




Center for
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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES



Islamabad

Balochistan

Karachi

ARABIAN



**Center for
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Security
Studies**

January 2011

REPORTS

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Introduction:

The CRSS is pleased to present a collection of three research reports that deal with some of the most pressing contemporary issues facing Pakistan. One report lists the causes that impede stability of Pakistan and have been at the heart of the country's continuous crisis of governance and instability. The second looks at the crisis in the troubled province of Balochistan. The third report offers a brief overview of the socio-political dynamics of Pakistan's largest city – Karachi – on the Arabian sea.

These reports are an attempt to provide readers interested in the subject with an insight into the inter-play among various socio-political stakeholders in the society.

As far as the '*Causes of Instability in Pakistan*' is concerned, it lists several factors - the most important structural and triggering causes - that underlie Pakistan's continuous political turmoil and the economic crisis, accentuated by the questionable war against terrorism that was unleashed almost a decade ago.

This report draws a distinction between “structural” and “trigger” causes of instability. Based on a wide range of interviews with important stake-holders across the social, political, economic and military spectrum, the Centre was able to pinpoint the Objectives' Resolution, the unbalanced civil-military relations, absence of good governance, inter-provincial disharmony, the armed forces' predominance of foreign policy, the country's geography, the vague status of FATA, as some of the structural causes of instability. On the other hand, some of the events of international dimensions such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the post 9/11 war on terror, Pakistani military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa regions, the tendency among smaller/regional parties like the MQM and the JUI to exploit bigger parties in power-sharing stand out as trigger causes of instability.

(CRSS Research Fellow Amanullah Sipra worked as the main contributor to this report).

The second report - '*Balochistan – Pakistan's Festering Wound*' - is an endeavour to go beyond the shallow analysis and provide a critical insight into the socio-political dynamics of Pakistan's geographically largest province. Because of the raging Baloch insurgency, crime, an over-bearing presence of the security forces, and extremely poor governance, this province currently resembles a

cauldron of multiple conflicts and crises. This report explains some of the determinants of Balochistan's current crisis such as the Baloch nationalist insurgency, Pashtun nationalist undercurrents, tribalism, involvement of the security forces in socio-political issues and a spate of natural calamities (earthquakes/floods) in the last decade or so. They have resulted in diminishing public trust in the federal government and the army, mistrust of the provincial government, mounting resentment among Baloch nationalists in particular, a spate of political target-killing of settlers (Punjabi and Urdu-speaking communities), sectarian violence (largely targeting the Shi'a Muslims), breakdown of law and order, and the resultant socio-economic crisis, impacting the lives of common people.

The primary purpose of this write-up is to look at the Baloch nationalist narrative from a distance, and then attempt to sift facts from fiction.

(Imtiaz Gul was the major contributor to this report).

The last report titled '*Karachi – Seething under Violence and Terror*', critically analyzes the underlying causes of violence and instability in this mega city, which entail grave implications for the national economy, as well as for the local socio-political order.

Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and the commercial capital, has been in the grip of deadly violence for quite some time. The violence reached alarming levels during 2010, with over 1400 murders, mostly ranked as “target killings” by ethnic groups opposed to each other. Rivalries among major political parties, which vie for protecting and expanding their political and business interests, also lie at the heart of this violence. The chaos and mayhem thus created provides opportunities for other elements – sectarian and criminal groups – to pursue their agendas. These groups also enjoy political patronage that allows them a huge space to operate with impunity.

(Research Fellow Hira Kashif worked as the main contributor to this report).



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Causes of Instability in Pakistan

Abstract

In 2011, the 64th year of its existence, Pakistan remains politically unstable and economically crisis-ridden. It is passing through one of the most critical periods of its history. The crises the country faces today are multiple—ranging from a crisis of identity to basic ideology to governance to insecurity and economy. The cumulative impact of these crises is continuous uncertainty and instability. The objective of this report, therefore, is to identify:

- a) Structural and
 - b) Trigger factors
- behind, or responsible for, this instability.

Some of the most distinguished analysts and commentators gathered at a round-table discussion, arranged by the Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] on January 16, 2011, also concluded that in the absence of a consistent policy based on a vision to rectify these structural causes, and effectively address some of the most important trigger causes, stability and progress will remain an elusive dream.

The group comprised political and defense analysts – ambassadors Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Ayaz Wazir, Arif Ayub, Lt General [Retd] Talat Masood, Lt General [Retd] Asad Durrani, Lt General [Retd] Amjad Hussain, Air Vice Marshal [Retd] Shahzad Chaudhry, Professor Salma Malik, Zakir Jauhar, Imtiaz Gul, economists Mosharraf Zaidi and Syed Hussaini, and social activist Tahira Abdullah.

Participants warned that consequent upon the failure of its institutions and few expectations from the ruling elite, Pakistan might face a mass uprising – implosion—in the next 5-10 years, or even sooner. The group comprising former diplomats, senior retired army officials, analysts and academics, called on all the key pillars of the state to develop a clear vision for the future of Pakistan, failing which the country will continue sliding into political, social, economic and financial chaos and anarchy.

According to the learned group's assessment, if the forces of status quo continued to refuse and resist change, the common person, walled in by the expedience and indifference of the ruling elite, would one day surely

explode.

"Along with the judiciary, the media and the rights-based groups in civil society, intellectuals and academics also need to work in tandem to build pressure on the government to deliver", the experts opined. "The basic necessities will have to be provided to the poor, who otherwise will take the extreme step."

The group agreed on the close nexus that exists between rising poverty and militancy, extremism and terrorism, and the need to tackle them together on an urgent basis. One of the participants pointed out that absolute poverty in Pakistan is now measured at 51% (Oxford Poverty Research), while up to 74% of the country's population survives on less than \$2 a day.

"On the economic front, corruption in the public sector will have to be controlled and the existing limited revenue base will have to be expanded for propping up the national economy, which is on the verge of default," the experts stressed, adding those living below the poverty line will have to be provided with the basic needs, social protection and safety nets; the educational curricula will have to be reformed; and universal, free and compulsory education and employable skills will have to be provided to the huge youth cohort, along with employment generation on an urgent basis. The feminization of poverty (3:1 ratio, according to the GoP data) will have to be addressed head-on, along with genuine land reforms and much higher investments in irrigation and agriculture (especially basic food crops), in order to prevent mass hunger, suicides, anarchy and chaos in the society.

The group called for urgently-needed public sector reforms a) to stop wasteful expenditures and corruption, and b) to increase productivity.

The group of opinion makers warned that to prevent implosion, the country will have to be transformed from the current National Security State to a Human Security State, in which the entire security establishment serves honestly and transparently.

Describing American, NATO and ISAF presence in Afghanistan and the CIA-operated drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas as a major cause of unrest within the country, the participants said that the United States cannot shift

the responsibility of its failure in Afghanistan to Pakistan. This also requires our policy makers to tailor foreign and military policies based on national interest—as resonated by a representative parliament—instead of acting upon foreign dictation.

SECTION I

Structural Causes of Instability

1. Objectives Resolution:

The ideology behind the creation of Pakistan remains subject to whether the objective was to form an Islamic state or win a place for the Muslims of British India to live a better life. A clear division exists among scholars on this question, keeping the nation confused on the very basis of Pakistan.

Many say that the movement for Pakistan was based on the single word 'Islam' while there are others who believe that the slogan of Islam brought people together on a platform to achieve economic betterment, which had been denied to them in the British India. In agreement to the latter argument, Shahid Javed Barki, former federal finance minister and renowned economist says, "The Pakistan movement may have used the idiom of Islam as a way of drawing mass support; it was not a movement for creating an Islamic entity but an attempt to secure a better economic future for the Muslims of British India."¹

The best answer to this question can be extracted from the views of Muhammad Ali Jinnah - the father of the nation - which he expressed in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947. In this speech, he actually portrayed the picture of Pakistan he had envisioned during his peaceful struggle for winning a separate country for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Making a reference to the religion-based status of people in Pakistan, he said, "You are free. You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques, or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state."²

The Objectives Resolution - adopted on March 12, 1949 by the Constituent Assembly - on the other hand proclaimed that the future constitution of Pakistan would not be modeled entirely on a European pattern, but on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam.³

Most liberal Pakistanis are of the opinion that the Islamic nature of the state of Pakistan, enshrined in the Objectives Resolution is one of the structural causes of the religiously-colored conflict in Pakistan today. In the words of Khalid Aziz, noted scholar and former Chief Secretary of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, "Pakistan did not get into the terrible state because of 9/11. The seeds were sown in March 1949. We not only encouraged Jihadism but by changing the laws and school syllabus we opted to become an Islamic orthodox state." ⁴

The scholars who believe that the Objectives Resolution was in contravention to the Quaid-e-Azam's August 11 speech, in which he had announced that the state would not be partial to any community on the basis of majority cite Justice Munir report – prepared by Justice Muhammad Munir and Justice Malik Rustam Kayani on Punjab Disturbances of 1953 caused by the Majlis-e-Amal's ultimatum that Ahmadiya community be declared as non-Muslim minority within a month. The report highlights some basic points, which appear to be contradictory between the Objectives Resolution and Jinnah's vision:

- ∅ The Quaid-e-Azam has said that in the new state sovereignty would rest with the people. The Resolution starts with the statement that sovereignty rests with Allah. This concept negates the basic idea of modern democracy that there are no limits on the legislative power of a representative assembly.
- ∅ There is a reference to the protection of the minorities of their right to worship and practice their religion, whereas the Quaid-e-Azam had stated that there would be no minorities on the basis of religion.
- ∅ The distinction between religious majorities and minorities takes the right of equality away from the minority, which again is a basic idea of modern democracy.
- ∅ The provision relating to Muslims being enabled to lead their life according to Islam is opposed to the conception of a secular state.
- ∅ If during Quaid-e-Azam's life, Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister, had even attempted to introduce the Objectives Resolution of the kind that he got through the Assembly, the Quaid-e-Azam would never have given his assent to it. ⁵

Ø In a debate with former Punjab Governor Shahid Hamid on Objectives Resolution, Islamabad-based lawyer Yasser Latif Hamdani said that the Quaid-e-Azam throughout his life 'had fought against majoritarianism and therefore he would never have agreed to its blatant expression.'⁶

The emphasis on religion as a political tool became more overt after Gen Zia-ul-Haq seized power in a July 1977 coup. The preamble to the Constitution says that the minorities are to be allowed to freely profess and practice their religion. However, in the annexure inserted by Zia-ul-Haq's Order 14 of 1985, the word 'freely' is missing.

General Zia-ul-Haq's support for the Jihad in Afghanistan and the pursuit for perpetuating his rule; Zia and his cronies began propagating an Islamic identity with two serious consequences: firstly, by supporting Jihad, the regime allowed the creation of private militias, with close links to the military. These militias eventually became important foreign policy tools in the conflict with India as well. Secondly, the reliance on Islamist ethos worked to the detriment of Pakistan's sub-continental cultural links, paving the way for a culture of intolerance and sectarian strife. Communities that had been living together for centuries now became intolerant of each other.

The rise of Islamist forces – Talibanization – because of Pakistan's support for the militants in Kashmir and the Afghan Taliban is, therefore, seen as a primary structural cause of the current conflict, something that continuously undermined civilian governance and authority on the one hand, and encouraged religious obscurantism on the other.

1.1. The Question of Minorities:

The Justice Munir report, as mentioned earlier, said that the Objectives Resolution has a “reference to the protection of the minorities of their right to worship and practice their religion, whereas the Quaid-e-Azam had stated that there would be no minorities on the basis of religion.”⁷

Noted historian Shahid Saeed says that “with the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the fate of minorities in this country was sealed forever and the

dream of the state envisaged in Jinnah's August 11, 1947 speech had died.”⁸

Setting aside the debate over the question whether or not the non-Muslims in Pakistan should be dubbed as religious minorities in the light of the Quaid's vision, even the guarantee given to the people belonging to minorities under Article 20 of the Constitution 'to freely profess, practice and propagate their religions' remains questionable. The Second Amendment and Ordinance XX prohibit the Ahmadis, religious community declared as non-Muslim in 1973 constitution, from practicing their religion openly.

“With the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the fate of minorities in this country was sealed forever.”

“The Hindu community has faced constant harassment and the number of forced conversions in Sindh has been constantly on the rise. The Christian community faces social barriers of enormous proportions and has been the target of innumerable terrorist attacks too”, says Shahid Saeed, adding, “The anti-Ahmedi agitation of 1953 started the wave of mass harassment and persecution that continues to this day. Temples have been razed, churches have been burnt and poor people lynched and killed in the name of religion.”⁹

The annual US State Department Report on Global Religious Freedom, which was released by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington on November 18, 2010, says that the organized violence against minorities has increased in Pakistan. Speaking about the report, Michael Posner, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour said, “There have been attacks against Christians, against the Ahmadis; and there are still discriminatory laws on the books, blasphemy laws, anti-Ahmedi laws. We're raising these issues with the government of Pakistan”.¹⁰

In Pakistan, the specification of janitorial jobs for Christians exposes the declaration made in the Constitution that all the citizens of the country have equal rights. The Ahmadis have not been given the right to name their town Rabwah, as it has now been renamed as Chenab Nagar. How can minorities be expected to be useful citizens of the country when there is a

wide gap created by religious and social barriers between the Muslims and the non-Muslims?

Referring to the frequent terror incidents against minority communities in the country, Babar Sattar, eminent expert on law, questions “how many cases of violence and arson targeting Christian households will it take for us to realize that we have become a society where even the right to life of those professing a faith other than Islam remains at the mercy of angry mobs? How many false blasphemy charges and asylum petitions in foreign countries will make us realize that we have institutionalized religious persecution in Pakistan?”¹¹

“How many false blasphemy charges and asylum petitions in foreign countries will make us realize that we have institutionalized religious persecution in Pakistan?”

2. Imbalanced Civil-Military Relations:

The relationship between Pakistan's political forces and military authorities has never been cordial, thus posing a constant threat to the country's stability. The four military regimes—1958-69 of General Ayub Khan, 1969-71 of General Yahya Khan, 1977-88 of General Zia-ul Haq and 1999-2008 of General Pervez Musharraf—have earned the institution a virtually undefined and unchecked authority in the country. The army's extremely predominant and central role in the country's politics has created a situation in which the national interest of Pakistan i.e. foreign policy and the security priorities are defined almost exclusively by the army – largely in the context of national security.

An environment of confrontation and acrimony among political parties did not let institutions and political process flourish in the country. Politicians never developed a consensus to halt the army's march towards civilian power; they instead have always been in efforts to develop closeness with the military authorities for dislodging their adversaries from government.

The military's position in the country's political arena got further strengthened by a few geo-strategic factors including status-quo in the regional security environment even after the end of the Cold War, the 9/11-

triggered war in Afghanistan, military operations against the Taliban in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and Malakand/Swat, and the ever-persisting Pak-India tension and arms race between the two rival countries.

During the course of the country's history, army chiefs, besides establishing direct military rules, also exercised their influence to resolve differences among politicians or avert national crises on a number of occasions. "They supported the President in removing civilian governments in August 1990, April 1993 and November 1996, having concluded that these governments could no longer ensure domestic peace, stability and order. In December 1997, on the other hand, the Army ultimately supported the Prime Minister in his bitter confrontation with the President and the judiciary."¹² In March 2009, Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani mediated between President Asif Zardari and the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif to resolve the issue of judges' restoration, who had been deposed in effect to General Musharraf's imposition of emergency on November 3, 2007.

Intelligence agencies – particularly the ISI [Inter Services Intelligence] – are also used for influencing political process in the country. As the MI [Military Intelligence] performs within the military, the ISI and the IB [Intelligence Bureau] have a role in political maneuvering of the country. The agencies keep on monitoring important political figures, particularly the dissident ones. "Since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the MI and the ISI have focused more on domestic Pakistani affairs, the latter working to implement the military's political agenda."¹³

The ISI formed the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] – an alliance of right-wing political parties – to counter Pakistan People's Party [PPP] in the 1988 elections. Similarly, Major General [retired] Ihtesham Zameer, head of the ISI's political cell in 2002 elections, confessed later in an interview that they had rigged the polls to ensure victory for the King's [Musharraf] party, Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e Azam [PML-Q].¹⁴

During the last few months of General Musharraf's regime, the Pakistan Army became extremely unpopular among people; and the factors which took this otherwise highly respected institution to this position include: Musharraf's prolonged regime, creation of PML-Q, the Red Mosque

operation, failure to check militancy and stop US drone attacks in the tribal region etc. However, since Gen Musharraf handed over the ceremonial command baton to his successor General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani on November 27, 2007, the army's image has considerably improved because of some bold steps taken by General Kayani.

Immediately after assuming the office of the Chief of the Army Staff [COAS], General Kayani issued orders for calling back all the military officers serving in civil government organizations. He later directed army officers to keep themselves aside of civilian affairs. The army's successful operations in Swat in May 2009 and another one in South Waziristan in October 2009, and its active participation in the country's worst floods during July-August 2010 have helped rehabilitate the armed forces image in the public.

Although the army has considerably regained its lost respect, many security analysts believe, its involvement in civilian matters has increased. Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, a renowned security analyst says, "the army is more deeply involved now than a decade ago in support activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief and rescue operations after natural disasters; the use of its organizational and technological resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking."¹⁵

Regarding the military's current status vis-à-vis civilian affairs, Dr Rizvi says, "the military elite concedes that governance is not one of its primary tasks, and gives this right to the civilian leaders. But the military leadership also firmly believes that it must play an autonomous role, with input into important political decisions and that it must mediate when political competition between civilian groups appears disorderly. The elite are prepared to support a government as long as it ensures stability and effectively performs its duties towards the citizenry and the state, and does not threaten military interests."

