



**Center for
Research &
Security
Studies**

State in Turmoil

Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)

2013

About CRSS

Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan advocacy, program implementation and research organization based in Islamabad. It seeks to promote an informed discourse on crucial socio-political, economic and security issues confronting Pakistan. It strives to realize its goals through a vast array of activities such as widely disseminated analyses on national and regional security issues, counter-terrorism and counter-extremism advocacy and conflict monitoring.

The Center regularly holds monthly Discussion Forums and seminars on important national issues, with the primary objective of collection opinion and comments from various stake-holders including key serving and former policy-makers, bureaucrats, and intelligentsia.

One of the core specialties of the Center is media advocacy campaign on critical humanitarian, social, cultural and security (counter-radicalization) issues in Pakistan. The Center has so far aired over 2,000 Radio programs – half of them live. Militancy-hit areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan are the major target regions of CRSS's media advocacy campaign.

Heinrich Boell Stiftung (HBS), Germany, CIDA-Canada, DFAT-Australia, US Institute of Peace (USIP) and UNICEF are some of CRSS partners.

Besides radio advocacy in two militancy-hit provinces, CRSS is also implanting a youth leadership development programme in Baluchistan, and holding a series of dialogues with scholars from Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia on the issue of separation of politics and religion as part of its counter-radicalization programme.

The Center is based in Islamabad, Pakistan with regional offices in Peshawar, Mingora (Swat) and Quetta.

For more information, please visit us at: www.crss.pk

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The Deadly Drone Campaign: Setting Dangerous Precedent A Pakistani Perspective



Executive Summary

Drone strikes on targets inside Pakistan are legally contentious, and deeply unpopular among a large section of the public which considers these attacks as violations of Pakistan's sovereignty. They risk civilian casualties and radicalization of a new generation outraged at what they see as American aggression. Furthermore, the use of the predators to hunt down Al Qaeda linked non – state actors sets a dangerous precedent for future as more and more states are likely to adopt these means and methods in others' territories.

During 2012, the CIA carried out as many as 46 strikes inside Pakistan, compared to 72 in 2011 and 122 in 2010, the New America Foundation (NAF) said, based on its compilation of reports in international media. In the wake of the increasing pressure and criticism, President Obama, in a State of Union address in February, pledged more transparency along with operational changes in the Drone programme. These changes seem to have directly impacted the drone campaign and manifest in the declining numbers, that is, only 11 attacks have been recorded in the first four months of 2013, compared to 13 in 2012.

Remote location and a hostile environment make it difficult to obtain authentic casualty figures. A report commissioned by legal lobby group Reprieve in September, according to NAF for instance, estimated that between 474 to 884 civilians were among 2,593 to 3,365 people killed by drones in Pakistan between June 2004 and September 2012. Out of a total of 350 drone attacks, 297 were carried out during the tenure of the Obama administration.

Civilian casualties have been an inevitable consequence. In January 2006 an attack on a madrassa in Damadola, in the Bajaur Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), killed 83 civilians, including women and children.

The accelerated use of combat drones on the western border region of Pakistan is setting a dangerous precedent for more powerful countries that have conflicts with their less powerful neighboring states. The Pakistan's precedent makes it more likely that other countries will follow the American example, when almost 76 countries currently have drones in their military arsenals.

Moreover, the US is clearly undermining its domestic, as well as international laws, governing the use of force through its clandestine

dealings with the Pakistani government. And then there is the impact on Pakistan's public life where growing unease at the strikes is directed at a government which at best has no control to halt the attacks; and at worst is complicit in this controversial campaign.

No matter what the security benefits of these drone attacks are, the campaign is potentially at risk of losing a war of winning the hearts and minds of people, which, as history has proven, is needed to win any war of attrition. Cameron Munter, the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, who prematurely wrapped up his diplomatic assignment in summer 2012, had also cautioned against these risks.

United Nations' special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism also said on March 15, 2013 that US drone strikes violate Pakistan's sovereignty and called for its immediate cessation. The Special Rapporteur, Mr Ben Emmerson, said in a statement, after conclusion of his unannounced visit to Pakistan from March 11 to 13, that Pakistan needed to be given an opportunity to establish peace in the country. The UN rapporteur is investigating the civilian impact of the use of drones and other forms of targeted killing in the context of counter-terrorism operations. He would present his report during the 68th session of the UN General Assembly in October.

Introduction

Pakistan has been at the crossroads of a 'global war of ideologies' since 1979, which put it first in alliance with Jihadi (Islamic fighting) groups to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan, then against those same Jihadi groups as American priorities changed after 9/11. Pakistan has been putting its own territory at risk. The increased activity of international Jihadists and dynamics of their activities changed drastically and the phenomenon became global. Their role in attacking US forces in Afghanistan brought the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) unmanned aerial vehicles into Pakistan back in 2002. But in the initial phase these were used only for surveillance purposes. What the actual terms of engagement were between the US and former President Pervez Musharraf for drones to operate in Pak-Afghan bordering regions are still unknown. Combat drones arrived in 2004. Since its inception, there have been approximately 350 strikes in Pakistan's tribal belt. According to facts and figures compiled in a report by Interior Ministry of Pakistan almost 487 civilians were killed (along with 2183 Jihadis) in 342 drone strikes in FATA from January 1, 2004-December 31, 2012 ¹.

The CIA's drone program is classified; its targets, selection criteria, and the casualties in these strikes are not made public. The US administration claims that the combat drones are the best available option for targeting terrorists involved in cross border attacks and international Jihadists with global ambitions. Yet there are human rights and media organizations which claim these attacks are killing and wounding civilians, along with suspected terrorists.² The US administration and military continue to argue that drones provide the best means for eliminating terrorists, with minimum collateral damage, in an area beyond the reach of its ground troops in Afghanistan. It is a known fact that allowing them to cross the border would be politically unacceptable to Pakistan.

Drone strikes in Pakistan are rapidly contributing in turning the local population against the US. Civilian deaths in these drone strikes are an infringement on the sovereignty of the host state, and are redefining the nature and conduct of warfare. This report seeks to explore the local perspective of this campaign including interviews with the people in tribal areas (which are the main targets of drone campaign), the views of politicians and military officials and the views of legal experts. This report also offers recommendations on how to address and analyze this complex issue.

1. Drone Strikes: The Context and Overview

In June 2004, the US launched a missile strike against Nek Muhammad, a Pakistani Taliban commander who had announced his support for Al Qaeda. Witnesses reported that the missile was fired from a drone circling overhead, but the Pakistani military denied any US involvement, instead taking credit for the operation. Today, this is remembered as the first US drone strike in Pakistan. The ease with which the most feared Taliban commander was eliminated set a new course for counter-terrorism campaign in the area. At the same time, the US, with the aid of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), acquired the operational rights of Shamsi Airbase in Balochistan to deploy surveillance and combat drones inside Pakistan.

Although the Bush administration started the drone campaign in Pakistan, it was very cautious in selecting targets to avoid political backlash and civilian casualties. This led to the implementation of 'personality attacks' whereby it was essential that the target of a drone attack should be a renowned Al-Qaeda leader, operative or a Taliban commander. During 2004-2008 only 52 drone strikes were recorded inside Pakistani territory in which the targets were identified as 'terrorists'. However, the civilian loss, like the attack on a religious seminary (Madrassa) in Damadola killing 83 people, resulted in a huge outcry in Pakistan and around the world. Similarly, an attack on a local Jirga (traditional and revered Tribal gathering) in North Waziristan Agency in 2011, killing scores of innocent civilians resulted in scathing criticism from Pakistani leadership and people.

Remaining restricted under Bush administration (2002-2007), the drone campaign expanded during Obama's administration, to include far more 'profile'- or so-called 'signature'- strikes based on a 'pattern of life' analysis. According to US officials' privy to the drone campaign, these strikes target groups of men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorists, but who have not been identified as known terrorists. Needless to say, such attacks cause large scale civilian casualties. In 2012, the *New York Times* quoted key US officials stating that "people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Al-Qaeda operatives, are probably up to no good". The *Times* also reported that some in the Obama administration joke that when the CIA sees "three guys doing jumping jacks," they think it is a terrorist training camp .3

Overall, there have been between 2,593 and 3,365 casualties in these drone strikes. These have been concentrated in South and North Waziristan agencies, which border Afghanistan. According to estimates, between 474 and 884 civilians were killed in these attacks; 176 of these casualties were

children .4 Thus, intensification in drone campaign inside Pakistan in recent years has met with an international outcry, local anger, calls for more transparency from international bodies like the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others.

2. Rush for justice: The Ramifications

The US administration has always made the point that its combat drone campaign inside Pakistan is in line with the rules and regulations of warfare, and that it fully abides by the international treaties governing the use of force. It has based its arguments on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1373, adopted in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001.⁵ The resolution calls upon all states to cooperate in bringing to justice those responsible for these acts of terrorism. However, the recent statement of UN special rapporteur has rendered these arguments meaningless and against international laws.

A look into the US drone campaign inside Pakistan underlines that the US is using disproportionate force against those allegedly involved in terrorist attacks, while also denying them the opportunity of proving themselves innocent a court of law. Christof Heyns, another UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings (summary or arbitrary executions) has also stated that the American use of drone strikes to carry out target killings is undermining the international laws put in place to govern the use of force among states in the aftermath of World War II. He further elaborated that some drone strikes "may even constitute war crimes" .6

Moreover, the drone strikes are reshaping and redefining the nature and conduct of future warfare, and rapidly shifting the balance in favor of the states which possess drone technology. At the same time, using drones as part of military strategy is setting a dangerous precedent which other states such as India, China, and Russia (who have conflicts with their neighboring states) can emulate. Similarly, combat drones are ushering in an era of 'disengaged' wars; it is now possible for a state to be involved in a war without any direct threat to its homeland, and minimal casualties to its ground troops. It is also divorcing the dimension of political cost from a conflict, which can sometimes serve as a factor in determining the length and intensity of a conflict.

3. Drone Strikes and Local Implications

The US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan have resulted in scores of different ramifications for the local people and government.

3.1 Legal

The fundamental question is about the legitimacy of the use of force and 'remote' target killing by a state inside a country whose state actors are officially, or otherwise not at war with that particular country. There are several legal and ethical concerns that need to be addressed in connection with drones, including the US President's controversial direct role in approving targets; the shift towards considering the presence of any fighting-age men as a 'signature' of terrorist activity and therefore a valid target; and the extrajudicial killing rather than the capture of suspects, thereby undermining traditional norms of justice. Clive Stafford Smith, Director of Reprieve, a charity that promotes legal frameworks, said in a recent briefing to British politicians, that the American use of drones amounted to 'death penalty without trial'. He underlined that "We sleepwalked into a nuclear age, now we are sleepwalking into a drone age."⁷

Wajid Shamsul Hassan, Pakistani High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, too, said the US strikes "violated" Pakistan's sovereignty and encouraged extremism in a state which is utterly anti-US. Similarly, Navi Pillay, UN Commissioner on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict said she was 'seriously concerned' by reports of civilian deaths in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia.⁸ Also, Hina Rabbani Khar, former Pakistani Foreign Minister, once remarked that although she did not disagree with the stated purpose of the drone campaign, the way it was carried out was questionable. She said that '... the use of unilateral strikes on Pakistan territory is illegal. It is illegal and it is unlawful. Ignoring opposition to the drones is about choosing to win the battle at the cost of the war. These are battles.'⁹ Pakistan's Foreign Office has condemned these attacks on more than one occasion and termed these against international norms and rules.

Moreover, the US has intentionally kept the drone campaign, and the nature of its relationship with Pakistan in conducting and coordinating this campaign, secret. However, it is evident that this campaign is clearly undermining Pakistani domestic law. According to the Pakistani constitution, any bilateral agreement cannot be between two individuals or individual organizations; rather it should be on state-to-state level fulfilling all the legal and constitutional requirements.

3.2 Political

Politically the issue of drone strikes inside Pakistan is putting the government on a slippery slope. Due to its heavy reliance on the US for economic aid and domestic political legitimacy, the government cannot explicitly condemn these attacks. On the other hand, the government of Pakistan is also under extreme pressure from media and many civil society organizations, to adopt a more aggressive stand on this issue. It is interesting to note that the failure of the civilian government in forcing the US to stop these attacks makes it complicit in the eyes of local people and political opposition.

Drone strikes in Pakistan are hugely contributing in bringing the right wing political and religious parties together, as the government draws flak from all around for its alleged duplicity i.e. protesting drones in public and accepting/appreciating them in private. This emerging alliance of the right is restricting the space for moderate and liberal political quarters in Pakistan to cooperate with the US in the war against terrorism, and also fuelling anti-Americanism in the country. At the same time, this political aspect is undermining the cause of eliminating extremism from Pakistan. The deadly campaign is regarded as an unjust and disproportionate use of force by US; this is increasing the sentiments of anger and animosity amongst the locals towards the US. For example, a resident of Wana in South Waziristan said that although the drone strikes are precise in targeting the suspected terrorists, often the resultant collateral damage involves loss of life and property to the innocent people living in the neighborhood. The net result stays the same: a surge in anger and frustration of the Pakistani people, directed not only towards the US but its own government.¹⁰

3.3 Security

The US administration often defends the drone campaign in Pakistan as a weapon of last resort for taking out the rank and file of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who were (and remain) involved in attacking its people. Yet a recent study by law academics of New York University and Stanford University, based on interviews and witness reports, concluded that besides stoking anti-Americanism, the drone campaign is potentially radicalizing a new generation and turning them into the arms of the militants.¹¹ According to the report, the deadly drone campaign is rapidly changing the ground scenario and psyche of the local people and making it more and more fearful and xenophobic.¹² Similarly a report by the Human Rights Clinic of Columbia Law School noted that the claims by the US administration, that drones are primarily killing terrorists, are flawed. The drones are killing a large number

of innocent civilians as well, and it goes uncounted in mainstream media.¹³ These claims are also substantiated in a report jointly produced by UK based human rights campaign group *Reprieve* and the Foundation for Fundamental Rights of Pakistan. The report was presented to UN Human Rights Council and detailed scores of incidents of drone strikes where the targets were solely innocent civilians.¹⁴

It is evident that by exploiting local sentiments against these attacks, the Taliban continue to find new recruits. The data compiled by the CRSS (through its Pakistan Conflict Tracker) underlines that in a month, an average of 300 persons are killed (mostly civilians) in restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Likewise, Taliban and Al-Qaeda train terrorists with more international goals as well. The failed Times Square bombing is a case in point, where the accused was trained in Pakistan and claimed that the killing of Pakistani civilians in drone strikes prompted him to join terrorists. That is why even former U.S. envoy to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, vehemently disapproved these attacks and termed them as counter-productive for the security interests of Pakistan.¹⁵

3.4 Cultural

The buzz of drones in the skies of the Pakistani tribal areas has transformed daily life to an unbelievable extent. US drones have killed people in mosques, madrassas, in funeral processions and weddings, at markets and inside homes. The result is a population that believes it is living in a killing field, unable at times to even bury the dead. One resident of Wana, South Waziristan, described a funeral which immediately attracted the familiar sound of a drone. Within moments, all the people fled the scene, leaving the dead body alone.¹⁶ This is the scale of fear that drones are sowing in the hearts and minds of the locals - while the US continues to preach that the War on Terror cannot be won if the hearts and minds of people are not won over.

"We all used to get together; all our friends in the village. We used to have fun. But now, that's not the case anymore," lamented a local resident of North Waziristan in an interview with a team of foreign researchers.¹⁷ In general, the people are wary of even meeting each other and the non-locals in the region, and consider everyone the potential target of drone attack at any time.

4. Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the following recommendations are offered for attempting to solve the issue amicably and without damaging potential success in the long term war against terrorism:

- ❑ The US should cooperate and coordinate more robustly with the Pakistani government in selecting and targeting the suspected terrorists in tribal areas, to give the campaign legitimacy in the eyes of local people and international community.
- ❑ The US should reconsider its strategy of targeting markets, marriage ceremonies, funeral processions and other religious and cultural gatherings, which cause a deep sense of resentment among local people.
- ❑ The US should initiate independent investigations into drone strike deaths, consistent with the calls made by human rights organizations and UN Special Report on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- ❑ In conjunction with robust investigations and, where appropriate, prosecutions, compensation programs should be established for those whose lives and property are damaged.
- ❑ The US should fulfill its international humanitarian and human rights law obligations with respect to the use of force, including restraining the use of lethal force against individuals who are not members of armed groups, or otherwise against individuals not posing an imminent threat.
- ❑ The media should cease the common practice of referring simply to militant deaths, without further explanation similarly, it should refrain itself from over-sensationalizing in the event of every drone attack, risking further rifts in its own society

PART TWO

Case Studies of Innocent Civilian Victims

Though the number of strikes subsided in 2012 (46) after touching its peak in 2010 (122), yet there are indications that the relentless drone campaign may surge once more. During the first ten days of the current year, six drone strikes were carried out in different areas of Pakistani tribal areas. At a time when drones are considered an effective tool to eliminate militants, following case studies give an insight into the incidents of drone strikes where civilians were also killed.

