

Moreover, one of the major reasons for the human rights violations, as mentioned

terrorism are concepts quite distinct from each other and the quintessence of the two notions is not difficult to distil. Terror as a manifestation of fright, dread, fear or insecurity is a consequential effect created by an act that may not necessarily be motivated to create such an effect whereas terrorism is an activity designed to create such an effect of terror. The critical difference between the two is the design and purpose understood in the criminal jurisprudence as mens rea. In the case of terror the act, or the actus reus, is not motivated to create fear and insecurity in the society at large but the same is actuated with a desire to commit a private crime against targeted individuals, etc. and unintended consequence or a fall out thereof whereas in the case of terrorism the main purpose is creation of fear and insecurity in the targets. Every crime, no matter what its magnitude or extent, creates some sort of fear and insecurity in some section of the society but every felony or misdemeanour cannot be branded or termed as terrorism. As the society at large may or may not succeed in achieving the desired effect but nonetheless it can be accepted as nothing but terrorism because of the object or purpose behind such act. Thus, the real test to determine whether a particular act is terrorism or not is the motivation, object, design or purpose behind the act and not the consequential effect created by such act."

¹⁸ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'Terrorism Prosecution in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal' (Platform 2016) 28.

¹⁹ *Waris Ali and others v. The State* (Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 2010).

above, is the poor investigation skills of the police. Even though evidence required through modern means is admissible under the law, investigative tools in Pakistan are not up to date with scientific developments.²⁰ Since the police do not have requisite training and are consequently negligent while performing their duties, they fail to effectively use the mechanisms and tools available to them. Procedures are often learned on the job and passed on from seniors to juniors perpetuating a culture of bad practices.

Evidence is routinely tampered with and police officials ignore the mandatory provisions of Section 172 Cr.P.C are ignored, whereby the police is required to maintain case diaries of the investigation. A case diary acts as a procedural safeguard as it makes it mandatory to record the time and date of arrest and provides a check against individuals being illegally arrested. Fabrication of events in these case diaries is unfortunately a common occurrence. Where the story of the arrest is concocted at a later stage, the Court is likely to highlight the inconsistency. The accused in such cases produce a petition under Section 100 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 stating that they were already in illegal custody at the time of the supposed arrest, which ultimately results in the acquittal of the accused.

In addition to case diaries, the daily diary (*roznamchas*) is intended to be a complete record of all events which take place at the police station. It should, therefore, record not only the movements and activities of all police officers, but also visits of outsiders, whether official or non-official, coming or brought to the police station for any purpose whatsoever. Properly numbered *roznamchas* are to be maintained in all police stations on registers provided by the senior superintendent of the police. However, there is an inadequate number of registers available and the police fail to fill daily diaries.

Such practices can lead to two problems. Firstly, there have been instances where seemingly genuine cases have been dismissed on the grounds that the Investigating Officer has arrested the accused during police patrol but no arrival and departure entries have been produced for the satisfaction of the Court. Secondly, the daily diaries can easily be manipulated in this manner to hide the actual facts of the arrest including the date and time whereby arrested individuals can be detained in police custody for periods exceeding twenty-four hours before they are produced in court. The latter being a gross violation of the fundamental right of liberty enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan.

²⁰ Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Section 27-B.

Moreover, a major hurdle in the investigative process is the absence of a forensics agency in Sindh or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, with only one in Punjab. All these flaws and gaps in the investigation, ultimately bear down on the accused and aggravate his/her suffering as they continue to serve lengthy periods in custody, whether in police or judicial lock up, until the Court discharges and/or acquits the accused on the grounds of insufficient evidence or gross defects in the investigation.

The actual trial process of the ATCs is also littered with various challenges and defects. There are often violations of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 9 (Right to life or liberty) and 10-A (Right to fair trial) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. These abuses of the law arise due to various reasons including trials in absentia, significant delays in the disposal of cases, inconsistency in the standards of evidence applied by judges, and denial of remissions to the convicted etc. One other significant issue faced by the involved parties is the lack of witness protection initiatives as required by the 2014 amendment to the ATA²¹ (that provided for the protection of judges, witnesses and prosecutors). Since it is not being implemented effectively there exists a high risk of witness intimidation and consequently many witnesses turn “hostile”, damaging the prosecution’s case. Also, in most terrorism cases witnesses refuse to come forward and thus there is often a lack of direct evidence in the form of eye witness testimony in most terrorism cases. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 21-D (1) ATA, only an ATC, High Court or Supreme Court may grant bail of a suspect charged with an ATA offence, thereby reducing his chances of being granted bail or delaying his chances of receiving bail. This is a grave infringement of an individual’s right to liberty, especially when the charge may have been levied by an unscrupulous complainant or a corrupt police official.²²

All these challenges lead to violations of human rights in the anti-terrorism court trial process and also contribute to the high rate of acquittals in terrorism cases.

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²¹ Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2014.

²² For detailed recommendations on how to address the abovementioned challenges see the Research Society of International Law Pakistan’s Report titled, ‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: A Review of Anti-Terrorism Court Trial Procedure in Pakistan’, available at <http://rsilpak.org/counter-terrorism-human-rights/>.

ANNEX I: LIST OF THE EXECUTED

#	Name	Date of Hanging	Jail of Hanging	Charges and Year
1	Ikhlas ahmad	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder
2	Arshed Mahmood	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder
3	Aqeel Ahmad alias Dr Usman	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Terrorism 2009
4	Zubair Ahmad	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder
5	Gulam Sarwar	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder
6	Rashid Mehmood Alias Teepu	Dec,19,2014	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder
7	Niaz Mohammad	Dec, 31,2014	Central Jail Peshawar	Attempted murder
8	Ali Ahmed Arif	Jan,7,2015	Central Jail Multan	Multiple Murder
9	Gulam Shabeer	Jan,7,2015	Central Jail Multan	Multiple Murder
10	Khalid Mehmood	Jan,13,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Attempted murder
11	Beharam Khan	Jan,13,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murder
12	Shahid Haneef	Jan,13,2015	Central Jail Sukkur	Murder
13	Muhammad Talha	Jan,13,2015	Central Jail Sukkur	Murder
14	Khaleel Ahmed	Jan,13,2015	Central Jail Sukkur	Murder
15	Zulfikar Ali	Jan,13,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder
16	Mushtaq Ahmed	Jan,13,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder 2003
17	Nawazish Ali	Jan,13,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Attempted murder 2003
18	Zahid s/o Nazar Hus-sain	Jan,14,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2002
19	Mohammad Saeed alias Maulvi	Jan,14,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Multiple Murder
20	Ikram ulhaq alias Akram lahori	Jan,17,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
21	Attaullah alias Qasim	Feb,03,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murder 2001
22	Muhammad Azam alias Sharif	Feb,03,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murder 2001
23	Muhammad Riaz	Feb,13,2015	Central Jail Mirpur	Murder 2004
24	Mohammad Fayaz	Feb,13,2015	Central Jail Mirpur	Murder 2004
25	Muhammad Siddique	Mar,12,2015	District Jail Toba Tek Sing	Multiple Murder 2004

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26	Sajid alias Tahir alias Taro	Mar,13,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder
27	Muhammad Akhtar alias Haseena	Mar,13,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Rape
28	Zafar Iqbal	Mar 17,2015	Central Jail Multan	Rape and Murder of a minor
29	Muhammad Faisal	Mar 17,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murder 1998
30	Muhammad Afzal	Mar 17,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murder 1998
31	Muhammad Nawaz	Mar 17,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 1996
32	Malik Muhammad Nadeem Zaman	Mar 17,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder 1998
33	Muhammad Jawed	Mar 17,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1997
34	Muhammad Iqbal	Mar 17,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 1996
35	Muhammad Riaz	Mar 17,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder 1995
36	Muhammad Sharif	Mar 17,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder
37	Mubashir Ali	Mar 17,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder
38	Rab Nawaz	Mar 17,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder
39	Zafar Iqbal	Mar 17,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder 2003
40	Muhammad shabir	Mar 18,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
41	Shaukat Ali	Mar 18,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
42	Tahir Shabir/Bashir	Mar 18,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
43	Ghulam Muhammad	Mar 18,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder 2000
44	Talib Hussain	Mar 18,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1992
45	Rab Nawaz	Mar 18,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1992
46	Zakir Hussain	Mar 18,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder 1998
47	Shafqat	Mar 18,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 1998
48	Saeed	Mar 18,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 1998
49	Ahmed Nawaz	Mar 18,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder 1998
50	Asad Mehmood Khan	Mar 18,2015	Central Jail Attock	Multiple Murder 2002
51	Mohammad Asghar	Mar 19,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder 1996
52	Ghulam Mohammad	Mar 19,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder 1996
53	Gulistan Zaman	Mar 19,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1998