The country's stability would obviously remain shaky for quite some time because of a) the military's repeated interventions and b) the failure of the politicians to sincerely fulfill their obligations as public representatives. It is either a matter of getting power, strengthening their rule or dislodging their

adversaries from the government, politicians every time saw towards the military for help; instead of relying on a political and democratic process. After every coup, numerous 'seasoned' politicians would appear before the dictator submitting their services to 'serve the nation'.

The army's belief that it alone can protect the interests of the country will never let a genuine political process flourish in the country. Politicians have to be given confidence and sufficient time to learn from their repeated mistakes.

The army's belief that it alone can protect the interests of the country will never let a genuine political process flourish in the country.

Recognizing the army's loyalty to the country, former ambassador Zafar Hilaly advises the most disciplined institution of the state to remain out of the political circle saying, "some of the most honorable and brave men in Pakistan wear the uniform of the armed forces. Their bravery, skill and their ceaseless sacrifices have kept Pakistan safe. However, what they cannot and must not do is to think that they have a monopoly of wisdom and therefore know best. Costly mistakes and blunders have been committed as a result. We cannot afford to repeat them and ignore, during the decision-making process, the views of those who have dedicated their entire lives to mastering their profession."¹⁶

3. Absence of Good Governance:

Good governance has so far been a wish in Pakistan. Almost every government promised to introduce good governance in the country, but could hardly materialize its words. The key elements that ensure good governance – participation, consensus, accountability and transparency – were found lacking in the working of every government – civil or military – in Pakistan.

The factors behind failure in achieving good governance include institutional deficiencies, corruption, deficient rule of law, incapacities of public sector personnel, lack of political will within the ruling civilian elite, flawed taxation system, and the ever rising inflation.

3.1. Institutional Deficiencies:

Institutions in Pakistan were not allowed to flourish mainly because of repeated military interventions and non-seriousness of politicians. Even after over six decades, the key institutions of the country stand on shaky foundations, common Pakistanis therefore remaining wary of the state institutions.

Explaining Pakistan parliament's performance, Mushtaq Ahmed, a senior official of Pakistan Senate says, "more than 80 per cent of the questions raised are killed in the speaker's chamber, lapse, go unanswered or are transferred due to the absence of the ministers concerned. Motions, call-attention notices and points of orders go unheard, while debates on vital issues bear no fruit. The chairs' directives and ministers' undertakings are rarely implemented, while the government decides to carry on with parliamentary proceedings even when there is no quorum. How, then, is an MP to prove his or her worth on the floor of parliament to the voters?"¹⁷

Regarding seriousness of the members of parliament to their primary duty of attending parliament's sessions for legislation, Mr Ahmed says, "the rules allow an MP to ask eight questions a day, which could potentially amount to over 2,000 legal questions a day. In practice, however, the total number of questions in the admitted list does not exceed 40 or 50 in the National Assembly and 20 to 40 in the Senate. A decline in members' interest in the proceedings of parliament was witnessed during the earlier regime when, according to the Four-Year Performance of the National Assembly of Pakistan 2002-2006, published by the NA Secretariat, out of the 41,000 questions received between 2003 and 2006, only 4,500 questions were answered. The ratio of rejected motions is very high — over 90 per cent in the National Assembly."¹⁸

As for the judiciary, although the institution has considerably regained its lost prestige after Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry said no to the then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf for submitting resignation on March 9, 2007, yet litigants are still languishing for years-long delay in decision of their cases.

“According to the government's Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP), more than 1.1 million cases are pending with country's lower courts as of May 2010, while 150,000 cases await the attention of four provincial high courts. The Supreme Court's backlog of cases is about 17,500.”¹⁹

The perception that the judiciary has always facilitated and legitimized military dictators has been greatly rectified with Justice Chaudhry's efforts for establishing the rule of law; however, the tussle between the judiciary and the current PPP government, particularly on the issues of implementation of the NRO [National Reconciliation Ordinance] verdict (which also affects President Zardari) and the 18th constitutional amendment, has raised many questions in people's minds.

The executive in Pakistan, unfortunately, has rarely been at ease with other institutions like judiciary, presidency, military, media etc. The potential of every government gets exhausted on ensuring its safety in the face of ever-existing threats from the office of president, army chief or chief justice. For some years, media too has been in the field putting constant challenges to the government to survive.

The four democratic governments succeeding 11-year General Zia-ul-Haq regime [1977-88] got dislodged as a result of the executive's tension with either president or army chief. And unfortunately, the incumbent democratic coalition government, secured by democratic forces after about nine years of General Pervez Musharraf's military rule [1999-2008], has also been in constant struggle to save itself. If the PPP government gets some respite from the Supreme Court on the issues of NRO judgment implementation and the passage of the 18th amendment by parliament, the coalition partners like Muttahidda Qaumi Movement [MQM] and Jamiat Ulema-e Islam-Fazal-ur Rehman [JUI-F] keep creating one crisis after the other to blackmail the senior coalition partner.

The departments of police and accountability have a key role in bringing good governance to a country. As for the Pakistan police, according to the National Corruption Perception Survey 2010 conducted by Transparency International Pakistan [TIP], police tops the 10 most corrupt departments of the government, and this position has been retained by it in four such TIP

surveys in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010.²⁰

A media report summarizes the effectiveness of accountability in Pakistan by stating, “the accountability apparatus put in place by the previous regimes through executive orders and ordinances, unfortunately was extensively used to target the opponents of the regimes or the political foes rather than the earnest efforts to ensure across the board accountability. In certain cases it also endorsed and strengthened avenues of corruption in the name of accountability. The concept of plea bargain practiced by the NAB [National Accountability Bureau] during the previous [Musharraf] regime is a class example of this mockery of accountability. These discriminatory accountability initiatives are still casting their evil shadow on our political horizon and obstructing the endeavours to improve the system of governance.”²¹

Police tops the 10 most corrupt departments of the government, and this position has been retained by it in four such TIP surveys in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010.

The TIP claims that it identified corruption cases worth Rs 300 billion in different federal government departments in 2010, but the NAB did not respond to even a single case.²² TIP Chairman Adil Gilani expressed his disappointment that there was no effective accountability apparatus presently operational in Pakistan due to which corruption was on the rise.²³

The two main watchdogs that make the government ensure good governance – media and opposition – have also not been on the ideal path. The state and the private media appear to be working in opposite directions. The private television channels are always in search of sensational stories which put the government in a tight spot, while the state-sponsored electronic media keeps singing praise of the government. The primary responsibility – reporting, analysing and safeguarding people's interests – goes lost somewhere in pursuit of the public and the private media's respective self-serving objectives.

Opposition in Pakistan has so far had only one objective – to dislodge the government by hook or by crook. Instead of making any constructive

criticism and letting the government complete its term, politicians in opposition would remain all the time busy in maneuvering to get power. In order to bring government of their adversaries to an end, they also did not feel any harm in getting close to the army for inviting a coup. The current leader of the opposition in National Assembly, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, who allegedly represents a friendly opposition, also made a call for mid-term polls during his speech in the National Assembly on November 1, 2010.

3.2. Corruption:

Despite making tall claims and establishing various anti-corruption bodies in different periods, governments in Pakistan failed to rid the country of corruption, letting the menace persist as a major obstacle in the way of national progress. Corruption upsets the socio-economic balance of the society, and enlarges the gap between people living off lawful means and those involved in illegal practices. The overall disappointment prevailing in the society caused by unequal distribution of resources for one reason or the other can jolt the very foundations of the country.

Besides causing a rise of 120 percent in food prices within a year, according to Adil Gilani, “the perception of corruption had caused a drop in foreign direct investment to \$2.21 billion during 2009-10 from \$3.71 billion the previous year. The foreign debt increased from \$40 billion in 1999 to \$46 billion in 2008 and \$53 billion this year.”²⁴

In 1996, Pakistan was ranked as the second most corrupt country of the world. The situation, however, later improved and in 2009, the country was placed at 42nd position. The TIP findings disclose that corruption in Pakistan during 2010 increased by 14 percent [from Rs 195 billion (\$2.3 b) to Rs 223 billion (\$2.6 b)], taking the country to the 34th position.²⁵

Ironically, police – one of the most important agencies to check corruption – stands atop among 10 most corrupt government organizations. The others orderly follow as power sector, land administration, education, local government, judiciary, health, taxation, custom, and tendering and contracting. The judiciary, which was the 7th most corrupt department in 2009 has become more corrupt in 2010, attaining the sixth position.²⁶

In Pakistan, corruption has been an established phenomenon, existing in one form or the other across the country. The four democratic governments from 1990 to 1999 were removed mainly on corruption charges. During his nine-year rule, President Musharraf reportedly received \$10 billion in aid from the United States under the head of the ongoing war against militancy and did not inform the public about spending of the amount.

Since the PPP-led coalition formed the government in March 2008, several mega corruption scams have surfaced, prompting even the Supreme Court into preventive legal action. Under the rental power projects – the so far biggest corruption scandal of the PPP government – “the government awarded 14 contracts in violation of the PPRA [Public Procurement Regulatory Authority] rules of 2004 as also stated in the ADB [Asian Development Bank] report, causing a loss of over US\$ 2 billion”, said Adil Gilani.²⁷

A news report by Washington-based senior Pakistani journalist, Shaheen Sehbai, published in *The News* on November 3, 2010, disclosed that President Asif Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, Governor State Bank and some others were holding negotiations with some 20 top corporate bosses and lobbyists of two of the world's largest gold mining groups “to hand over one of the world's biggest gold and copper treasures found in Balochistan at Reko Diq, worth \$260 billion, to their companies and for peanuts.”²⁸

Giving an estimate of the worth of these gold and copper resources located in Chaghi district of the province, Mr Shehbai said, “the Reko Diq scandal is equal to 260 steel mills valued at one billion dollars each or 570 steel mills at \$350 million each, the price at which PSM [Pakistan Steel Mills] was being sold by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz before it was stopped by the Supreme Court.”

A subsequent news report, however, stated that “the Executive Committee of National Economic Council (ECNEC) has approved the PC-1 of a project submitted by the Government of Balochistan to undertake the processing, smelting and refining operations of Reko Diq gold and copper mines within the country.”²⁹ According to the report, the decision came as “some sections of the establishment told the political leadership that any attempt

to sell national assets to foreigners would be resisted”.

Doubts over handing over of this project to the provincial government still persist as the Ministry of Finance has not yet announced its decision on it. Secondly, the Tethyan Copper Company (TCC) Pakistan, a consortium of Chilean and Canadian companies, has also made “a revised offer to secure mining lease and production sharing agreement with the provincial government for commercial production there.”³⁰ The Supreme Court is currently hearing at least three petitions clubbed together, challenging the award of the Reko Diq contract to TCC.

3.3. Deficient Rule of Law:

Rule of law is the primary pre-requisite for good governance and justice delivery but until the restoration of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Chaudhry on March 16, 2009, the judicial system and the police department were badly tainted and considered corrupt. The ruling elite's (politicians, generals, and bureaucracy) contempt for the rule of law has been so pervasive that common Pakistani has little hope of getting justice. It was one of the major contributory factors to the surge in militancy in Malakand and FATA.

In an assessment of the state of rule of law in Pakistan, Erum Haider, research analyst at Jinnah Institute – an Islamabad-based think tank – says, “no society has ever attained a perfect realization of the rule of law. But when plotting 35 countries on an objective scale, Pakistan is dangerously close to perfect failure, scoring last on three out of nine distinct metrics of a just and fair society.”

Pakistan scored the worst of 35 countries on corruption, fundamental rights and access to civil justice.

“Pakistan scored the worst of 35 countries on corruption, fundamental rights and access to civil justice. That's the good news. The bad news is that it failed to beat Ghana, with a GDP per capita that's nearly half of Pakistan's; and Liberia, which has been under civil war since it came into existence.”³¹

Concluding her paper titled 'Rule of Law', Ms Haider says, “the dismal state of access to justice in Pakistan is summed up by the fact that nearly half of all crimes go unreported. Of the crimes that are settled by court lawsuit, over seventy percent are simply never resolved.”

3.4. Incapacities of Public Sector Personnel:

In Pakistan, little importance is given to enhancing the capacity of government officials who are responsible for running the system of the state. Except the key civil service officers' cadre, no other personnel are imparted with any regular sort of training from their departments. Instead of adapting to new technologies and mechanisms for bringing overall improvement in the working of a department, the old traditional practices are preferred to be continued.

The civil servants who are professionally trained to run the state system are usually more loyal to the sitting government than the state. Willingly or unwillingly, they have to secure the interest of the minister and the party in the government; sometimes even at the cost of the benefit of people and the state.

Non-observance of merit in recruitments and politically-influenced appointments in public sector organizations also bring the efficiency of government departments down. People's disillusionment of government departments in such an environment can only lead to weakening of the state institutions.

3.5. Lack of Political Will within Ruling Elite:

Able and sincere political leadership has been a problem of Pakistan since day one, which still remains to be addressed. Critics believe that Pakistan has a lot within itself to become a progressive welfare state; however, what it lacks is the political will, which is becoming the main obstacle in the development of the country in every sector.

In his weekly column in daily *The News* on October 17, 2010, Dr Farrukh Saleem, a renowned political analyst says, “clearly, the gulf between the top

PPP leadership and Pakistani public opinion is as wide as the Indus River's basin (approximately 450,000 square miles). Admittedly, the PPP is the largest political entity on the face of this country. It surely has the resources as well as the capacity to turn this country around. What is missing is the realisation (sic) that the country is being led in the wrong direction. What is missing is the willingness to turn things around.”³²

Instead of focusing on the common man issues, rulers in Pakistan who mostly belong to the elite of the society, remain busy in giving protection to the interests of the small wealthy class.

Roedad Khan, a former federal secretary, points to this bitter fact observing “the power of a small elite which possesses most of the wealth appears to be greater than the power of the government elected by the people, presumably to run the country in the interest of all the citizens. This group is determined to preserve its privileged position and thus, its money. In effect, there is a virtual alliance between the possessor-class and the government, which it manipulates through its control of the parliament, the press, the financing of political parties, and the handling of its vast funds to influence the fiscal policies of government.”³³

3.6. Flawed Taxation System:

Pakistan's tax system is flawed and leaking because of factors such as tax evasion, inequitable tax imposition and limited tax base. The wealthy elite that has larger share to pay to the national kitty successfully keeps itself safe from tax payment. Most of the political leaders pay nominal tax just to fill in documents. One of the largest sectors in the country - agriculture - remains out of the tax net.

Slating the existing tax system in Pakistan the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “it's absolutely unacceptable for those with means in Pakistan not to be doing their fair share to help their own people while taxpayers in Europe, the United States and other contributing countries are all chipping in.”

“The most important step Pakistan can take is to pass meaningful reforms to

expand its tax base," Clinton said in a public statement as she joined the European Union's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton in pledging assistance to Pakistan in Brussels."³⁴

According to a report on Pakistan's tax system published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Pakistan has one of the lowest effective tax rates in the world, equal to about nine per cent of the value of the country's economy. In contrast, the US equivalent is more than three times as high at about 28 per cent.

One of the reasons Pakistan's rate is so low is because many people avoid paying taxes. Fewer than two per cent of the country's 175 million citizens pay any income tax. Also, some sectors of the economy like agriculture — a major money maker for the elite — are totally exempt from tax, and the rich have pushed to keep it that way."³⁵

Ishrat Hussain, former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, estimates that "better enforcement of current tax policies and the elimination of key exemptions should produce an effective tax rate of 15 per cent – generating nearly \$10 billion in additional revenue per year."³⁶

3.7. Rising Inflation:

The ever rising inflation in Pakistan has made the life of people, particularly the poor lot, difficult. As the essential household items are becoming inaccessible for the poor people of the society due to the constant soaring prices, the trend of committing suicide and street crimes is increasing.

The inflation rate in Pakistan was last reported at 15.48 percent in November of 2010. From 2003 until 2010, the average inflation rate in Pakistan was 10.15 percent reaching an historical high of 25.33 percent in August of 2008 and a record low of 1.41 percent in July of 2003.³⁷

The prices of petroleum products were revised 12 times in 2010, which also affected the prices of daily necessities like clothes, shoes, jackets, sweaters, milk, and other things.

Contrary to the current government's claims of controlling price-hike, the inflation rate has constantly been on the rise. According to a latest report released by Pakistan's Federal Statistical Department, the overall inflation ratio on all items has increased by 15 percent during the last one year. The prices of petroleum products were changed 12 times in 2010, which also affected the prices of daily necessities like clothes, shoes, jackets, sweaters, milk, and other things.³⁸

The reshuffle of economic team again and again by the government proves that it failed in managing financial matters of the country, sending a message of uncertainty to financial markets and international lending agencies. During three years, the Finance Ministry has seen four ministers, five finance secretaries and three State Bank governors. The finance ministers include Ishaq Dar, Syed Naveed Qamar, Shaukat Tarin and Abdul Hafeez Sheikh [present]; the finance secretaries are: Dr. Waqar Masud (three times and also present), Furrukh Qayyum and Salman Siddique; and the three SBP governors are: Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, Syed Saleem Raza and Shahid H. Kardar [present].

4. Inter-Provincial Disharmony:

Disproportionate and unequal resource-distribution among the four provinces has been one of the major causes of instability in Pakistan. Sub-nationalist sentiment (Baloch nationalist movements, demands for a Seraiki province (southern Punjab) and the recent protests to press for a Hazara province are all but a few manifestations of the economic inequities that have stoked anti-Islamabad sentiment. Ethno-linguistic diversity and Islamabad's inability to develop a national politics create stakes for all groups, including differing tribes and classes.

4.1. Distribution of Resources Among Provinces:

The National Finance Commission [NFC] Award – a formula to distribute resources among provinces by the federal government to be redefined after every five years theoretically-- has been a matter of contention among the four provinces. Punjab, the largest province of the country in terms of population, has held the position that population should serve as the basis

of the formula, while the other three provinces - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Balochistan - would seek importance for the revenue by each province, level of poverty in smaller provinces and some other related factors.