Case Study No. 1

Date: 24th October, 2012

Targeted Area: Ghunday Qala, Miran Shah, North Waziristan.

Casualties: One woman was killed and eight children injured.

Description: Mother of Atiqur- Rehman of more than sixty years of age was collecting ladyfingers along with children of her family in the garden in front of her house when the drone hit, killing her on the spot the accompany were injured in the attack.

Case Study No. 2

Date: 24th October 2012

Targeted Area: Village Ghondi Kalai Tapi, Tehsil Miranshah, North Waziristan

Casualties: Two were dead including a woman and a child.

Description: This was carried out on Resham Jan's house, who was a candidate in 2008 general elections. His wife and a grandson got killed in this attack and another grandson was injured.

Case Study No.3

Date: 2nd August 2012

Targeted Area: Village Lwara Panga, South Waziristan

Casualties: Twelve persons were killed, including four Taliban and eight other innocent locals.

Description: Three missiles were fired from a drone on a shop and a nearby vehicle belonging to Taliban. Locals used to sit near the shop for gossips. That day two Taliban came to the shop for buying grocery, while the other two were waiting in a vehicle near the shop when drone struck the shop and the vehicle, killing four Taliban and eight other innocent locals sitting near the shop.

Case Study No.4

Date: 4th June 2012

Targeted Area: Hassu Khel, Mir All, North Waziristan

Casualties: 16 persons died in this attack including Al-Qaida leader Abu Yahya Al-libi.

Description: In this attack, four missiles were fired from the drones which resulted in killing 16 people including Al-Qaida leader Al-libi. According to the local sources, six persons among the dead were innocents.

Case Study No.5

Date: 13th March 2012

Targeted Area: Village Akbar Khel, Azam Warsak, South Waziristan

Casualties: Five persons got killed in this attack, two of whom were innocent.
Description: Four missiles were fired from a drone, killing five men. Two persons, Noor Muhammad, a shopkeeper and another customer, were also killed along with three Taliban. Both the shopkeeper and customer were innocent civilians.

Case Study No.6

Date: 3rd January 2012

Targeted Area: Mosaki, Mir Ali, North Waziristan

Casualties: Two persons were killed.

Description: A drone hit the hujra owned by Sadiq Noor 40, son of Jehan Roz, a Dawar by tribe. Sadiq Noor was a local teacher but locals believe that he was a coordinator for the militants. Although media reported killing three foreign militants along with Sadiq Noor, however an eyewitness from the area told that when he arrived only mutilated dead bodies of Sadiq Noor and his 9-year old son Wajid Noor were lying there.

Case Study No.7

Date: 31st October 2011

Targeted Area: Village Meborakshahi, North Waziristan

Casualties: Two persons died in this attack.

Description: Two missiles were fired on a vehicle carrying Tariq Aziz and his 12 years old cousin, Waheed Ullah. Both the victims are thought to be innocent. Aziz used to work for Waziristan Students Welfare Organization. According to his friends, he highlighted student's problems and also raised voice for the youth of Waziristan. A few days before his death, he had participated in an agitation against drone attacks in front of Parliament in Islamabad. As soon as, he got back home from Islamabad, he was killed in a drone attack.

Case Study No. 8

Date: 30th October 2011

Targeted Area: Doghi Macha, North Waziristan

Casualties: Four persons died.

Description: Four men died when a vehicle "GHOGAYE" (in local term) was hit by two missiles fired from a drone. Shaheed-ur-Rehman and his companions were among the dead. He was a marble businessman in Doghi Macha, and the other three persons accompanying him were laborers-working with him.

Case Study No. 9

Date: 6th July 2011

Targeted Area: Village Hurmaz, Mir Ali, North Waziristan

Casualties: Three persons died in this attack

Description: After taking dinner, Zahirullah (the victim) and his friends were offering *Isha* prayers, when the drone struck. His friends were local inhabitants and they had come to discuss some business matters. He was running his own business of motorcycles and cars and had a shop in the main bazar of Mir Ali.

Case Study No. 10

Date: 17th March 2011

Targeted Area: Tehsil Datta Khel, North Waziristan

Casualties: 46 people died in this attack

Description: This drone attack is considered one of the deadliest in the region, killing 46 innocent people. The attack happened when Malik Daud, an elder of a tribe was heading a jirga to settle a tribal feud over a mountain dispute, involving two sub-tribes in Datta Khel. Malik Daud also fell prey to this attack. For the first time in drone strikes' history in Pakistan, the government paid compensation for the dead. The dead included three children who were there with their elders just to watch the proceeding. These children included Mustafa Wazir (12), Ayaz Khan (8) and Mohammad (13).

Case Study No. 11

Date: 8th March 2011

Targeted Area: Village Doog, South Waziristan

Casualties: Four people were killed in this attack.

Description: A drone fired missiles on Fazal Karim's hujra (guest house), killing Karim and his three guests, two natives of Miran Shah (North Waziristan) and one Arab. Karim was innocent and had no links with Al-Qaeda, Taliban or any other militant faction.

Case Study No. 12

Date: April 22, 2011

Targeted Area: Tehsil Spinwam, North Waziristan

Casualties: 25 persons were killed including 12 years old Arif Khan

Description: Among 25 persons who died as a result of this drone strike, only two were thought to be local Taliban, the rest were innocent people including Arif Khan. A friend of Khan told that the latter used to graze sheep in the nearby fields. On that day, he was serving tea to the guests in the hujra (guest house).

Case Study No. 13

Date: February 21, 2011

Targeted Area: Village Tapi, North Waziristan

Casualties: Six people died and 3 other injured.

Description: A drone fired four missiles on a house. The first missile killed four persons on the spot, while three were fired to target the fleeing persons. It is believed that the attack resulted in killing three innocent and one of whom was Jan Muhammad, an intermediate level student.

Case Study No. 14

Date: November 16, 2009

Targeted Area: Village All Khel, Khaisoor, Tehsil Mir Ali, North Waziristan

Casualties: Two persons killed and one injured.

Description: A drone fired three missiles on a vehicle carrying three persons some 100 yards away from All Khel bazaar. One of the three men, Samiullah remained unhurt while both of his cousins got killed. They were travelling from their home to bazaar to bring grocery.

Case Study No. 15

Date: March 17, 2010

Targeted Area: Village Shana Khura Hamzoni, Tehsil Miran Shah, North Waziristan

Casualties: Four persons were killed. One was belonging to village Shana Khura and the other three were from Madda Khel area of North Waziristan.

Description: This was the first drone attack which was carried out in Humzoni sub-tribe of Dawars, because the local commander Sadiq Noor doesn't allow foreigners to reside in his territory. Two missiles were fired on a hujra adjacent to Gul Bat Khan's home. The target was his elder son, Rasool Khan, who is considered to be a Talib who fights against NATO and America in Afghanistan. Rasool Khan survived the attack, but his younger brother, Wilayat Khan was killed. Who was innocent.

Case Study No. 16

Date: November 21, 2008

Targeted Area: Village Ali Khel, Khaisoor, tehsil Mir Ali, North Waziristan

Casualties: 32 persons got killed including Maliks (tribal elders), women and children.

Description: A local jirga was underway in Malik Shanawar Shogi Ali Khel to settle a dispute, when a drone fired three missiles. The intended target was a local Taliban commander Hikmat Roshan, who was there to resolve the dispute, but he survived the attack. Malik Shanawar including six other Maliks got killed. Five children also died in this attack.

Case Study No. 17

Case study: 3rd June 2012

Targeted Area: Village Sholang, South Waziristan

Casualties: Six persons got injured.

Description: This attack was carried out at a time when locals gathered for the condolences over the death of a local Taliban commander Rehmanullah. He was killed in a drone attack three days earlier. His brother Malang, who was innocent and five other common villagers got injured in this attack.

Case Study No. 18

Date: December 10, 2010

Targeted Area: Village Spalga, Tehsil Miran Shah, North Waziristan

Casualties: Five persons were killed.

Description: Tariq Khan, a local chemist along with four other people was killed, when a drone fired three missiles on a vehicle carrying them from their village towards Miran Shah Bazaar. Tariq Khan ran a medical store in front of Agency Headquarter Hospital Miran Shah. All the dead in the attack were innocents.

Case Study No. 19

Date: 24th February 2010

Targeted Area: Darga Mandi, North Waziristan

Casualties: Five persons were killed.

Description: A drone fired missiles on a house. Five persons were killed in the incident including Rafiqur-Rehman's wife. His 9-year old daughter Naila got injured in the attack. Locals say that wife of Rehman was preparing meals in the kitchen when drone hit their house.

Case Study No. 20

Date: 31st December, 2009

Targeted Area: Machi Khel, Miran Shah, North Waziristan

Casualties: Three persons died.

Description: Drone hit the house of Karim Khan a local freelance journalist killing his 13 years old son Zahinullah and his brother Asif who was a teacher by profession. The target was Haji Omer, a Wazir tribe militant commander from South Waziristan and was a facilitator to militants from Central Asia. He was also killed.

Case Study No. 21

Date: 8th January 2010

Targeted Area: Tappi Village, North Waziristan

Casualties: Five persons killed.

Description: A vehicle was hit by drone in front of a shop in Tappi area. Mir Qalam 19, from a nearby village Tappi Ghundai Kala was invited to a dinner

at Tappi village. He was on his way, when he saw Akbar Zaman 35, a government school teacher, Saad Wall Khan 24, and Mohammad Fayaz 25, standing nears a shop. Mir Qalam stopped his car right in front of the shop where all the above mentioned three were standing to meet them. Meanwhile, the drone hit his car killing all the four. In this attack a three years old girl Ayesha, daughter of Mohammad Noor was also killed when the shop next to her house was blown up by the missile. Locals believe that Mir Qalam might have some liking for Hafiz Gul Bahadar, but was not an active militant. While the rest of the four including the kid had nothing to do with militancy.

Case Study No. 22

Date: 23rd January 2009

Targeted Area: Gangi Khel, Wana, South Waziristan

Casualties: Four persons were killed.

Description: A drone hit the hujra of a tribal Malik Dil Faraz 45, a Wazir by tribe. He lost three of his kids including two school-goings, Mohammad Ghulam Wazir 18, Mohammad Ullah 15, and Habib Noor Wazir 12. One of their cousins, Habib Ullah 24, was also present on the occasion. All of them were killed. They had no connection with the militants. Since the Malik was pro- government, therefore the attack had a very deep impact on the rest of maliks. It benefited the militants.

Case Study No. 23

Date: 23rd June 2009

Targeted Area: Neej Naray, Makeen, South Waziristan

Casualties: 46 persons were killed.

Description: A drone targeted Tehrik-i-Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud's hideout. He was not there so it killed five other militants. The militants expecting another drone strike left the dead bodies. On the same day the locals, not even a single militant, were about to offer their funeral prayers around 5 pm at Tangi Patoni, South Waziristan, the drone hit the funeral procession. Locals claimed that 41 persons were killed and they are identified as following:

1. Nooruddin s/o Behram Khan Mehsud
 2. Waray Gul s/o Nazar Mehsud
 3. Khanan gul s/o Waray Gul Mehsud
 4. Ikram Uddin s/o Mehmood
 5. Noor Bakee Khan s/o Soobath Khan
 6. Rehman Ullah s/o Wall Rehman
 7. Abdul Wakeel s/o Abdur Raheem
 8. Sher Alam s/o Abdul Sattar
 9. Mussa Khan s/o Muhammad Anwar Khan
-

10. Said Ghani s/o Muhammad Anwar Khan
11. Zafran s/o Muhammad Anwar Khan
12. Abdul Khanan s/o Abdul Hassan
13. Faraz Khan s/o Ghulam Rasool
14. Noor Wall Khan s/o Gul Daad Khan
15. Mukdim Khan s/o Khoon Badshah
16. Gul Muhammad s/o Shareen
17. Nijjatullah s/o Noor Wali
18. Haider s/o Gul Nawab
19. Naeem Gul s/o Amal Jan
20. Faiz Muhammad s/o Soorat Jaan
21. Kareemullah s/o Zareen Khan
22. Hameedullah khan s/o Gul Marjan
23. Gul Zaman s/o Bakhta Khan
24. Noor Zaman s/o Gul Zuman
25. Abdul Qadir Khan s/o Gul Zaman
26. Haji Rasheed s/o Jamal Khan
27. Yasbaah s/o Pasheen Khan
28. Sayed Zuman s/o Shah Saleem
29. Fazal Najar s/o Taleem Khan
30. Ghani s/o Madazar
31. Janarooz Khan s/o Zarjeel
32. Mustakeem s/o Meeraqib
33. Khalid s/o Basima All
34. Maeen Khan s/o Nawal Khan
35. Muhammad s/o Kanda Hoor
36. Mir Akhman s/o Gulzar
37. Amin Khan s/o Mir Rehman
38. Islamuddin s/o Mir Rehman
39. Darru Khan s/o Fareed Khan
40. Mumpuz s/o Mallang
41. Aamay Noor s/o Muhammad Anwar Khan

Case Study No. 24

Date: 19th November 2008

Targeted Area: Jani Khel, FR Bannu (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

Casualties: One person was killed.

Description: A drone targeted the hujra and house of Dilber alias Parpand. Three Arabs along with Parpand stayed there for about 15 minutes and then left before the strike. Women and children inside the house remained safe as only the boundary wall was damaged while a government Primary School teacher Hafiz Rafi Ullah 30, got killed and Khakim Khan 25, son of Dilbar got injured. No militant was killed in the strike. People of the area were

outraged, as an innocent school teacher was killed, people really hate drones.

Case Study No. 25

Date: 1st December, 2005

Targeted Area: Patisi Adda, Mir Ali, North Waziristan

Casualties: Three persons died

Description: Drone hit the house of Sadiqullah Dawar and killed Abu Hamza Rabia, an Al-Qaeda operative. Two children were also killed in the said attack. These include, Noor Aziz 7, son of Baitullah Dawar and Abdul Wasid Dawar, 15, son of Mohammad Tariq.



End Notes

¹ The [News](http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-152167-US-drones-killed-2183-Jihadis-487-civilians-since-2004): US drones killed 2,183 Jihadis, 487 civilians since 2004 <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-152167-US-drones-killed-2183-Jihadis-487-civilians-since-2004>

² Such as The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, UK based charity Reprieve, Long War Journal, New America Foundation, Amnesty International, Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, "Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012", *Long War Journal*, Jan. 19, 2012). available at <http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistanstrikes.php>; Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Brookings Institute, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0714_targeted_killings_byman.aspx.
and UN Special Rapporteur.

³ Jo Becker and Scott Shane, "A Measure of Change: Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will", *New York Times*, May 29, 2012, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html>

⁴ Data compiled by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, available at

<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/>

⁵ UNSC Resolution 1373, September 28, 2001, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

⁶ Owen Bocott, "Drone strikes threaten 50 years of international law, says UN rapporteur", *The Guardian*, June 21, 2012, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/drone-strikes-international-law-un>

⁷ Alice K. Ross, "UK parliament launches group to focus on drones", October 18, 2012, available at <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/10/18/uk-parliament-launches-group-to-focus-on-drones/>

8 Terri Judd, "US should hand over footage of drone strikes or face UN inquiry", *The Independent*, August 20, 2012, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/us-should-hand-over-footage-of-drone-strikes-or-face-un-inquiry-8061504.html>

9 "Pakistan backs drones' aim, not method: Minister", *The Express Tribune*, September 28, 2012.

10 CRSS interview with the local resident.

11 "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan", October, 2012, available at <http://livingunderdrones.org/report/>

12 Ibid.

¹³"Counting Drone Strike Deaths", October, 2012, available at <http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/humanrights-institute/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinalNotEmbargo.pdf>

14 "Complaint against the United States of America for the killing of innocent civilians of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", Reprieve and the Foundation for Fundamental Rights, available at http://reprieve.org.uk/media/downloads/2012_02_22_PUB_drones_UN_HRC_complaint.pdf

15 Tara McKelvey, "A Former Ambassador to Pakistan Speaks Out," *The Daily Beast*, November 20, 2012, available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/20/a-former-ambassador-to-pakistan-speaks-out.html>

16 CRSS interview with the local resident.

17 "Living under Drones---", October, 2012.

Pakistan Security – 2012


The overall level of violence declined by almost 15 percent during 2012¹ across Pakistan.² However, **ethno-political** violence in Karachi (Sindh), **religio-political terrorism** in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and **nationalist-separatist** violence in Balochistan continued unabated. The deadly wave of **target killings** in Karachi, presumably triggered by the rivalry between Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP) also continued, claiming almost 991 lives in 791 violent attacks. Among these deaths, 917 were of civilians and 74 of security forces' personnel. The data collected through ten newspapers, that CRSS uses as a primary source, underlines that on the whole, 6059 persons perished during 2012, in 2536 incidents of violence (*for details see data sheet below*).