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54	Abdul Sattar	Mar 19,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder 1992
55	Nasrullah	Mar 24,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1994
56	Abdul Razzaq Chohan	Mar 25,2015	Central Jail Sukkur	Murder
57	Jalil aka Jalal Morejo	Mar 25,2015	Central Jail Sukkur	Murder 1997
58	Shahbaz Ali	Mar 25,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1998
59	Ghulam Yaseen	Mar 25,2015	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Rape and Murder
60	Ayub, son of Bashir	Mar 25,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
61	Muhammad Khan	Mar 25,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder 2000
62	Muhammad Afzal	Mar 26,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1995
63	Mohammad Riaz	Mar 31,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 2000
64	Akram-ul-Haq	Mar 31,2015	Central Jail Attock	Kidnapping
65	Mohammad Ameen	Mar 31,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
66	Hubdar Shah	Mar 31,2015	Mianwali Jail	Multiple Murder 2000
67	Jafar alias Kali	April 7,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Multiple Murder
68	Tayyab Ghulam Nabi	April 7,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2002
69	Ameer Hamza	April 8,2015	Central Jail Machh	Murder 1995
70	Sikander	April 8,2015	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2002
71	Rana Mushtaq	April 9,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder
72	Hamid Mahmood	April 9,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Kidnapping and Murder
73	Luna Khan, son of Allah Rakha	April 14,2015	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder
74	Majid	April 16,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder
75	Qaisar	April 16,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
76	Ijaz	April 16,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 1995
77	Abdul Jabbar	April 16,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 2001
78	Zafar Iqbal	April 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 2005
79	Manzoor	April 18,2015	District Jail Vehari	Murder 2001
80	Inayatullah	April 21,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Multiple Murder
81	Zafar Iqbal	April 21,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Multiple Murder
82	Muhammad Latif	April 21,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Multiple Murder
83	Muhammad Hussain	April 21,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 1998
84	Nizamuddin	April 21,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 1998

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85	Muhammad Azam	April 21,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 2004
86	Luqman	April 21,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Gang rape of a minor 1999
87	Saleem	April 21,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Gang rape of a minor 1999
88	Sultan Alias Raja	April 21,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 2000
89	Liaqat	April 21,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1998
90	Azhar Mehmood	April 21,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 1995
91	Ghulam Nabi	April 21,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Multiple Murder
92	Allah Rakha	April 21,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
93	Riaz Ahmed	April 21,2015	Central Jail Machh	Murder 2004
94	Raja Raees	April 21,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Multiple Murder
95	Rizwan	April 22,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Multiple Murder
96	Muazzam Khan	April 22,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1995
97	Mohammad Nazeer	April 22,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2001
98	Mohjammad Zahid	April 22,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 2001
99	Muhammad Hanif	April 23,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 2006
100	Gul Muhammad	April 23,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 1999
101	Muneer Hussain	April 28,2015	District Jail Vehari	Multiple Murder 2000
102	Abdul Ghafoor	April 29,2015	District Jail Vehari	Rape and Murde of a minor
103	Zulfiqar Ali	May 6 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Multiple Murder
104	Saulat Mirza	May 12,2015	Central Jail Machh	Murder
105	Ahmed Khan	May16 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
106	Mohammad Musa	May 20.2015	Central Jail Machh	Murder
107	Zulfiqar	May 20.2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 2000
108	Shaukat Masih	May 21,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 2000
109	Aijaz alias Jajji	May 21,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder
110	Abbas	May 21,2015	Central Jail Multan	Multiple Murder 1996
111	Abdul Ghaffar	May 23,2015	Central Jail Multan	Multiple Murder 1990
112	Wazir	May 23,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
113	Ehsan	May 23,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
114	Rashid Muneer	May 23,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Multiple Murder 1991

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115	Shakeel	May 26,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	
116	Sher Ali	May 26,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Multiple Murder
117	Iftikhar Ahmed	May 26,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Multiple Murder 2001
118	Asif Zeb	May 26,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1998
119	Ishaq	May 26,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
120	Mohammad Nawaz	May 26,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder
121	Rana Faryad	May 26,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder
122	Mohammad Afzal	May 26,2015	District Jail Jehlum	
123	Amjad Ali	May 26,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder and rape of niece, killing of two witnesses
124	Anwar Ahmed	May 26,2015	District Jail Toba Tek Sing	Multiple Murder
125	Ibrahim	May 26,2015	Central Jail Machh	Murder 2003
126	Shahzad/Shahraz Ahmad	May 27,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
127	Abdul Khaliq	May 27,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
128	Bahadur Khan	May 27,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
129	Khan Muhammad Blauch	May 27,2015	Central Jail Machh	Multiple Murder 2004
130	Abdul Staar	May 27,2015	District Jail Vehari	Rape and murder of a girl
131	Sanaullah	May 27,2015	District Jail Vehari	Abduction and murder of minor
132	Naseer Ahmad	May 27,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 2002
133	Faisal Mhmood	May 27,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 2000
134	Qari Shamsul Islam	May 27,2015	Central Jail Peshawar	Murder 2002
135	Shahsawar	May 28,2015	Central Jail Haiderabad	Hijacked a PIA plane in 1998
136	Sabir Baloch	May 28,2015	Central Jail Haiderabad	Hijacked a PIA plane in 1998
137	Shabbir Baloch	May 28,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Hijacked a PIA plane in 1998
138	Mahmood	May 28,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Murdered a minor 2002
139	Akseer	May 28,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 1998
140	Muhammad Ashraf	May 28,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Double murder 2000
141	Amir Abdullah	May 28,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 2002

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142	Khurram	May 28,2015	Central Jail Haripur	Murder
143	Murad Ali	May 30,2015	District Jail Sargodha	
144	Abdul Rehman	June 2,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	
145	Muhammad Khan	June 2,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Double murder 2002
146	Khizer Hayat	June 2,2015	Mianwali Jail	Murder 1998
147	Muhammad Sarwar	June 2,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder of woman 1993
148	Chan Zaib	June 2,2015	Central Jail Attock	Double murder
149	Javed	June 3,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Double murder 1987
150	Shamsul Haq	June4,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1999
151	Fateh Muhammad	June4,2015	Mianwali Jail	Double murder 1999
152	Abid Maqsud	June 9,2015	District Jail Sialkot	
153	Sanaullah	June 9,2015	District Jail Sialkot	
154	Nawaz alias Kaka	June 9,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	
155	Muhammad Abid alias Boota	June 9,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	
156	Aftab Bahadur	June 10,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Triple murder 1992
157	Tariq alias Tara	June 10,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1995
158	Hashmat Ali	June 10,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murdered 5 people
159	Shahid Rafiq	June 11,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1996
160	Gul Muhammad	June 11,2015	Central Jail Haripur	Murder
161	Khizar Hayat	June 15,2015	Central Jail Multan	
162	Mukhtar	June 16,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2004
163	Jawed Sultan	June 16,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1990
164	Muhammad Rafiq	June 16,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1990
165	Ikram Hussain	June 16,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1990
166	Allah Ditta	June 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder of a woman 1999
167	Younas	June 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Triple murder 2000
168	Ashraf,	June 16,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Killing and raping of 12 year old girl 1999
169	Basharat	June 16,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Triple murder 1999
170	Ghulam Rasool	June 16,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Triple murder

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171	Asghar	June 16,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered his nephew 2000
172	Abdull Rauf	June 16,2015	District Jail Jehlum	Murder
173	Asgher	June 16,2015	Central jail DGK	Murder
174	Fayyaz Ahmed	June 17,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
175	Qaisar	June 17,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
176	Muhammad Iqbal	June 17,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder
177	Muhammad Aslam Khan	June 17,2015	Mianwali Jail	
178	Muhammad Saleem	June 17,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1998
179	Rashid	June 17,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder
180	Nabeel Ahmad	June 17,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 2000
181	Farooq Babar, son of Aslam	July 27,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1988
182	Akhtar Hussain	July 28,2015	Central Jail Multan	
183	Karim	July 28,2015	Central Jail Attock	
184	Karim Nawaz	July 27,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1999
185	Muhammad Usman	July 29,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 1998
186	Aftab Ahmed	July 29,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 1998
187	Safdar	July 29,2015	Central Jail Attock	Double murder 2003
188	Muhammad Nawaz	July 29,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 2002
189	Gulfam	July 29,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 2001
190	Nayyar Ibad	July 29,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1996
191	Muhammad Tufail	July 29,2015	District Jail Kasur	Double murder 2001
192	Ahmed Din	July 29,2015	District Jail Jhang	Murder
193	Muhammad Arshad	July 30,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 2002
194	Jahandad Khan	July 30,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 2002
195	Israr Ahmad	July 30,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2002
196	Muhammad Tariq	July 30,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 2000
197	Nadeem Shahzad	July 31,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Kidnapping and murder
198	Riaz Yousuf	July 31,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murdered a woman and her four children in 1999