The 7th NFC Award, which has been eventually agreed upon among provinces after 13 years and signed by the four provincial finance ministers and the federal government representative at a ceremony at Gwadar Port in Balochistan on December 30, 2009, declares that population will serve 82 percent, poverty 10.3 percent, revenue five percent (2.5 percent cent each for revenue for generation and collection) and area 2.7 percent as the basis for the distribution formula.

According to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, "The outstanding issues like adoption of multiple criteria for the distribution of resources, payment of net hydel profit to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, the issue of distribution of gas development surcharge and imposition of GST [General Sales Tax] on services have been resolved amicably."³⁹ Nonetheless, it is to be seen whether the new NFC formula and the other confidence building initiatives serve the purpose reducing the existing trust-deficit between the federation and the provinces.

4.2. Provincial Autonomy under the 18th Amendment:

The repeal of the Concurrent List from the Constitution through the 18th Amendment on April 8, 2010 is supposed to promise more freedom of action and financial resources to the provinces. To follow-up on its promise, the federal government allocated 52 percent additional resources to the

The question remains whether the provinces will come up to the expectations and deliver to their people.

four provinces in the budget for 2010-2011, effective from July 1, implying that the provinces could now have more financial resources as well as the ability to generate their own resources.

But the 18th Amendment, private sector consultants to the government fear, may also become a cause or trigger for instability and obstruction in the way of governance. While sectors such as health, population,

education, industries, and agriculture are supposed to be directly handled by the provinces, the provincial governments, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan don't have the requisite capacity to handle these issues by themselves.

Under the current 7th NFC Award, the power to impose General Sales Tax [GST] on services has been given to the provinces, and the share of the provinces in the divisible pool has been increased to over 56 per cent. However, the question remains whether the provinces will come up to the expectations and deliver to their people.

4.3. Nationalist Movements:

Besides the nationalist movement in Balochistan, which existed in one form or the other in the province since the country's inception and has today turned into a movement for independence, the nationalist movements for separate provinces of Seraiki in the south of Punjab and Hazara in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have also been going on in Pakistan.

4.3. (a) Balochistan Movement:

Shortly after Pakistan's creation in 1947, the Army of the Islamic Republic had to subdue insurgents based in Kalat from attempting to secede in 1948 and 1958. The movement gained momentum during the 1960s, and amid consistent political disorder, the government ordered a military operation into the region in 1973, assisted by Iran, and inflicted heavy casualties on the separatists. The movement was largely quelled after the imposition of martial law in 1977, after which Balochistan witnessed significant development. After insurgency groups again mushroomed in the 1990s and 2000s, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the war in North-West Pakistan exacerbated the conflict, most recently manifested in the killings of non-Baloch settlers in the province by separatists since 2006.⁴⁰

The conflict between Baloch nationalists and Islamabad became more severe after the killing of elderly Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006 and Balach Marri on November 20, 2007 in military operations. Baloch leaders having a claim that their province has been kept

deprived of its due share by the federation are today open in the field to speak against Islamabad and particularly the establishment in the strongest possible words.

Portraying a picture of Balochistan, Muhammad Akhtar Mengal, a former chief minister of Balochistan and President of Balochistan National Party says, "The appalling poverty, desolation, unemployment, worsening health conditions, malnourishment, tribal infighting, mounting corruption, support for drug barons and religious fundamentalism in historically peaceful and secular-oriented Baloch society are the domino effects of system policies imposed by the Islamic super-establishment."

He goes on to declare, "The Baloch people have lost trust and hope that Pakistan's inbuilt discriminatory system will provide them any justice and punish or discourage perpetrators of crimes against humanity. However, the international community and international organizations, including human rights mechanisms' negligence and silence are adding to the Baloch miseries."⁴¹

"The Baloch people have a simple demand of independence."

A section of the Baloch nationalist leaders is even demanding independence. Mehran Baloch, the youngest son of Baloch leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, says "The Baloch people have a simple demand of independence."⁴² Mehran Baloch - a Baloch people's representative at the U.N. Human Rights Council for 10 years starting from June 2010 - also urged the Western world for direct talks with Baloch leaders as he said Islamabad does not represent popular Baloch aspirations.⁴³

During the recent years, violence in Balochistan increased manifold. On one side, common people and particularly educationists are being targeted by the allegedly banned Baloch Liberation Army [BLA], Balochistan Liberation United Front [BLUF] and some other similar militant outfits, while on the other, Baloch nationalist leaders are also being killed; and the responsibility for this is being put on the army by the nationalists. A large number of Baloch people including women have reportedly gone missing for some

years. Claims regarding the figure of the missing persons vary; however, the provincial Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani has confirmed that 800 Baloch people are missing.⁴⁴

In its 15 December 2010 edition, daily *Dawn* quotes a Human Rights Watch report on Balochistan killings as disclosing that at least 22 teachers and other education personnel have been killed by suspected militants between January 2008 and October 2010. Besides, 2010 saw the killing of prominent Baloch leader Habib Jalib, followed five days later by the killing of another political leader Liaquat Mengal. In 2009, the bodies of three prominent leaders Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Lala Mir and Mohammad Baloch were found in Turbat.⁴⁵

With a view to bring Balochistan at par with other areas of the country, the government introduced the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package [beginning of the rights of Balochistan] on November 24, 2009. The package in broad sense contains “an offer of dialogue with 'estranged brothers', promises of probes into political murders, army pullout from a key area, halt to new cantonments and more local control on resources.”⁴⁶ In connection with the earlier announced package, on January 21, 2011, the Central Development Working Party (CDWP) of the Planning Commission of the government of Pakistan approved 68 development projects worth Rs. 170.4 billion for Balochistan. The projects included: 37 infrastructure projects worth Rs. 107.9 billion, 28 social sector projects worth Rs. 59.5 billion, and 3 other projects worth Rs. 2.9 billion.⁴⁷

The reforms promised in constitutional, administrative and economic fields in the package look attractive as well as promising; however, the million dollar question remains whether all what is announced will be implemented and the dissident Balochs get satisfied, returning to normal life.

4.3. (b) Seraiki Movement:

Beginning in the 1960s, Riaz Hashmi and other Seraiki nationalists have tried to secure official language status for the Seraiki language, and to push for a separate province. This has led to a proposed separate province Seraikistan, a region being drawn up by activists in the 1970s. The 1977 coup by General

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a centralist ruler, caused the movement to go underground. After his death in 1988, the Seraiki movement re-emerged with the goals to have the Seraiki language recognized, to have official documents printed in Seraiki, a Seraiki regiment in the Pakistan Army, employment quotas and more Seraiki language radio and television channels.⁴⁸

Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam [PML-Q] Senator and former Information Minister Muhammad Ali Durrani has been leading a campaign for a separate province for the people of the Seraiki belt for about two years. He demands that the original status of Bahawalpur – formerly a princely state and later a province – should be restored. Some other MPs including Jehangir Khan Tarin and Jamal Leghari are also backing this movement. The organizations that have been actively involved in this mission include Pakistan Seraiki Party, Seraikistan Qaumi Movement, and Seraiki National Party.

4.3. (c) Hazara Movement:

Like the movement of Seraiki speaking people in the Punjab province, the people of Hazara also raised a voice of the same kind in the 1980s. This movement, which was founded in 1987, is named "Hazara Qaumi Mahaz" (HQM). The movement which has members across the country recently rose to prominence again with leaders again raising a demand for Hazara Province.⁴⁹

As it was announced in April 2010 that the name of NWFP is going to be changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under the 18th amendment, the majority Hindko speaking people of Hazara division took to the streets under the leadership of Haider Zaman Khan and some other politicians like Gohar Ayub Khan and Amanullah Jadoon demanding a separate province. At least 10 people were killed and nearly 200 hurt in the protest demonstrations across the Hazara region against changing of the name and for creation of a new province. The movement has nonetheless calmed down though the province has been renamed.

4.4. Inter-Provincial Water Distribution Row:

Inter-provincial disputes, particularly between Punjab and Sindh, considerably pre-date the creation of Pakistan. Pre-Partition attempts by Punjab to construct irrigation infrastructure on the Indus were opposed by Sindh. In 1945 the British imposed a solution on the two provinces, which gave priority to Sindh's right to receive water from the Indus. No further sharing arrangement was made upon Partition, so the British formula remained in force and was followed until 1970. Thereafter the federal government began allocating water on an ad hoc basis; its decisions favored Punjab. Disputes between the provinces continued because of the perceived pro-Punjab bias in allocations, and because of the impact of water infrastructure construction on the smaller provinces. Numerous commissions were formed to resolve these issues but failed to reach an agreement – until 1991.⁵⁰

In 1991, the four Chief Ministers agreed on the Indus Water Apportionment Accord. This allowed for a minimum flow of water into the sea, and shared the remainder between the four provinces. In this way, the Accord allowed for the erratic flow of water in the Indus, and ensured that all provinces gained from surpluses or lost from shortages in supply.⁵¹

With complaints regarding implementation of the 1991 Accord, “the smaller provinces accuse Punjab of using its upstream position and control of water infrastructure to implement sharing on the basis of 'historic use' between 1977-82, the period during which ad hoc allocations by the federal government had favored the province. Sindh, in particular, contends that it has received less water than its entitlement under the 1991 Accord. It says that the reduced flow is insufficient to meet minimum requirements for inflow to the sea; seawater now comes up to 100 km inland.”⁵²

The smaller provinces accuse Punjab of using its upstream position and control of water infrastructure to implement sharing on the basis of 'historic use' between 1977-82.

The Indus Rivers System Authority [IRSA], which is represented by all the four provinces, is supposed to take decisions regarding the distribution of

water among the four provinces. However, this regulatory body too, is sometimes alleged of being biased by one province or the other. On the disputed issue of opening of Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal back in July 2010, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani who also chairs the Council of Common Interest - a platform to deal with various provincial matters - had to intervene and annul the decision taken by the then IRSA acting Chairman Shafqat Masood of opening the canal, which was opposed by Sindh. Mr Masood who was also representative of Punjab was removed from the post and replaced with Raqeeb Khan Khattak from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).

KPK on the other hand, has its own grievances against Punjab with respect to water distribution. Punjab has lobbied hard over the years for construction of Kalabagh Dam, to be constructed in South-east of Punjab province. Successive KPK governments have strongly opposed the construction of the dam on the pretext that it would cause, at worst, flooding and, at best, water-logging in the low-lying but fertile plains in the Peshawar valley of the province. The valley is one of the limited cultivable plains in the province. Sindh province once again fears that the construction of the dam would limit the flow of water to it. The KPK is also unhappy over the construction of the run-of-the-canal Ghazi-Barotha power generation project, which has diverted plenty of water from the Indus that flanks the western border of KPK and is a source of water for the adjoining districts. The KPK claims that at the time of the construction of the Ghazi-Barotha project, it was claimed that it would only use excess water from the Indus, while it is obvious from the flow of the Indus after the completion of the project that the flow in the river has reduced considerably because of the construction of the project.

4.5. Provinces' Representation in the Army:

Since Pakistan Army has acquired the status of a major actor in a wide range of affairs from civil to defense and even the foreign policy in the country, representation of any area or ethno-linguistic community in the army is considered as a guarantee to protection of the rights of that area or community. As in other fields, Punjab being the largest province in population of the country dominates the army, which other provinces believe is a reason for the imposition of several pro-Punjab decisions on

them by the federation.

The Pakistan Army has a total number of 480,000 troops. Currently, the percentage of Punjabis in Pakistan Army is 55.92 percent, Pashtuns 15.42 percent, Balochis 2.34 percent, Sindhis 15.09 per cent and people from Azad Jammu and Kahsmir/Gilgit-Baltistan are 8.48 percent. The number of non-Muslims in the Pakistan Army is just 0.43 per cent.⁵³

With a view to address smaller provinces' reservations regarding their representation in the army and develop an ethnic balance in the organization, Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, as a media report says, has recently introduced reforms aimed at decreasing the number of Punjabis and Pashtuns and encouraging Balochis, Sindhis and religious minorities in the fresh recruitments.

According to the report, "the GHQ [General Headquarters] has set a new target of decreasing the number of Punjabis from 55.82 pre cent to 54.50 per cent, number of Pashtuns will come down to 14.50 per cent from 15.42 per cent while the number of Balochis will increase from 2.34 per cent to 4 per cent, Sindhis will increase from 15.09 per cent to 17 per cent and recruits from Azad Kashmir/Gilgit-Baltistan will increase to 9 per cent from 8.48 per cent by the year 2011. The number of non-Muslims will also increase from 0.43 per cent to 1 per cent by the next year".⁵⁴

Baloch people are also extremely upset with the army for its frequent operation in different areas of the province. In a bid to correct the army's image among the Baloch people, the GHQ has relaxed the terms and conditions for the Balochis to join the army.

General Kayani, in his visit to Sui - a town of Balochistan's Dera Bugti district - on January 3, 2011, announced that the newly-constructed army cantonment in Sui will be converted into a military college. Inaugurating the college at a ceremony, he said that 10,000 Baloch youths would be inducted into the army. General Kayani said that classes would commence in April this year, with 60 percent seats reserved for Balochistan.

4.6. Federal Legislative List -Part II (of the Constitution of Pakistan):

This deals with issues such as water, electricity, oil/gas, minerals, industries, railways. The Council of Common Interest (comprising representatives from all four provinces) was supposed to supervise, control and plan on these issues. But this power-sharing mechanism has only occasionally been invoked to settle issues between the Center and the four provinces.

The issues like construction of dams, shortage of essential items including wheat, rice, pulses etc in various parts of the country and distribution of foreign aid among the provinces during calamities like the recent floods could be addressed by the CCI, but the provinces continue to have acrimony against one another over all these matters. The CCI has also so far failed to take up the contentious issues of the net hydel profit of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the gas royalty of Balochistan.

5. Socio-Economic Problems:

Poverty and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas, have emerged as two key factors of social instability in Pakistan. The rulers' anti-people policies have led to an increasing rate of suicide incidents, besides a growing trend of radicalization in the society.

5.1. Poverty:

Almost 80 percent of Pakistan's 70 percent rural population comprises small farmers, either small land-holdings or peasants. They usually live on the margins because of the increasing cost of life, which is determined by the industrial and services' sectors. Agricultural policies – as pursued by the center and provincial governments - usually favor big land-owners, who have much easier access to water, credit and agricultural inputs. They can almost certainly sell-off their produce without delays and are also paid in time, whereas small farmers are mostly disadvantaged when it comes to farming loans, timely buy-off and payments for their produce.

A 2.4 percent population growth, stagnating economy (exports declining from 18.5 billion dollars in 2007-8 to less than 17 billion in 2008-9), the

global financial crisis, acute power shortages, wheat and sugar crisis, dwindling foreign investment – topped up by a volatile security situation - have all contributed adversely to the existing poverty levels. In 2009, poverty rose by 2.3 per cent to 36.1 per cent (from 33.8 in fiscal year 2008), putting 62 million Pakistanis below the poverty line. According to a World Bank task force, another 10 million people were expected to fall into the poverty trap during 2010.⁵⁵

The UN's Human Development Index [HDI] 2010 ranking for Pakistan puts it at 125 amongst the 169 countries for which the data is available. The country stands at 101 out of 135 on the Human Poverty Index, with a value of 33.4 per cent. However, some of the most disturbing data comes from the Center for Research on Poverty and Income Distribution, which confirms that rich-poor divide in Pakistan, is increasing alarmingly.

According to conservative estimates, 63% of the poor in Pakistan are in the category of 'transitory poor'. The rest of the 32% and 5% of the population - subsisting below the poverty line - are 'chronic' and 'extremely poor', respectively. Chronic and extremely poor are those households that are always below the poverty line, all the time during a defined period. Similarly, on the other side, 13% and 21% of the total non-poor (above the poverty-line) have been classified as 'transitory vulnerable' and 'transitory non-poor', respectively. This portrays a worrying situation as more and more people are moving from the transitory category to the chronic category, due to regressive taxation leading to inequitable distribution of income and wealth, monopoly over assets by a few, and wasteful expenditure by the government.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] has estimated the number of chronically hungry people in the world in 2010 as 925 million—98 million down from 1.023 billion in 2009, which means that Pakistan has been doing considerably worse compared to the rest of the world on the poverty alleviation front.

“As many as 80 out of 131 districts of the country are facing food insecurity.”

Pakistan faces extreme food insecurity, which puts individual security in danger posing a threat to the

security of the state, the region and ultimately the globe. Speaking about increasing food insecurity in the country after the floods in a seminar on “Floods and Food Insecurity – Challenges” arranged by the CRSS on August 31, 2010, Dr Abid Suleri, Executive Director Sustainable Development Policy Institute [SDPI] said that 80 out of 131 districts of the country are facing food insecurity. “Unfortunately, the districts which were already food insecure across the country witnessed worst flood”, said Dr Suleri adding that food insecurity has increased in the country from 37 percent to 48.8 percent over the last six years.⁵⁶

5.1. (a) Growing Trend of Militancy:

With most of the country's resources directed to debt-servicing, the military and its ongoing campaigns against militants, very little is available to address chronic poverty in Pakistan. It is interesting to note that poor populations are most vulnerable to the propaganda used by extremist groups to recruit more people to their cause. In many cases, they also provide food and shelter, making it more appealing for poor populations to turn to violence and extremism.

FATA which is the worst terror-affected region of Pakistan is also the most backward region in the country with 60 per cent of the population living below the poverty line. Per capita public expenditure in the region is one-third of the average for Pakistan.⁵⁷ Similarly, the southern part of Punjab where militancy has established its roots is an area poorer than other regions of the province.