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security Forces		Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts	350	537	873	97	267	59	33	693	1173
Suicide attacks	39	172	353	33	62	43	15	248	430
Drone attacks	49					345	75	345	75
Target killings	1324	1564	628	220	62	27	2	1811	692
Landmine explosions	56	48	48	17	33			65	81
Sabotage attacks	108								
Dead bodies found		527		49		42		618	
Military operations	185	30	20	166	107	1477	332	1673	459
Schools blown up	116		2						2
Missile/Mortar/Firing	309	263	764	117	198	226	75	606	1037
Total	2536	3141	2688	699	729	2219	532	6059	3949

A concise look into the casualty figures underlines that the civilians remained the major target of violent incidents, accounting for almost 52 percent of the total deaths in various forms of violence and terrorism across Pakistan. As noted in *pie chart I* below, 3041 civilians were killed in 2012. Moreover, the available data suggests that the militants fighting against the state remained the second major target of violence constituting 37 percent of the total dead. Clashes between militants and security forces also left 699 security forces' personnel (11 percent) dead where the deaths were mostly recorded in

¹ Data compiled by CRSS from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012.


² Estimates in Pakistan Security Report 2011, published by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), over all 7107 people were killed across Pakistan in 2985 incidents of violence during 2011.




militancy-hit areas of FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. Furthermore, during 2012, 46 **CIA operated drone strikes** were reported in different areas of Pak-Afghan border, mostly in North and South Waziristan agencies (FATA), leaving as many as 345 suspected militants dead. Meanwhile, continuing their **sabotage campaign** to demolish state infrastructure, militants blew up 116 private and state-run schools in different parts of FATA and KP during the year. Also, 108 sabotage attacks were reported, mostly in Balochistan, targeting power pylons and gas pipelines.

In 2012, **target killing** remained the major cause of deaths in the country. *Pie chart II* below shows that 52 percent of all the violent incidents were of target killing in nature, accounting for 31 percent of the total death toll. Numerically, 1811 persons were shot dead across Pakistan, as a result of 1324 incidents of target killing. Among these, a whopping 1564 deaths were of civilians, while 220 of security forces' along with 27 militants also falling prey to target killings. Meanwhile, deadly clashes between military and militants were the second major cause of deaths, as a result of which, as many as 1673 persons perished, including 1477 militants and 166 security forces personnel, mostly in different parts of KP and FATA. During the year, 618 **dead bodies** were also recovered from different parts of Pakistan, most of them in Karachi, Peshawar, FATA and Balochistan. The third major cause of the violence was bomb blasts. In total, 693 persons, including 537 civilians, 97 security personnel and 59 militants perished in this form of violence across the country. Likewise, 39 suicide attacks left 248 persons dead and another 430 injured in different parts of the

country, but again most of these attacks were witnessed in KP and FATA.



During 2012, FATA witnessed the major loss of lives, where almost 2794 persons died (*as shown in bar chart I below*). After FATA, Sindh, due to large scale killings in Karachi, turned out to be the second major hub of violence, where ethno-political, sectarian and criminal violence left almost 1371 people dead during the year. Meanwhile, violence across KP and Balochistan claimed almost equal number of lives during the course of the year.



Moreover, the sporadic waves of **sectarian violence** continued to pile up misery in Pakistan, especially for Shia Muslims. In 2012, 368 people were killed due to sectarian motives; majority of them belonging to Shia community (295) in Parachinar (FATA), Quetta

(Balochistan) and Karachi (Sindh). Majority of the victims of sectarian violence were from the Hazara community, residing in and around Quetta. Increased trend in sectarian violence across Pakistan underscored the fact that this sort of violence is on the rise once again – vividly depicted by mass killing of the Shias in Quetta and Karachi during the first quarter of 2013.


Provincial Overview

FATA

Like the preceding year, FATA emerged, once again, as the epicenter of violence during 2012. The data sheet below underlines that overall 2819 people met violent deaths in the region in 656 attacks. These included 11 suicide attacks, 135 bomb blasts and 49 drone attacks in the area. Military operations involving military and militants resulted in 1349 deaths, and 1208 deaths among these were of militants.

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security Force		Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts	135	201	492	52	107	43	28	296	627
Suicide attacks	11	86	120	8	26	29	21	123	167
Drone attacks	49					345	75	345	75
Target killings	125	80	74	29	67	145	49	254	190
Landmine explosions	21	11	26	6	14			17	40
Sabotage attacks	24								
Dead bodies found		78		31		49		158	
Military operations	127	20	4	121	63	1208	242	1349	309
Schools blown up	37								
Missile/mortar/firing	127	126	233	22	18	129	71	277	322
Total	656	602	949	269	295	1948	486	2819	1730

As depicted in *pie chart III* below, some 67 percent of the total deaths in FATA were of militants, while security forces accounted for 23 percent of the total loss of lives. Although, militants and security forces are main actors involved in the bloody war, yet civilians also became victims in cross fires and blasts. During 2012, 602 (10 percent of the total) dead were civilians.



Sindh

After FATA, Sindh emerged as the second major center of violence during 2012. The data sheet below underlines that overall 1371 people were killed in the region as a result of 925 violent incidents. These incidents included two suicide attacks, 42 bomb blasts and 797 incidents of target killing in the province; almost 98 percent of these attacks occurred in Karachi alone. Also, 261 dead bodies were also recovered from different areas of the city. Most of the victims of violence in the city were civilians and accounted for 1267 deaths of the total death toll.

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security Force		Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts	42	40	176		12		1	40	189
Suicide attacks	2	2	18	5	19	1		8	37
Drone attacks									
Target killings	797	922	390	77	30	6		1005	420
Landmine explosions									
Sabotage attacks	47								
Dead bodies found		254		6		1		261	
Military operations	9	18	2	3	2	3		24	4
Schools blown up									
Missile/mortar/firing	28	31	116	2	3			33	119
Total	925	1267	702	93	66	11	1	1371	769

Balochistan

After Sindh, Balochistan fell next on the ladder of violence during 2012. The data sheet below shows that in total, 959 people were killed in the province in 470 violent occurrences. These included one suicide attack, 63 bomb blasts and 272 incidents of target killing. Target killing continued to be the major source of violence used by miscreants. Also, 111 dead bodies were recovered from different parts of the province. Most of the victims of violence were civilians i.e. 727 out of the total 959 dead.

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security Force		Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts	63	183	522	26	70			209	592
Suicide attacks	1					1		1	
Drone attacks									
Target killings	272	348	131	83	30	7		438	161
Landmine explosions	20	14	15	11	13			25	28
Sabotage attacks	42								
Dead bodies found		107		4				111	
Military operations	13	11	1	5		65	14	81	15
Schools blown up	5								
Missile/mortar/firing	54	64	89	24	22	6		94	111
Total	470	727	758	153	135	79	14	959	907

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KP)

Surprisingly, KP ranked fourth on the violence list during 2012. Data sheet below shows that a total of 896 people were killed in the province, as a result of 518 violent attacks. These included: 19 suicide attacks, 111 bomb blasts and 135 incidents of target killing in the province. Target killing remained the major weapon in the hands of militants to inflict violence. As a result 240 persons lost their lives in such incidents in during the year. Also, 68 dead bodies were recovered from different areas of the province. 581 amongst the 896 victims of violence were civilians.

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security	Force	Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts	63	183	522	26	70			209	592
Suicide attacks	1					1		1	
Drone attacks									
Target killings	272	348	131	83	30	7		438	161
Landmine explosions	20	14	15	11	13			25	28
Sabotage attacks	42								
Dead bodies found		107		4				111	
Military operations	13	11	1	5		65	14	81	15
Schools blown up	5								
Missile/mortar/firing	54	64	89	24	22	6		94	111
Total	470	727	758	153	135	79	14	959	907

Punjab

Punjab was the fifth major center of violence during 2012, but the overall level of violence compared to other provinces was substantially low. The data sheet below highlights that 88 people were killed in the province as a result of 17 violent attacks. These attacks included two suicide attacks, four bomb blasts and seven incidents of target killing along with one recovered dead body. Most of the victims of violence were civilians who accounted for 46 deaths of the overall total of 88

Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security	Force	Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts									
Suicide attacks									
Drone attacks									
Target killings	16	37	62	5				42	62
Landmine explosions									
Sabotage attacks									
Dead bodies found		1						1	
Military operations									
Schools blown up									
Missile/mortar/firing									
Total	16	38	62	5				43	62

Gilgit-Baltistan(GB)

Gilgit-Baltistan witnessed the lowest level of violence during 2012, as compared to other provinces. As data sheet below shows that overall 88 people were killed in the GB region in 17 violent incidents. These included two suicide attacks, four bomb blasts and seven incidents of target killing. Also, one dead body was recovered from the area. Here again civilians bore the major brunt accounting for 38 deaths.

Annual Data Sheet of Gilgit Baltistan, 2012									
Nature of Attacks	Number of Attacks	Civilians		Security	Force	Militants		Total	
		Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured	Dead	Injured
Bomb blasts									
Suicide attacks									
Drone attacks									
Target killings	16	37	62	5				42	62
Landmine explosions									
Sabotage attacks									
Dead bodies found		1						1	
Military operations									
Schools blown up									
Missile/mortar/firing									
Total	16	38	62	5				43	62

The trends and territory of violence across the country underscores that law and order situation across Pakistan remains volatile, while law enforcement agencies look incapable and ill-equipped to address this persistently deteriorating security situation. Meanwhile, at a time when state security continues to go from bad to worse, the political leadership as well as the security apparatus looks either indifferent, incapable or helpless in the face of worsening security situation.

Sources:

1. *The News*
2. *Dawn*
3. *The Express Tribune*
4. *Pakistan Today*
5. *Daily Times*
6. *The Frontier Post*
7. *Jang (Urdu)*
8. *Daily Mashriq (Urdu)*
9. *Aaj (Urdu)*
10. *The Nation*

Karachi: The State of Crimes

Introduction

Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, situated on the Arabian Sea, boasts a multiethnic population of at least 18 million people. During the last couple of years, Karachi has seen recurrent outbreaks of violence which have claimed hundreds of lives. Data collected through different sources suggest that of all the 11,990 civilians, who lost their lives due to bomb blasts and suicide and other fatal attacks in the country during the last eight years, Karachi's share is nearly 50 percent. Thus, whereby business and employment opportunities in Karachi lure people from all over the country to flock down to the city and try their luck, the growing crime rate and increased level of violence there creates terror among its residents and makes their life unsafe.

From 2003 through 2011, nearly 5,549 people were killed in different types of violence in the city, involving terrorism, target killing, and sectarianism. The number is persistently on the rise in the backdrop of turf wars among land and drug mafias and other criminal gangs. The picture looks no different when we look at the trend of other crimes. Be it car snatching and theft or kidnapping for ransom, all indicates an upward trend. How the law enforcement agencies are dealing with this recent upsurge in crimes and what steps they are taking to curtail the violence need detailed inquiry. The data compiled by the Police Department in Sindh is a good source to begin with; but it says nothing about police or other law enforcement agencies' actions or its outcome as far as curbing violence and maintaining law and order are concerned. But, there is another non-governmental organization called Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) that keeps a good record of most of the crimes that are reported in Karachi and it also maintains a record of the cases that were resolved during any specific period. The data maintained by CPLC covers the following dimensions of city crimes:

- 4 Wheelers' snatching, theft, and recovery
- 2 Wheelers' snatching, theft, and recovery
- Cell phone's snatching, theft, and recovery
- Kidnappings and kidnappings for ransom
- Killings or target killings
- Areas where these crimes were reported

Thus, this report is fundamentally based on data compiled by CPLC, yet in order to make it more objective and analytical; data from other sources has also been incorporated. This report analyzes different aspects of all these crimes and to see if crime rates are increasing or declining. It also highlights the discrepancies of the data maintenance and carries out comparative study of similar data from different locations to determine the areas that are dangerous in terms of crime rate. It is hoped that this analysis would be valuable for the people and help the concerned authorities to take a look at these crimes from a different perspective.

1. Karachi: An overview

Karachi is the most populous urban center of Pakistan and the hub of commercial activities of the country; it generates nearly 50 percent of the total revenue collected by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) nationwide. According to the Price Water House Coopers study of 2009, Karachi's GDP was nearly \$78 billion in 2008 and it is expected to touch \$120 billion mark by 2020 at an expected growth rate of 5.9 percent. With almost ten percent of the total population of Pakistan, Karachi contributes almost 20 percent of the total GDP of the country. Two main seaports, Port of Karachi and Port Qasim, play very important role in handling imports and exports of the country. Being a port city, Karachi handles nearly 60 percent of the total trading business. Textiles, pharmaceuticals, steel, and automobiles are the main industries in the city. Most of Pakistan's public and private banks are headquartered in Karachi. Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is Pakistan's largest and oldest stock exchange with many Pakistani, as well as overseas, listings.

i) Ethnic groups

Ethnically, Karachi is a highly diversified city of the country where almost all of the ethnic groups have their representation. The most prominent ethnic groups living in Karachi are Mohajirs (Urdu speaking population). Other ethnic groups are Punjabis, Sindhis, Kashmiris, Seraikis, Pakhtuns, Balochis, Memons, Bohras, Ismailis and others. Afghan refugees, mainly of Pashtuns and Tajik origins, are also residing in this city. Proportion of the major ethnic communities living Karachi is: Mohajirs 43 percent, Pashtuns 17 percent, Punjabi 11 percent, Sindhi six percent, Baloch five percent, Seraiki three percent, Hazara and Gilgiti two percent.ⁱⁱ

Since the creation of Pakistan, Karachi has been going through rapid demographic changes. According to a report, Sindhis were the largest ethnic community (60 percent) living in Karachi during 1941 and Urdu speaking were only six percent. This ethnic composition has almost reversed and now Sindhis represent six percent of the city population.

Migration of population to this city is phenomenal. According to Arif Hasan, well-known city planner and social researcher, nearly 1.1 million people migrated to Karachi between 1981 and 1998^{iv}. No other city in the country received such a huge number of immigrants. These demographic changes triggered many socio-economic and political activities in the city and contributed a lot towards the violence and disturbance that often grip the city by surprise and cause panic.

ii) Religion

Religious composition of Karachi population, as per 1998 Census, is: Muslims 96.45 percent (Sunni 65 percent, and Shia 30 percent), Christians 2.42 percent, Hindus 0.86 percent, Ahmadis 0.17 percent with a negligible presence of Parsis, Sikhs, Bahai, and Budhists.

iii) Political parties

Almost every mainstream political party of the country has its followers and offices in Karachi. However, the leading political party of Karachi is Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) which dominates the city's politics. Next in line are Pakistan Peoples' Party PPP; and Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Muslim League-N and Q, Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI), Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI, etc. Ethnic divisions of the city have a greater role in determining an individual's loyalty towards a political party. MQM has the support of the leading ethnic community of Mohajirs while ANP enjoys the support of the second largest ethnic group of Pakhtun population. In the 2008 elections Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had major following among the Baloch and Sindhi population.

iv) Jihadist/sectarian militant organizations

Karachi is also home to a number of Jihadist/sectarian militant organizations. Some of the known among them are:

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: The banned sectarian outfit is headquartered in Nagan Chowrangi (New Karachi).

Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) (also known as Harkatul Ansar): It is headquartered and has a recruiting office in Haroonabad, (SITE area).

Jaish-e-Muhammad's (JeM): It is a religious militant organization which has its office in Hyderi, (Noth Nazimabad). It was founded by firebrand cleric Maulana Masood Azhar in late 1990s to fight against Indian forces in Kashmir, but, in recent years, has turned its guns on Pakistani security forces.

Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT): It is also a religious militant organization banned by the United Nations Security Council for its alleged role in terrorism in India and the region. It has its main office in Gulshan Chowrangi.

It is largely believed that Tehrik-e-Tliban Pakistan (TTP) has also entered in to the city in a big way in recent months and years. They have come from the troubled areas of KP and tribal areas, some along with IDPs. According to media reports, they have formed parallel justice systems and have succeeded in terrorizing locals in different parts of the city. They are concentrated mainly in Pakhtun dominated areas.

v) Underworld gangs

Most notorious underworld gangs of the region are also allegedly present and operating in and from Karachi. Among these Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon, Shoaib Khan, Khalid Shahenshah and Haji Ibraheem aka Bhulu are the most famous who are involved in illicit drug businesses, human trafficking and gang wars in Karachi.

vi) Criminal gangs

Two organizations, Peoples Amn Committee (PAC) and Kutchi Rabita Committee (KRC) came to the limelight during the last year when target killing incidents in Lyari, Shershah and Kharadar areas brought the civic life to a standstill. PAC is supposedly enjoying the support of the PPP and KRC has the backing of MQM. Killings in these areas are considered as a result of the turf war between PPP and MQM. The persons leading both of these organizations are: (Late) Rehman 'Dakait', Baba Ladla, Zafar and Uzair Baloch (PAC); Arshad Pappu,

Ghaffar Zikri, Akram Baloch and Bilal Sheikh (KRC). Rehman “Dakait” was killed last year in an encounter with the police, while Arshad Pappu was arrested in 2006 but he was released on bail in February 2012 and later acquitted in about 60 cases, by the courts.