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199	Abdul Samad (alias Samar John)	July 31,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Kidnapping and murder
200	Muhammad Ashraf	July 31,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
201	Zafar Iqbal	July 31,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
202	Laghir Maseeh	Aug 4,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Kidnapping and murder
203	Ghulam Rasool	Aug 4,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 2000
204	Shafqat Hussain	Aug 4,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Kidnapping and murder
205	Amanullah	Aug 5,2015	Mianwali Jail	Triple murder 2006
206	Mohammad Mumtaz	Aug 5,2015	Mianwali Jail	Triple murder 2007
207	Mohammad Riaz	Aug 5,2015	Mianwali Jail	Triple murder 2008
208	Waqar	Aug 5,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murdered 5 people in June 2000
209	Inamullah	Aug 6,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1996
210	Shafaqat	Aug 6,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
211	Tariq	Aug 6,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 2001
212	Ghulam Shabbir	Aug 8,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 2000
213	Abdul Qayyum	Aug 18,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Triple murder 1999
214	Amjad Ali	Aug 19,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 1998
215	Bashir Ahmad	Aug 22,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 1999
216	Zulfiqar alias Nana	Aug 25,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered 4 policemen 1997
217	Shahid Mehmood	Aug 26,2015	Central Jail Karachi	Double murder 1998
218	Tajammul Hussain	Aug 26,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder and rape 2004
219	Maqbool Hussain	Aug 27,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murdered 6 people in 1996
220	Ashraf	Sept 1,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1994
221	Jamma Khan	Sept 1,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2000
222	Zahoor Hussain	Sept 2,2015	District Jail Jehlum	Triple murder 1992
223	Arshad Mahmood	Sept 2,2015	District Jail Jehlum	Murder 2005
224	Ajmal alias Pathar	Sept 2,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2001
225	Muhammad Khan	Sept 3,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 1995
226	Muhammad Boota	Sept 3,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2003
227	Faqir Muhammad	Sept 3,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2004

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228	Maqbool Alias Qulli	Sept 3,2015	District Jail Kasur	Kidnapping and murder
229	Muhammad Sadiq	Sept 5,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1999
230	Muhabbat Ali	Sept 9,2015	District Jail Vehari	Murder 2001
231	Muhammad Bashir	Sept 9,2015	District Jail Vehari	Murder 2001
232	Muhammad Aslam	Sept 9,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	
233	Mubshir Hussain	Sept 9,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder 1999
234	Tanzeel Ahmad	Sept 10,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2005
235	Muhammad Khalid	Sept 10,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1999
236	Muhammad Asif	Sept 10,2015	District Jail Vehari	
237	Abdul Shakoor	Sept 10,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2001
238	Allah Datta	Sept 16,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
239	Bashir	Sept 16,2015	Central Jail Haripur	
240	Haji Shabbir	Sept 16,2015	Central Jail Haripur	Murder 1996
241	Ashfaq son of Ali Muhammad	Sept 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1999
242	Imran	Sept 22,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
243	Muhammad Anwar	Sept 29,2015	Central Jail Gujranwala	Murder 2002
244	Ansar Iqbal	Sept 29,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 1994
245	Shahid Ali	Sept 29,2015	District Jail Sialkot	
246	Mushtaq	Sept 30,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	
247	Muhammad Ikhtlaq	Oct 1,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Double murder February 2, 2001
248	Saukat Ali	Oct 1,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Double murder February 2, 2001
249	Akram	Oct 3,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Triple murder 2002
250	Idrees	Oct 6,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1997
251	Muhammad Anees	Oct 11,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 1997
252	Muhammad Akram	Oct 13,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Murder 2000
253	Akram waheed	Oct 13,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1992
254	Shafeeq	Oct 13,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder during theft 1992
255	Thanedar	Oct 13,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered wife and father-in-law 2001
256	Mohammad Azam	Oct 13,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murdered father-in-law 1999
257	Mohammad Aslam	Oct 13,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murdered father-in-law 2000

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258	Ghulam Qadir	Oct 13,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder of relatives 2002
259	Ghulam Sarwar	Oct 13,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder of relatives 2003
260	Shahid Ali	Oct 13,2015	District Jail Sialkot	
261	Muhammad Ashraf	Oct 13,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder
262	Salman	Oct 14 ,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Kidnapping and murder 1998
263	Shafeeq	Oct 14 ,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Kidnapping and murder 1998
264	Younus	Oct 14 ,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder 2002
265	Rana Aslam	Oct 14 ,2015	Central jail DGk	Murdered his wife in June 1996
266	Ghulam Mustafa	Oct 14 ,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murdered a woman 2001
267	Zaman alias Zamani	Oct 15 2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1993
268	Zareen alias Sarwer	Oct 15 ,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Double murder
269	Rab Nawaz	Oct 15 ,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
270	Ghulam Akbar	Oct 15 ,2015	Central jail DGk	Murder 1996
271	Hazoor Buksh	Oct 15 ,2015	Central jail DGk	Murder 1996
272	Abdul Sami	Oct 15 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
273	Anwar Shamim	Oct 15 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
274	Muhammad Hussain	Oct 15 ,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	
275	Idress Ali	Oct 17 ,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Murder 2001
276	Muhammad Farooq	Oct 20 ,2015	District Jail Sargodha	Murder 2003
277	Khalil	Oct 20 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2002
278	Nadeem	Oct 20 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 1999
279	Bashir	Oct 20 ,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 1998
280	Amjad Ali	Oct 20 ,2015	Central Jail Attock	Double murder 2002
281	Aleeq Shah	Oct 20 ,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 2001
282	Mustafa	Oct 20 ,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered 6 people 2000
283	Saeed	Oct 20 ,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1999
284	Muhammad Akram	Oct 20 ,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1999
285	Khalil Ahmad	Oct 20 ,2015	District Jail Kasur	Murder 2002
286	Munir, son of Nazir	Oct 21 ,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder
287	Kamranul Zaman	Oct 21 ,2015	District Jail Toba Tek Sing	

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288	Fayyaz	Oct 21 ,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered son-in-law
289	Saif/ Saifullah	Oct 21 ,2015	Central jail DGk	Double murder
290	Afsar Ali	Oct 21 ,2015	Mianwali jail	Murder
291	Muhammad Azam	Oct 27 ,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murdered two brothers-in-law 1999
292	Abdul Majeed	Oct 27 ,2015	Central jail DGk	Double murder 2002
293	Imtiaz Hussain	Nov 2,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
294	Ghazanfar	Nov 3,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Double murder 2000
295	Nisar	Nov 3,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Double murder 2000
296	Muhammad Annar/ Rana	Nov 3,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Double murder 2000
297	Mohammad Akram	Nov 3,2015	District Jail Kasur	Murder
298	Irshad	Nov 4,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	
299	Muhammad Nadeem	Nov 12,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 1997
300	Khadim Hussain	Nov 18,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2003
301	Muhammd Younas	Nov 29,2015	Kot Lakhpat Jail Lahore	Murder 2001
302	Molvi Abdul Slam	Dec 02,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack, 2014
303	Hazart Ali	Dec 02,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack, 2014
304	Mujeeb Ur Rahman	Dec 02,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack, 2014
305	Sbeel alias yahya	Dec 02,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack, 2014
306	Pervez Khan	Dec 9,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 2000
307	Rustam	Dec 9,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder 2003
308	Muhammad Ishaq	Dec 9,2015	District Jail Jehlum	Murder 2006
309	Muhammad Akram Rahi	Dec 11,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder 1996
310	Zafar Iqbal	Dec 13,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Murder 1996
311	Khalid	Dec 13,2015	District Jail Sialkot	Murder 1996
312	Munzor Hussain	Dec 15,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 2003
313	Muhammad Tahir	Dec 15,2015	Central Jail Multan	Murder 2003
314	Aziz-ur-Rehman	Dec 15,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2002
315	Akhtar Ali	Dec 15,2015	Central jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2002
316	Azam	Dec 15,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder-2004
317	Iftikhar/Mukhtar	Dec 15,2015	Central Jail Gujrat	Murder-2004