5.1. (b) Increase in Suicide Incidents:

Pakistan has witnessed dramatic rise in suicide incidents in the recent past, and most of the economic and medical experts have dubbed poverty and unemployment as its main causes. This is evident of the fact that the rate of suicide is consistently higher in men than in women, as men outnumber women by two to one and within the men, more single people commit suicides than married ones.

Some 50 percent of the suicides are committed due to poverty and economic hardships.

Dr. Darya Khan Leghari, a psychiatrist associated with Sir Cowasji Jehangir Institute of Psychiatry (SCJ) Hyderabad, says that in a country like Pakistan where growing economic instability, especially poverty, has forced people to sell their children and body organs, the reasons behind increasing rate of suicides could be understandable. Citing to the data revealed by the regional directorates of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human rights in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta, he informed that 50 per cent of the suicides are committed due to poverty and economic hardships.⁵⁸

Dr. Leghari said that the facts revealed that suicide has become a major health problem in Pakistan, and despite this there are no official statistics. One major reason for this is that when a person attempts suicide his or her family usually tries to cover the act. While further elaborating the issue, he said that “Pakistan's population is 162 million and it is ranked as the 6th most populous country in the world. The official unemployment stands at 12 per cent of the eligible workforce and health spending is only 0.7 per cent of the national annual budget.”

Dr. Salman Shah, eminent economist and former federal Finance Minister, is of the view that “when the basic human needs could not be fulfilled in the available meager resources and the government also ignores the deprived class, one should not be surprised over the suicide incidents.”⁵⁹

5.2. Illiteracy:

An illiterate person does not have solid footings in his views on any subject, and remains an easy prey for anyone to conquer him. For not having knowledge of even the basics of Islam, he is easily misguided by radical groups that use him for securing their respected designs. The areas affected by militancy in Pakistan have a relatively low literacy rate. Secondly, education in Pakistan is different for the rich and the poor, as the poor can neither afford to enrol in the high-level educational institutes, nor do they have access to the modern curricula studied by the rich ones. The polarization created by this dangerous trend damages the general fabric of the society.

According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10, the overall literacy

rate increased to 57% in 2008-2009 (which was 56% in 2007-08), indicating 1.8% increase over the same period last year. Male literacy remained the same at 69% in 2007-08 and 2008-09, while it increased from 44% to 45% for females during the same period. Province-wise literacy data of PSLM (2008-09) shows Punjab stood at 59%, Sindh 59%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 50% and Balochistan 45%. There are currently 226,552 institutions in the country and the overall enrollment has been recorded at 37.18 million with a teaching staff of 1.37 million.⁶⁰

The ongoing wave of militancy has badly damaged the educational infrastructure in the tribal belt, significantly impacting the literacy rate there. In one of its reports, FATA Secretariat Education Department says that the literacy rate in the tribal areas has fallen to 29.72% in 2010 from its formerly encouraging of 42.28%. A total of over 300 schools had been targeted during past 6 years.

Education can prove an effective tool to correct the radicalisation trends, which have sunk the country into multiple crisis. Even tribesmen, who are generally believed as socially conservative people believe that education can resolve their biggest problem, i.e. terrorism. According to a public opinion survey conducted jointly by New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow in FATA during June-July 2010, nine out of every ten people identify lack of education and schools as their most important problem.⁶¹

5.3. Unemployment:

An unemployed person – one who has ability to work and is also willing to work but does not have the opportunity – is a burden to the society. Being depressed of being idle and having no work to do, an unemployed person can take any decision, which can bring harm to his own self as well as the society. In one year (2009-2010), the unemployment ratio in Pakistan has almost doubled; soaring to 14 per cent from 7.4 per cent.⁶²

Media reports say that a lot of people in the tribal belt as well as other parts of the country have joined militant groups and other destabilizing forces just to earn money for their near and dear ones. Even an educated person, when denied entry to any openings, can raise a gun and indulge in illegal activities

to snatch his share from the society.

The above-cited New America Foundation survey discloses that “unemployment is very high in FATA, with only 20 percent of respondents in our survey saying they were working full-time. Indeed, lack of jobs was chosen as the most important problem in the region by 95 percent of those surveyed.”

6. Army's Predominance of Foreign Policy:

In the wake of the regional and national security issues facing Pakistan especially after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the country's foreign policy has been in the military's hands. As the political leadership succeeded by General Musharraf left decision making regarding war on terror on the military, Army Chief General Kayani had to come forward and own the issue, devising strategies in the light of the national interest; be it the matter of launching military operations in the country, representing Pakistan in international conferences on the Afghan issue or leading the Pak-US strategic dialogue in Washington.

“Pakistan does not really have a foreign policy. It has a defence policy of which the foreign policy is an adjunct, an offshoot.”

Zafar Hilaly, former ambassador and analyst, says: “Pakistan does not really have a foreign policy. It has a defence policy of which the foreign policy is an adjunct, an offshoot. Hence, as the military shapes defence policy, it also has a commanding role in foreign policy. But that has not been enough, so on occasions it has also sought a hand in its implementation. Generals, admirals and air marshals have held key ambassadorial appointments and a general [Yahya Khan] has even been the foreign minister.”⁶³

Pointing to the army's increasing influence over foreign policy, the former ambassador says, “The control exercised by the General Headquarters (GHQ) over foreign policy is greater today than in the past. So much so that the initiative for dispatching notes, verbal demarches and policy announcements originate from the GHQ. One informant wondered whether majors and colonels do the actual drafting.”⁶⁴

It seems that Pakistan's political leadership, too, has accepted the army's role in formulating the country's foreign policy. Addressing a seminar on Endgame in Afghanistan arranged by the CRSS on December 20, 2010, Malik Amad Khan, minister of state for Foreign Affairs said, "as Pakistan is facing different conflicts inside as well as outside the country, the army's input in foreign policy has become essential, and it is also proving highly productive".

The input by the military or the intelligence agencies for the formulation of foreign policy towards any country or issue must have been useful; however, as for Kashmir, Afghanistan and the United States, the country's foreign policy has completely been in the army's control.

6.1. Army's Role in Kashmir Policy:

Except the 1947-48 war on Kashmir, all the other major overtures with India over the issue – whether of war or peace – were decided by the army in Pakistan. As for the first Kashmir war, it is generally reported that the then Army Chief General Douglas Gracey, a British Indian army officer, refused to obey the Governor General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah's orders of sending troops to fight against Indian forces in Kashmir. Gen. Gracey argued that since the Indian forces occupying Kashmir represented the British Crown, he could not engage in military encounter with them.

The next war with India on Kashmir was fought in 1965 when Field Marshal Ayub Khan was ruling the country. The war was a result of Pakistan army's Operation Gibraltar aimed at sending forces into Jammu and Kashmir to take part in the insurgency against the Indian rule of Kashmir.

In 1999, Pakistan Army launched 'Operation Badr' in Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control [LoC] – de facto border between India and Pakistan – to infiltrate troops and the Kashmiri militants into Indian side of the LoC. The main objective was to pressurize India to come to the dialogue table by severing the link between Kashmir and Laddakh. The campaign was designed by the then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf even without taking Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into confidence. The Lahore Declaration signed between Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee, which was dubbed a major

breakthrough in the otherwise strained ties between the two neighbouring countries, also fell victim to the Kargil conflict.

Later again in July 2001, it was Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan simultaneously, who took a U-turn on the Kashmir policy withdrawing from Pakistan's principled stance of the demand for implementation of the UN 1948 resolutions on Kashmir and held a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra to find an 'out of the box' solution for the dispute. The summit, however, failed.

Pursuing the Musharraf policy of putting Kashmir aside for the time being and building trade ties with India, the incumbent democratic government did not even make a reference to the issue of Kashmir in the UN General Assembly sessions in 2008 and 2009. However this year [2010], following reinvention of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India by Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Shah Mahmood Qureshi in his speech at the General Assembly session again raised the voice for the resolution of the Kashmir issue in accordance to the UN resolutions.

6.2. Army's Role in Afghan Policy:

Pakistan and Afghanistan have never had friendly ties for certain issues including dispute over the Durand Line [the border between the two countries], the 1980s Soviet invasion, Pakistan's support to the Taliban and the US-led ongoing war. Afghanistan's tilt towards India has also been a cause of the strained relationship between the two neighboring Muslim countries.

Pakistan Army still seems to be pursuing the philosophy of strategic depth initiated by General Ziaul Haq. However, Pakistan's Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani's recent repeated announcements that Pakistan does not want 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan in the sense it existed in 1990s implies that Pakistan is going to at least reduce, not withdraw, support to the Taliban.

The Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001 were fully backed by Pakistan. As they are also putting stiff resistance to the NATO forces in the

war-ravaged country, many including the United States still allege that the ISI is covertly supporting the Taliban, particularly the Siraj-ud Din Haqqani-led group. Such a US perception about the ISI has been the biggest cause of the existing distrust between Washington and Islamabad on the war on terror.

6.3. Army's Role in U.S. Policy:

Since the United States had been engaged with Pakistan military more than the political leadership during the past six decades, the army in Pakistan appeared to be in-charge of the external affairs related to Washington or Pentagon. From Ayub Khan to the incumbent General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, army chiefs in Pakistan were considered as the real rulers of the country, and hence approached whenever needed by the powers that be in the White House.

In 1959, President Ayub entered into an open military alliance with the United States allowing the then US President John F Kennedy to set up intelligence facility-cum-military base in Badabair, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for surveillance sorties over the then USSR. General Yahya who needed recognition and support following taking control of power in succession to General Ayub played a role to facilitate Washington's secret diplomacy with China for fixing the mess America had to face after suffering heavy losses in Vietnam in 1971. General Yahya hoped that the United States would assist Pakistan in fighting against the insurgency in East Pakistan, but Washington suspended military aid to Pakistan on charges of human rights violations in East Pakistan.

Later, premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto established ties with China and Russia also to balance Pakistan's ties with these big powers. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 tilted Pakistan's foreign policy towards the United States. The then military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq came to the field to help the United States to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the same happened. Following this long period of strong relationship between Pakistan's military and Washington, another era of cooperation began after US attack on Afghanistan, when again in Pakistan, there was a military dictator in the helm of affairs.

The Americans felt comfortable in dealing with a single individual and continued supporting General Musharraf in the power to the maximum limit. Even after restoration of democracy in Pakistan in 2008, the Americans have been engaged with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, successor of General Musharraf, believing him to be the most powerful man in Pakistan. The military to military relationship between the two countries has also been very close, as Pakistan remains one of the major military equipment buyers of the US market. Besides, the United States also extended military assistance to Pakistan time to time. Pakistan Army officers pay frequent visits to the United States and attend various trainings or other capacity building programs.

7. Geography:

Pakistan's complex geography – protracted tensions with India over Kashmir, long history of strained relations with Afghanistan, and its proximity to Iran, which has tensions with the United States, and the increasing US focus on the region – can be termed as a structural cause of conflict. Varying competing interests of the USA, China, India and Iran have made the nation-building much more difficult. Combined with the lack of sincere long-term strategic vision within the country, the competing interests of these countries do work to the disadvantage of Pakistan.



7.1. Pakistan's Border with India:

Since their creations in 1947, Pakistan and India, despite having 2,050-km long common border, have a relationship of rivalry, tension and mistrust. There has been a sort of confrontation between the two Britain-free states on the sole issue of Kashmir. Missile race, acquisition of nuclear capability, building of heavy armies etc have been the top priorities of the two countries for the past six decades, which ultimately brought the graph of socio-economic development in either country down considerably.

In the east, Pakistan has 1,280-km long international boundary with India demarcating Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat from the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and the 770-km long Line of Control [LoC] - ceasefire line of 1947-48 Kashmir war - which divides Indian administered Kashmir from the Pakistani Azad [free] Kashmir and the northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. As the two rival countries have fought four wars - three over Kashmir - the common border particularly the LoC remains unsafe for both of them, and hence they have permanently deployed hundreds of thousands of troops along the border. Pakistan and India have also established military presence at the Shiachen Glacier - 6,300 meters (20,700 feet) high 73-km long glacier in the east of Karakoram Range in the Himalaya Mountains - which is another disputed border point between the two countries.

After waging four wars, the two neighboring countries today have zero trust over each other. Instead of focusing on building mutual trust and confidence and an environment of coexistence, the two countries followed the policy of defending their borders through military means. Even extensive pressure as well as guarantees from the United States could not convince the Pakistan Army that it does not have any threat from its eastern border, and hence it continues deployment of its nearly 100,000 troops along the Indian border. The military expenditures at such a huge level in pursuit of the policy of countering India certainly have implications for the overall development of the country.

7.2. Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan:

The 2,560-km long Pak-Afghan border, which is officially called the Durand Line (named after foreign secretary of the colonial government of India, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who demarcated the frontier between British India and Afghanistan in 1893), is a treacherous, inhospitable and mountainous region. Illegal trade, drug smuggling and safe havens of militants are the key features of this poorly marked border, which Afghanistan does not recognize as international border. The daily movement of the divided Pashtun families across the border and the difficult terrain has made the border almost uncontrollable.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been in turmoil because of the cross border activities of armed Islamists. From 1979-89, Mujahideen belonging to Pakistan would cross over to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union and return. Following the US disengagement in Afghanistan, the ISI's involvement in Afghanistan increased to strengthen pro-Pakistan ethnic and tribal groups there. And with the US invasion of Afghanistan subsequent to 9/11 attacks, the movement of the Taliban and other foreign and local militants across the border increased. Many from Afghanistan fled to Pakistan's tribal areas to take refuge while many others from Pakistan's tribal region and other parts of the country went to the other side of the border to fight against the US-led foreign forces.

Whatever Pakistan has to suffer as fallout of the Afghan war is because of this porous border, which has, as it appears, brought the war to Pakistan's tribal areas. The prevailing instability which has actually jolted the very foundations of the state of Pakistan has been caused by the Pak-Afghan border. Although Pakistan's nearly 140,000 troops and thousands of NATO soldiers are guarding the border yet the militants and the militancy continue leaking into the Pakistani region, afflicting heavy damages to the country.

7.3. Pakistan's Border with Iran:

Iran, which has openly defied the West on acquisition of nuclear capability, shares 912 kilometer long border with Pakistan. Although talks between

Iran and six other world powers continue taking place yet Tehran has announced that it would not withdraw from its right to acquire nuclear technology for civilian use. Former US President Bush had dubbed Iran as 'axis of evil', and the incumbent President Obama has also repeatedly issued warnings, asking it to stop its nuclear weapons programme. In such a complex geo-political situation next door, Pakistan faces the dilemma as to how to position itself. It would find itself in even more challenging situation were an armed confrontation between Tehran and Washington to break out.

The Pak-Iran relationship has been a story of mixed taste. Iran was the first country that recognized Pakistan as an independent state in 1947. During the Shah's era, both the countries further came close to each other. Following the Iranian revolution, Iran dissociated itself from US-friendly countries such as Pakistan. Later, however, the two opposed the Soviet invasion. Their relationship, nonetheless, took a turn when they started supporting opposite sides in the Afghan civil war which continued from 1991-2001. As Iran and India backed Tajik Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Pakistan-supported Taliban, Tehran created a distance from Pakistan.

The existing Pak-Iran relationship has considerably improved and the two countries have also signed the gas pipeline agreement despite the US opposition to it, but mutual trust has not returned to the level that existed before the Afghan civil war. Iran believes that some elements in Pakistan's Balochistan province are supporting Jundallah group - a Sunni Islamist group that carries out militant activities in different parts of the country. Iran is also building a barrier along its border with Pakistan to stop illegal trafficking and stem the flow of drugs.

In the background of such a precarious relationship with Iran, the regional dynamics

The continuous tension between Iran and the United States/Israel has also been a matter of concern for Pakistan, as it cannot remain unaffected if the situation worsens to the level of any clash.

and the insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan does not consider its border with Iran, too, as safe. The continuous tension between Iran and the United States/Israel has also been a matter of concern for Pakistan, as it cannot remain unaffected if the situation worsens to the level of any clash.

7.4. America's Interests in the Region:

In the wake of the strategic location of the South Asian region for having proximity to China, Russia and the Central Asian states, the United States has been in the efforts to establish its presence in the region. A control over Afghanistan may provide Washington a facility to have an eye on the activities of China, besides encouraging India to enable it to become a threat to China. Washington also does not want Russia to reestablish its hegemony. An influence and presence in Central Asian states can bring a strategic as well as monetary benefit to the US. Tehran's open and blunt expression of enmity against the United States is also a matter of concern for it.

As China - an emerging world power - and Russia do not want the US presence in this region, they too have been active to strengthen regional blocs like SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization]. These two powers have been holding the stance that regional countries should join hands to resolve all the regional issues, including Afghanistan, besides economically cooperating with one another. Secondly, like the US, China and Russia too have equal interests in the natural reserves of oil and gas in the Central Asian republics.

As for Afghanistan, all the regional states including Russia and China are concerned over the snow-balling violence in that country, fearing that the menace could intrude into their boundaries. Russia, China, India, Iran and the Central Asian Republics have a common agenda, i.e., to prevent Taliban from regaining power after the US-led NATO troops pull out. Pakistan, on the other, has a belief that it would have no threat from its western borders if the Taliban have a role in the system in Afghanistan.

Being a direct neighbour, Pakistan has the highest stakes in Afghanistan, and thus finds itself at the center of a complex geo-strategic situation prevailing in the region. As many actors are busy in the game in this part of the world, it

becomes difficult for Pakistan to safeguard its regional interests in addition to maintaining peace and stability within its boundaries.