2. Underlying issues at a glance

The recent history of violence in Karachi underscores one point lucidly that the city is rapidly falling victim to the temptations of ‘power and influence’ on the part of political players. These political players base their legitimacy on ethnic lines in the city. Thus politics is played out brutally in the city, while other factors such as extortion, sectarian rifts, gang wars, drug dealings and land grabbing are flourishing under the political umbrellas. The dynamics of political violence revolve mainly around political turf wars between the various stakeholders of the city. The political dimension of the violence is so unequivocal in the city that almost 1600 people lost their lives in 2011 during the target killing spree. And the targets of the killings were selected purely on political grounds. The political dynamics are so badly entrenched in the city that former Sindh Home Minister Dr Zulfikar Mirza once declared on the floor of the house that had he been given a free hand without having to cater to the dictates of political expediency, he would have sorted out the perpetrators of deadly violence, most of whom, he alleged, enjoyed the backing of political parties. Such a statement by a responsible government dignitary underscores the role played by political parties in fuelling violence and protecting its perpetrators. Ethnic factor is deeply embedded in the ongoing criminal and political violence in the city. Pakhtuns, who are estimated to constitute 20-25 percent of Karachi’s population, have remained politically marginalized in the city. But now they are asserting themselves; the consequent readjustments on the political spectrum are causing upsurge in violent episodes. Political observers agree that the central actors in the bloodshed are competing ethnic political parties and the criminal gangs linked to them. At the heart of the conflict is a fight for control of the hugely lucrative chunks of public land that are being illegally developed, both for profits and control of turfs and political power. Alleged entry of suspected terrorists from KP and tribal areas due to the ongoing military operations in tribal region further complicates the situation. These elements have had links in Karachi since the early 1980s. They

can easily find refuge in the religious seminaries and slums. Also, they can easily make their way from tribal areas to Karachi due to thin security presence along the route. According to recent reports, militant groups having links with the Taliban generate millions of dollars through criminal activities in Karachi, such as kidnappings for ransom, bank robberies, drug dealings, etc. So, today's Karachi has become home to scores of parties vying for 'power, control and influence' in the city, leaving the law enforcement agencies overpowered, out-numbered and helpless.

3. Crime assessment and mapping

Like kidnapping, killings or murders are committed for same reasons. Sindh Police maintains data for 'murders' and 'murders in the form of target killings'. CPLC, on the other hand, maintains data of all the killing incidents. Since Karachi is heavily affected by target killing incidents, their data can be of much help in understanding the exact nature of this crime and its effects on the city. The problem with the Sindh Police data is that it is not so reliable and doesn't cover events beyond 2007. It covers target killings for the year 2011 only. To cover target killing incidents, one has to rely on other credible sources.

Killings or target killings

Target killing has become a country wide phenomenon in today's Pakistan and is not confined to Karachi alone. However, what makes it different and alarming is the magnitude of such cases and its very selective pattern. Most of the killings taking place elsewhere don't carry the kind of pattern that is observed in Karachi. The particular pattern of Karachi killings brings it the name of target killing to differentiate it from other cases of killings. The terminology of target killing is basically used for intentional killing of a person or persons to achieve certain political or non-political agenda. While every 'murder' is technically counted as a 'target killing', Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Karachi Waseem Ahmed says, "... a target killing is a murder with sectarian, ethnic and terrorism motives behind it+. On average, some 3.6 murders have taken place in Karachi every day since January 2010."viii

For over two decades, Karachi has been the epicentre of target killings for reasons ranging from ethno-political to sectarian disputes and from land mafia rivalries to personal vendetta. Since 1994, 9,696 lives have been lost in Karachi in the incidents of this so-called target killing phenomenon, to which there seems to be no end in sight. A good number of the victims are the activists of different political or religious parties functioning in the city. The report issued by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2010) says that political activists who were targeted during 2010 belonged to the political parties like PPP, MQM, and ANP but it doesn't identify as to how many activists from each party were affected. On January 6, 2011, the Dawn published the following data from HRCP report for 2009 which identified the names of the political and religious parties whose activists were targeted in Karachi: "A total of 748 people lost their lives to targeted killings in the city last year, up from the 272 victims in 2009. The report says that of the 215 victims who were killed reportedly due to their association with political, religious and nationalist parties, 64 belonged to the MQM, 44 to the ANP, 43 to the MQM(H), 32 to PPP, four to the PPP(S), one each to the PML(N), PML(Q), PML(F) and Punjabi Front, eight to the Sunni Tehrik (ST), three to the JI, two to the JUI, 15 to the JAS [Jammat Ahl-e-Sunnat], seven to the PPI and two to the JSQM."ix)

A media report (daily Express Tribune, 12 December 2010) provided information about the victims of Karachi killings. Details of which are as follows;

Table 1: Source: Express Tribune - 12 December 2010x

People killed in Karachi as of November 2010 Number (Table 1)

Although ethnic and political killings are shown as two different reasons in the table, the root causes of both of them are mostly the same. MQM is considered as a representative of the Urdu-speaking people while ANP has an overwhelming Pashtun representation. PPP represents Baloch and Sindhi population of Karachi. Any conflict that takes place among these political parties generates ethnic hatred and results in ethnic killings that go side by side with the killings of political activists. By putting ethnic and political killings into one category of target killings the total number of victims goes up to 405,

which is the highest among all other categories. The causes of Karachi killings as given in the Table 1 makes it easy to figure out that the target killings is only 25 percent of the total killings in Karachi. The CPLC data shows the number of people killed every year but it does not identifying the victims and the causes behind those killings. Sindh Police, on the other hand, maintains data of target killings separate from the data of other murders and it shows that the year 2011 had only 60 deaths due to target killings while 1604 persons were murdered for causes other than target killing. During the last decade, 2011 was the worst year for Karachiites when they had to bury over 1644 (CPLC data) or 1664 (Sindh Police data) people who were murdered by some unknown assailants. After 1995, it was the highest number of people who were murdered in a single year. Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry is on record saying that in January 2011 alone there were 75 deaths due to target killings in Karachi.^{xi} Dawn reported on July 6, 2011, "A report issued by the HRCP's Karachi chapter on Tuesday said that a total of 1,138 people were killed in the city during the first six months of the current year and 490 of them fell prey to targeted killings on political, sectarian and ethnic grounds."^{xii} What led Sindh Police to believe that only 60 out of 1664 murders were victims of target killings is not clear. But apparently, it points to the apathy and helplessness of the Sindh Police to let the deaths of hundreds of people go un-investigated by categorizing them as mysterious cases of murders with no obvious intentions. The Karachi Chapter of HRCP has been working very diligently to keep a good record of all those killings that occur in the city and they always come up with information that helps to identify the cases that fall into the category of the target killings. They also give details of the association of the victims with different political and religious organizations. In a culture of denial, their data helps a lot in understanding the nature of conflicts and the parties that are somehow or other involved in it. Table 2 (below) shows that majority of the victims were from four political parties of the city; MQM, ANP, MQM-H, and PPP. Except MQM-H, all other parties are actively functioning in the city, enjoying large political base compared to MQM-H, and none of them have their leaders in jail. Yet, MQM-H has the highest number of victims of target killings after MQM and ANP. Not only the political parties but the religious organizations (JAS, ASW), JUI, ST, and JI), ethnic parties (PPI, MQM-H, JSQM, and Punjabi

Front) and banned organization (SSP – Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) have also lost their activists in target killing incidents in Karachi.

Table 2: Source: Dawn

Victims of Target Killings in Karachi

Who is targeting who and what instigates them to indulge into this horrific crime? And how certain deaths are attributed to political, ethnic, or sectarian rivalry? Political rivalry mixed with sectarian and ethnic hatred makes everything so blurred that no line can be drawn to differentiate one form of killing from another. A political activist can be targeted on ethnic ground and a common man can be targeted for political reasons because he belongs to an ethnic community that is represented by a certain political party. Once the target killings on political reasons subside, another wave of target killings erupts on sectarian grounds and starts targeting people belonging to a certain sect irrespective of which political party they belong to. Then, enters the gangsters and land mafia to make their presence felt. This whole game continues with intermittent intervals and the interesting part of this whole episode is that despite being a part of the game, all players deny their involvement in it and point fingers at all others except themselves. According to Table 2 above, MQM appears to have been hit hard by the incidents of target killings that have increased phenomenally during the last three years. Because of having large portion of the population under its influence, the number of victims belonging to MQM is supposed to be on a higher side. However, the surprising part of it is that despite the biggest victim of the target killings MQM is still blamed for its major role in this crime. A Police official, who requested anonymity, said the police were currently investigating the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) as a group of special interest in some of the alleged politically motivated target killings.^{xiii} Its leaders are always charged of involvement in target killings. “MQM is being maligned...how MQM can be accused of involvement when we have lost so many workers ourselves?” argued MNA and senior MQM leader Haider Abbas Rizvi. Rizvi said that although “seemingly politically motivated target killings are taking place in Karachi, no political parties were engaged in these activities as a matter of policy.”^{xv} But despite its vehement denials over the

years, MQM is so far unsuccessful to make people believe that its hands are clean.

Infested areas

Orangi Town was hit hard by incidents of target killings in the year 2011 followed by the Old City that includes areas of M.A. Jinnah Road, Kharadar and parts of Lyari. The other areas highly affected by target killings were New Karachi, Lyari, Gulshan, Malir and Korangi (Graph 1¹).

Kidnappings

Kidnapping is a crime that doesn't happen because of some sudden outrage. A reason has to be behind it in addition to proper timing, planning and well-calculated execution. Unfortunately, the data available on this crime is generally divided into two categories; one is kidnapping and the other is kidnapping for ransom whereas most of the kidnappings that are carried out in the country can be divided into the following three categories:

- Kidnapping (for personal enmity or any other reason)
- Kidnapping for ransom
- Kidnapping for political reason

Kidnapping (for personal enmity or any other reason)

Sindh Police maintains dataxvi for kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom whereas CPLC has no category other than kidnapping for ransom. Kidnapping for no reason is a kind of misnomer (see next chapter).

Kidnapping for ransom

Kidnapping for ransom is a crime that keeps traumatized the victims and their whole family until the abducted person is released safely. Kidnappings are carried out for various purposes involving political rivalry, personal enmity, and economic issues. Kidnapping for ransom

¹ Graph 1: Source: Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/28/ethnic-fault-lines-of-karachi.html>

at least gives a hope to the victim and their family that there is a possibility of safe return of the victim once the demands of the perpetrators are met. All other cases of kidnappings are more serious in nature because most of them end up in death of the victims. The data CPLC maintains on this crime draws a very rosy picture of the problem as it claims to have a 98.86 percent recovery rate of all kidnapping cases. From 2002 to 2010, CPLC was able to recover all kidnapped (517) persons successfully. 2011 is the only year where they show ten unresolved cases. Sindh Police data clashes with the CPLC data and shows that there were 4,558 kidnapping and 285 kidnapping for ransom cases in Karachi during 2008-2011. CPLC shows 395 cases of kidnapping for ransom during the same period but remains silent about the large number of other kidnapping cases (Table 3²).

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) is another source that annually issues a report covering different crimes committed in the country. In its annual report for 2008, HRCP says, "Thirty-seven policemen were killed in Karachi during that period. As many as 173 people were killed there in 2008 after being abducted, many for ransom."^{xvii} This HRCP report and Sindh Police data raise a question about the fate of several thousand people who were kidnapped from Karachi for various reasons; whose cases remain unresolved and about whom no information is available with the police. What is worrisome is the growing trend of kidnapping for ransom cases. During the last five years, kidnapping for ransom has grown fourfold from 25 cases in 2006 to 106 in 2011. If crime rate continues growing at such pace than despite the so-called recovery rate of 98.86 percent (CPLC data), it calls for a fresh look at the current policing methods and the causes that render these methods ineffective. Taliban factor is believed to have a major role in bolstering kidnappings for ransom in the city. Since Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, Pakistan Army carried out several operations against the Taliban in tribal areas and Swat. Drone attacks also went up from 4 in 2007 to 118 in 2010. Faced with an adverse situation and dwindling financial sources, Taliban have resorted to other methods of fund raising and one them

² Table 3: Source: Sindh Police and CPLC Comparison of data from Sindh Police and CPLC

is kidnappings for ransom. Karachi, being the commercial hub of the country and having a large population hailing from the tribal areas and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, has become the best place for them where they can find shelter from the on-going military operation and drone attacks continuing in their native areas, besides carrying out their kidnapping-for-ransom operations as well. The following comments from HRCP and CPLC also point fingers at the Taliban for their involvement in this crime. The HRCP Assistant Coordinator, Abdul Hai, said the increase in crime and terrorism in the city is because of the Taliban. "Taliban want to derail the Pakistan government and so they are attacking every aspect in our society that can become a centrifugal force [sic], like sectarian and ethnic violence."^{xviii} "At least five of over a hundred kidnappings in 2011 have been committed by 'Jihadi' groups, according to the Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) — an increase from just one or two last year."^{xix} Irrespective of the ratio of 'jihadi' groups' involvement in kidnapping for ransom cases, the concerning issue is that the trend is growing and a large number of cases are either improperly recorded or left un-investigated.

Kidnapping for political reasons

While people and media were voicing their concern over the upsurge of mysterious cases of 'kidnapped and dumped' dead bodies in Balochistan, a wave of similar events rose in Karachi last year worrying the its dwellers about their lives and security. The horrifying news of kidnappings and dumping of dead bodies in Karachi became daily headlines of the newspapers while the law enforcement agencies appeared helpless in bringing the situation under control. Dawn, on 19 August 2011, reported: "At least 21 bullet-riddled and tortured bodies stuffed in gunny bags were found in different parts of Karachi on Thursday as more than 30 people were killed in the city on the second day of a renewed wave of violence that police saw blended with an 'ethnic color', taking the two-day death toll to nearly 50."^{xxi} Kidnappings and killings in Karachi were not the exact replica of the similar cases in Balochistan. In Karachi, political parties were blamed for having their involvement in these cases while in Balochistan the accused were mostly the security agencies. In Karachi, dead bodies of the abducted persons were found the very next day of the incident while such victims in Balochistan went

missing for weeks or months before their dead bodies were found. In some cases, the missing persons in Balochistan did come back home alive but in case of Karachi once kidnapped means sure death. Once a person was picked up there was hardly any chance for him to reappear alive. However, one factor was similar in Balochistan and Karachi; these kidnapping were carried out with identical motives behind them.

“Eyewitnesses and political observers say ethnic and political rivalries were the dominant factors behind most of the killings over the past three days. They point out that while most of those abducted and gunned down earlier in the week were predominantly Lyari’s local Baloch, including footballers and a former MNA, allegations leveled by the PPP-backed Lyari Amn Committee and Muttahida Qaumi Movement against each other confirm that divisions during the current wave of violence in old parts of Karachi are along ethnic lines.”^{xxii}

In an interview that appeared in the Dawn of 14 July 2010, Nazim F. Haji, founding chief of the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC)] said:

“The political parties are inextricably involved in this issue... They talk about target killings and land mafias as if some outside force is behind it...when truly it is a battle for their respective turfs and these murders are a significant, real feature in that battle,”^{xxiii}

No exact numbers are available of those unfortunate people who were killed after kidnapping in Karachi last year. “Yes, there is a sharp surge in the number of bodies being found every day in the city,” said Anwar Kazmi, a senior official of the Edhi Foundation. Dawn 19 August 2011.^{xxiv}

While so many lives were lost in the political rivalries among different political parties, the police or any other agency failed to record these deaths under proper category. What it points to is that police should have a category of killings after kidnapping in their recording system to know how many people became victims of this crime. Without this the responsible cannot be apprehended even in future.

Car (4 Wheelers) snatching, theft, and recovery

Car theft

From 2002 to 2004, car theft and car snatching cases were close to each other. From 2005 onward, a change in the trend started taking place and car theft cases went two to three times higher than the car snatching cases. This trend is still continuing. However, the bright side of the picture is that these crimes have been on a sharp decline since 2008. From 4505 cases of car theft in 2008, the number came down to 2813 in 2011 - nearly 38 percent decrease. But the dark side is that the recovery rate of car theft cases also declined proportionately to the crime rate during this period. 2565 cars were recovered in 2008 compared to 1605 in 2011 - 38 percent decline in recovery rate which is surprisingly the same for car theft crimes. Maintaining a better recovery rate could have brought significant success in curbing this crime in the city.

Car snatching

Car snatching is a more daring crime than car lifting and according to CPLC data nearly 1527 cars on an average were snatched every year in Karachi during the last ten years (2002 - 2011). With the exception of a random reduction in these crime rates, this crime continued maintaining its pace during the whole decade. From 1645 car snatchings in 2002 the figure came down to only 1520 in 2011. It appears to be no big change in this crime if we don't compare it with the significant surge in the number of cars within this period. The number of cars almost doubled during this period (From 767,913 in 2002 to 1,377,332 registered cars in 2011). Yet, car snatching rate remained even lower than what it was back in 2002. Unfortunately, the recovery rate of the snatched cars in the same period doesn't match with the crime rate. Out of 1645 cars that were snatched at gunpoint in 2002, police were able to recover 1094 cars - nearly 66 percent recovery rate. From the 66 percent recovery rate, it tumbled down to 34 percent.