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318	Zahid	Dec 15,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder-2005
319	Muhammad Iqbal	Dec 15,2015	Central jail DGk	Murder-2004
320	Muhammad Ishaq alias Saqi	Dec 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder-1992
321	Liaqat Hussain	Dec 16,2015	District Jail Faisalabad	Murder-1992
322	Mushtaq Ahmad	Dec 17,2015	Central jail DGk	
323	Mazahar Hussain	Dec 17,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
324	Delawer	Dec 17,2015	Adiala Jail Rawalpindi	Murder
325	Naveed Ahmad	Dec 17,2015	Central Jail Attock	Murder-2002
326	Zahoor Ahmad	Dec 19,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder-2002
327	makhdum	Dec 19,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder-2003
328	Abdul Majeed	Dec 23,2015	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder
329	Noor Saeed,	Dec 29,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack
330	Murad Khan	Dec 29,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack
331	Inayat Ullah	Dec 29,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack
332	Israr Uddin	Dec 29,2015	Kohat Jail	APS Attack
333	Muhammad Sardar	Jan 12,2016	District Jail Toba Tek Singh	Murder
334	Rasheed Ahmad	Jan 12,2016	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder
335	Rizwan Kiyani	Jan 12,2016	Adyala Jail	Murder-1995
336	Sajid	Jan 14,2016	District jail Sialkot	Murder 2003
337	Anwar Khan/ Noor Khan	Jan 20,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1993
338	Hakim	Jan 20,2016	District Jail Jahlum	Murder 2004
339	Allah Ditta	Jan 20,2016	District Jail Jhang	Murdered his wife 1999
340	Muhammad Sultan	Jan 20,2016	District Jail Attock	Murdered his wife 2007
341	Ghulam Gilani	Jan 20,2016	Central Jail Mianwali	Double murder 2004
342	Mumrez	Jan 28,2016	Central Jail Mianwali	Double murder 2005
343	Muhammad Akram	Jan 21,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1999
344	Zulfiqar Ali	Feb 3,2016	Kot Lakhpat	
345	Muhammad Jora alias Mittho	Feb 4,2016	Central Jail Multan	Murder 1996
346	Bilal Ahmad alias Abu Abdullah	Feb 5,2016	Central Jail Kohat	Terrorism (TTP member)

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347	Haider Shehzad	Feb 9,2016	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2000
348	Altaf	Feb 10,2016	Central Jail Multan	Double murder 1995
349	Ghafoor Masih	Feb 9,2016	Central Jail Faisalabad	Double murder 2007
350	Abdul Majeed	Feb 9,2016	Central Jail DGK	Double murder 2002
351	Muhammad Tariq Bin younas	Feb 10,2016	Kot Lakhpat	
352	Ramzan	Feb 23,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Triple murder 1992
353	Faiz Alias Faizo	Feb 23,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1992
354	Mumtaz Ahmad	Feb 23,2016	District Jail Toba Tek Singh	Murder
355	Nemat Gull	Feb 24,2016	Central Jail Mianwali	Murder 1993
356	Adrees S/o Asim	Feb 24,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder
357	Irshad	Feb 25,2016	District Jail Gujranwala	Kidnapping and assault of child 1999
358	Imran Sabir	Feb 25,2016	District Jail Kasur	Triple murder 2003
359	Saeed Khan	Feb 26,2016	Adyala Jail	Terrorism
360	Mumtaz Qadri	Feb 29,2016	Adyala Jail	Terrorism (Murdered Punjab Governor Salman Taseer) 2011
361	Muhammad Ali	Mar 2,2016	District Jail Jhang	Murder 1998
362	Tariq Mahmood	Mar 9,2016	District Jail Toba Tek Singh	Murder 1999
363	Nadeem	Mar 9,2016	District jail Sialkot	
364	Khalid Iqbal	Mar 9,2016	Adyala Jail	Murder 1989
365	Gohar Ali	Mar 15,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1998
366	Mohammad Sohail	Mar 24,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Terrorism
367	Obaidullah	Mar 24,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Terrorism
368	Ghazanfer Ali	Mar 29,2016	District Jail Sargodha	Honor killing 1999
369	Gulam Abbas	Mar 30,2016	District jail Sialkot	Murder 1997
370	Mehmood s/o Khawja khan	Mar 30,2016	Central Jail Kohat	Terrorism (TTP member)
371	Rab Nawaz s/o Shahi Room	Mar 30,2016	Central Jail Kohat	Terrorism (TTP member)
372	Khalid Parvez Bhatti	April 2,2016	District Jail Vehari	Murdered an advocate 1999

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373	Aslam S/O Mulazim Hussain	April 5,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder 2003
374	Luqman	April 6,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder 1996
375	Imran	April 6,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder 1996
376	Raheel	April 6,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder 1994
377	Nasir Mehmood	April 9,2016	District jail Sialkot	Murdered 6 persons 2002
378	Tahir Iqbal	April 9,2016	District jail Sialkot	
379	Adeel Shahzad	April 12,2016	Central Jail Faisalabad	4 murders 2001
380	Muhammad Ashraf, alias Achoo	April 12,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 2000
381	Anwarul Haq	April 13,2016	Central Jail Multan	Murder 2000
382	Ghulam Farooq	April 13,2016	District jail Sialkot	Murder 1999
383	Muhammad Irfan	April 13,2016	District Jail Jhang	Murder 2006
384	Waris Mir	April 13,2016	Central Jail Larkana	Abducted 10 PIA employees 1995
385	Imtiaz Ahmad	April 14,2016	Central Jail Haripur	Murder 2005
386	Muhammad Amjad	April 14,2016	Adyala Jail	Murder 2010
387	Allah Ditta	April 14,2016	Central Jail Multan	Murder
388	Imran	April 26,2016	Central Jail Faisalabad	Murdered 4 persons 2005
389	Tahir	April 26,2016	Central Jail Faisalabad	
390	Gulam Hussain	April 27,2016	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder 2008
391	Ali Raza	April 28,2016	Central Jail Haripur	Murder 2004
392	Farhad	April 28,2016	Central Jail Haripur	Double murder 1997
393	Asghar Ali	May 3,2016	District Jail Sargodha	6 murders 2007
394	Nadim Aslam	May 3,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder
395	Mohammad Ishfaq	May 3,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder
396	Mohammad Arif	May 3,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder
397	Shahzad s/o Nazir	May 3,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Murder
398	Muhammad Zahoor	May 4,2016	Central Jail Mianwali	Triple murder 2008
399	Mansha	May 10,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 2001
400	Captain Zafar Iqbal	May 10,2016	Adyala Jail	Murdered 11 men 1994
401	Mirza Sarfraz	May 10,2016	Adyala Jail	Murder 1993
402	Ghazanfar Abbas	May 11,2016	Central Jail Multan	Triple murder 1993
403	Ejaz Ahmad	May 26,2016	Kot Lakhpat	Double murder 2007

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404	Sayed Jahan	May 26,2016	Teemer Graha KPK	Double murder
405	Muhammad Bashir	May 31,2016	District Jail Attock	Murder 2001
406	Hamid Akhter Kathya	June 1,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Murder 1995
407	Muhammad Tariq	June 2,2016	District Jail Kasur	Murder 2005
408	Bashir Hussain	June 6,2016	Central Jail Multan	Triple murder
409	Khaliq U Rahaman	July 15,2016	Central Jail Faisalabad	Triple murder
410	Tahir Hussain	July 18,2016	Adyala Jail	Double murder 2003
411	Chanzeb	July 18,2016	Adyala Jail	Double murder 2003
412	Shafeeq	July 26,2016	District jail Sialkot	Double murder 2004
413	Sibtain Shah	July 27,2016	District Jail Sargodha	
414	Gulam Mustfa	July 27,2016	Central Jail Sahiwal	Triple murder 1992
415	Ali Gul	July 29,2016	Central Jail Machh	Murder 2005
416	Ghazenfer Ali son of Ghazen	July 31,2016	Central Jail Mirpur	Murdered his relative 2005
417	M.Yaqoob	July 31,2016	Central Jail Mirpur	Murdered a prayer cleric 2006
418	Salman	Aug 16,2016	District Jail Attock	Murder during robbery 2001
419	Ehsan Ullah alias Ehsana	Nov 25,2016	District jail Sialkot	Triple murder 1993
420	Khan Iqbal	Dec 24,2016	Adyala Jail	Murder 1996
421	Naveed Khan	Jan 11,2017	Adiala Jail	Double murder including an ATA judge 2006
422	Mansha	Feb 4,2017	Kot Lakhpat Central Jail	Double murder 1996
423	Salman	Feb 4,2017	Kot Lakhpat Central Jail	Double murder 1996
424	Shaukat Ali	Mar 9,2017	District Jail Kohat	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) member 2009
425	Imdad Ullah	Mar 9,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member 2009
426	Sabir Shah	Mar 9,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member 2009
427	Khandan	Mar 9,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member 2009
428	Anwar ali	Mar 9,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member 2009
429	Syed Zaman	Mar 16,2017	Sahiwal Jail	Harkatul Jihad al-Islam