8. Kashmir and Afghan Policy:

Pakistan's foreign policy towards Kashmir and Afghanistan, which predominantly remained under the army's control, had been unclear and vague. On Kashmir, Pakistan has been insisting that it only extends political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiris. In reality, however, the Pakistani army and its intelligence apparatus have been backing the Kashmiri militants. Similarly in Afghanistan, the 'strategic depth' policy of supporting pro-Pakistan ethnic groups in Afghanistan mocks at Pakistan's official statements that it has been desirous of a free and independent Afghanistan. With the change in power corridors in Islamabad or in the backdrop of prevalent geo-strategic dynamics, Pakistan's foreign policy on these two sensitive issues also witnessed a change. During the past two decades, particularly, there has been a shift in Pakistan's official stances on the two issues.

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Pakistan's support to jihadi elements in Kashmir and Afghanistan has affected the society at large in many ways. The recruitment of seminary students in particular and poor youths in general in the jihadi organizations such as Lahskar-e Taiba [LeT] and Hizb-ul Mujahideen [HM], operating in the Indian administered Kashmir, and also for the 1980s Afghan Jihad and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, has considerably changed the social fabric of the rural Pakistan. The void created by poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and inefficient system particularly in rural localities across the country has been exploited by the jihadi organizations, and a section of the society has developed an extremist sort of thinking.

8.1. Kashmir Policy:

Kashmir, a formerly princely state in British India, remains the main cause of

tension between Pakistan and India even after six decades of their partition. The first war fought between the two countries in 1947-48 resulted in the division of Kashmir forming Pakistan's Azad [free] Kashmir and the Indian administered Kashmir. Despite repeated promises by Indian leaders including former Prime Minister Pandit Nehru to give Kashmiris the right to self-determination in accordance with the 1948/1949 UN resolutions [which give the Kashmiris a right to join either India or Pakistan], India did not hold any plebiscite in Kashmir.

Pakistan, while sticking to its principled stance of solution of the Kashmir issue according to the UN resolutions, followed a carrot and stick policy. However, neither international pressure raised by taking up the issue at different fora including the UN General Assembly, nor the wars fought in 1965 and 1999 could yield any results.

The diplomatic and political support which Pakistan had been extending to the Kashmiris since day one turned into military assistance to the people in Kashmir to start an insurgency there in 1990. Several Pakistan-backed jihadi organizations came into being in the Indian Kashmir in the subsequent years, and they joined hands with the local insurgents to fight against the Indian forces. The Kashmiris claim that nearly 100,000 Muslims have been killed by the Indian troops since 1990; however, the Indians speak of about 43,000 casualties.

General Musharraf took a turn on Pakistan's traditional Kashmir policy by inviting the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to an open dialogue on the issue for its solution. The 2001 Agra summit was the climax of the series of talks between the two governments and the Track-II diplomacy; however, it proved inconclusive. In 2004, General Musharraf announced to pursue a Kashmir settlement, proposing to set aside the UN Security Council Resolutions. With this Pakistan stopped mentioning these resolutions at international fora. Even reference to the Kashmiris' right to self-determination was dropped in the annual statement in the UN General Assembly from 2005.

The PPP incumbent government followed the Musharraf policy on Kashmir. Rather, in the words of Asif Ezdi, former ambassador and analyst, "In his two

statements in the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2009, [President] Zardari went even further than Musharraf in playing down the Kashmir issue.”⁶⁵

A change in the Kashmir policy is again being witnessed as Pakistan has reverted to its earlier demand of solution of the Kashmir issue in accordance with the UN resolutions. In his statement at UN General Assembly in September 2010, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved through plebiscite under the UN resolutions.

Earlier, speaking in the National Assembly on the government's policy on Kashmir on May 4, 2010, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the then foreign minister, said, “On Kashmir, the viewpoint of this government is the same, ... which has been historical and principled, that Pakistan is committed to find a just and peaceful resolution in accordance with UN resolutions and aspirations of the Kashmiri people.” And according to Shahid Javed Barki, former Finance Minister, Pakistan government is again extending diplomatic support to the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir.⁶⁶

In recent years, the Kashmir militancy seems to have been undergoing change as well. Particularly, in summer 2010, Kashmiris took to the street in thousands to press for the right to self-determination. This change in the people's mode to get the right to self-determination has also been noted by the government in Delhi and they are offering dialogue to the movement leaders including All Parties Hurriyat Conference Chairman, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq through interlocutors.

8.2. Afghan Policy:

The prevailing instability in Pakistan has a strong connection with the country's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The mujahideen sent by Pakistan with the US support to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war (1979-1989) have had an extremely negative impact on the Pakistani society. Islamabad's support to the Taliban regime (1996-2001) also made people in Pakistan in general and in the tribal region in particular develop an extremist Islamist ideology.

According to Raza Khan, political analyst, Pakistan's Afghan policy is centered on four main pillars, "preventing Afghan Pakhtun nationalists from coming into power as well as dislodging and enfeebling central authority there; locating 'strategic depth' vis-a-vis arch rival India; supporting the so-called Islamist outfits like mujahideen and Taliban; and making Afghanistan a virtual province."⁶⁷

Explaining Pakistan's traditional 'strategic depth' policy in Afghanistan, Mr Khan says, "Since the erstwhile Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, Pakistan has sought 'strategic depth' which on the one hand meant raising and training Islamist militants on Afghan soil to fight in Indian Kashmir alongside local separatists. On the other hand 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan for Pakistani strategists meant to have a fall-back territory for its retreating troops in case of war with India apart from deploying some of the country's nuclear missile launchers in Afghanistan so as to have a second-strike capability against India. Pakistan and India are declared nuclear powers."

The US-led war on terror delivered serious blow to the philosophy of the 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan as Islamabad had to disengage from the Taliban and join the US-led operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although US officials have been alleging that some ISI officers are still supporting resistance groups in the war-torn country, yet Pakistan has openly declared the Taliban its enemies. Pakistan's security forces also arrested several important Taliban leaders in Pakistan including Mulla Abdul Ghani Biradar (No. 2 in Taliban hierarchy), Mulla Abdul Salam, Mulla Mir Muhammad, Maulvi Kabir, Motasim Agha Jan and some others.

The open criticism of Pakistan's 'strategic depth' perhaps made the policy makers in the country bring a change in the policy. Pakistani officials are now stating that their country wants an independent, sovereign and friendly Afghanistan. "Pakistan believes in the policy of non-interference in respect of its policy towards Afghanistan, with no desire to dictate or be dictated", said Malik Amad Khan, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,

"Pakistan believes in the policy of non-interference in respect of its policy towards Afghanistan, with no desire to dictate or be dictated."

addressing CRSS seminar titled "Afghanistan: The Endgame" held in Islamabad on December 20, 2010.

Experts interpret the words 'independent' and 'friendly' Afghanistan as a Pakistani desire not to see expanding its military influence in Afghanistan. According to Dr Ashraf Ali, an expert on Pakistan's Afghan policy at National Defence University Islamabad, "new interpretation of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan suggests that the army is ready for adjustments in its much-criticized policy."⁶⁸

Pakistan's Afghan policy, coupled with the questionable war on terrorism, has already entailed serious consequences, with over 32,000 human losses since December 2001. No part of the country remains safe because the society has been greatly radicalized across the country, and even today most Pakistanis remain skeptical of the military establishment's future plans in Afghanistan. The army has constantly been engaged in military operations against militancy - a direct fallout of the Afghan war - in the tribal agencies. The U-turn over the Afghan policy on the eve of the US invasion left the society totally polarized, and until now disharmony prevails across the country.

In the wake of the US announcement of beginning phased withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan from July 2011 and the NATO's pledge to transfer security of the country to the local forces by 2014 has made Pakistan's role in Afghanistan more important. As Pakistan still enjoys influence over some Taliban groups in Afghanistan, Islamabad's participation in the reconciliatory process appears to be inevitable. The recent frequent visits of the US officials including Af-Pak US acting envoy Frank Ruggiero and even of the Afghan Peace Council Chairman Dr Burhan-ud Din Rabbani indicate that the process of negotiations is already underway for designing the future of Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

9. Status of FATA:

FATA - a group of seven tribal agencies and six smaller frontier regions in the north-west of Pakistan with nearly 4 million population - is administered under the 19th century colonial Frontier Crimes Regulations [FCR]. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts of Pakistan and the institutions guaranteeing fundamental rights to the citizens of Pakistan have not been extended to the tribal areas, and the president of Pakistan legislates and makes decisions about the area.



The status of FATA as a tribal region has been a major structural cause of instability in Pakistan, as even before the Afghan war, criminals from other parts of the country would flee for shelter. Since Pashtuns have a cultural tradition of giving protection to their guests even at the cost of their lives, the tribal belt has been serving as a host place for anti-societal elements for a long time.

Under the passion of this very same tradition of hospitality, the Pashtuns of the tribal area welcomed the local as well as foreign mujahideen on culmination of the Soviet war in 1989, and these mujahideen made this area their permanent abode. Now again, on the US invasion of Afghanistan, a large number of the Taliban fled to this tribal belt and took refuge there. They established their safe havens there, and the United States still believes that the resistance in Afghanistan is being backed from this tribal region.

In the backdrop of these developments, the tribal belt in Pakistan has become a dangerous place not only for Pakistan but also for other parts of the region as well as the world. Faisal Shahzad who was arrested in the case of a failed bid to bomb Times Square in New York in May 2010 allegedly took military training from a military camp in North Waziristan. The Pakistan army has been carrying out military operations in these tribal agencies since December 2003 and has also paid a heavy price for it in terms of so far nearly

3000 casualties, but the issue persists to be resolved.

Many say that legal and political reforms are the sole solution of the ongoing militancy in FATA. They believe that a void of a system in the region has led to its backwardness in every sector of life and subsequently promotion of extremism in the society.

Many say that legal and political reforms are the sole solution of the ongoing militancy in FATA.

Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Political Agent of North Waziristan, is of the view that that the ongoing insurgency in FATA is, in fact, a war for reforms. "There is a need for another amendment in the constitution to introduce reforms in the region," Aziz said referring to the recently passed 18th Amendment Act. He said that the government must introduce reforms in FATA.⁶⁹

After taking vote of confidence on March 29, 2008, Pakistan Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani announced to repeal the FCR, which was widely welcomed in the country. However, the announcement could not be materialized for not providing any alternative to the FCR. On August 14, 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari also pledged to introduce political, judicial and administrative reforms in FATA, but this promise too still remains to be fulfilled. Three commissions led separately by Farhatullah Babar, Mumtaz Bangash and Justice (Retd.) Ajmal Mian who had been working on proposing amendments to the FCR prepared recommendations, but they too have not yet been implemented.

The few most important options being debated regarding the future of FATA include conversion of FATA into a separate province, its merger into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, replacement of the FCR with new laws and permission of political activities in FATA. In its 2010 edition of 'Understanding FATA', CAMP [Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme], which has been conducting opinion polls in FATA since 2007, has presented the locals' perception of the issue and their opinion for its solution during the last four years.

The CAMP says, "Regarding the future status of FATA as a political unit of Pakistan, we see variations over the last four years. Nearly one third, 30.7%,

want FATA to be fully integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 24.9% want to have a separate province. Those favouring the current governing arrangement was a steady 23% (2008) to 21% (2009) during the previous two surveys, but last year only 7.9% of the respondents stayed with the status quo."⁷⁰

About the option of a separate FATA Council, the CAMP recorded that "only 2.9% of the people, who may have been by chance members of the elite class of FATA, supported a FATA Council with an elected assembly. The idea was that such a council can decide the future of FATA gradually and, in the meanwhile, the President of Pakistan would retain his Article 247 powers under the constitution."

"Support for allowing the Political Parties Act of 2002 has not varied from the 2008 and 2009 polls. Nearly 60% of the respondents welcomed President Asif Ali Zardari's announcement of a political reforms package for FATA in 2009", the report added.

Describing the prime minister's announcement to annul the FCR and taking and extending the normal laws of the country to FATA as 'no longer a workable proposition', I. A. Rehman, an advocate of peace and human rights and a director of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan [HRCPP] proposes, "a new law should be made for the area that does not have the obnoxious features of the FCR, such as the scheme of collective fines, destruction of offenders' houses and absence of appeal provisions, and still retains the spirit of a community-managed system for adjudication. In order to avoid every case causing protracted litigation, petty cases and minor disputes could be resolved by democratically constituted juries with possibilities of appeal to superior judicial forums."⁷¹

Mr. Rehman says that the idea of making FATA a separate province is a 'harder determination' however many political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as he claims, are in favor of FATA's merger in the province. Contrary to this opinion, Muttahida Qabail Party, a tribesmen political party launched on June 16, 2010, is of the opinion that FATA should be declared a separate province.

Khalid Aziz points out that the prevalent disorder in FATA underlines the need for introducing radical reforms in the existing system in the tribal region. A consensus option of any of the above-mentioned proposals can be enforced in region; however, it needs to be kept in view while finalizing the formula that any solution or a new system lacking local traditions and cultural norms would prove counter productive. A full involvement of the representatives of tribesmen in finding out a solution of the issue of constitutional status of FATA can only help achieve the desired results of bringing durable peace to that region and subsequently to other parts of the country.

The office of Political Agent, administrative head of a tribal agency, will have to be revived with all its original powers and authority. The army's direct contact with local tribesmen can hardly prove effective in controlling the tribal areas. Since a political agent belongs to the very same society and also has links with the local tribal elders, he can easily control the tribesmen utilizing their traditional values and practices.

10. Political Expedience and Lack of Vision:

Pakistani politicians, and military and civilian bureaucracy rule the country on an ad-hoc and personalized basis. Their policies lack vision and commitment. There is no word like 'principles' in the dictionary of their professional life. The general opportunistic approach of rulers has made the people in Pakistan believe that whatever is being uttered by the powers is not believable. A general perception exists in the Pakistani society that the elite in their quest for power can sacrifice anything of this country, and they only mean their own benefit.

In his book "*Obama's Wars*", Bob Woodward - a senior US journalist - narrates the stunning story of a meeting between President Asif Zardari and Michael Hayden, the then CIA director general, in New York on November 12, 2008. According to Woodward, when Hayden attempted to explain the U.S. position on drone strikes, Asif Zardari removed all his fears saying, "Kill the seniors. Collateral damage worries you, Americans. It does not worry me."

"Kill the seniors. Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me."

Another example is the government's failure to put credible and workable development plans before the Friends of Democratic Pakistan [FoDP] that had begun in Tokyo in April 2009. Despite several top-level meetings, the government failed in convincing the FoDP countries of their commitments.

The latest manifestation of this was the early June Pakistan-European Union summit during Prime Minister Gilani's visit. The EU promised to raise its annual support to 75 million Euros but a Pakistani-origin head of Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) - that had been launched at Tokyo in April 2009 - in UK parliament, Sajjad Karim said the talks held between Pakistan and European Union (EU) failed to meet expectations.⁷²

Talking to Geo TV in Brussels, he said, "I am very sorry to unveil that Pakistan has failed on many fronts during dialogue with EU because of poor homework. He said such meetings need months of preparations or even a complete year's homework but Pakistani delegates had made preparations hurriedly in a day or a week for such important event."

"No sincere efforts were seen for the talks from Pakistani side, which led to failure besides this, neither did Pakistan complete homework to effectively work with European ministers, members of European parliament and nor did Pak-EU ties extend any help in this wake," Karim added.

Politics in Pakistan is more close to personal gains than manifestos and ideologies. Not to speak of politicians, even the whole of political parties take upside down turns and enter into alliance with the parties or groups who are quite contrary to their ideologies. To change loyalties after winning elections is a common and perhaps acceptable tradition in Pakistan.

The incumbent Pakistan People's Party that loudly speaks against dictatorship and claims to be an anti-establishment party entered into a deal with President Musharraf for the return of the self-exiled Benazir Bhutto. Similarly, the politicians who welcomed Musharraf and provided him political support [PML-Q] belonged to the same party whose government was removed by Musharraf in the coup. The parties such as the MQM [Muttahidda Qaumi Movement] and the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam-Fazal-ur Rehman group [JUI-F] appear to have no ideologies or manifestos, except

to be part of every government.

As for the vision, the rulers in Pakistan - military or civil - have been following the policy of ad-hocism in every field. Even the issue that has plagued the country for several years, terrorism, is being dealt with an ad-hoc approach. Neither General Musharraf nor the present democratic government has made public any formal policy on terrorism. The nation does not even know the government's response on several key issues including drone attacks, violation of aerial space by the NATO jets, US allegations of Pakistan's support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and above all, the framework of dealing with the menace of militancy in the country.

Even in the presence of an elected government, decision-making has been left to the army. Strange to note that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani says it is the army that has to decide as to whether it has to launch a military operation in North Waziristan, and if so, when.

In the absence of a consistent economic policy, the GDP growth rate remains unstable and as low as (4.3% in 2010, 2.7% in 2009 and 5.3% in 2008), inflation continues to soar and shortage of essential items including sugar, edible oil, flour, onions etc. has become a matter of routine. Lack of policy in the field of energy on the part of non-democratic as well as democratic governments has caused a serious shortage of energy including gas and electricity in the country.

11. Feudalism:

Like medieval Europe, big landowners in Pakistan, particularly in the remote areas, have established vast estates. Being real masters of the area with an effective influence on the government machinery, they have set up their private prisons to detain anyone who challenges their authority or disobeys them. A system of debt bondage for the poor peasants prevails in such areas.

Since the inception of Pakistan, the country's politics has been dominated by feudal lords. Muslim League [ML] – the party which spearheaded the Pakistan movement – was led by big landlords locally called Zamindars,

Jagirdars, Nawabs, Nawabzadas and Sardars, except the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. During the first few decades of the country's history, these lords retained their influence on national affairs through military and civil bureaucracy, and with the first PPP government in 1972, they assumed direct power and have been keeping it with them.

Pakistan has so far been ruled either by feudal lords or generals. After staging a coup, military needs support of these locally influential feudal lords for staying in power and giving perpetuation to their rule, which is provided, and in response, the military also protects their interests.