What factors played their roles in maintaining the car snatching cases to below 2002 level and bringing down the car theft cases from 4505 in 2008 to 2,813? Can this be attributed to the Police Department's good performance or the use of advanced detective methods by the CPLC? Or, are these the advanced tracking systems installed in the

cars by their owners which can be credited with keeping the culprits at bay?

Keeping in view the missing and faulty data available with police of the crimes committed, it is difficult to say at this stage whether it is the efficiency of the police which kept this particular crime rate low or there are some other underlying factors related to the city's overall situation, but which haven't come to the fore yet.

Assuming that the car tracking systems are playing very effective role in minimizing this crime, the next question that arises is; are our law enforcement agencies so ineffective in keeping the crime rate under control? This may not be the whole truth but there is hardly any evidence to suggest otherwise. According to some sources, not a single vehicle, either a car or a motorcycle, is ever recovered by the police. Luck, in many cases, is what one has to depend on to have his/her vehicle recovered when the police and tracking systems fail. Unfortunately, most of the criminals involved in such cases remain at large. Some of the stolen vehicles are often found abandoned at some crime scene – and then it finds a place in the 'recovered vehicles' list'.

Areas of crime

Gulshan Town had the highest number of car snatching and theft cases in 2011 while places like Nazimabad, Jamshed Town, Shah Faisal Town, and Gulberg were next on the list. (Graph 2³).

Motorcycle (2 wheelers) theft, snatching, and recovery

Motorcycles' snatching and theft is a crime that has been constantly on the rise in Karachi. From 2002 to 2011, it has increased up to 300 percent (6138 versus 18,906 motorcycles) while the recovery rate has registered only 130 percent improvement during the same period (1878 in 2002 and 2545 in 2011). However, the number of motorcycles registered in the city has also increased by nearly 350 percent during this period (400,338 in 2002 vs. 1,789,429 in 2011). If we draw a graph of the recovery rate as the percentage of snatched/theft motorcycles the picture is equally grim (Graph 3⁴).

³ Source: CPLC

⁴ Source: CPLC

From a recovery rate of 31 percent in 2002, it has now come down to 15 percent. Currently, the people of Karachi are experiencing loss of 46 motorcycles every day due to theft and snatching and only 6 to 7 of them get recovered.

Areas of crime

Gulshan Town was again on the top of all other towns of Karachi with highest rate of motorcycle snatching/theft cases in 2011. Saddar, including, Preedy Street remained second. (Graph 4⁵)

Cell phone theft and snatching

Cell phone theft and snatching are crimes that have affected many in the city. A large number of people have lost their lives while putting up a resistance to the criminals. In the period between December 2010 - 2013 November 31, there were 23591 cases of cell phone theft and snatching in the city. But there is no information available about the arrest of the culprits involved.

Areas of crime

Gulshan Town and Saddar are the highly affected areas of cell phone snatching incidents in 2011. Ranking next to them were Ferozabad, Shah Faisal Town, and Malir (Graph 5⁶).

Extortions

As Karachi is rapidly turning into a hub of crimes, so is the issue of extortion (*Bhatta*) getting chronically endemic. It has emerged as an easy and effective tool of plundering money for the criminals linked, mostly, with the political parties operating in the city. Normally, criminals throw the value of money written on paper (*parchee*) in front of the gate of a shop or an industry, demanding the business to comply at the earliest or face the consequences. The consequences include either the killing of that particular businessman or abduction of his family members. 'It has become very violent. They are simply killing people who don't pay. We have had two deaths because of this recently,' said Mian Abrar Ahmad of the Karachi Chamber of

⁵ Source: CPLC

⁶ Source: CPLC

Commerce.^{xxv} Recent reports also suggest that criminals are sending text messages to the business community, asking them to pay *Bhatta* or else...

The government tried to take action against those involved in the crime but political considerations/expediency always hindered it. Meanwhile, political actors in the city continue to blame each other for collecting extortions money from the business community, as, Mohajir Qaumi Movement Chairman Afaq Ahmed accused Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) on March 21, 2012 for introducing extortion in the city. He accused the MQM's industries minister of collecting more than Rs 50 million from the city's industrial area alone, including an additional Rs2-3 million from the Builders Association.^{xxvi} Meanwhile, MQM lawmaker in National Assembly Haider Abbas Rizvi underlined: 'It seems [as if] it is all by design and planned – as if the police in the areas where such incidents are rampant are deployed by the extortionists'. He specifically mentioned Karachi's biggest flea market in Shershah where he said more than 6,000 shop-owners were compelled to pay Rs 600,000 every day."^{xxvii}

The government introduced some steps in the past to beef up security around the industrial areas and launched Anti-Extortion Cell (AEC) in the Police Department, but these steps fell short of achieving its goals and the number of extortion cases continued to swell. CPLC received twenty complaints in March, while it got 39 and 21 in January and February respectively. 'We agree with statements being made that extortion is on the rise and if you look at the numbers in March, it is particularly alarming,' said CPLC chief Ahmed Chinoy.^{xxviii} Mapping the area of extortion cases in recent months, CPLC chief narrated that most of the callers, complaining about the issue, belong to Districts East and South of the city.

4. Decoding crime and violence

CPLC is a comparatively reliable source for collecting data on different crimes in the city. Sindh Police also maintains its own data but the reliability of their data becomes highly questionable when it is compared with independent sources. For example, the data maintained by Sindh Police shows that there were 1277 cases of cars snatching and 6224 cases of motorcycles snatch/theft during 2011

while CPLC record shows 4,726 cases of car snatch/theft and 18906 cases of motorcycle snatch/theft during the said period. Such a big difference between the Sindh Police and CPLC data leaves one wondering as to which data can be considered more authentic. While CPLC can be commended for doing a very good job of keeping a database that appears to be very authentic, there are lots of rooms for improvement there also. They should at least start maintaining separate data for the following crimes:

- o Target killings
- o Kidnapping for ransom
- o Kidnapping for political reasons

Maintaining data of the areas from where people are kidnapped and those who commit this crime can serve as a good source for an analysis by the law enforcing agencies and the researchers and any future government /administration that wanted to tackle the city's law and order problem in a serious and non- political way. The continuous problem of target killings in Karachi calls for soul searching on the part of those who want to pursue their agendas through this cruel method. Loss of a large number of party members and followers by MQM shows that despite being highly organized and disciplined political party, it appears to have been failing to ensure safety of their followers and guarantee peaceful environment to the city dwellers and also that it has some role at some level in this wave of target killings. Same can be said about extremist and Jihadist organizations and other political parties.

The economic conditions of the areas affected by different crimes vary from poor to richest and it appears that the economic denominators have not much relation to these crimes. For example, areas like Orangi Town and Lyari have majority of population in between poor to lower middle class. Both of these places have very high rate of target killings but very low rates in other crimes. Likewise, the areas like Old City and Saddar are business hubs and most of the inhabitants are very rich with the exception of some peripheral poor localities. Yet, the Old city area has similar crime rates as of Orangi. Saddar, on the other hand, has very high rate for car snatch/theft, cell phone snatching crimes, and for target killings. Target killings in these areas are basically the result of political conflicts while occurrences of other crimes are related to other criminal gangs and the economic

conditions of the peripheral areas. Political activism in Saddar and Old City is very high. Among the peripheral areas of poor localities like Lyari and Lines areas, opportunities of car and motorcycle snatching and theft are not as good in poor areas as they are in the middle and upper middle class income localities. When the areas of Karachi are divided on the number and frequency of crimes, it is observed that the places like Gulshan, Shah Faisal, New Karachi, and Saddar/Preedy Street have the highest crime rates compared to other locations . (Table 4 and Graph 6). **Note: The identification of economy of the areas is based on an assumptive assessment as there is no scientific study available for proper identification of it. ⁷

Although most of the perpetrators of these crimes are still at large, the indicators discussed in previous chapters point to some of the possibilities that can be the basis of these crimes. It is also obvious that political rivalries among different political parties are not the only drivers of target killings in Karachi; sectarianism and gang wars have a significant contribution to it as well. Sectarian feuds between religious parties like Sipah-e-Sahaba (also known as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat - ASWJ) and Tehrik-e-Jafaria or Sipah-e-Mohammad are responsible for countless deaths in the city. North Karachi had been the center of this rivalry last year. Jihadist/Taliban organizations, too, have their presence in the city; the most daring attack on PNS, Mehran last year and the latest targeting of a cell phone company (Telenor) franchis are just two examples. All cellular companies operating in the country have recently approached the government to seek necessary protection from the threats they receive from TTP.^{xxxii}

Extremist/terrorist organizations like TTP and ASWJ and other sectarian groups may appear as different groups but their enemies and targets are one and the same. TTP tried to target SSP of CID, Aslam Chaudhry on September 19, 2011. Nearly three months later, a series of attacks on the cellular companies coincided with the target killings on sectarian grounds in Karachi. On 3rd February 2012, CID arrested three suspects for Shia killings who belonged to ASWJ. In retaliation, ASWJ announced its plan to start a campaign against the SSP CID. On 14 February, cellular companies approached the government to seek protection from the TTP threats. Next day, TTP

⁷ Graph 6: Source: Based on the total number of crimes as listed in Table 4 above.

released a video showing the suicide attack that was carried out on September 19, 2011 to kill SSP, CID, Aslam Chaudhry. Acts of terrorism and sectarianism are interlinked with each other and both of them appear to be two sides of the same coin.

During the last two years, it was Karachi that had the highest number of sectarian attacks in the country. (Graph 7)⁸

What is surprising the most is that majority of the sectarian and terrorist attacks take place in areas that are well-off in terms of economy and education like Old City, Nazimabad, and North Karachi. Poverty and illiteracy have no or little relationship with these acts. The crimes in Karachi have two basic divisions; political and religious. Political rivalry is driven by the desire of having a greater share in the local economy and governance. Religious rivalry has its roots in the broader scheme of things that are linked to the struggle between liberals and fundamentalists on the agenda of how to run this country; through religious bigotry or religious freedom. These rivalries are constantly eroding the writ of the government and impinging on the ability of the law enforcement agencies.

Law enforcement agencies appear not only to have miserably failed in bringing down crime rate in Karachi but are facing issues in properly prosecuting the criminals in the courts of law due to outdated methods of their investigation and interrogation techniques. Whether it is the deficiency of the Police Department or lacunae in the legal system, but a proper scientific study from this point of view is essential in order to determine the real causes behind failure in clamping down on and the acquittals of criminals from the courts of law and to devise methods that can minimize such occurrences in the future. Police department and other law enforcing agencies need to improve their investigation system to save them from the blame of not providing enough evidences in courts to prove the charges against criminals. Police also need to improve their data recording system so that the nature of crimes and their perpetrators can be identified even in some future day.

⁸ Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>

End Notes

i For details, CPLC website: <http://www.cplc.org.pk/>

ii Nadeem F. Piracha, "Karachi: The past is another city", Dawn, 25 August 2011, available at

<http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/25/karachi-the-past-is-another-city.html>

[Excerpts] Mohajirs (Urdu-speakers) constitute 41 per cent of the city's population followed by the Pushtun (about 17 per cent), Punjabi (about 11 per cent), Sindhi (about 6 per cent), Baloch (about 5 per cent), Sariki (about 3 per cent) and those from Hazra and Gilgit (2 percent). Pushtun as 17 percent of the total population Karachi is quite often refuted and claimed to be around 20 – 25 percent.

Note: Not only that Nadeem F. Piracha used this figure but another well-known writer and researcher, Dr Qaiser Bengali, also used a similar figure in his lecture that he recently delivered at a seminar organised by the Shehri CBE: 'Karachi's ethnic composition undergoing radical change'

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=75494&Cat=4>

He [Dr Qaiser Bengali] said Pakhtuns only represented three percent of Karachi's population in the year 1941, but now that figure has risen to 15 percent. He estimated that by the year 2045, Pashtuns would increase to 19 percent of the city's population, while the Urdu speaking population would fall to 40 percent. As a result, he said that by 2045, Karachi would be home to the largest Pashtun population. He said these demographic changes were creating problems, due to what he labeled the politics of control.

iii) Imtiaz Ali, "Karachi's ethnic composition undergoing radical change", The News, November 1, 2011, available at

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=75494&Cat=4iv> Arif Hasan, "Sindh local government: The real issues", The Express Tribune, January 10, 2012, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/319333/sindh-local-government-the-real-issues/>

v) In response to Declan Walsh's article on Karachi's deadly divide – by Shaista Aazar

<http://criticalppp.com/archives/28250>

vi) Ibid

vii) Faraz Khan, "Lyari braces for battle as Arshad Pappu returns", The Express Tribune, February 18, 2012 available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/338124/lyari-braces-for-battle-as-arshad-pappu-returns/>

viii) Qurat ul ain Siddiqui and Sadeef A. Kully, "Karachi target killings – contradictions and denials",

Dawn, July 14, 2010, available at <http://www.dawn.com/2010/07/14/karachi-target-killing-contradictions-and-denials.html24> | Page

ix "Karachi targeted killings claimed 748 lives last year" , Dawn, January 6, 2011, available at

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x "Target killing statistics – MQM hardest hit, ANP close behind" The Express Tribune, December 12, 2010, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/88995/target-killing-statistics-mqm-hardest-hit-anclose-behind/>

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<http://pakistanpal.wordpress.com/tag/is-ig-sindh-given-contract-of-killing/>
Chief Justice Iftikhar Muammad Chaudhry during hearing of Hajj scandal case expressed concerns over the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi. The CJ in his remarks, questioned was the IGP Sindh given contract of killing in Karachi? He added that around 75 people have been killed in January alone.

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[..Excerpt of the report] However, in the first 11 months of this year, the total number of killings in the metropolis stood at 1,860 including 711 target killings [Note: CPLC data shows 1339 persons as killed during the whole year 2010. Out of the 711 murders, 218 were politically motivated while 283 were non-political in nature.

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Pakistan's Balochistan Province under Siege

Pakistan's area-wise largest southwestern Balochistan has been in the grip of a bloody secessionist, ethnic Baloch-led insurgency for decades. The latest insurgency began in August 2006 with the mysterious killing of a tribal chief and former governor Nawab Akbar Bugti. This sparked a new cycle of insurgency that continues to date and has claimed hundreds of lives. Nationalist separatists have also been warning political parties and people at large to stay away from the May 11 elections.

The province which was known to the world for its natural resources today faces a ruthless insurgency, compounded by abysmal governance and extremely indifferent civilian and military ruling elite now a days. The breakdown of law and order in the province amounted to ultimate failure of the provincial government which, according to an October 2012 ruling by the apex Supreme Court, had lost “constitutional authority” to continue. Balochistan has also seen a systematic terror campaign targeting shia-Hazara Muslim community, resulting in deaths of hundreds of innocent shia-Muslims.

General Introduction to Balochistan

The population of Pakistan's area-wise largest province stands at slightly over 13 Million (according to 2011 estimates, daily The News, April 05, 2012).

Reeling from a security crisis and plagued by misgovernance, Balochistan currently faces multiple socio-political challenges. Decades of socio-political neglect, economic injustices, under-development and the tribal make-up of the society has turned it into Pakistan's “soft belly” – reeling from the consequences of a raging Baloch insurgency (both subversion of utility infrastructure as well as kill and dump pro-government Baloch leaders, the military's brutal response to it (kill and dump) , wave of anti-shia sectarian violence (that spiked in 2012 with hundreds of target-killings), abysmal mis-governance and rampant crime under political patronage. The apex Court, in an October 2012 ruling on the Law and Order situation in Balochistan, also touched on these issues and declared that the breakdown of law and order in the province amounted to gross failure of the provincial government and that it had lost “constitutional authority” to continue.

Demography: Baloch Majority Districts:

- 1- Bolan
- 2- Sibbi
- 3- Kacchi
- 4- Dera Bugti
- 5- Kohlu
- 6- Nasserabad
- 7- Jaffarabad
- 8- Jhal Magsi
- 9- Mastung,
- 10- Kalat
- 11- Nushki
- 12- Chaghi
- 13- Awaran
- 14- Washik
- 15- Kharan
- 16- Khuzdar
- 17- Lasbela
- 18- Panjgur
- 19- Gawadar
- 20- Kech
- 21- Barkhan

Quetta, the provincial capital, is almost equally divided between Baloch and Pashtoon populations.

Pashtoon Majority Districts

- 1- Qilla Abdullah
- 2- Pishin
- 3- Ziarat
- 4- Qilla Saifullah
- 5- Loralai
- 6- Musakhel
- 7- Zhob
- 8- Sherani

Baloch Insurgency

At the heart of the security crisis are Baloch nationalist/separatist groups, vying for an independent Balochistan. Their demand stems from decades of neglect and denial of socio-economic and political rights by the Centre – synonymous with the civilian ruling elite and the mighty military. The resultant clash between the separatists and the Centre has sunken the province in to a black security hole.