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430	Shahwali	Mar 16,2017	Sahiwal Jail	Harkatul Jihad al-Islam
431	Muhammad Zeeshan	Mar 16,2017	Sahiwal Jail	TTP member
432	Muhammad Gulzar	Mar 17,2017	Gujranwala Central Jail	Triple murder 2002
433	Amir Bahadur	Mar 28,2017	Haripur Central jail	
434	Tahir Shah	Mar 30,2017	Kohat District Jail	TTP member
435	Fazal Haq	April 11,2017	Sahiwal Jail	TTP member
436	Shahid Umar	April 11,2017	Sahiwal Jail	TTP member
437	Ilyas alias Kala Jatt	April 12,2017	Faisalabad Central Jail	
438	Huzoor Bakhsh	April 19,2017	Dera Ghazi Khan Jail	Dual murder 1995
439	Rehman Ud Din	April 25,2017		TTP member
440	Mushtaq Khan	April 25,2017		TTP member
441	Obaidur Rehman	April 25,2017		TTP member
442	Zafar Iqbal	April 25,2017		TTP member
443	Barkat Ali	May 3,2017	Adiala Jail	TTP member
444	Muhammad Adil	May 3,2017	Adiala Jail	TTP member
445	Ishaq	May 3,2017	Adiala Jail	TTP member
446	Latif-ur-Rehman	May 3,2017	Adiala Jail	TTP member
447	Hussan Dar	May 4,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member
448	Umer Zada	May 4,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member
449	Hazrat Ali	May 4,2017	District Jail Kohat	TTP member
450	Qaiser Khan	May 10,2017		TTP member
451	Muhammad Umar	May 10,2017		TTP member
452	Qari Zubair	May 10,2017		TTP member
453	Aziz Khan	May 10,2017		TTP member
454	Bakht-e-Ameer	May 11,2017		TTP member
455	Asghar Khan	May 11,2017		TTP member
456	Muhammad Nawaz	May 11,2017		TTP member
457	Mushtaq Ahmed	May 11,2017		TTP member
458	Dr. Usman Ghani	May 16,2017	Faisalabad Central Jail	TTP commander 2014
459	Ahmed Ali	May 17,2017		TTP member
460	Haroon-ur-Rasheed	May 17,2017		TTP member
461	Asghar Khan	May 17,2017		TTP member
462	Gul Rehman	May 17,2017		TTP member
463	Muhammad Ibrahim	May 18,2017		TTP member

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464	Rizwan ullah	May 18,2017		TTP member
465	Sardar Ali	May 18,2017		TTP member
466	Sher Muhammad Khan	May 18,2017		TTP member
467	Atta Ullah	May 24,2017		TTP member, In- volved in 2014 APS Peshawar attack
468	Taj Muhammad	May 24,2017		TTP member, In- volved in 2014 APS Peshawar attack
469	Mukhtar Ali Rajput	May 25,2017	Karachi Central Jail	Double murder 2014
470	Qaisar Shah	July 5,2017	Central Jail, Gujranwala	Murder and Rape of a minor
471	Ghulam Rasool	July 11,2017	District Jail, Sargodha	Multiple Murder 2008
472	Yaqoob	July 11,2017	District Jail, Sargodha	Multiple Murder 2008
473	Imran	July 11,2017	District Jail, Sargodha	Multiple Murder 2008
474	Shamshad Ali	July 13,2017	Central Jail, Faisalabad	Murder 1999
475	Muhammad Azram	July 18,2017	Adiala Jail	Multiple Murder
476	Tariq Iqbal s/o Sardar Ali	July 19,2017	Central Jail Multan	Murder
477	Muhammad Latif	July 20,2017	Central Jail, Attock	Murder
478	Abd-ul-Rehman	Aug 8,2017	Central Jail, Faisalabad	Murder
479	Muhammad Riaz Bhatti	Sept 27,2017	Central Jail, Faisalabad	Murder 2002
480	Sajid s/o Ibrahim Khan	Oct 4,2017	KPK	Terrorism
481	Behram Sher s/o Khairan	Oct 4,2017	KPK	Terrorism
482	Fazal-e-Ghaffar	Oct 4,2017	KPK	Terrorism
483	Ali Sher	Oct 24,2017	Central Jail Bahawalpur	Murder
484	Sikandar Ali Joyo	Oct 31,2017	Hyderabad Central Prison	Murder and Rape of a minor
485	Muhammad Tahir	Nov 16,2017	Sahiwal Jail	Murder
486	Nasir Abbas	Nov 16,2017	Jhang Jail	Murder

ANNEX II: MILITARY COURTS IN THE US AND UK

Military Tribunals in the United States

The Army Public School incident in Pakistan is sometimes referred to as the 9/11 of Pakistan. While a crude comparison, it does illustrate the fact that the incident marked a major policy shift in the country, much like it did in the US. While the American stance on the death penalty is driven in-part by the majority of the public favoring the punishment for a crime such as murder,¹ its history of military courts and orders is a separate matter altogether.

Post 9/11, President George W. Bush signed a new military order in the war on terror, intended to detain non-citizens accused of terrorism. The Secretary of Defense was given the power to establish military tribunals to try the accused within, or even outside of the United States, and to determine the rules and procedures, different from regular courts of law, to ensure a full and fair trial. Three to seven military officers would be commissioned to act as both judge and jury, and not all elements of the normal due process were to be afforded to the accused.²

In the war of 1812, a British spy was tried by a military commission constituted by General Andrew. Committees of War, a fancy name for military tribunals, were utilized during the Mexican-American War (1846-48). The Union also leveraged military tribunals during and after the American Civil War. After the 1862 Dakota War, thirty-eight individuals were executed after being sentenced by military courts. The alleged Lincoln conspirators were likewise tried by a military commission in the spring and summer of 1865. Post the Spanish–American War, military tribunals were used in The Philippines. A tribunal was also set up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during WWII to try eight German citizens accused for espionage and sabotage in the United States.

1 Gallup. (n.d.). Death Penalty: Gallup Historical Trends. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx>.

2 Constitutional Rights Foundation. (n.d.). America Responds to Terrorism: Military Tribunals. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from <http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/military-tribunals.html>.

Military Courts in United Kingdom (The Military Court Service)

Military courts also exist in the United Kingdom in the form of the Military Court Service or MCS, granting criminal court administration to the Royal Navy (RN), Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) in the Court Martial, Summary Appeal Court (SAC) and Service Civilian Court (SCC). The MCS is headquartered in Upavon, Wiltshire, and there are five permanently manned MCCs in the UK. However, the courts are

“portable” and can hold proceedings anywhere in the world. Their function is to deliver a criminal court service for the three branches of the armed services.

ANNEX III: LIST OF THE CONVICTED

1. Sajid S/O Ibrahim Khan - sentenced to death³
2. Behram Sher S/O Khairan - sentenced to death
3. Fazal-i-Ghaffar S/O Shehzada - sentenced to death
4. Rehman Ud Din S/O Moamber - sentenced to death⁴
5. Mushtaq Khan S/O Umar Saleem - sentenced to death
6. Obaid ur Rehman S/O Fazal Hadi - sentenced to death
7. Zafar Iqbal S/O Muhammad Khan - sentenced to death
8. Muhammad Ibrahim S/O Maseen - sentenced to death⁵
9. Rizwan Ullah S/O Taj Mir Khan - sentenced to death
10. Sardar Ali S/O Muhammad Akram Khan - sentenced to death
11. Sher Muhammad Khan S/O Ahmed Khan - sentenced to death
12. Hafeez ur Rehman S/O Habib ur Rehman - sentenced to death⁶
13. Muhammad Saleem S/O Muslim Khan - sentenced to death
14. Kifayat Ullah S/O Dilresh - sentenced to death
15. Raiz Ahmed S/O Ghularam Khan - sentenced to death
16. Kulbhushan Jadhav - sentenced to death⁷
17. Shabbir Ahmed S/O Muhammad Shafique - sentenced to death⁸
18. Umara Khan S/O Ahmed Khan - sentenced to death
19. Tahir Ali S/O Syed Nabi - sentenced to death
20. Aftabud Din S/O Farrukh Zada - sentenced to death
21. Ahmed Ali - sentenced to death⁹
22. Asghar Khan - sentenced to death
23. Haroon ur Rasheed - sentenced to death
24. Gul Rehman - sentenced to death
25. Atta Ullah - sentenced to death¹⁰

3 3 terrorists convicted by military courts executed in KP: ISPR. (2017, October 4). DAWN. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1361654>.

4 Four TTP terrorists hanged in KP jail. (2017, April 26). Samaa. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/04/four-ttp-terrorists-hanged-in-kp-jail/>.