The major political parties in the country are feudal-oriented, and more than two-thirds of the National Assembly [Lower House] is composed of this class. Besides, most of the key executive posts in the provinces are held by them.⁷³ According to a report, the feudal lords and their allies constitute only five percent of our agricultural households and own 64 percent of our farm land. The rest of the 95 percent are only their political vote-bank.⁷⁴

Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, three attempts (1950, 1959 and 1972) were made to enforce land reforms in the country by fixing a ceiling of maximum acres of land for a land order and withdrawing the remaining to the government for compensation. The government would sell or distribute this land among poor tenants who cultivate the land. The efforts could not bring about the desired results mainly because the ceiling was fixed for an individual instead of a family and people would transfer their lands to their other family members and relatives.

Even after three waves of land reforms, 3,529 zamindars [land lords] have 513,114 holdings of more than 100 acres in the irrigated areas, and 332,273 holdings exceeding 100 acres in un-irrigated areas. Some 794,774 Khatadars [tenants of the state] have 5,464,771 land holdings of less than 12 acres in irrigated areas. In un-irrigated areas, 144,098 are reported to have 1,628,826 holdings of less than 24 acres.⁷⁵

The feudal system has given Pakistan many ills and evils including hereditary politics, illiteracy, poverty, injustice etc. proving a major obstacle in the socio-economic development of the country. The nexus between feudal

lords and military/civil bureaucracy has not let institutions flourish in the country.

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There is no genuine political culture in rural areas, as people are not free to vote; nor can a common man contest elections. Only feudal lords and their children have the 'right' to represent the local population and the poor peasants who always remain under the burden of their lord's blessings have no other option but to give their votes in abundance to him.

Even those political parties, which claim not to be feudal-oriented ones, such as Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz [PML-N], too, is influenced by hereditary politics. The system followed within the MQM – a middle class party mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad – is also very much feudalistic. The head of every party in Pakistan appears to be a dictator who cannot tolerate questioning of his decision by anyone in the party.

In a rural peasantry society, people are not even free to get education, establish mutual relationship on their own and opt livelihood for themselves. Landowners who run the system there according to their own whims, being elected representatives of people, strongly oppose construction of schools and colleges in their areas, fearing education and awareness among people can threaten their system. The common man's exposure to towns and the outer world is also discouraged by them.

In the words of Tufail Abbas, former President of Pakistan Mazdoor Mahaaz, and Editor-in-Chief of the monthly Urdu journal *Awami Manshoor*, "This feudal system has made the people of Pakistan pathetic."

According to a recent survey conducted by the University of Karachi on the feudal system in the country, 92.72 % people in Karachi believe that feudal lords have failed to be true leaders and that 31.81% are of the view that the feudals could never think of poor people. 94.51% respondents said that feudal lords are not in favor of promotion of education in the country.⁷⁶

Underlining the need for genuine land reforms to dent the feudal hold on

socio-political life in Pakistan, Dr Zulfiqar Shah, a Pakistani-origin assistant professor at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom suggests, “the land ceiling should be fixed at 50 acres irrigated and 100 acres non-irrigated land. The necessary legislation should be done in favor of land reforms and Haq-e-Shufa [to give priority right to tenants to buy the land under their cultivation]. All laws and regulations regarding the land developed under colonial era need to be abandoned and a judicial commission on land utilization should be formed to check exceeding commercialization of land. Under Haq-e-shufa, the agricultural land of about 8 acres should be allotted to the landless agriculture workers and peasant families. The agricultural land occupied by or allotted to military forms and government departments should be revoked and distributed among the landless peasants under the principle of Haq-e-shufa. Corporate farming should not be promoted. Allotment of forest land to the influential persons has to be revoked and re-allotted to the peasants on the condition of re-forestation.”⁷⁷

Besides introducing land reforms, the feudal mindset existing within political parties also needs to be replaced with democratic norms. A true democratic culture can only develop when every individual is able to freely contest elections. Monopoly of a select feudal families in politics will have to be rooted out for bringing socio-economic development particularly in the down-trodden areas of the country.

In his article titled "The feudal battle against the judiciary", published in *Daily Times* on October 20, 2010, Dr Manzoor Ejaz, a renowned columnist, has described the recent clash between the judiciary and the PPP government on the issue of Asif Zardari's Swiss cases as a struggle between the old feudal system and the middle class in the country. He says, "The PPP's collision with the judiciary is not merely a Zardari-specific issue. There

“How can the old masters, who do not allow the tenants to sit on a cart in front of them, accept an institution that treats every citizen equally? How can these lords with private jails and usage of primitive methods keep the serfdom system intact concede to a body of middle class judges who, temperamentally, abhor such practices?”

are Miranis, Jhakranis and all kinds of feudals in the ruling party who have been committing various crimes against the people. How can the feudals involved in cases of Vani [a custom in which blood feuds are settled with forced marriages, often with minors] and Karo Kari [pre-meditated honor killing] accept a judiciary that is keen to prosecute them? How can the old masters, who do not allow the tenants to sit on a cart in front of them, accept an institution that treats every citizen equally? How can these lords with private jails and usage of primitive methods keep the serfdom system intact concede to a body of middle class judges who, temperamentally, abhor such practices?"

12. Bureaucratic Lethargy:

Slow bureaucratic response to a proposal, project or complaint submitted by anyone has emerged as a key structural cause of instability in Pakistan. Non-seriousness and incompetence of politicians provides bureaucrats an opportunity to rule the roost. As implementation of policies or decisions is independently controlled by bureaucrats, ministers sometimes feel helpless before their secretaries. Red-tapism, favoritism and corruption have become essential features of bureaucracy in Pakistan.

According to a news report published in daily *The Nation* on December 22, 2009, despite a green signal given by the federal government and the Azad Kashmir government, bureaucrats in Islamabad sabotaged the \$800 million Mahl hydropower project in Kashmir. The report adds, "After having been subjected to four years of red tape and delays, the 500MW project to generate cheap electricity has now been almost shelved." Explaining the face of bureaucracy in the federal capital, the report says, "There should be little doubt that the top CSP [Civil Services of Pakistan] cadres form an essential part of the official 'steel frame' since they run the day-to-day functions; but there ought to be a sound system of checks and balances to ensure transparency."

Police and District Management Group [DMG] (most prestigious group of Civil Services of Pakistan until Musharraf's 2001 Devolution Program) are the two most relevant departments for public in bureaucracy. Reforms have been introduced into these two departments more than once, and the most

recent are the Police Order of 2002 and the Devolution Plan, but nothing has yet served. The Musharraf-launched district administration system rather further worsened things at the local level. Many believe that the offices of Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner were more effective than the local government offices headed by District Nazims [administrators]. Analysts are of the view that weak administration and poor law and order in the absence of a deputy commissioner offered a space to extremist elements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA to flourish.

Analyzing the effectiveness of the local government system in maintaining the law and order system in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Rahimullah Yousufzai, Resident Editor *The News Peshawar* says, "The district nazims failed to deliver during law-and-order situations and abolition of the office of divisional commissioners, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where militancy became a huge challenge, negatively impacted the administration whose role was to coordinate between the political agents of the tribal areas and the deputy commissioners of adjacent districts in matters of law and order and crime-control."⁷⁸

A largely indifferent attitude of bureaucracy to people's grievances is likely to lead to social disorder. As bureaucracy in Pakistan has changed its role - to serve politicians and rulers instead of people - general disappointment, frustration and restlessness are certain to hit the society. Bureaucracy facilitates military rulers more than the common people.

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Traditionally, bureaucracy in Pakistan along with the military bureaucracy has been involved in deciding and tailoring domestic as well as foreign policies. Being permanently in the office, unlike politicians, they know how to run and at times manipulate the system and also have powers for the same purpose. Many governments have played into the hands of bureaucracy.

SECTION II

Trigger Causes of Instability

1. Soviet Invasion:

The Afghan war (1979-89) badly affected the social fabric of Pakistan by bringing nearly 3.3 million refugees, sectarianism, Kalashnikov culture, smuggling, drugs, and several other socio-economic and cultural problems. The effects of these ills still persist in the society; they were rather reinforced with the launch of the US-led war on terror. Another influx of Afghans on the eve of the US attack on Afghanistan took the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan to 5 million by the end of 2001. Under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [HRCF], 3.5 million refugees have been repatriated; however, nearly 1.7 million are still living in Pakistan; and under the program, they would leave by 2012.⁷⁹

Besides disturbing the demographic balance in the Pakistani society, the refugees put a heavy burden on the national economy. Pakistan - a weak economy - fed these refugees for several years. During these years, the refugees have constructed their own houses, established businesses and also entered into relationships with the locals.

Seeds of religious extremism in Pakistan were sowed during the anti-Soviet jihad, and the controversial war on terrorism fueled and strengthened it further. Afghan jihad warriors either went to Afghanistan or joined hands with the FATA-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] to fight the state of Pakistan for its alliance with the U.S.

During the Afghan war, the United States sent AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles in abundance to Pakistan for onward delivery to the Afghan Mujahideen. It, thus, became very easy for a common man in Pakistan to have a gun. Arms trade within the country prospered and also gave birth to the metaphor of Kalashnikov culture.

Many of the Afghan refugees also got involved in crime and cross border illegal trade. Wheat and rice were taken to Afghanistan to be sold at higher

rates and the tax-free Afghan material imported via Pakistan would also mostly end up in Pakistan, particularly at the Bara Market, Peshawar. As a result, the country lost big amount of revenue.

During the Jihad days, the Americans ostensibly encouraged the Mujahideen to cultivate poppy to buy weapons for the war and fulfill their other expenditures. Poppy was cultivated at a large area in Pakistan, and in the late 1980s, Pakistan was producing around 70% of the world's heroine, overseen by an estimated 40 drug cartels.⁸⁰

Citing the few benefits of the Afghan war including political legitimacy to Zia-ul-Haq, facilitation for Pakistan to achieve nuclear capability and \$7.4 billion military and economic US assistance, A. Z. Hilali, professor at Peshawar University, says that Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for the Afghan war.

In his paper on the Afghan war, he summarizes the effects of the war on Pakistan as, "Afghan refugees posed an alarming threat to Pakistan's security. Domestically, the Afghan refugees have not only created political, economic and socio-cultural problems for Pakistan, but they also introduced drugs and a Kalashnikov culture. The Afghan War also allowed ethnic and sectarian warfare and Islamic fundamentalism to tighten their grip on the country. Moreover, the consequences of the Afghan war damaged Pakistan's international image, spreading a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region and increasing tensions with its neighbours."⁸¹

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2. War on Terror and Military Operations:

Pakistan's current crisis of instability is largely rooted in the ongoing war against terrorism. With every passing day, the number of troops in Afghanistan has gone up and the Taliban militants have also responded with increased activity, with the graph of violence on the rise ever since.

The same happened in Pakistan; the first deployments of the Pakistan army were in the heights of Tirah Valley in December 2001, with a few hundred soldiers (in an attempt to block the passage of al Qaeda and Taliban militants from Afghanistan). The arrival of al Qaeda and Taliban in Waziristan forced the army to deploy all along the routes, conduct search and surveillance operations, and also establish additional check posts.

The presence and operations of the army in the tribal areas enraged the tribesmen, who until then had not been familiar with the army at all. They found it very difficult to reconcile with the new situation. Right-wing political parties such as JUI-F and Jamaat-e Islami [JI] exploited these conditions, and have kept calling for the pullout of the army from tribal areas. This also plays into the common psyche inside Pakistan, with many common people calling it "America's war."

The Lal Mosque (Islamabad) Operation in July 2007, in which several dozen Islamists and their chief Abdur Rasheed Ghazi were killed, also provided another trigger that resulted in a) widespread resentment and outrage against the government, and b) a massive reaction by different militant groups, who began a series of deadly suicide bombings. A lot of anti-government militants currently operated from FATA under the name of Ghazi Force (named after Abdur Rasheed Ghazi).

Since 2004, Pakistan Army has been carrying out military operations in different agencies of FATA and also in some settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The army has also deployed over 100,000 troops along the Pak-Afghan border to check infiltration by the militants. During the fight against the Taliban, the army has lost around 3000 troops and the total estimated death toll of Pakistani civilians killed in this war so far has been put at 30,000.⁸² The operations of Swat (May 2009) and South Waziristan (October 2009) have been declared the most successful ones. Although the wave of militancy in Pakistan has relatively subdued during the recent months; however, many believe that the Taliban have shifted to North Waziristan - the tribal agency on which the US is pressing Pakistan to launch a military operation.

The war has also incurred a heavy economic loss on Pakistan. In the

ministerial meeting of Friends of Democratic Pakistan [FoDP] held in Islamabad in July 2010, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said "Pakistan has suffered \$43 billion in the past nine years."⁸³

In consequence to the conflicts persisting in this region for the last three decades, the Pakistani society has become largely radicalized. Not to speak of the poor, illiterate and unemployed rural inhabitants, even educated youth has strong inclination towards religion.

According to a survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, in the country's various postgraduate colleges and universities, in September 2010, 92.4 percent respondents said that religion is an important factor in their life; 55.8 percent were of the view that religious values are critical to the country's progress; 51.3 percent endorsed the country's prevalent legal system in which Sharia [Islamic law] is one, but not the only, source of law while 28.2 percent opined that religion should be the only source of law in the country (50 percent of respondents from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 61.5 percent from FATA said that the Sharia must be the only source of law in the country).⁸⁴

Commenting on this survey, Ishtiaq Ahmed, professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stockholm University, says that such sort of personal radicalization is not harmful for the society. He said, "The fact that 92.4 percent opined that religion was an important factor in their life is an interesting finding. Such personal radicalization (sic) is unproblematic as long as it serves as a moral and ethical radar to make sense of life's meaning and purpose. For liberals and democrats there should be no problem in respecting such radicalization. However, as soon as radicalization impinges on the rights of individuals and carries implications for the legal and political system, there is need to be more critical."⁸⁵

2.1. Drone Attacks:

Drone attacks, carried out by the US Central Intelligence Agency, also serve as a trigger factor of instability. The New America Foundation says such attacks have gone up by 50 per cent since the Obama administration took over the White House in January 2009. There were roughly 45 drone attacks

under the George W. Bush administration between the invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001 and January of 2009. But since then, according to CRSS, Islamabad, as many as 130 missiles have hit targets in Waziristan.

In 2010, the US drones carried out a record number of 124 attacks in the tribal areas - more than double the number of predator strikes conducted in 2009 - killing 1184 people, compared with 2009's death toll of 760 in 53 such attacks.⁸⁶

Right-wing religio-political parties, mainstream Pakistan Muslim League (N), and sympathizers of al Qaeda and Taliban condemn the drone attacks as a “violation of Pakistani sovereignty”, and therefore also use them to justify their opposition to the military's counter-insurgency efforts. Even Amnesty International has now started public campaigning against the US drone strikes through a series of seminars and discussions. It also released a 130-page report which documents the “human rights violations carried out by almost all warring factions, sects and cults in Khyber and FATA.”

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“The US CIA and American military's unlawful drone-missile strikes - which have illegally killed thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians/citizens in Pakistan during the last 10 years, from 2000 to 2010 - were unlawfully authorized by PPP/PPPP, MQM, ANP, JUI-F and PML-Q leaders. Amnesty International USA has demanded legal accountability of all American and Pakistani war criminals for the US unlawful drone-bomb attacks on Pakistan.⁸⁷”

3. Natural Calamities:

In times of economic crisis, natural calamities become an additional cause of instability, directly impacting lives of common people. During the past five years, Pakistan suffered two devastating catastrophes in its history, which will take the country decades to recover.

The 2005 earthquake which hit Kashmir and northern areas of Pakistan with an intensity of 7.6 at the Richter Scale claimed nearly 75,000 lives, directly affecting 4 million people with 3.3 million turning homeless. Damages incurred have been estimated well over \$5 billion.⁸⁸

Pakistan reportedly received \$6 billion in foreign aid for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation of the quake-hit people, but the funds were misused at a large scale, and hence, many people turned homeless in the earthquake still do not have their own houses. The people who lost their livelihoods in the calamity, too, had to suffer a lot.

The worst of the country's calamities was the July-August 2010 super floods, which affected almost every part of the country from the north to the south. Estimates suggest that the floods directly affected about 20 million people, mostly by destruction of property, livelihood and infrastructure, with a death toll of close to 2,000.⁸⁹ Although the floods did not kill as many people as died in the earthquake yet the scale of destruction of the infrastructure was huge, with one fifth of Pakistan coming under water.

In their joint Damage Need Assessment (DNA) estimates, the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) say that Pakistan would need \$30 billion to reconstruct infrastructure and rehabilitate the affected people. The survey found that the country suffered a loss of \$9.5 billion (around Rs 800 billion) to public and private property, crops and other infrastructure in all four provinces and FATA.⁹⁰

The international community's response to help the flood victims in Pakistan was slow mainly because of the reports of embezzlement in the foreign assistance for the 2005 earthquake affectees and the incumbent government's poor credibility. The government has been engaged in diplomatic efforts to get more assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation but failed in securing enough commitment.

Whatever the aid the federal government has so far received from international donors has proved to be a bone of contention for the provinces, as one demands to receive more than the other making claim to

be worst affected. The provinces, except Punjab, have done little on their own to face this unusual situation. Millions of people are lying helpless in different areas of the country, still waiting to receive from the government to reconstruct their houses and rearrange for their livelihood means.

4. Blackmailing by Political Parties:

Some parties like the MQM and the JUI-F which have a one-line political objective (rule in every government), have been a cause of instability in the country. These parties have been alleged to be closer to the establishment than their voters. Their time to time threats to their coalition partners are sometimes believed to be blackmailing tactics to extract some more from the government and sometimes ordered by the establishment. In a situation when neither of the two largest political parties in Pakistan (PPP and PML-N) have clear majority in general elections, the importance of the parties like the MQM and the JUI becomes critical for having the power of making or breaking the government.