As of early 2013, some 21 of Balochistan's 30 districts are ethnically Baloch dominated. The common man – Baloch, ethnic Hazara (a shia Muslim community), and non-Baloch settler - is sandwiched between the tribal chief (Nawab, Sardar, Mir) the separatist militants, and the government. Certain regions in Central Balochistan – Khuzdar, Lasbela, Wadh, Chaghi, Mastung, and Kohlu epitomize the intensity of the Baloch insurgency, which has triggered a wave of exodus, particularly of non-Baloch people. Settlers – mostly ethnic Sindhis, Punjabis, and the Urdu-speaking immigrants have left. All five military operations including the ongoing army activities were also conducted in the same regions, where inhabitants largely belong to the immensely populated Marri tribe.



Between Januarys -November 13, 2012, some 727 persons lost their lives in at least 416 incidents of violence across the province. As many as 33 sectarian attacks were recorded during this period, leaving 69 persons dead and almost 95 percent of those killed were Shia Hazaras. Abduction for ransom also soared during this period, wherein 52 persons were kidnapped around the province. Meanwhile, the recovery of dead bodies continues to plague the province and 92 dead bodies were recovered so far. Target-killing, the most lethal weapon of the nationalist-separatists, resulted in the killing of 224 persons in the province – most of this violence occurred in provincial capital Quetta, Zhob, Khuzdar, Gwadar, Bugti and Kohlu districts.

Sectarian Violence

A relatively recent alarming addition to the drivers of violence is the menace of sectarianism. Widespread human rights abuses committed by the Al-Qaeda-linked, and rapidly anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) outfit is at the centre of this sectarian frenzy, which has largely targeted the minority Shia population, particularly the ethnic Hazaras, who essentially are immigrants from Afghanistan. According to certain reports, over 800 Hazaras have been killed in 24 incidents of mass-murder and 131 targeted ambushes since 2001. There is an Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda link to the Shia massacres in Balochistan. The bloodshed of the Afghan Taliban had led tens of thousands of Hazaras in Afghanistan during their rule. Hazaras in Afghanistan continue to be a part of the so-called Northern Alliance which resisted Taliban. What is, however, clear is that Hazaras' ideological links with Iran – shiaism –has turned them into the target of some of Pakistani militant groups.

Conspiracy Theory on the US Role in Violence

In addition to the usual blame for violence on Baloch separatist groups, the LeJ and the security apparatus led by the Frontier Corps (FC), a possible US role in the simmering violence also adds spice to the debate on causes of Balochistan's instability. While operating in Balochistan this dimension of the provincial dynamics needs to be kept in mind.

Many Pakistani nationalists as well as the security agencies would have most Pakistanis believe that the surge in violence is because of the American support for Baloch separatist outfits. Moreover, many Baloch

and Pashtoon leaders in Quetta suspect an American hand through the radical Sunni outfit Jundullah and Lashkare Jhangvi in the Shia killings. They believe to deny Iran's any link with Pakistan and India. The US also publicly opposes the Iran-Pak gas pipeline (Hilary Clinton and Cameron Munter, ex US ambassador to Islamabad made a few public statements, advising Pakistan not to deal with Iran). The bottom-line in such conspiracy theories is the instable and militarized Balochistan that basically works against the proposed Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline which might eventually extend to India as well.

Nexus between Crime and Militancy

Police officials claim that currently more than 70 criminal gangs and a dozen of insurgent groups are operating in the province. Both of these actors have political supporters. The level of collusion between criminal gangs and politicians is so entrenched that National Party, Balochistan, vice president; Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo and Lashkari Raeesani allege provincial ministers patronising criminal gangs.

Interviews with businessmen and transporters also support the view of the Supreme Court which in its judgment in October 2012 said rampant corruption, omni-presence of criminal gangs, abductions for ransom, looting of freight-laden trucks were a clear proof of the fact that law and order in the province had broken down. The routes running through Baloch areas such Khuzdar, Wadh, Hub, Taftan as well as the route that pass through the Pashtoon belt i.e. Killa Saifullah, Zhob, Muslim Bagh, Loralai, Chaman, Killa Abdullah (particularly from Killa Abdullah to Chaman Wali Cross and Haji Muhammad Ali Bavri are also not secure any more, and almost daily cargo trucks and passenger buses are ambushed by armed robbers or sectarian killers. Sibi, Dera Murad Jamali, Chaman, and even the Sariab area of Quetta are also most vulnerable spots for crime and killings.

A report by the Balochistan Home Department (in March 2012) said as many as 1,493 innocent citizens have been killed and 3,313 injured in 1,718 incidents, mostly in target killings and sectarian attacks from 2007 to February 15, 2012. The report on the deteriorating law and order situation in the province, says that militant factions like the Balochistan Liberation Army, the Balochistan Republican Army, the Baloch United Liberation Front, and Baloch Liberation Front- are spearheading violent activities. The report categorically underlined that, particularly since 2007,

the aforementioned insurgent outfits have developed a nexus with criminal gangs operating in the province for financial and outreach reasons.

The report pointed out that banned militant sectarian outfits are also colluding with the insurgents and criminal gangs to enhance their outreach in the area. First case of kidnapping by Baloch insurgents surfaced in 2009, when hitherto unknown, Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) held an American United Nations official, John Solecki, for two months. Furthermore, “Baloch nationalists are also suspects in the case of a British Red Cross doctor mysteriously kidnapped from Quetta in January” this year.

Though it is difficult to establish any direct link between Baloch insurgents and kidnappings for ransom but plenty of verbal evidence on various proponents of violence and crime - the Taliban and Baloch insurgents and tribal chiefs – is available on how these groups move in tandem to mobilize funding from smuggling, extortions, car-hijacking, abductions for ransom, and ‘illegal weapons’ trade, which involves heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, grenades are showcased in places like Gulistan in Pishin.

Governance and Tribal Ethos

Governance in Balochistan is characterized by tribal ethos and ethnic factionalism. Four post-partition insurgencies were witnessed in the province during 1948, 1954, 1961 and 1977. At present, it is undergoing fifth insurgency, which was ignited in August 2006 after the murder of Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti who ironically was considered as a federalist politician. The ongoing insurgency started in Marri-Bugti and Mekran(southern) areas and since then the military operations have resulted in huge human and property losses and stark violation of human rights by the state as well as the insurgents.

Balochistan’s administration system is a hybrid of formal and informal systems. Only five percent of the provincial territory is governed by the formal policing. Law and order in the remaining 95% of the province is managed by a system of “levies” recruited from among local tribes, who provide security services through a mix of tribal norms and quasi-official procedures. Levies are primarily state-funded private armies of tribal chieftains. The tribal system with its archaic social structures and a justice system controlled by the tribal elite had long made formal rule of law framework irrelevant for most of the population. Such a system obviously

perpetuates a high degree of conflict and insecurity— thereby, leaving the poor communities distant from the ‘formal’ state.

Political Landscape

Nowhere in Pakistan is the political landscape as fragmented as in Balochistan, probably because of the tribal nature of a society that is scattered in sparsely populated regions. Balochistan is not a political society in modern socio-political terms, but still it has some deep-rooted nationalist and democratic political parties, which can play a significant role in influencing Baloch masses, provided they are ready to play such role in current peculiar political circumstances.

Currently five schools of thought dominate this landscape:

Baloch Separatists (five factions, primarily Marri and Bugti): These groups demand total independence from Pakistan. A spokesperson for three groups i.e. the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) of Brahamdagh Bugti, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) led by Dr Allah Nazar , and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) of Harbiyar Marri told media on October 21, 2012 that “everybody knows who is calling the shots in Balochistan ... Talks are possible but only on our agenda – independence. If the army is at all serious about having talks with us, it will have to recognise our agenda.”(<http://tribune.com.pk/story/454628/balochistan-crisis-we-will-never-negotiate-with-govt-says-brp/>)

2. Balochistan National Party (Mengal) and National Party (Dr. Malik Baloch).

These parties also stand for provincial autonomy but are vague on the real autonomy issue. The National Party led by Dr. Malik Baloch represents the middle class , educated political workers, academia and intelligentsia, and is guided by fundamental democratic principles of plurality and inclusion. It claims to believe in liberal and secular values and pursues maximum national autonomy with the Pakistani federation. It lobbied for these demands including the ownership of oil and gas resources in the province (as spelt out in the Constitution's Article 271). Balochistan National Party (Mengal) demands the right for self determination, a position it seems to have taken since 2008 in the face of mounting pressure by radical separatist movement groups. At the same time, it also talks of elections and democracy, probably to stay relevant and acceptable to the majority of Balochis.

3. **Balochistan National Party (Awami):** This party represents moderate Baloch forces, and is considered as the fence-sitters. It has been part of almost every government in the province. It can be compared to the PML-Q (led by Ch. Shujaat Hussein), a party that grew under the shadow of Gen. Musharraf and was instrumental in weakening the PML-N led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

4. **Jamhoori Watan Party (Bugti):** This party has been in turmoil since the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and has lost its sting due to internal fragmentation. It is divided in two factions: one is led by Aali Bugti and the other by Talal Bugti. The third faction, Baloch Republican Army (BRA), is led by Brahamdagh Bugti, which believes in total independence and is thus categorized as a nationalist militant group.

5. **PPP / PML-N:** Both parties are centrists/nationalist and stand for the Federation. The **Jamiat Ulemai Islam (JUI-F)** – a religio-political party - is also a pro-federation party, primarily an opportunistic grouping of Deobandi Maulanas, and has been part of almost every government. A Balochi, Maulana Ghafoor Haideri, is its secretary general. Some call the JUI-F an extension of the military-dominated establishment in Balochistan. But despite the official support and boycott of the last general election by mainstream Baloch parties, the JUI-F could not win a single seat from the Baloch areas, unlike the elections in 2002, when it managed just about two National Assembly seats.

Pashtoon Parties:

1. **Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP):** Their agenda revolves around equality for Pashtoons in Balochistan. It also demands a new social contract, is liberal in outlook and opposed to the ultra-conservative agendas pursued by religious parties such as the JUI. It also supports the presence of America in Afghanistan and insists on eliminating militant networks operating in the border region.

2: **Awami National Party (ANP):** Liberal, Pashtoon nationalist party. The ANP is part of the government in the province.

3: **JUI-F:** It also has Pashtoon leaders like Maulana Sherani , Maulana Wasy.

4: **PML-Q (Jaffar Mandokhel)**: Centrist. This is a pro- federation party but most of its leaders are considered as opportunists. This faction of the Muslim League is also called the King's Party, as they are always with the government.

Baloch Nationalists (Separatists)

Baloch insurgent groups are primarily nationalist-secular and their “struggle” for independence from Islamabad” is rooted in the decades’ old demand for provincial autonomy. These groups have always kept themselves away from religion. Baloch separatist groups do not believe in elections and consider the pro-parliamentary democracy within the Federation as traitors. Their publicly-stated struggle is centered on autonomy. But all these groups are divided, and therefore, the religio-political JUI-(F) and its splinters emerge as the deciding factor for any coalition.

Major Separatist Groups:

- ¾ **Baloch Liberation Front (BLF, Dr. Allah Nazar)**
- ¾ **Baloch Liberation Army (BLA, led by Hairbiar Marri).**
- ¾ **Baloch Republican Army (BRA, led by Brahamdagh Bugti, grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti)**
- ¾ **Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB, Jawaid Mengal, son of Sardar Attaullah Mengal)**
- ¾ **Sarbaz Balochistan (SB)**
- ¾ **Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF)**

They are pitched against over a dozen political groups which are pro-federation. Additionally, the ethnic Pashtoons, who constitute almost half of the province’s population, want political and economic rights without asking for independence. Furthermore, the religio-political party –JUI (F) - and its splinters also are predominantly Pashtoon and have been part of every government in the Centre (expedience) and in Quetta (both expedience and compulsion of requisite numbers).

Most Frequent Complaints by Baloch Nationalists

The history of neglect by the center, the high-handedness of the civilian-military establishment, denial of political and financial autonomy and the

continuing nexus between the provincial elite—mostly opportunistic—and the military establishment. The Baloch nationalist narrative also feeds off these misgivings and the insurgent groups in particular use this to justify their violent campaign. Following are some of the most frequent complaints that revolve more around the role of the Center/military and focus less on the role tribal sardars and chieftains have played – most of them as willing pawns, driven by their own economic interests.

- The Punjabi-dominated Center is not sincere
- The present government in Balochistan lacks legitimacy as all Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the February 2008 elections as a mark of protest against an unannounced operation in Balochistan. Baloch nationalists see it as an agent of the Pakistani establishment.
- The Military Establishment wants to keep Balochistan subjugated through suppression of Baloch nationalist forces. It is a conscious attempt to keep Balochis divided.
- The civilian-military ruling elite in the Center do not want development and prosperity in Balochistan.
- Some of the Baloch tribes such as, Jams, Raisanis, Jamalis, Rinds, Zehri's as well as religious leaders associated with the JUI (F) serve as the extensions of the civil-military establishment.
- Intelligence agencies use businessmen / smugglers / gang leaders for “social support” but many of these people reportedly indulge in criminal activities like kidnappings for ransom, extortion from affluent people and smuggling.
- “Official” protection of private influential groups has contributed to the breakdown of law and order.
- The civil-military establishment is consciously promoting religio-political groups to counter Balochi nationalists.
- Intelligence agencies eliminating Baloch nation through clandestine abduct, kill and dump operations.

- Intelligence agencies eliminating Baloch nationalists through target killings and police encounters to muzzle demands for rights. That is why almost all political/sectarian murders are blamed on intelligence agencies, or projected as acts of suppression. Baloch nationalists talk of about 500 activists having been executed through abduct-kill-dump operations.
- Intelligence agencies and the FC are playing favorites with Bugti family members, using one against the other.
- Intelligence agencies and the FC are using tribal chiefs against prominent Bugti and Marri leaders.

In Nov 2009, the federal government responded to these grievances by announcing an Economic Rights' Package (AHBP). The package as well as the 7th National Finance Commission Award (a mechanism to distribute funds between the Centre and the four provinces) more than doubled Balochistan's financial resources. Until late 2008, the province used to get about 43 billion rupees (less than 400 million dollars) from the federal consolidated fund. Under the 7th NFC award signed at Gwadar in 2009, the share of Balochistan doubled from 5.1 to 9.09 percent i.e. a net transfer of about 83 billion rupees in 2010 and over 110 billion in 2011 (Dollar-Rupee Parity : 95 Rupees= Dollar).

Who lives where?

1. Jhal Magsi – Jhal Magsi is a stronghold of Magsis led by Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi, Governor Balochistan. Magsi have always been close to military establishment. They hold sway over Jhal Magsi and in areas of district Shadadkot in the bordering Sindh province. Mir Nadir Magsi, the younger brother of Nawab Magsi is provincial minister in Sindh cabinet while his younger brother Mir Amir is MNA from Sindh. Mir Tariq Magsi, MPA from Jhal Magsi is Governor younger brother and another brother is senator Mir Akbar and son senator Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi. Governor wife Shama Perveen Magsi is MPA on reserved seat and holds the portfolio of IT as Minister

2. Dera Bugti : Bugtis (sub-tribes Massori and Kalpar). The current, official Chieftain of the tribe is Nawab Aali Bugti, who had been installed by the military establishment in 2009. The Chieftain is traditionally the

person who controls Dera Bugti and the surroundings. Massori Bugtis are led by Wadera Ali Mohammad. Masooris live in Bakkar district bordering Punjab and Barkhan. Kalpar Bugtis, led by Jalalan, lives in gas producing town of Sui.

With the support of government agencies, three major players count as important for Dera Bugti. They include Mir Ahmadan Bugti (member of national parliament). He recently got injured after stepping on an explosive device laid for him. The other two are Mir Ghulam Qadir Massoori and Jalalan Kalpar.

3. Kohlu: Mohbbat Khan Marri and Shahnawaz Marri are important players here. Mohabat is the uncle of Shahnawaz Marri. They belong to Fatah Khanzai faction of tribe who have always been loyal to military establishment. There are two major factions Bijranis and Gazanis in the area. A considerable group Bijranis are controlled by Mir Hazar Khan, a former guerilla commander while Gazainis by elderly separatist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.

4. Barkhan: Khetran tribe dominates this district which borders Dera Ghazi Khan in the east and Loarali in the north while in the south with Kohlu and Dera Bugti (both politically sensitive and volatile districts) there are three personalities Sardar Abdur Rahman Khethran, Mir Tariq Mahmood and Mir Baz Mohammad Khetran. All three are political rivals. Sardar Abdur Rahman, the chieftain, holds sway in the area for being elected MPA from the area. Militants have been attacking the camp of gas and oil companies and power pylons.

5. Khuzdar – Dominant tribes in this district are Zehris and Mengals, Bizenjos. Zehris are known to patronize criminal gangs in the region and for harbouring. They also reportedly provide the social support network secret agencies against separatist groups.