5 Four TTP terrorists executed in KP jail. (2017, May 18). Samaa. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/05/four-ttp-terrorists-executed-in-kp-jail/>.

6 Military courts hand death sentence to 4 terrorists, confirms COAS. (2017, September 8). DAWN. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1356407>.

7 Military tribunal sentences Jadhav to death. (2017, April 11). DAWN. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1326144>.

8 COAS confirms death sentence of four terrorists tried by military courts. (2017, September 20). GEO TV. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.geo.tv/latest/158980-coas-confirms-death-sentence-of-four-terrorists-tried-by-military-courts>.

9 Four 'hardcore terrorists' convicted by military courts hanged: ISPR. (2017, May 17). DAWN. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1333705>.

10 Two 'hardcore terrorists' tried by military courts hanged: ISPR. (2017, May 24). DAWN. Retrieved

26. Taj Muhammad - sentenced to death
27. Barkat Ali S/O Abdul Ghafar - sentenced to death¹¹
28. Muhammad Adil S/O Muhammad Akbar Jan - sentenced to death
29. Ishaq S/O Abdul Hai - sentenced to death
30. Latif Ur Rehman S/O Saif Ur Rehman - sentenced to death
31. Muhammad Shahid Omar - sentenced to death¹²
32. Fazl-e-Haq - sentenced to death
33. Tahir - sentenced to death¹³
34. Sami Ur Rehman S/O Gul Habib - sentenced to death¹⁴
35. Azeem Khan S/O Shaiber - sentenced to death
36. Arshad Bilal S/O Khadim Khan - sentenced to death
37. Anwar Ali S/O Fazal Ghaffar - sentenced to death
38. Muhammad Aleem S/O Abdul Rasheed - sentenced to death
39. Fazal Aleem S/O Abdul Rasheed - sentenced to death
40. Rasool Muhammad S/O Ahmed Jan - sentenced to death
41. Sohail Ahmed S/O Usman Ali - sentenced to death
42. Naimat Ullah S/O Ahmed - sentenced to death
43. Rahmat Ali S/O Noor Said - sentenced to death
44. Shoukat Ali - sentenced to death¹⁵
45. Imdadullah - sentenced to death
46. Sabir Shah - sentenced to death
47. Khandan - sentenced to death
48. Anwar Ali - sentenced to death

February 17, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335129/two-hardcore-terrorists-tried-by-military-courts-hanged-ispr>.

11 Four TTP militants tried by military courts hanged: ISPR. (2017, May 3). Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1399815/four-ttp-militants-tried-military-courts-hanged-ispr-2/>.

12 Two hardcore terrorists hanged in Sahiwal. (2017, April 11). Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1380997/two-hardcore-terrorists-hanged-sahiwal/>.

13 Terrorist involved in Bannu jailbreak executed. (2017, March 30). Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1369798/terrorist-involved-bannu-jailbreak-executed/>.

14 COAS approves death sentence of 10 terrorists tried by military courts. (2018, January 19). Samaa. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2018/01/coas-approves-death-sentence-of-10-terrorists-tried-by-military-courts/>.

15 Five hardcore TTP terrorists executed in Kohat jail. (2017, March 9). Tribune. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1350193/five-hardcore-ttp-terrorists-executed-kohat-jail/>.

ANNEX IV: LIST OF PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS

PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY¹⁶

#	Organization	Proscription Date
1	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	August 14, 2001
2	Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	August 14, 2001
3	Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)	January 14, 2002
4	Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)	January 14, 2002
5	Sipah-i -Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	January 14, 2002
6	Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP)	January 28, 2002
7	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM)	January 14, 2002
8	Tehreek-e-Islami	January 14, 2002
9	Al-Qa'ida	March 17, 2003
10	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	November 15, 2003
11	Khuddam-ul-Islam (Ex JeM)	November 15, 2003
12	Islami Tehreek Pakistan (Ex TJP)	November 15, 2003
13	Jamat-ul-Ansar	November 20, 2003
14	Jamat-ul-Furqan	November 20, 2003
15	Hizb-ul-Tahreer	November 20, 2003
16	Khair-un-Naas International Trust	October 27, 2004
17	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	April 7, 2006
18	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan	August 21, 2006
19	Lashkar-e-Islami	June 30, 2008
20	Ansar-ul-Islam	June 30, 2008
21	Haji Namdaar Group	June 30, 2008
22	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	August 25, 2008
23	Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	September 8, 2010
24	Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	September 8, 2010
25	Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB)	September 8, 2010

¹⁶ Proscribed Organizations. (2017, April 23). Retrieved February 19, 2018, from <https://nacta.gov.pk/proscribed-organizations/>.

26	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	September 8, 2010
27	Balochistan Musalla Defah Tanzeem (BMDT)	September 8, 2010
28	Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit	October 10, 2011
29	Markaz Sabeel Organization, Gilgit	October 10, 2011
30	Tanzeem Naujawana-e-Ahle Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit	October 10, 2011
31	Peoples Aman Committee (Layari)	October 10, 2011
32	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ) Ex-SSP	February 15, 2012
33	Al Harmain Foundation	March 6, 2012
34	Rabita Trust	March 6, 2012
35	Anjuman-e- Imamia Gilgit Baltistan	April 24, 2012
36	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit	April 24, 2012
37	Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat, Gilgit	June 5, 2012
38	Balochistan Bunyad Parast Army	August 4, 2012
39	Tehreek Nafaz-e-Aman	August 4, 2012
40	Tahafuz Hadudullah	August 4, 2012
41	Balochisan Waja Liberation Army	August 4, 2012
42	Baloch Republican Party Azad	August 4, 2012
43	Balochistan United Army	August 4, 2012
44	Islam Mujahidin	August 4, 2012
45	Jaish-e-Islam	August 4, 2012
46	Balochistan National Liberation Army	August 4, 2012
47	Khana-E-Hikmat Gilgit Baltistan, Gilgit	March 13,2013
48	Tehrik-e- Taliban Swat (TTS)	March 15,2013
49	Tehrik-e- Taliban Mohmand (TTM)	March 15,2013
50	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	March 15,2013
51	Abdullah Azam Brigade	March 15,2013
52	East Turkemenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	March 15,2013
53	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	March 15,2013
54	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	March 15,2013
55	313 Brigade	March 15,2013
56	Tehrik-e- Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	March 15,2013
57	Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir	March 15,2013
58	Baloch Student Organization Azad (BSO-A)	March 15,2013

59	United Baloch Army(UBA)	March 15,2013
60	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM)	March 15,2013
61	Daish/ISIL/IS/ISIS	July 15, 2015
62	Jamat Ul Ahrar (JuA)	November 11, 2016
63	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi (LeJA)	November 11, 2016
64	Ansar-ul-Hussain	December 30, 2016
65	Tehreek-e-Azadi-Jammu & Kashmir (TAJK)	June 8, 2017
66	Jundullah	January 31, 2018

ANNEX V: OVERVIEW AND FUNCTIONS OF NACTA

Overview of NACTA

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was formed in 2009, aimed at helping curb terrorism in the country. It was meant to be the premier intelligence agency for deployment of special weapons law enforcement forces conducting operations that fell outside the ambit, scope or jurisdiction of conventional law enforcement. The NACTA was designed to assess difficult situations, to confront armed conflicts, to go up against militant suspects and to conduct armed counter-terrorism operations. It is required to formulate a counter-terrorism plan to achieve short, medium and long term objectives and formulate action plans for their execution.

It is headquartered in Islamabad. The previous Coordinator of NACTA was Hamid Ali Khan who resigned in August 2015 and the Ministry of Interior appointed Lt. Cdr. (ret'd) Ihsan Ghani as the new National Coordinator NACTA.¹⁷

Initially nothing more than an idea on paper, NACTA's power was greatly enhanced in March 2013 under the NACTA 2013 Act.¹⁸ But the agency remains largely defunct. At the time of writing this report, the main page of the website, under the Threat Alerts section, says: "Currently no threat alerts."¹⁹ The remainder of the website is mostly barebones. NACTA's complete board has yet to meet once since the enactment of NAP.

Functions of NACTA

The functions of this Federal organ, as available on its own website, are as follows:

- a) To receive and collate data or information or intelligence, and dissem-

17 Ghiskori, Z. (2015, August 20). Ihsan Ghani best pick for handling affairs of NACTA - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 05, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/942034/improving-nap-ihsan-ghani-best-pick-for-handling-affairs-of-nacta/>.

18 Act No. XIX of 2013: An Act to Establish A National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan. (2013, March 26). Retrieved February 15, 2018, from http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1364795170_139.pdf.