These parties have been alleged to be closer to the establishment than their voters.

4.1. Politics of MQM:

The MQM - the second largest party in southern Sindh province - also occasionally serves as a trigger of instability. Because of its fascist style of politics and big representation in Karachi and Hyderabad, Sindh's two largest cities, the MQM often indulges in blackmail of the coalition partners in Sindh and in the Centre.

The party has been in power - directly or indirectly - since it became part of mainstream politics in 1985. It entered into alliance with the big political parties (PML-N and PPP) and at times supported the military. After enjoying power in the Musharraf regime, the party became part of the current democratic government - led by the party which claims to be the sole anti-establishment party of the country.

By securing 25 seats in the February 2008 elections, the MQM emerged as

the king-maker in the 342-member national legislature. It even got more importance after the collapse of the PPP-PML-N ruling coalition on August 25, 2008 on disagreement over reinstatement of the judges deposed by General Musharraf in November 2007.

The MQM - a party of Muhajirs [Urdu-speaking migrants from India] who form 45 percent of Karachi's population (7-9 million) and 23 percent of the entire Sindh - has been locked in a vicious, at times bloody rivalry, with the Pashtoons, which make about 25% of Karachi's population. The Muhajirs want to keep the Pashtuns under their dominance; while the Pashtuns who migrated to this city for livelihood and have been living there for decades are striving to establish their own identity.

The Karachi violence, which has claimed thousands of lives since 1995 - is mainly rooted in this years old tension between the two communities. The report by the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee, a government funded organization, discloses that as many as 1034 people were killed in the first 10 months of 2010. In October, around 70 people were killed in target killing incidents in the city.⁹¹

Dilating on the main causes of Karachi violence, analyst Dr Farrukh Saleem says, "to be sure, the primary driver behind the current mayhem is political in nature. Secondary drivers include sectarianism, ethnic rivalry, criminal gangs, drug mafia, land mafia, other criminal elements and a powerful weapons mafia."⁹²

In early December 2010, the MQM reenacted its bullying by withdrawing from the coalition at the Centre, putting it in the position of losing majority in the House and then rejoining it after the prime minister's visit to its headquarters in Karachi.

Such an opportunistic way of politics on the part of the party which claims to have come into existence for representing the lower middle and the middle classes of the society

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in an otherwise feudalistic politics, is highly regrettable. If political democratic parties always threaten their coalition partners to invite military dictators into the civilian rule, how could the country be able to achieve political stability?

4.2. JUI-F and Other Religio-Political Parties:

The JUI-F of Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman is almost always part of the government. It uses the controversial Islamic laws introduced in 1979 by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as a black-mailing tactic. It is also opposed to the reforming of madrassas – seminaries – and together with other components of MMA [Muttahidda Majlis-e Amal] - an alliance of religious parties which ruled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during Musharraf regime - the JUI to a great extent had stalled the reform process during Gen. Musharraf's rule.

Like the MQM, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has 8 seats in the National Assembly, too, carries importance for a coalition government. He was in power during the Musharraf rule and also had been part of the incumbent government until December 14, 2010 when he left the coalition in protest of the sacking of his party's Federal Minister Azam Swati by the prime minister. He is now an open critic of the government. Like the MQM, the JUI, too, follows the policies based on the agenda of getting power.

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Balochistan – Pakistan's Festering Wound!

Acknowledgment

This report is based on CRSS consultative meetings, intensive discussions, group discussions, and individual interviews with Baloch political leaders, human rights' activists, and intelligentsia on several locations, including Quetta, Khuzdar, Naseerabad, Karachi and Islamabad. The primary purpose of this write-up is to look at the Baloch nationalist narrative from a distance, and then attempt to sift facts from fiction. The immediate context for this report is the year 2010 and herewith CRSS has attempted to give a brief general, socio-political and economic background of the conflict, explaining the genesis as well as various elements of the conflict. The commentary, analysis, and forecast, however, are largely reflective of how CRSS has been able to look at the Balochistan situation.

Most of the general information and common socio-economic statistics have been compiled from various articles by economists and analysts and writers such as Dr. Kaiser Bengali, monograph of Sheikh Asad Rahman, Ahmad Salim's book on Balochistan, research paper of LEAD Pakistan, HRCP reports, International Crisis Group reports, research papers by Nizamuddin Nizamani (SDPI), Faisal Gorchani (SDPI), editorials of different newspapers and articles.

1. Background:

Pakistan's area-wise largest province Balochistan today is a politically fragmented, socially isolated and economically backward society. Despite being mineral-rich and located in a geo-strategically important region, the province has been a prey to constant conflict and instability for various reasons since the inception of Pakistan in August 1947. Denial of socio-economic rights, the resultant nationalist under-currents, five Baloch insurgencies and the state's militant response to them have deeply scarred Balochistan's socio-political landscape. As a consequence, political divisions along tribal and ethnic lines have necessitated unholy alliances and compelled the central government to appease and accommodate every political group in power. It is evident from the fact that following the general elections in February 2010 at least 60 of the 65 members of the Balochistan Assembly (legislature) were made ministers or given posts with the status of a minister to pave the way for a coalition.

Balochistan, therefore, currently resembles a cauldron of multiple socio-political and ethnic conflicts and crises.

Some of the most pressing of these conflicts can be listed as

- a) The Baloch Insurgency
- b) Pashtun nationalist undercurrents
- c) Tribalism
- d) Over-bearing involvement of the security forces in socio-political issues
- e) Natural calamities (earthquakes/ floods/ environmental degradation)

Some of the grave consequences of these conflicts are:

- a) Public resentment and distrust in the federal government and the army
- d) Target-killing of settlers (Punjabi and Urdu-speaking communities)
- e) Sectarian violence (largely the Shi'a Hazara community bears the brunt)
- f) Bad governance (corruption of ruling elite / bureaucratic rigmarole)
- g) Crime (abduction for ransom, extortion, car-snatching)

h) Economic Adversity (poverty / unemployment)

At the root of Balochistan's current crisis is a history of denial of due socio-economic rights coupled with a high-handed approach by the Federal government as well as the military. Over the years, the accumulative impact of these factors, therefore, has been politically debilitating, socially disruptive and economically crippling, with the result that several Baloch districts of Balochistan today are plagued by political and sectarian violence on the one hand, and crime on the other. It is essentially the Baloch nationalist movement, accompanied by the breakdown of law and order, because of which the Baloch pockets of the province in particular have descended in chaos and represent a huge security challenge. High-handed approach by the security forces, economic backwardness, extremely poor governance and political patronage of criminal gangs accentuate this situation, which Baloch nationalist forces fully exploit to their benefit. They tend to project almost every action by security forces (police / levies, Frontier Corps) as an “act of oppression against the Balochi nationalists.”

On Dec. 1, 2010, for instance, an unknown armed group attacked an FC check-post in Turbat around 7:30 in the morning, resulting in the death of one person. Other FC personnel chased the attackers who took refuge in the house of Ayub Gichki, an uncle of a former chief minister Akhtar Mengal in the Overseas Residential Colony. When asked to surrender, those holed up inside responded with at least 15 hand-grenades. The episode ended when the FC raided the house and killed five people, including two sons of Gichki. The incident sparked protests and strikes in several parts of Balochistan the next few days, with almost all political parties blaming the government for killing “innocent Baloch” youth.

Interestingly, a CRSS team was busy in a consultation on issues of provincial autonomy at the Usmania Hotel in Quetta the same day. During the informal exchange of views, some of the Balochi and Pashtoon participants did concede that political patronage of criminal gangs involved in abductions for ransom, extortions and car-thefts, etc. was a major factor in the breakdown of the law and order in the province. They informed us, in private discussions, how some of the mainstream political parties were on the one hand serving as the apologists for the Baloch insurgents by resonating their

demands for provincial autonomy, and on the other providing the criminal bands of these “Nationalist groups” with social protection.

During the open debate, however, the same leaders, took an entirely different position, and condemned the attack as “yet another proof of how the army is crushing innocent Baloch.”

During similar private discussions, we encountered contradictions in the public and private positions of Balochi and Pashtoon leaders and intelligentsia on the pro-independence militant outfits and the behavior of the army.


These anecdotes, by no means, suggest denial or belittling of the issues faced by Balochistan. Beyond doubt, years of political expedience, unholy alliances between tribal sardars (chieftains) and the military-led establishment on the one hand, and private traders, professional gangs and the establishment on the other have blurred the distinction between the Baloch nationalists craving for equitable treatment by the federal government and criminal activities.

Beyond doubt, years of political expedience, unholy alliances between tribal sardars (chieftains) and the military-led establishment on the one hand, and private traders, professional gangs and the establishment on the other have blurred the distinction between the Baloch nationalist craving for equitable treatment by the federal government and criminal activities.

That is why almost every murder / kidnapping and disappearance is viewed through the prism of Baloch nationalists, who tend to project every government action and every social murder as an assault on their cause. The Deputy Inspector General Police (Operations) Hamid Shakeel, for instance, told the media on Nov. 28, 2010 that some 78 criminal groups were operating in Balochistan. Police had arrested more than 150 members of these groups, according to him. Most of them were involved in kidnapping for ransom, snatching vehicles, motorbikes, robbery and other crimes.

2. Balochistan in General:

Balochistan covers nearly 44% (347,190 km²) of Pakistan's total landmass (803,940 km²). The province is predominantly rural with few semi-urban centers with, Quetta, the provincial capital, loosely qualifying as an urban center. Some 20 per cent of Balochistan's population lives in semi-urban centers, while rest of the area is sparsely populated with nomadic and settled Baloch and Pashtun tribes. Until 2004, Balochistan was loosely governed under a mixture of tribal and federal laws with 95 per cent geographical area classified as "B Area." A semi-government force called Levies, comprising about 14,000 polices the 95 percent B area. This force largely comprises nominees of tribal chiefs. Only about five per cent of the area is classified as "A", meaning thereby that all federal laws are applied here, and implemented through the provincial police comprising about 29,500 including the Balochistan Constabulary (Reserve Police). Pakistan's military ruler General Pervez Musharraf, who had publicly described Balochistan as an unruly place, had announced in 2004 that all the B-areas would gradually be converted into A-areas within three years. This also meant replacing the Levies with regular police, and thereby denying the tribal chiefs the power to have their own people in the security process.



Most Baloch nationalists and tribal chiefs interpreted this move as a conspiracy by Islamabad to convert Baloch ethnicity into a minority by encouraging more settlements especially of Punjabis and Sindhis generally. Although the Frontier Constabulary is responsible for guarding Balochistan's roughly 1,200 kilometer border with Afghanistan, its 1,129 kilometer coastal line and nearly 900 kilometer long border with Iran, this army-led paramilitary force also has the sanction by the provincial government to operate in about 15 insurgency-hit districts, including surveillance of sensitive government and infrastructure installations such as gas facilities and electricity grid stations.

Discussions with important individuals in Quetta and elsewhere, however, lead one to conclude that the Levies' Force serves as the mainstay of power as well as a big source of income for the tribal elders and that is why almost all of them resented Musharraf's move, condemning it as an anti-Baloch conspiracy.

It was probably against this backdrop that almost all Baloch parliamentarians joined hands in reversing the process and through a resolution in November 2010 the Balochistan Assembly restored the status of the federal B Areas.

2.1. Ethnic Composition:

According to the 1998 Population Census, the largest ethnic group in Balochistan was Balochi-speakers, consisting of 55 per cent of the population. The next largest group was Pashto speakers making up 30 per cent. Others included Sindhis (6 per cent), Punjabis (3 per cent) and Seraikis (2 per cent). The Population Census does not explicitly mention Brahvi-speakers as a separate linguistic group. In fact the Brahui-speakers dominate the central upland districts of Mastung, Kalat, and Khuzdar, and also have a sizeable presence in some of the other districts. Linguistically, Brahvi and Balochi are distinct languages. In terms of culture, social organization, and history, however, the native speakers of these two languages see themselves as part of a wider Baloch society and tradition. This is an interesting case where an ethnic group has two distinct languages. Because of their shared ethnicity, and for political considerations, Brahvi-speakers

have been classified as Balochi-speaking in the Population Census. This paper will refer to Balochi and Balochi-Brahvi ethnicity as interchangeable categories.¹

2.2. Status of Human Security:

The status of human security and poverty in Balochistan is alarming. The total population of Balochistan is 6.5 million or 5.14% of the total population of Pakistan, occupying an area of 347, 188 km or 47% of the total area of the country with 12 persons per km in terms of population density. 55% people in Balochistan live below the poverty line; landless people in rural areas are 52.49%. 35% people live without any property in rural areas. 31.14 % are homeless people in urban areas. The literacy rate calculated in 2002 was 30.5%, which is low as compared to the 49.6% national rate. It has the highest infant and maternal mortality rate in the country. Worsening figures of poverty, and indifferently designed development plans and packages have resulted in massive backwardness and anarchy.

The province, which has been supplying most of the resources to a 'federation' has been the most deprived according to the UNDP Human Development Report 2003; the report said 'Dera Bugti the wealthiest district of the country in terms of gas production ranked last among the 91 districts of the country on the Human Development Index'. According to the Social Policy and Development Center (SPDC), "An overview of the development scene in Balochistan is discomfoting and the extent of relative deprivation in the province is appalling."²

Since 2003, not a single mentionable change has taken place in the province, (except for opening a campus of Balochistan University in Loralai).

The contrast between Balochistan and the rest of Pakistan is appalling. Out of only minerals and mining, Balochistan yields revenue of around one billion rupees. However, drought and scarcity of water has caused loss of approximately 43% of the livestock, which has dragged the province into extreme poverty. There is a lack of 'supporting infrastructure and services along Balochistan's coastline'; approximately 30% of marine catch is wasted

because of lack of modern processing facilities.³

As a whole, Balochistan's socio-economic indicators and extremely volatile political conditions, accompanied by Baloch militancy, present a bleak and dismal picture. A World Bank report lists Balochistan among economically "lagging regions." The major cause, says the report, is "internal conflict" caused by the militant campaign by 'non-state groups' (Baloch insurgents). Besides Balochistan, the report counts Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], and North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]) also to the "Lagging Regions" with high conflict rates.⁴

2.3. Insecurity among Hindus in Balochistan:

Hindus, who had chosen not to leave Pakistan like their religious compatriots in 1947, were comfortably living in Balochistan's districts of Lasbela, Jaffarabad, Naseerabad, Bolan, Mastung, Khuzdar, Dera Bugti, Quetta, Jhal Magsi, Sibi and other districts, for centuries; they have, however, been prey to terrorism recently. The Hindus, instead of being discriminated, were protected by the tribal chiefs like Nawab Akbar Bugti, who kept the Hindu population close to his fort to protect the lives of the Hindus of Balochistan. The Hindu community in Dera Bugti was about 7000, including about 50 percent females (women and girl children). The Hindus owned nearly 250 shops/businesses in Dera Bugti, mostly near and around the Bugti fort; in fact, most lived under the protection of Nawab Bugti. The hostilities, however, forced them to abandon homes and business and flee for safety. According to a report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in 2005 31 Hindus, including 19 children, three women and 11 men, were killed in the attack on Bugti's fort. The recent update of their status is that they also have become prey to

In a way, Balochistan's geographical location influences the regional power politics in the context of the US-Iran stand-off, the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the Chinese desire to use Balochistan as a transit hub, particularly for its energy imports.

harassment, kidnapping and target-killing.⁵

Even today, based on CRSS interviews with displaced Hindu families living in dismal conditions in the suburbs of Quetta in November/December 2010, it is quite evident that these families are virtually living as outcasts. Financially squeezed, socially not really welcome, and politically under the constant gaze of security agencies (because of their Bugti origins) have made their lives miserable. These conditions underscore how “these minority Balochis have become victims of harassment, kidnapping and target–killing.”⁶

The weekly *The Pulse* also spoke of big unrest among Balochistan's Hindu community because of continued waves of abductions of their fellow community members.

“Many of them have already left for India or abroad. A kidnapped religious cleric from Kalat has not been released yet. In the last week of December, sub-engineer Irrigation Department and former journalist Nanak Ram Rajput was abducted. A few weeks earlier, a revered Hindu leader Go-Lukh Meer of ancient temple and his friend Vinod Kumar went missing.”⁷

Provincial Minister for Minorities' Affairs and Human Rights, Engineer Basant Lal Gulshan also expressed concern over the rising kidnappings of Hindus, according to *The Pulse*. Gulshan, however, blamed “foreign elements” for these abductions that “mean to destabilize Balochistan.” The minister revealed that since 2007, as many as 39 people had been kidnapped and two killed.

2.4. Geo-Political Situation:

Balochistan borders both Iran and Afghanistan and has an almost 1000-kilometer coastal line on the Arabian Sea, making it a geo-strategically important location by default. Even as far back as 1870, the British colonial Boundary Commission sliced and gifted Baloch lands to Iran and Afghanistan to “appease the regimes against a suspected Russian advance towards the warm waters of Balochistan”.⁸ In a way, Balochistan's geographical location influences the regional power politics in the context of the US-Iran stand-off, the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom in

Afghanistan, and the Chinese desire to use Balochistan as a transit hub, particularly for its energy imports.