Sardar Sanaullah Zahri is mostly elected in the elections from his area Zahri/Gath. Bezenjos are in Naal area and the chieftain is Sardar Aslam Bezenjo who is currently Minister for Irrigation.

Wadh is dominated by Mengals while Khuzdar comprises of mixed population. Khuzdar has currently turned into a battle field for rival Mengal factions. One faction is led by Chieftain Sardar Attaullah while another by Mir Naseer, the former caretaker Minister. A separatist group Lashker-e-Balochistan led by Jawaid Mengal who lives in exile in London

is active in attacks against government forces and installations and rivals. While another group Nifaz-e-Defa Aman Tahrik (NDAT), which draws support from government agencies is headed by Shafiq Mengal. Around 250 persons are estimated to be killed in clashes for the last three years.

Musakhel : Musakhail tribe is in majority in this district, and has been a stronghold of the JUI-(F). Two major political/tribal personalities here are --Sardar Azam Musakhail and Sardar Asmatullah. Azam has been loyal to PKMAP, the nationalist liberal Pashtoon party and once won in 2003 elections while Asmatullah has been associated with PML (Q). Otherwise the provincial assembly seat has always been with JUI (Fazal).

6. Zhob: This district, that borders Afghanistan and FATA to the north, is divided among three major tribes i.e. Kakars, Mandokhels, Nasirs.

Major political forces are two factions of JUI-F, and JUI-Ideological. In addition to them the PML (Q) and PKMAP also enjoy considerable support here. Senator Maulana Mohammad Khan Sheerani, the provincial head of JUI (F) and Chairman Islamic Ideological Council and Maulana Asmatullah are political rivals, though they had once belonged to the same JUI-F. Jogeza is who are considered to be head of Kakars, the biggest Pashtoon tribe, cannot even contest elections against the aforementioned clerics due to lack of support among masses. Even the nationalist PKMAP had to enter into alliance with PML (Q)' Shiekh Jaffar Khan Mondokhail in previous elections. Due to fast growing influence of Jamiat Nazaryati (ideological) in the area, the activity of both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban has been on the rise in recent years. Religious militancy here is strong and Afghan Taliban use the smaller Kibzai tribe for shelter in the Murghakibzai sub-district.

7. Naseerabad/ Jaffarabad : Umrani, Khoso, Bungalzai and Lahri tribes live in Naseerabad. Umrani dominate politics here as this both seats of the district have been won by Saqid Umrani and Babu Amin Umrani.

In Jaffarabad Jamalis and Khoso live but with open political rivalry. Being close to the military establishment, Jamalis have almost always edged out Khoso rivals. Both PA seats and one national assembly seat have been won by Jamalis.

8. **Bolan:** a volatile district because of law and order (crime) and insurgency. Rind, Kurd, Bungalzai and Raisani are the major tribes inhabiting this district.

The Rind tribe is the largest of all, led by Sardar Yar Mohammad Rind, who had won one of the two seats of provincial assembly in 2008 elections. Another seat has always been bagged by Finance Minister Mir Asim Kurd Gaillu.

Sardar Yar Mohammad and Nawab Aslam Raisani, the present chief minister, have been locked in politicalrivalry for over 30 years. Other political/tribal personalities keep shifting loyalties between Nawab Aslam and Sardar Yar Rind as and when necessary ahead of elections.

Governor Balochistan Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi 's role is decisive on national assembly seat for his tribe's en-bloc votes of over twelve thousands in the favour of any candidate.

9. **Sibi:** Pashtoon tribes inhabiting Sibi are Khajjak and Luni while Baloch are Dombki, Rind, Marri, Chandio etc. Dombki always win the provincial assembly seat with their enbloc votes from Lahri area. Although Barozai enjoy enormous respect among the people, yet they have not been able to win the seat to the provincial or national parliament.

10. **Lasbela:** Jam and Bhootani tribes dominate the socio-political landscape here. Jams are currently headed by Jam Mir Yousaf, the federal Minister. Jams live in Uthal, Bela and Hub while Bhootanis are in the Durajee region. Jams can win the elections on one of the two provincial seats and one national assembly seat. Jam Yousaf himself and his father late Jam Ghulam Qadir remained the Chief Ministers and many times federal ministers.

11. **Chaman:** **Ethnic Pashtoon tribes** Achakzai and Noorzai are the major tribes in Chaman. Both factions of JUI-F dominate politically, however PKMAP and ANP have their own pockets of influence here. Since PKMAP boycotted the 2008 elections, the independent candidate Captain (R) Abdul Khaliq won the elections and is now provincial minister. Asghar Achakzai, Naseer Ahmad Bacha, the former provincial Minister, Maulavi Haneef, Senator Hafiz Hamdullah are the influential personalities in Chaman.

12. **Loralai:** (Pashtoons) Kakar, Luni, Tareen, Jomezais and Nasaar are the major tribes in the area. The district in the north borders Zhob district, in the east Dera Ghazi Khan, in the south Musakhail, Barkhan and Kohlu. Lunis always won one provincial assembly seat regardless of which party they represent. Another seat is won by JUI (Fazal) or PMAP. Sardar Yaqub Nasaar, the sitting member of national assembly and a former federal Minister, Sardar Masood Luni, the provincial Minister, Sardar Gul Mohammad Jomezai are the major socio-political personalities of the area.

Changing Perceptions: The Evolution of Media in KP and FATA

Introduction

The mass media is effective tool of building and changing perceptions. Acknowledging this critical role of the media, the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) Islamabad launched an FM Radio program Sabawoon (Dawn) in June 2011 with the aim to challenge and condemn what is generally referred to as "religious extremism and political terrorism". The broader purpose was to highlight traditional and peaceful aspects of the Pakhtun culture and society and provide a narrative embedded in democratic values rather than in the religion. The target audience of the radio program is in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This region is being hit due to violence and militancy followed by US-led military intervention in Afghanistan that began in October 2001.

The disastrous consequences of war on terror are apparent in the Pakhtun belt of Pakistan as violence has caused enormous damage to socio-cultural life in the region. Even the role of social institutions such as Jirga, the traditional tool of dispute resolution, has significantly diminished due to the ongoing war in the KPK and FATA. Militancy has also affected the free flow or dissemination of information to and from the KPK and FATA region. The Taliban and the Pakistani military both intimidate pressurize and manipulate local journalists, while the Taliban continue to use their own information networks to propagate their version of Islam.

This situation necessitated a counter-information offense, particularly to connect with the disgruntled youth which had become vulnerable to the militants' propaganda in the absence of an effective and realistic alternative narrative on religious extremism and terrorism. Initially, both the public and private media found the challenge daunting because of capacity as well as fears of reprisals. Therefore the need for providing an alternative discourse was compelling; especially at a time, when militants are also using the mass media to promote their interpretation of the religion. Interestingly the Taliban are using the Internet but many local people, particularly in the FATA region are unable to use the Internet.

In this backdrop the CRSS launched live radio broadcasts in the KPK and FATA region to provide accurate and objective information and to promote peace and harmony in the war-hit areas. It is estimated that around 80

percent male and 70 percent of female or better to say a large number of male and female population in KPAK and FATA still listen to radio.¹

The CRSS program is broadcasted live from FM 101 Peshawar and in recorded format from MW Peshawar, FM 93 DI Khan and FM 93 Abbottabad. In FM 101 studio a live call facility is installed for conference calls on their UAN number. This allowed us to take telephonic guest from far-flung target areas and provide other callers to interact with them directly. For off air calls we have announced a cell number which receives calls for 18 hours daily and SMS messages for round the clock.

Total population of KP is about 22 million and the population of FATA is about six million. Among these, almost one million people are the potential audience of our program. The program was designed to create awareness among the people of the targeted areas about the richness of the Pakhtun history and culture and its social traditions and symbols. Through this program the youth learned about work and achievements of Pakhtun's social and political figures and literary icons. Moreover, discussions are also held on the prevailing security situation in the region and its possible solutions.

Objective

Through this report we tried to assess the impact of our program on influencing the public opinions and perceptions in the KPK and FATA region. Such an evaluation may help us to improve our broadcasts.

Methodology

To analyze the success of this program in changing the perceptions of the people of the targeted areas, out of 300 programs aired in the year from June 2011 to August 2012, 100 programs are selected from the beginning months, from the mid of the year and from the last quarter of the year.

In order to analyze the effect of this program, three indicators are selected to gauge the effect of this program on the people from the KPK and FATA. The first indicator is the 'framework of the program' the second indicator is the 'quality of the content' that will help us to assess the importance of

¹ Haroon Rashid, Correspondent BBC, available at, <http://dawn.com/2012/03/01/fata-journalists-on-razors-edge/>, retrieved on October 15, 2012.

discussion. The response of the listeners is another indicator to gauge the impact of the program.

1. Framework of the Program

The program 'Sabawoon' (dawn) is designed to target every section of the society. The purpose of getting more attention of the people is achieved by naming the programs with Pakhtun cultural attributes. Therefore the program Sabawoon is broadcasted with different themes six days a week.

1). The program named 'Jirga or Maraka' (An assembly of elders that used to be an effective forum for conflict resolution) is to attract listeners in the targeted areas because Jirga has long historical roots in the Pakhtun code of conduct. The Pukhtuns are familiar with the name and procedure of the Jirga. Secondly, it also revived the significance of the Jirga which could be reactivated by the people to cure social ills.

2). Another program was named 'Aman aw Khushali', meaning peace and prosperity again a positive message. In this program efforts were made to give people a hope and motivate them to take positive steps to change their lives and environment.

3). 'Hujra' is another program that is named after a common Pakhtun cultural symbol. Hujra is a socialization club for male members of the Pakhtun society and is often found at street corners or outside the main residential area of a house. The guests and hosts of Hujra program are selected irrespective of their economic background. The main objective of the Hujra was to provide a discussion platform on sensitive issues and to revive the collective discussion practice in the Pakhtun culture.

4). The program 'Kar Rozgar' (economic activities and livelihood) was aimed to encourage people to revitalize economic activities that have been halted due to militancy in the KPK and FATA. The program is designed to give advice to the unemployed people.

5). In 'Namawari Pukhtana' (famous Pukhtuns or successful Pukhtuns), successful people were interviewed who could serve as a source of inspiration for the new generation. In these interviews, special emphasis is given on how to achieve success in life and career.

6). The program 'Adab-o-Saqafat' (literature and culture) aimed to promote peace and positive thinking by utilizing the tool of literature, poetry and culture. Poets, writers, native leaders and actors were invited in the program who discussed various aspects of the Pakhtun culture. They also talked

about the significance of peace and respect in the Pakhtun culture and society. However, the participants of our program also tried to change the perceptions of the people by highlighting good and bad aspects of the culture.

In almost every program of the main series of Sabawoon, the reports presented were broadcasted six days a week with different themes but focus remained on the main purpose of the program – the promotion of peace. As people were reluctant to talk directly on the issues of terrorism due to concerns for their security discussions were held indirectly to repudiate terrorism in the Pakhtun society. The main aim was to help the people who have been facing a war-like situation for over a decade. Ordinary people were also invited in the programs to discuss the issues in simple and understandable language.

2. Quality of the Content

In these programs, the topics selected for the program were relevant to the existing situation in the target areas. The programs were started on general discussion, on an issue like the reliability of the Jirga system in the Pakhtun society. But, more specific discussions were also held on topics such as the lack of education in the tribal areas, weaknesses and drawbacks of the Pakhtun society, control over sources of information, governance issues in FATA (Frontier Crimes Regulation), underrepresentation of FATA people, psychological impact of militancy on children in the KPK and FATA, natural resources in the KPK and FATA, women's rights etc. These issues were discussed with elders, politicians, and academics.

Most of the discussion was devoted to the present day problems as well as the past of the Pukhtuns which was glorified and praised. The glorification of the past had both positive and negative effects. Though, it was basically aimed at attracting attention of the people, it also caused some confusion when imperatives of modern way of living were discussed some of which seem to be in contradictory to the Pakhtun culture.

In every program two field reports relevant to the discussion would participate. They interviewed victims of violence. Notable politicians, journalists, academicians, poets, businessmen, students and sportsmen, pointed out issues and problems in the KPK and FATA region. The reports broadcast in the program received the attention of the listeners who also shared their opinions on the issues under discussion.

With the passage of time, the content of the program and discussions became useful. In this way, through the narration of the success stories of the panelists, efforts were made to correct the wrong perceptions about the

Pakhtun culture. The panelists stressed the need of peace in the region and also urged people to engage in healthy activities.

3. Response of the Listeners

The positive aspect of this program is that it attracted maximum number of listeners. In the beginning people were less familiar with this program; the overall response to the program was also less. Phone callers were initially reluctant to speak live but later they became emboldened and openly discussed their ideas and suggestions. With time, the anchors were also more up-coming and were able to produce quality programs by keeping in mind the interest of the listeners and the objective of the program. Almost daily guidance of producers/presenters enhanced the presentation and contents which resulted in an impressive feedback. In every program eight to nine live calls were included in the first quarter of the year. Later more than 20 calls were received in each program. It was encouraging to see people from remote and backward areas of the KPK and FATA participating through phone calls, and appreciating the program. It showed that people not only listened the program but also took interest in the social, political, economic and security issues of their areas.

Findings

1. Education

Many participants of our program said that lack of education was the main cause of the current problems of Pukhtuns. The panelists viewed that previously the elders deemed only religious education necessary. They emphasized that Pukhtuns need to seek modern day knowledge as well to address their problems.

The positive indicator was in the second half of the year many callers from Peshawar and tribal areas agreed with this conclusion and said the main reason for their backwardness was lack of education. It shows that the perceptions of the people are changing and they are showing interest in getting education. Many listeners spoke about dysfunctional schools in the KPK and tribal areas. They complained that there are many schools in tribal areas but there are no teachers and other facilities. Thus the program has been successful in sensitizing this issue to the concerned departments as many education department officials were among the panelists invited to the programs. The provincial minister for education was also invited to one of the programs.

Moreover, one of the good aspects of the program Sabawoon was the discussion with the intellect young students from underdeveloped areas of the KPK and FATA. These students excelled in education. Many people

appreciated the initiative of inviting brilliant students in the programs as they could act as source of inspiration for other children. The students said they want to be educated not for money but to serve their country.

Such discussions were also aimed at encouraging people to keep struggling in difficult times. Many listeners would complain about the lack of facilities and bad security situation as reasons for low illiteracy level but they were determined to educate their children despite all odds.

After holding many programs on the status of education in the KPK and FATA it became easier to persuade people to acquire education. People of the KPK and FATA region are talented but war and violence have tarnished the image of this region. "Unfortunately, the people of tribal areas got an image of war and battle whenever someone mentions that region. In reality, the youth of the region is talented and motivated to work hard," said journalist Dilawar Wazir in a live discussion in Sabawoon. After talking with Mr. Wazir, it is understood that tribal people have the flexibility and potential of change if education is provided to all. The success story narrated by Mr. Wazir also showed that he studied with very limited resources and in tough situation, and became a successful journalist. He tried to persuade the youth and parents of the turbulent areas to get education which is the only way to counter many of the prevailing problems there.²

Discussion was also held on female education. The guests were of the view that Pukhtuns themselves be blamed for not paying much attention to education specifically female education. A caller Spugmai resident of Peshawar said: "I am disappointed and worried that why I have not pursued education. I was very fond of study, but my brother did not allow me."³ Another caller Muskan from Landi Kotal Khyber Agency said on the issue of female education in tribal belt, "Actually our elders are following same old traditional norms and have doubts in their minds regarding modern education. They feel ashamed when their girls go outside. But they do not feel embarrassment when their women wander in mountains for breaking lumber for fire and bringing water from watercourse. This, infact, is a matter of shame for us. Secondly primary schools are established in large number, but there is no access to higher education."⁴

² Dilawar Wazir (Journalist), Sabawoon, Nomwary Pukhtana, 15-07-2011.

³ Sabawoon, Hujra, 21-03-2012.

⁴ Ibid.

In the programs conducted on female education, many calls were received from women from tribal areas who strongly advocated the need for educating the women. It shows that the thoughts of people are getting change. In initial programs of Sabawoon, people thought that lack of awareness and education facilities were causes of low education in KPK and FATA, but the positive trend is noticed in the latter half of the year when women and girls condemned their strict cultural code for their lack of education.

As compare to the KPK, education level, particularly female education, system is miserable in FATA. It is pointed out in the discussions that the situation is now radically changed. Both male and female, are equally important. Many people who called to the program Sabawoon strongly agreed with the studio guest on educating females.

In the beginning when male callers were asked about the need of female education they argued that the mixing or interaction of males and females is not allowed in Islam. However such perceptions appear to be changing in the second half of the year. The callers even supported the idea of working women, saying, it is not against the Pakhtun culture or Islam. As a caller Riaz Gul from Khushdil Khan Village said, "I would like to say something that after getting education women should start service at workplaces under Islamic norm and without women's participation progress is not possible."⁵ Moreover, during the programs, the panelists said extremists were exploiting the security condition to keep people away from education and parents were urged to be vigilant about activities of their children and protect them from militants' manipulations.