19 NACTA Website - Main Page. (n.d.). Retrieved February 02, 2018, from <http://nacta.gov.pk/>.

inate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism;

- b) To coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies, and review them on periodical basis;
- c) To develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans on periodical basis;
- d) To carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents;
- e) To carry out liaison with International entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism;
- f) To review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government; and
- g) To appoint committees of experts from Government and NGOs for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and function of the Authority.

ANNEX VI: THE 20 POINTS OF THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN²⁰

1. Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
2. Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.
3. Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
4. NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
5. Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.
6. Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations.
7. Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations.
8. Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
9. Taking effective steps against religious persecution.
10. Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.
12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.
13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.
14. Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism.
15. Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.
16. Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.

²⁰ National Action Plan 20 Points. (2017, August 24). Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/>.

17. Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
18. Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.
19. Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.
20. Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.

ANNEX VII: UNDERSTANDING SEMINARIES

Codifying the mechanism for the registration and documentation of seminaries is a necessary first step, before any regulation and reform can occur. It is also important to understand why 3.5 million children in Pakistan attend seminaries, and the history of seminary reform.

A Brief History

Initially, madrassas were centers of education, both religious and secular. They earned the title of “trust institutions” over time, as they provided social services to poor families, such as food, shelter, clothing and free education. Part of the reason for the rise in seminary education and housing was the state’s failure to address the basic needs of the population. Parents, who made less than two dollars per day, started seeing madrassas as a beacon of hope, a way to help the family survive, where their children could learn to read and write, be clothed and fed, and have a roof over their heads.

This is the central argument upon which rests the severe backlash from the religious right, whenever the state of Pakistan attempts to regulate seminaries.

This harsh reality has allowed the scope and scale of madrassas to grow and morph over time.

Over the course of time, funding became an issue as madrassas expanded. Religious seminaries have enjoyed overt financial backing from various Muslim states. A Wikileaks cable suggests that an estimated \$100 million makes its way annually from the Gulf States to seminaries in Pakistan. Ostensibly, this is to support continued religious education and social services. But analysts have long suspected that some part of these finances make their way to funding militancy.

Schools of Thought

There are five schools of thought that have formed loose coalitions of seminaries. Each of these offers a school of thought that varies along a few key parameters. However, data suggests that those that attend seminaries in Pakistan primarily do

so for economic reasons, not religious ones.²¹

History of Seminary Reform

Previously, many madrassas were registered under the Societies Act 1860. Later in 1994, the registration of madrassas was prohibited in the regime of Benazir Bhutto. The “Model Deeni Madrassa Ordinance” was issued following the Musharraf regime in 2001, post 9/11, but it was rejected by the overarching body for the five schools of thought. The “Madrassa Regulatory Ordinance” was issued by the government next, and a ban on madrassa registration was ultimately raised under the notification No # 40/30/99/P11-20.

All things considered, this is not the first time Pakistan has attempted to register seminaries, and the backlash is nothing new.

Militant Connection?

The idea that madrassas are “incubators of violent extremism” took hold after 9/11, and the US pressured General Pervaiz Musharraf to take some action over the schools. While numerous reports, including the Annual Status of Education Report Pakistan, claim that there is no connection between seminaries and militancy, several facts work against this notion.

The most overt and public display of the strength of madrassas was the Red Mosque standoff in 2007, where armed students engaged in a hostile and bloody standoff with state authorities for several days. Further, both the NAP and the NISP call for the registration, regulation and reform of madrassas, a tacit acceptance that a problem exists.

Further, a Brookings Institute research report in 2010 claimed that 82% of students in Deobandi seminaries see the Taliban as role models. Another Brookings Institute report claims that the real problem lies in a handful of hardline seminaries.²² Finally,

21 Shabir, G., Abbasi, S. M., & Khan, A. (2012). Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 32(1), 2012th ser., 147-156. Retrieved February 25, 2018, from http://www.bzu.edu.pk/PJSS/Vol32No12012/Final_PJSS-32-1-11.pdf.

22 Winthrop, R., & Graff, C. (2010, June). Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education And Militancy In Pakistan. Retrieved February 3, 2018, from http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/pakistan-education-winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf.

the government has disclosed that nearly 80 working seminaries in Pakistan are receiving foreign monetary aid of up to three hundred million rupees.²³

23 Ghiskori, Z. (2015, January 29). Year 2013-14: 80 seminaries received Rs300m in foreign aid - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 3, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/829407/year-2013-14-80-seminaries-received-rs300m-in-foreign-aid/>.

ANNEX VIII: HISTORY OF FATA REFORMS

Historical Background of FATA

FATA is geographically located along the Durand line with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on its eastern border. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legislation, serves as the manifestation of the government’s writ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, dating back to the British colonial period in pre-partition India. The “excluded areas” as they were called by section 91 of the colonial constitutional law of the Government of India Act are still areas excluded from the realm of development, investment, and modern civilization. FATA has no network of state institutions in the modern sense. Almost seven decades after independence, tribal Pashtuns remain subject to the application of this inhumane set of regulations.

Article 247 of the Constitution states: “Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.” NWFP’s provincial governor exercises executive authority in FATA as the president’s representative. The overall administrative and political control of FATA falls under the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), currently headed by Lt. Gen. (retd) Abdul Qadir Baloch.

FCR versus 1973 Constitution

Pakistan’s Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights, including the right to equal citizenry, to all Pakistanis under Articles 8-28. However, under Article 247 these provisions do not extend to the residents of FATA. No Act of Parliament extends to these areas unless the President so directs. In fact, even lawmakers elected from the region can legislate for any part of the country, except for FATA. The FCR discriminates both in civil and criminal matters, classifies citizens, does not require proof for conviction or a civil decree and gives no right of defense by a counselor, or a right of appeal. In short, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a whole, for all practical purposes, is a redundant and tautological

document as far as its application in FATA is concerned. Consequently, the people of FATA have neither any 'human rights' nor can they claim any other status, privilege, position conferred upon other citizens of Pakistan by the Constitution.

A Brief History of FATA Reforms

The FATA Reforms Committee, the latest in a line of many, was formed in May 2014, prior to the enactment of NAP, to frame strategic objectives for the volatile tribal areas. This committee released its report after thorough deliberation but unfortunately the report didn't come up with any suggestions on FATA reforms.²⁴

Another FATA Reforms Committee was formed in November 2015²⁵ by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, almost a year after the APS attack to assist with the implementation of point 12 within the National Action Plan. This move was seen by many as a means to appease lawmakers from FATA for the withdrawal of their candidate five days before the election for the Speaker of the National Assembly.

The main goal of the Committee was to align FATA into the mainstream judicial system and bring about an end to the violence in the Agencies. The Committee was also assigned the task of determining whether FATA should be merged with its neighboring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or whether it should be declared as a separate province/territory. The five member Committee is headed by Sartaj Aziz who also acts as the Prime Minister's advisor on foreign affairs.

The FATA Reforms Committee published its first report in August 2016. According to the report the Committee had visited all seven FATA Agencies and held meetings with the tribal *Maliks* (leaders) and other political and civil stakeholders to gather an in depth understanding of the security situation and determine the best means to bring socio-political reforms. The report included recommendations for reforms which, if approved, would be implemented over a ten year period.²⁶

According to the report, there is a desperate need for socio-political and judicial

24 Ali, Z. (2014, March 20). Another commission formed on Fata reforms. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1107498>.

25 Bureau Report. (2015, March 28). 'Much awaited' Fata Tribunal formed. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1184671>.

26 Government of Pakistan. (2016). Report of the Committee on FATA Reforms 2016. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <http://202.83.164.29/safron/userfiles1/file/Report%20of%20the%20Committee%20on%20FATA%20Reforms%202016%20final.pdf>.

reform in FATA, and the most appropriate means to achieve these reforms is to integrate FATA with KP. This integration would be beneficial for many reasons which include geographical and cultural factors.

However, in order to achieve a smooth integration, it is important for FATA to develop to a certain level, where it can compare to KP. The National Security Division recognizes this need for extensive developmental programs and suggests that 3% of the National Finance Commission Award should be allotted to FATA over the next 10 years. This amount comes up to approximately 900 billion Rupees and should be used to create and facilitate the FATA Development Authority for building up infrastructure, on par with the other provinces in Pakistan. For example until October, FATA did not have a single university for higher education.²⁷ However, as of December 19, 2016, there were still protests against the center for delaying the reform process.²⁸

There is also a proposal to replace the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) with a Tribal Rewaj Act which proposes that the “[p]rovisions relating to collective responsibility in the FCR should be omitted from the new act”, and that the “jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court should be extended to FATA.” The report also proposes the retention of the *Jirga* system, with major enhancements, to resemble the internationally accepted Jury system.²⁹

However, even with this proposal, concerns as regards the violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan still remain.