The panelists also identified problems in the current curriculum taught at schools. They stressed on improving the quality education and on the need of setting up research centers in FATA. Experts also supported launch of leadership development programs. The overall impact of the program was good as just in one of the programs 20 calls were received underlining importance of education.⁶

⁵Sabahwoon, Jirga Marka, 05-03-2012.

⁶Sabawoon, Hujra, 21-03-2012.

2. Women's Rights

In various programs panelists discussed women rights issues and stressed the importance of gender equality which is rare in the tribal society. In the beginning, the number of calls on the issue was few but in the second half of the year the response was encouraging and callers called for equality of rights of wife and husband.

Mostly studio guests were Pukhtun women politicians who emphasized on women education and urged more women participation in politics. They tried to persuade people that Islam gives women full rights and all decision making powers. Along with other rights, women also have right to vote and prohibiting them from casting vote is like putting restriction on someone's thinking. Discussion was held on the status of women in tribal society where they are socially restricted. They are not allowed to take decision about their lives and children. Women also face other difficulties like torture and denial of the right of inheritance and education in the tribal society.

In some areas of the KPK and FATA, even women are not allowed to exercise their right to vote. This has been a major social problem with regards to women rights, coming up through discussion by panelists and the live callers. Moreover, women are socially and economically dependent on men.

The program was further emboldened in which the issue of violence against women was also raised and reports were presented on the issue of acid attacks on women. It was assessed by the response of the people that the perceptions of the people were changed to large extent. People were more sensitized about this issue. A caller Lal Zada from Zarmarno area said, "I listened to the report, which was a deplorable incident, unfortunately in our province women's rights are ignored. Those persons who deprive their women from fundamental rights, God will bring them into justice. Supposed if I have been authorized with power then first I would try to protect women's rights. My eyes were filled with tears when I listened to report on vicious act with woman. May God put mercy in the hearts of cruel people? Well we have formed committee at village level and will ask it to strictly adhere the rules pertaining to women's rights."⁷

Another caller Qasim Afridi from Khyber Agency appreciated the program and said, "Actually we do not follow Islamic teachings. Islam stressed upon the need of protecting women's rights and forbids us to avoid torture our women." Likewise Naeem from Dara Adam Khel stressed upon collective efforts to deter gender based violence. Arshad Afridi Jamrud Khyber Agency;

⁷ Sabawoon, Nomawary Pukhtana 25-05-2012.

"I think the incident of acid attack on woman should be raised on assembly floor to send the accused behind the bars." Sher Shah from Hari Chand Mohmand Agency stressed upon the role of media in sensitizing this issue among the masses.⁸

The extent of condemnation of the violence against women shows that people's thinking could be changed through informative programs. It is due to the lack of information and lack of exposure of people in backward areas of KPK and FATA where women are falling prey to the gender based violence.

It is a positive indicator that during the programs on women issues, maximum response was received from men though in Pakhtun society, discussion on women issues is a taboo. But through this program some men showed their firm desire to change their perceptions about women education, their right of casting vote, property rights and discouraging violence against them. As caller Zakria Khan from Peshawar said "we need good education system for women, as we need doctors, nurses, teachers, and we can only have that if we have more educated women. So this is my request to everyone that they should allow their women to be educated."⁹ Another caller Tamash Gul from Charsada talked on women rights "I would like to say that we should be aware about the rights and duties, husband should know about the rights of his wife and wife similarly should be aware about the rights of the husband, only then we can make things work."¹⁰

During the discussion many listeners had common view and they supported women rights. Noor Muhammad from Zargar Abad Peshawar praised the program and viewed, "I am third year student of Government College Peshawar. I belong to Mohmand Agency. I would say we should focus on female education. The education ratio in Mohmand is very poor. The government is also not providing us the required facilities. I would say that girls schooling is not against Shariah (Islamic rules) and women should step out of homes for education while wearing Parda. It is essential for the formation of a civilized society." Same point was raised by another listener from D.I. Khan who praised the program and said "I think we should get

⁸ Sabawoon, Nomawary Pukhtana, 25-05-2012.

⁹ Sabawoon, Jirga Maraka, 02-01-2012.

¹⁰ Sabawoon, Jirga Maraka, 02-01-2012.

education while keeping in mind the ideology and principles of Islam and we should also focus to learn Islamic teachings as well.”¹¹

Another caller Abdul Wajid from Peshawar, talked in favor of female education but also raised some objections, “I wanted to ask you a question, and we are in favor of educating our women but the problem we have is that when we send our women to study in the universities and colleges there we see that trends and culture are totally against our society and the teachings of Islam, as you know Islam does not allow intermingling of opposite sexes”.¹² Many other callers also voiced in favor of female education but stressed to keep it within the limits of Pakhtun culture and Islamic values. It also came through the program that all Pukhtuns are not against female education but they have certain conditions for their education. They cannot alter the set rules of their culture and Islamic norms for their education but if education will be provided to them within those limits, they will educate their women.

While some people were very generous in supporting women’s empowerment through education like a caller, an Afridi from Peshawar said, “I am really happy that you have initiated such an informative topic, our society has taken all the rights from a Pakhtun woman and they have kept her behind the closed doors, Islam has given a women full right to educate herself and peruse her aims and ambitions, while staying within the limits of decency.”¹³ Almost all the people had a common view of educating their women but within the set rules of Pakhtun society. It shows that women in Pakhtun society have the right of education only if she could stick to the defined norms of its society. But the kinds of norms and limits defined by them for a woman are yet to be clarified. Therefore this issue needs further sensitization.

3. Business Activities

Many issues related to the livelihood of the people discussed in our programs. The assessment has shown that the program relevant to the livelihood of the people has benefited workers such as drivers and renders whose problems are not generally discussed in the mainstream media. Many reports were presented in the program to highlight the issues of the workforce. In these programs large number of callers shared their experiences and problems. It was found that it was not only militancy but

¹¹Sabawoon, Aman aw Khushaly, 10-04-2012.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

corruption, favoritism and discrimination also hurt business activities. Many concerned departments of government were accused of illicit activities. Moreover the major part of the discussion covered the issues of tribal areas and the KPK where business activities have been disturbed due to militancy.

In the program business community's problems were identified and our experts advised local businesses on how to cope with the situation and continue trading. Many callers who were frustrated due to the situation started giving positive response in the later episodes of the programs as they were persuaded to resume their business. Issues regarding the livelihood of the people were also sensitized to the concerned departments of the government to give incentive to those people and solve their problems in the conflict stricken areas as many of the panelists invited to the program were government officials.

Problems of livelihood and employment in tribal areas were also discussed in which many listeners did not only share their problems but they also gave suggestions. Studio guest Abdul Wahid said thousands of shops are closed in Bara Bazaar, Khyber Agency due to which unemployment rate has rather increased.¹⁴ Likewise a caller Amjad Khan from Peshawar said, "Our land is very productive and our people are very hard working, they do most of the hard work but they do not know how to make profit by taking their products to the markets. Our people need some training on how they can expand their business."¹⁵

A female listener, Laila Afghan, asked the government to provide employment for the youth. Tamash Gul from Charsadda who is a regular listener of the program Sabawoon suggested that if investors start investing in tribal area the local people will get employment. People thought that if resources in the tribal areas were properly utilized many unemployed people would get jobs. Many countries are giving funds for tribal areas but government does not take any initiative to give scholarships to the students of FATA. All educational institutions in FATA should be opened immediately.¹⁶ Listeners took a lot of interest in the problems related to the business in KP and FATA. It seems from their response and suggestions that the discourse became more appealing for the people.

¹⁴Sabawoon, Jirga Maraka, 13-02-2012.

¹⁵Sabawoon, Kar Rozgar, 08-09-11.

¹⁶Sabawoon, Jirga Maraka, 13-02-2012.

4. Change in Pakhtun Culture

In many programs, the studio guests and the listeners viewed that the change in the Pakhtun culture has also added to the unrest in the society. Like Hujra (traditional gatherings of people in Pakhtun society) which worked as an institution to reform the society, has now shrunk into a drawing room meeting and the social element of life has been reduced to television and the Internet. Due to this, the studio guests emphasized on the importance of the Pakhtun's Hujra culture. Through their discussion they tried to create awareness among the youth about the Pakhtun's cultural norms and values which teach peaceful coexistence. They viewed that there is no shortage of talent in the Pakhtun region but restoring and maintaining peace is crucial. Provincial minister Mian Iftikhar says that development is impossible without peace. Revival of Hujra culture can promote peace in the Pakhtun society. Many people highly appreciated the "Hujra" program of Sabawoon. A listener Fazlullah from D. I. Khan said, "I liked Hujra program the most. We listened to our elders who advised us to follow our ancestral ways. I think our elders are not playing their responsibility otherwise the situation may not too worse today."¹⁷

Tahmash Gul from Charsadda added, "Hujra tradition should be kept alive and instead of taking an issue to the police or political agent, this should be redressed through Jirga. I liked your Hujra theme the most, because it reflected the true picture of Pakhtun society."¹⁸

As those traditional gatherings of Hujra are now replaced by TV and internet therefore in many programs the role of media in changing the Pakhtun culture, was also discussed. So many guests viewed that a change without vision brings destruction to the society. "We are so far away from a positive change because we haven't created a system for us which can benefit both the country and its people" said a studio guest. Moreover people view that TV dramas and literature have now greater impact on peoples' perceptions. TV drama writers portray Pukhtuns as warriors who know nothing but fighting. That's why Pukhtuns are being depicted as terrorists "Yes we are a warrior nation but we have fought wars to save our culture, our people, our land, and our religion. We are not fanatics, we have always fought war to defend ourselves" said Noor Ulbashar a famous Pashto drama writer.¹⁹

Many listeners said that Pakhtuns are getting wrong projection in the media and that must change. Some of our audience emphasized that dramas

¹⁷ Sabawoon, Aman aw Khushaly, 10-04-2012.

¹⁸ Sabawoon, Hujra 11-04-2012.

¹⁹ Sabawoon , Nomwary Pukhtana , 14-10-11.

promoting peace and harmony in the Pakhtun society should be produced. In Pakhtun tradition, a Pakhtun even can go directly to his most bitter enemy if he convenes a Jirga. Life of the enemy becomes the utmost responsibility when he enters somebody's home; there his life is considered as sacred. Then going for Jirga is even more sacred in terms of maintaining the security of its people. There is no place for militancy in Pakhtun culture. But like Hujra system, Jirga has also lost its validity in Pakhtun society which was an easy way of justice and a quick resolution of conflicts. Therefore terrorism is actually direct assault on Pakhtun culture, said Noor Ulbasha.

During a discussion on the role of Pashto dramas in the promotion of peace, it was also viewed that terrorism and militancy have negatively affected Pakhtun literature and thinking of Pakhtun writers. People are afraid of militants and as well as the law enforcement agencies.²⁰ Such discussion was aimed to disseminate awareness among the Pakhtun society that they should not let miscreants to exploit them in the name of their culture.

Moreover, in the program some of the participants underlined the need for reviving concept of Sufism in the Pakhtun society as it promotes peace and tranquility. "I think sufiism can play a vital role in the establishment of a peaceful environment, said Mustafa Kamal.²¹ So listeners were reminded the legends of their society like Rehman Baba and other poets who gave a message of peace and unity in their poetry.

It was found that people still cherish their culture. As Mehboob from Charsada said, "I would like to talk about 'Panah' (shelter). Giving refuge to the people is our age old tradition and custom, but we should not give Panah to a thief, a traitor of our country, or someone who has negative designs against us. Rest giving refuge to the people in need is our honor and pride."

People praised Jirga system but also showed their reservations about the present day Jirga system which is managed by political agent. They viewed that because of the element of corruption, it is now losing its relevance.²³ Another caller Orang Khan Resident of Peshawar viewed differently that Jirga system is still very useful whereas the government

²⁰Sabawoon, Nomwary Pukhtana, 14-10-11.

²¹Sabawoon, Adab-ao-Saqafat, 10-03-2012.

²²Sabawoon, Hujra, 13-07-11.

²³ Sabawoon, Jirga Maraka, 25-07-11.

system is dysfunctional. It shows that the programs like Hujra and Jirga Maraka helped people think critically on the positive and negative aspects of change in Pakhtun culture.

The people liked cultural programs in which discussion was held on the marriage and death ceremonies. People called for more such programs to be held. A caller Tayab from Dalazak, Peshawar said, "Cultural programs are the need of day. Due to so-called liberal and pro-western sections in our society, our values have been drastically changed."²⁴ So many people criticized the negative change in the culture and urged for the restoration of actual cultural norms which are based on peaceful co-existence.

5. The Impact of Success Stories

Program Nomwary Pukhtana (famous Paktuns) got much popularity among the people of the targeted areas. It helped in changing the perceptions of the people. The program was informative as well as a source of inspiration for the people of the conflict stricken areas. This program was also helpful in correcting the wrong perceptions about the Pakhtun culture. Bringing iconic personalities to the program had positive impact on the minds of the listeners.

Listeners appreciated the program because of the courage and spirit of the successful personalities from Pakhtun society. They appreciated the efforts of these successful people who serve in building the Pakhtun nation. Zahid Islam from Pirpai said, "I would like to salute the courage and bravery of Main Iftekhar Hussain, that despite of threats and bomb blasts he came to take part in your show to talk to us. We need more elders like him who are brave and honest, watching such brave elders really encourage us as well." Likewise Amjad from Peshawar, a regular caller to the program, said he appreciates the spirit of the show because it is reviving his culture and is educating Pakhtun nation. "Our nation is very talented but they lack resources and guidance. Our nation can resolve their problems if organizations and Government could show them a path to follow."²⁵ It has great impact on the people's perceptions because of the distinguished personalities from different walks of life attended the programs by sharing their valuable thoughts with listeners about the prevailing problems in Pakhtun areas and its possible solutions. In this way the listeners were persuaded to show resolve and continue their hard work to achieve the set goals in life. Through this program, the panelists provided the people, a

²⁴ Sabawoon, Hujra, 08-08-2012.

²⁵ Sabawoon, Nomwary Pukhtana, 26-08-11.

much needed direction and guidance to get achievements in different walks of life, even if conditions are not favorable. Taj Muhammad from Tukhtabaz praised the program and said, "This program is very interesting which is giving us information and knowledge about our famous personalities and cultural values. Your program is used to preserve our culture and Pakhtun literature. Actually we have lack of knowledge and also do not respect our elders and teachers. We do not interact with skilled and experienced people. If we act upon advices and teachings of ancestors so we can come out of prevailing strained situation".²⁶ A caller Jannat Gul from Daki Miradad Pul and Shahid from Bajaur Agency also appreciated the program by viewing that it is promoting peace, tolerance, awareness among people. He said awareness, unity and consultation with elders are needed to deal with the prevailing problems.²⁷ The extent of the popularity of this program can be judged through people's appreciation of the successful women from their society who were guests of the radio programs.²⁸

Moreover, those people who were frustrated with corruption and nepotism due to which they lost confidence on hard work, panelists encouraged them and tried to convince them to continue their struggle. Zia caller from Mohmand Agency said, "I want to share my views that there is nepotism in every sector and merit is being ignored, owing to few of talented persons are deprived of grab key slots in public and social sector." Dr. Fakhrul Islam gave the youth a message of self determination, courage and constant struggle. He explained to the listeners that his constant struggle and support of his parents, made his life. He gave the youth a message to believe on hard work and not to think about the prevailing corruption and discriminatory practices in the country.²⁹

Similarly, a good response was received when students from FATA narrated their success stories who have achieved distinguished marks despite the bad security situation in their hometowns. A Caller Usman appreciated them and said, "These students have really got education in tough situation and secured top positions. Our youth have capability and rich potential to do wonders, but most of them do not take interest in education particularly in Pakhtun's society."³⁰

²⁶ Sabawoon, Nomwary Pukhtana, 23-03-2012.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Sabawoon, Nomawary Pukhtana 25-05-2012

²⁹ Sabawoon, Numawary Pukhtana 27-04-2012.

³⁰ Sabawoon, Nomawary Pukhtana, 06-07-2012.

Likewise, Maskeen a caller from Turay Danday, Peshawar considered this program a ray of hope. "Your programs are hope for peace, stability and prosperity. If such informative discussions are frequently carried out then it will have good impacts on already suffered minds of Pukhtuns. There are plenty of natural resources in our region, but are needed to be properly utilized so we would be economically stabilized."³¹Media is thus vital for the sensitization of these issues and the promotion of peace through programs like Sabawoon.

Conclusion

Maximum efforts have been made to enhance the quality of the content of the program by selecting sub-themes which identified various problems and issues of the society. The anchors of the program were well-prepared to deal with guests and handle live callers. Moreover, it also shows that guests are invited from all walks of life who had deep understanding of the topics discussed. The feedback on the overall impact of the program was heartening and one could discern change in perceptions though more efforts are needed to achieve desired results.

³¹ Sabawoon, Nomawary Pukhtana 04-05-2012



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