27 Shah, Q. S. (2016, October 14). Classes at Fata University to start on Oct 24. Dawn. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1289940>.

28 Correspondent. (2016, December 16). Rally against centre for ‘delaying’ reforms in Fata. Dawn. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1303215>.

29 Rehman, I.A. (2016, September 01). FATA reforms: plans and pitfalls. Retrieved February 27, 2018 from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1281159>.

ANNEX IX: BALOCHISTAN INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MISSING PERSONS, AND RECONCILIATION

Balochistan Nationalist Movement

Baloch nationalism in its contemporary form began nearly a century ago in the 1920s in the form of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan (AIB - Organization for Unity of the Baloch). The movement claims that the Baloch people are a nation and emphasizes ethnic loyalty over religious or national loyalty; an idea that is contrary to the ideology behind Pakistan's creation. Their demands have ranged from cultural, economic and political reforms, to political autonomy, to outright secession from Pakistan. The movement is secular and heavily influenced by leftist Marxist ideology.³⁰

Baloch Insurgent Groups

The on-going insurgency is not the first of its kind. In fact, the current conflict that started in 2003 is the fifth of its kind.³¹ The insurgents in Pakistan are fragmented into several groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and the Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB - Balochistan's army). While this fragmentation is reflective of the tribal nature of Baloch nationalists, their demands are deeply rooted in Baloch nationalist ideology.

Indian Influence

Aside from several terror attacks that rocked Balochistan in 2016, arguably the news event that received the most coverage was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's comments about the province.³² In a speech that largely avoided foreign

30 Breseeg, T. M. (2004). Baloch nationalism: Its origin and development. Karachi: Royal Book Company.

31 BBC. (2014, February 22). Balochistan: The untold story of Pakistan's other war - BBC News. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897>.

32 Reuters. (2016, August 15). People of Balochistan, Kashmir thanked me: Modi on India's Independence Day. Dawn. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1277670>.

policy, Modi spoke openly against Pakistan, stating that the people Balochistan had thanked him. Modi dedicated his country's independence day to the Baloch people, who (according to him) were marginalized under Pakistan's biased political regime. Although these remarks were met with condemnation from the Pakistani government and media, they fueled the fire for supporters of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), which continues to fight for Baloch liberation.

Ajit Kumar, India's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations (UN), said the following on September 14: "This is a country (Pakistan), which has systematically abused and violated the human rights of its own citizens, including in Balochistan."³³ The irony of Indian leaders lamenting human rights abuses notwithstanding, these comments stirred major controversy in Pakistan.

Baloch Insurgency

According to the National Security Department, the insurgency in Balochistan is being marginalized and its leaders are being pacified through political mainstreaming.

Several Baloch insurgency leaders are living in foreign countries in self-exile, and serving as conduits in the hands of hostile countries supporting the insurgency. The state has limited control over these leaders while they are abroad.

There is also continued criticism of the state in the media with regards to how the separatist movements are being dealt with. Critics point out that the state does not attempt to reach out to the separatists or resolve the issues that are fueling their agendas. Instead, the state is on the hunt for people involved in these movements and openly targets them for anti-patriotic views.

Missing Persons

Missing persons is a generic term used in Pakistan to refer to the ostensibly hundreds of persons in Pakistan who have disappeared in conflict zones.

In 2017, five bloggers went missing earlier in the year, most connected to pages

³³ The Wire Staff. (2016, September 15). As Pakistan Talks Kashmir, India Invokes Balochistan Charge at UN for First Time. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://thewire.in/66047/punched-twice-by-pakistan-at-un-india-invokes-balochistan-charge-for-first-time/>.

that ridiculed the state or military.³⁴ They were also targets of “weaponized blasphemy”, a tool commonly used to silent dissent. They were returned, on average, a month later. Most confirmed later in the year that they state was involved in their³⁵ abduction.³⁶ The Federal Investigation Agency confirmed in December that the blasphemy allegations against the bloggers were utterly unsubstantiated.³⁷

In other developments, in October, the apex court demanded a list of all missing persons kept in prisons,³⁸ and Pakistan’s Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights announced in December that it would talk to missing persons that had been since recovered.³⁹

The number of missing persons is a contested issue, with a huge gulf between the claims by Baloch activists, human rights bodies and the statistics of the government. Different parties are reporting wildly different estimates. Baloch groups claims the number is as high as 21,000⁴⁰ and NGO’s place it at 3,500.⁴¹ This is radically different from official numbers, as in February 2015, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED) informed the Supreme Court that 982 missing persons had been traced in the last four years.⁴² According to the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED) report, 1,273 cases of enforced disappearances are still unresolved, with only 122 of them belonging to

34 Editorial. (2017, January 10). Missing Activists. Dawn. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1307432>.

35 Abducted blogger breaks silence: ‘We want a Pakistan with rule of law’. (2017, February 9). DAWN. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1313745>.

36 Pakistan blogger Aasim Saeed says he was tortured. (2017, October 25). BBC. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41662595>.

37 No evidence found against bloggers accused of blasphemy, FIA tells court. (2017, December 23). DAWN. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1378262>.

38 SC summons details of all missing persons kept in prisons. (2017, October 26). Dunya News. Retrieved February 25, 2018, from <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/411547-Supreme-Court-missing-persons-cases-report-summoned-within-one-week>.

39 Anwar, M. (2017, December 7). Pakistani Senate to Question Recovered Missing Persons About Disappearances. Voice of America. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-senate-question-recovered-missing-persons/4154246.html>.

40 Correspondent. (2015, April 17). Raising his voice: 21,000 missing in Balochistan, says Mama Qa-deer - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/871142/%20raising-his-voice-21000-missing-in-balochistan-says-mama-qadeer/>.

41 Junaidi, I. (2016, December 20). Only 96 people are missing in Balochistan, Senate body told. DAWN. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1303380>.

42 Malik, H. (2015, February 22). Enforced disappearances: Up to 982 missing persons traced in the past four years - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://tribune.com.pk/%20story/842656/enforced-disappearances-up-to-982-missing-persons-traced-in-the-past-four-years/>.

Balochistan.⁴³ Meanwhile, Defence of Human Rights, an NGO that traces missing people, puts the number at 5,149 from all over Pakistan.⁴⁴

Missing persons remain a thorny issue for the authorities to navigate. Without a proper resolution of the problem, reconciliation efforts will be hampered in Balochistan.

Reconciliation Efforts

The government currently believes that reconciliation and addressing grievances is the best way to appease the Baloch nationalists and to end the conflict in the province. The report presented to the lawmakers in the National Assembly by the Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar is fairly vague. Verbatim, it states that “surrender and reconciliation/rehabilitation of absconders/outlaws in progress.”

According to one report, some 1,025 militants, belonging to various pro-scribed outfits, have surrendered before the provincial government during the 2015.⁴⁵

In April 2015, the Chief Minister of Balochistan, Dr. Abdul Malik, also said that a reconciliation strategy had been devised to help mainstream Baloch nationalists.⁴⁶ The Prime Minister also visited Balochistan in August and launched a “Peaceful Balochistan Plan” to bring angry Balochs back into the fold.⁴⁷ After a meeting in October between the CM and the PM, the CM announced that he would hold a tribal council to meet exiled leaders and persuade them to join the political mainstream.⁴⁸ Balochistan Minister Nawab Sanaullah Zehri had also met the Khan

43 Shah, W. A. (2015, September 14). View from the courtroom: Hundreds of missing persons still untraced. Dawn. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1206866>.

44 Iqbal, N. (2015, January 14). SC seeks report on number of missing persons. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1156658>.

45 Shah, A. (2016, April 26). 1,025 militants surrendered in Balochistan during past year. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1254551>.

46 Khan, A. (2015, April 26). Reconciliation plan drawn up for estranged Baloch leaders: CM - The Express Tribune. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/876111/reconciliation-plan-drawn-up-for-estranged-baloch-leaders-cm/>.

47 Shahid, S. (2015, August 07). Plan for ‘peaceful Balochistan’ approved. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1198912>.

48 Ali, S. (2015, October 08). Sharif intensifies efforts to reconcile with exiled Baloch leaders. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://nation.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/sharif-intensifies-ef-forts-to-reconcile-with-exiled-baloch-leaders>.

of Kalat⁴⁹ in London earlier in August, 2015 as part of the reconciliation policy.⁵⁰

49 Current Khan-e-Kalat, Mir Agha Suliman Daud, went into self-exile in the United Kingdom after the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 and decided to form a government in exile of Balochistan.

50 Shah, S. A. (2015, August 15). Zehri meets Khan of Kalat in London. Retrieved February 16, 2018, from <http://www.dawn.com/news/1200640>.