The Indian and Russian interest in Balochistan, however latent that may be at the moment, had also been evident from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the eagerness displayed by India in establishing its presence in Afghan Provinces bordering Balochistan. Former and living Pashtoon and Baloch tribal leaders such as Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, Attaullah Mengal, Khair Bux Marri, inter alia, were known for their contacts with Moscow and Kabul. That is why, some of them took refuge in Afghanistan and Moscow after the military operation in the 1970s and Pashtoon and Balochi nationalist parties even today radiate an anti-establishment sentiment. Neither did the army trust them as pure Pakistani groups. Some of the Sardars were followers of the Marxist Ideology and hence opposed the democratic system of government.⁹

The Chinese interest in the Gwadar Port is no hidden secret either. Some of the Baloch militant groups have openly opposed the Chinese involvement in the construction of the Gwadar port, something the US and India would be interested in for the long-term trading routes through the Indian Ocean as well. The scheduled meeting of President Musharraf with the PM of China for the inauguration of Gwadar port on March 21, 2005, had to be cancelled because of strikes and protests in Gwadar that raged for three days and destroyed shops belonging to the non-Baloch population.¹⁰

Pakistani authorities also accuse India of supporting Baloch nationalists, while the American involvement and influence in Balochistan has also grown in the context of the post-9/11 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. (US Special Forces have been using the Pasni Airport and Kharan's Shamsi airbase since the launch of the war on terror on October 7, 2001). The US is also accused of supporting the anti-Tehran sunni militant group Jundullah, which reportedly operates out of Pakistani Balochistan territory.

In December 2010, Jundullah terror group leader "Abdul Rauf Rigi, the new chief of the outlawed terrorist group was arrested by the Pakistan army's intelligence forces. Abdul Rauf Rigi took over the Jundullah terror group

after the death of his elder brother Abdul Malik, who was hanged in Iran. He had been arrested by the Iranian intelligence forces in February 2010, and hanged in June, being accused under 79 counts of crime, which included bombing operations and armed attacks on the police and civilians. Abdul Rauf Rigi's location of arrest in Pakistan has not been revealed as yet.¹¹

The arrest of the two Rigis in February and December, respectively, came in the wake of Iranian pressure on Pakistan to counter militant safe havens in its border areas. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad had in late 2010 called on his Pakistani counterpart Asif Ali Zardari to “arrest and deliver” terrorists operating from Pakistani soil. Iran's strong demand came after the suicide attack at the Imam Hussein Mosque in the Iranian city of Chabahar on December 15, which left at least 40 people killed and several injured. The attack had targeted a Shi'ite procession during the holy month of Muharram in Iran.

2.5. Political Landscape:

Nowhere in Pakistan is the political landscape as fragmented as in Balochistan, probably because of the tribal nature of a society that is scattered in sparsely populated regions. Balochistan is not a political society in modern socio-political terms, but still it has some deep-rooted nationalist and democratic political parties, which can play a significant role in influencing Baloch masses, provided they are ready to play such role in current peculiar political circumstances.

Currently five schools of thought dominate this landscape:

1. Baloch Separatists (five factions, primarily Marri and Bugti)
2. Balochistan National Party (Mengal) and National Party (Dr. Malik Baloch).

These parties also stand for provincial autonomy but are vague on the real autonomy issue. The National Party led by Dr. Malik Baloch represents the middle class, educated political workers, academia and intelligentsia, and is guided by fundamental democratic principles of plurality and inclusion. It

claims to believe in liberal and secular values and pursues maximum national autonomy with the Pakistani federation. It lobbied for these demands including the ownership of oil and gas resources in the province (as spelt out in the Constitution's Article 271).

Balochistan National Party (Mengal) demands the right for self determination, a position it seems to have taken since 2008 in the face of mounting pressure by radical separatist movement groups. At the same time, it also talks of elections and democracy, probably to stay relevant, and acceptable to the majority of Balochis.

3. Balochistan National Party (Awami): This party represents moderate Baloch forces, and is considered as the fence-sitters. It has been part of almost every government in the province. It can be compared to the PML-Q (led by Ch. Shujaat Hussein), a party that grew under the shadow of Gen. Musharraf and was instrumental in weakening the PML-N led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

4. Jamhoori Watan Party (Bugti): This party has been in turmoil since the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and has lost its sting due to internal fragmentation. It is divided in two factions: one is led by Aali Bugti and the other by Talal Bugti. The third faction, Baloch Republican Army (BRA), is led by Brahamdagh Bugti, which believes in total independence and is thus categorized as a nationalist militant group.

5. PPP / PML-N/: Both parties are centrists/nationalist and stand for the federation.

6. Jamiat Ulemai Islam (JUI-F): This religio-political party is primarily an opportunistic grouping of Deobandi Maulanas, and has been part of almost every government. A Balochi, Maulana Ghafoor Haideri, is its secretary general. Some call the JUI-F an extension of the military-dominated establishment in Balochistan. But despite the official support and boycott of the last general election by mainstream Baloch parties, the JUI-F could not win a single seat from the Baloch areas, unlike the elections in 2002, when it managed just about two National Assembly seats.

2.6. Pashtun Parties:

1: Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP): Their agenda revolves around equality for Pashtoons in Balochistan. It also demands a new social contract, is liberal in outlook and opposed to the ultra-conservative agendas pursued by religious parties such as the JUI. It also supports the presence of America in Afghanistan and insists on eliminating militant networks operating in the border region.

2: Awami National Party (ANP): Liberal, Pashtoon nationalist party. The ANP is part of the government in the province and it formed an organizing body led by Arbab Zahir, a senior leader of the ANP in Balochistan.

3: JUI-F: It also has Pashtoon leaders like Maulana Sherani, Maulana Wasy.

4: PML-Q (Jaffar Mandokhel): Centrists, stand for federation but mostly opportunists. This faction of the Muslim League is also called the King's Party, as they are always with the government.

2.7. Baloch Nationalists (Separatists):

Baloch insurgent groups are nationalist/secular and have always kept themselves away from religion. Baloch separatist groups do not believe in elections and consider the pro-parliamentary democracy within the Federation as traitors. Their publicly-stated struggle is centered on autonomy.

Baloch separatist groups do not believe in elections and consider the pro-parliamentary democracy within the Federation as traitors.

Their “war against Islamabad” is rooted in the decades old demand for provincial autonomy. But all these groups are divided, and therefore, the religio-political Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F) and its splinters emerge as the deciding factor for any coalition.

2.8. Major Groups:

- Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).
- Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).
- Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
- Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF).
- Lashkar-e-Balochistan.
- Sarbaz Balochistan.

Socio-Economic Indicators:

- 18 out of the 20 most infrastructure-deprived districts in Pakistan are in Balochistan.
- The percentage of districts that are classified as high deprivation stands as follows: 29 per cent in Punjab, 50 per cent in Sindh, 62 per cent in the NWFP, and 92 per cent in Balochistan. If Quetta and Ziarat are excluded, all of Balochistan falls into the high deprivation category. And Quetta's ranking would fall if the cantonment is excluded from the analysis.
- The percentage of population living in a high degree of deprivation stands at 25 per cent in Punjab, 23 per cent in urban Sindh, 49 per cent in rural Sindh, 51 per cent in the NWFP, and 88 per cent in Balochistan.
- Nearly half of Balochistan's population lives below the poverty line, compared to 26 percent in Punjab, NWFP 29 percent, and 38 percent urban and 27 percent rural population in Sindh.
- Compared to the national literacy rate of around 50 percent, the same rate is just about 23 percent, with only 7 percent female literacy rate.
- Only 4 out of total 30 districts have gas supply while the province has been a major producer of gas for the total domestic, commercial and industrial needs of the country from early 50s. Even capital Quetta, was not provided gas in 1986.
- Almost 78 percent of the population has no access to electricity and gas.

3. Conflict-Generating History at a Glance:

- The current military operation in Balochistan is the fifth in the series. The first one was in 1948, the second in 1958, the third in 1962, the fourth in 1973. All the operations were to curb resistance to interference from the Central Government.
- The current military operation in Balochistan is the fifth in the series. The first one was in 1948, the second in 1958, the third in 1962, the fourth in 1973. All the operations were to curb resistance to interference from the Central Government.
- Historically, Balochistan or Kalat have never been a part of the Indian state.
- After the British conquered a part of the State of Kalat in 1839, the British pledged to respect the independence of Kalat and also gave it subsidies to maintain local loyalty for protecting British interests.
- Mir Ahmed Yar Khan and the people of Balochistan supported the movement for the creation of Pakistan but at the same time they envisioned Kalat as a separate, independent and sovereign state after the departure of the British from India.
- Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself was the champion of independence and sovereignty of Kalat. In 1946, Mr. Jinnah pleaded before the Cabinet Mission for complete independence and sovereignty for Kalat as it existed before the agreements and treaties of 1841, 1854 and 1876 with the British. The Marri and Bugti Tumandars also joined the plea demanding their regions to be included with the Kalat federation. Jinnah eventually won the case.
- Thus Kalat and Pakistan signed a standstill agreement on 4 August 1947 in which Pakistan recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign state, while future relations between Kalat and Pakistan regarding defense, external affairs and communications were to be negotiated later.
- While Pakistan announced its independence on August 14, 1947, Kalat announced its independence on the very next day, August 15, 1947.
- But soon after independence, Kalat was pressurized to merge itself with Pakistan in the 'interests of both'.
- The Khan of Kalat refused to agree and tabled this desire of Pakistan in the Kalat State Houses of Parliament, Dar-ul-Umra and Dar-ul-Awam, which unanimously refused to merge Kalat with Pakistan. However,

they partially agreed to have an agreement with Pakistan for having a joint currency, defense and external affairs while keeping Kalat an independent and sovereign state. The members, however, pledged to strongly resist any coercive action from Pakistan even with force.

- Pakistan “illegally” annexed Kalat's sub-states Makran, Kharan and Lasbella.
- Pakistan ordered its garrison commander to invade Kalat and keep the Khan under house arrest until he signed the document of annexation.
- Khan eventually went to Karachi and signed a controversial but conditional merger document with Pakistan on 27 March 1948 in his personal capacity despite strong opposition from both Kalat legislatures.
- This forced annexation gave birth to this conflict erupting in a low-scale resistance in Kalat led by the younger brother of Khan, Agha Abdul Karim, who was the governor of Makran that had been part of Kalat for 300 years. However, the rebellion was overcome by military as the resistant leaders were arrested over a deceptive agreement on the Holy Quran but were imprisoned as well as fined. Agha Karim spent seven years in prison.
- In a personal meeting in 1958, President Iskandar Mirza asked the Khan of Kalat to mobilize sardars for the restoration of the Khanate of Kalat, and then on the pretext of this activity, sent in Pakistan Army under the command of Tikka Khan. The army arrested the Khan and sent him to an internment in Lahore. As soon as Ayub Khan took charge, he sentenced Prince Karim to another 14 years of jail term. In May 1959, Nawab Nauroz Khan Zehri came down from mountains on assurance of amnesty on the Quran. He was immediately arrested together with his sons and grandsons and sent to Hyderabad jail, where they were tried for treason. Seven of his associates, including his sons, were sentenced to death and hanged in Hyderabad. The ninety years old Nawab Zehri died in captivity in Hyderabad.
- In 1962, Ayub Khan sacked Ataullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bukhsh Marri, and Nawab Akbar Bugti from their hereditary positions as sardars of their tribes. This led to resistance, which was again quelled with an army action, arrests, long incarcerations, etc.
- From this resistance emerged a movement (1962 to 1968) which resisted the one unit regime imposed by Ayub Khan in West Pakistan to

provide population parity between the two wings of the country (the other being East Pakistan which eventually became Bangladesh). One unit was finally disbanded in 1969 and Balochistan gained the status of a province in 1970.

- Another resistance began in 1973 when the federal government of Z.A. Bhutto sacked the elected government of Balochistan on the flimsy charge of conspiracy against the state. The Army again went in to crush the resistance, but this time with the help of the Shah of Iran, and using highly sophisticated equipment including helicopter gunships. It was the bloodiest conflict. The resistance ended when General Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship announced a general amnesty in 1978.
- The latest resistance and the military response to it began during the dictatorship of General Musharraf in response to the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti.¹²

4. Government-Bugti Feud:

At the heart of the current simmering conflict in Dera Bugti was the Bugti-Musharraf stand-off, which essentially kicked-off the crisis. But the Bugti factor dates back several decades, to the time when Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) began extracting gas from four fields in the Sui region. According to official documents, signed by representatives of Nawab Bugti that a former minister had shared with us in 1998, the late Nawab received a minimum of Rs. 200 million annually against various heads. None of them really existed on ground. Even the rentals he received were off the PPL and Oil and Gas Development Corporation Limited (OGDCL) cars, i.e., the vehicles belonged to the companies, but in papers Bugti had rented them out to these companies. The documents showed that even salaries of about 200 ghost workers went to the Bugti family.

The Bugti-Musharraf row began in 2005 with attacks on gas pipelines in the gas producing town of Sui, some 45 kms away from Dera Bugti, to pressurize the government into accepting Bugti's demands such as new employments and regularization of those Bugti workers who had been working in the company for the last many years.

“In the first phase these workers observed token hunger strike and then,

apparently at the behest of Nawab Bugti, they went on damaging the pipelines. Nawab Bugti and his tribesmen were receiving handsome money as land rent from the companies under the formal agreements and the rent has been increasing year by year.”¹³

As the Bugti agitation was going on, Dr. Shazia Khalid, who was serving at the PPL medical facility in Sui was allegedly raped by an army Captain Hammad on January 3, 2005, prompting Nawab Bugti to demand action against the officer. Musharraf was not ready to punish Hammad and declared him innocent. In the ensuing weeks, a huge controversy enveloped Sui. Differences between Bugti and the army sharpened, mutual positions hardened and the military eventually almost forced Dr. Shazia Khalid to leave the country on March 18th, 2005, hoping this would remove the source of friction and silence Bugti but “the Nawab decided to demonstrate his power by launching a major attack on the check posts of Defense Security Guards in the fenced area of gas installations in which many Bugtis and soldiers were killed. Gas supply to the country from Sui field was suspended for many days after the damage to the main supply pipeline. Military was moved from Puno Akil cantonment and construction of cantonment was also announced at Sui. On March 15th, the military rained rockets on Bugti's fort where members of minorities—Sikh and Hindus lived under his protection. As many as 62 including 32 Hindus as well as women and children were killed while he himself escaped unhurt. The incident took place after a clash between the Bugti tribesmen and personnel of paramilitary forces.”¹⁴

Soon after the incident, hundreds of armed Bugti tribesmen laid a siege around personnel of paramilitary forces and thus cut-off the only road—the line of supply for forces. Gen. Musharraf sent Ch. Shujaat Hussain along with Mushahid Hussain, both leaders of PML-Q on a reconciliation mission. They were close to Musharraf, but Bugti also trusted them. Ch. Shujaat Hussain brokered a verbal deal between the government and Bugti on the reversion of both parties – military and Bugti militants - to their previous positions which was also confirmed by the then Major General Shujaat Zamir Dar, F.C Inspector General. Later rockets were also fired on Bugti residence on December, 30, 2005, though he escaped unhurt.

Officials recall that a meeting was also arranged between Bugti and Musharraf in 2005 to break the deadlock and a private aircraft was also sent to fetch Bugti from Sui. Bugti, who lived in Dera Bugti, traveled to Sui to leave for Islamabad, but some hawkish elements within the military establishment apparently scuttled the entire scheme by delaying the aircraft on the pretext of a technical fault. Bugti waited for about two hours at the Sui airport but then returned to Dera Bugti once he figured out the scheme. Interestingly, the plane took off minutes after Nawab Bugti left, suggesting that some elements within the army opposed Musharraf's rapprochement. This further deepened the schism between Bugti and Musharraf. During a press conference at the Presidential Palace in Islamabad in February 2005, the latter went on to ridicule Baloch nationalists, saying only three sardars – Akbar Bugti, Khair Bux Marri and Attaullah Mengal – were the problem in Balochistan. He also boasted on the occasion that “it is a different age, they wouldn't know what hit them.”

In retrospect, most Balochs believe that had the Bugti-Musharraf meeting come about Balochistan perhaps would be different in 2010. The arrogance and high-handedness displayed by parts of the military establishment, one may conclude, had left no option for Bugti but to retreat into the mountains of Tratani area, where he died a tragic death in the hitherto unexplained military action on August, 26, 2006.

Balochi journalists and some officials believe that intelligence agencies, particularly the Military Intelligence (MI) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) patronized the rivals of Bugti to weaken his “oppressive hold” on the area.

One big source of friction between Bugti and the government has been the encroaching influence of the army in his fiefdom. Balochi journalists and some officials believe that intelligence agencies, particularly the Military Intelligence (MI) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) patronized the rivals of Bugti to weaken his “oppressive hold” on the area.

“Bugti never wanted to tow their (intelligence) line rather wanted to impose his own will in Dera Bugti. As long as both the FC and the Army did not interfere in tribal affairs, Bugti also kept a distance and never created

problems for them or the administration, while the gas companies ran their affairs smoothly as well. When the establishment grew suspicious of Bugti amassing weapons and ammunition besides bulldozing his rivals, one way to counter this growing influence of Bugti was to patronize his rival Bugtis and set up check posts," said a Baloch National Party leader.¹⁵

In fact, the Frontier Corps had begun building up presence in Dera Bugti and setting up posts near and around Bugti's fort and Kohlu after the rocket attacks on Gen. Musharraf during his visit to Kohlu on December 13, 2005. Bugti had responded by expanding his own security check-posts, before he moved to the mountains of Marri areas and declared revolt against Musharraf, following a rocket attack on his fort.

Bombardment of Bugti family homes in Dera Bugti on Decemeber 17, 2005, scared the locals and many began fleeing to avoid looming Bugti-Army hostilities. Many left Dera Bugti to avoid arrests. Dera Bugti eventually became almost a ghost town as life came to a halt. Little business and almost non-existent utilities made it almost impossible for the common man to stay on.

A number of people left or wanted to leave when Brahamdagh Bugti, Nawab Bugti's beloved grandson who had fled to Kabul after elder Bugti's murder, reportedly began extorting money from the locals out of his Kabul sanctuary.

The army and FC responded to the exodus from Dera Bugti with a high-handed approach of not allowing people to leave in an attempt at preventing the town from becoming a ghost town. Army officials said that they did so to stop "potential pro-Bugti miscreants" from fanning out for subversion, or even joining five separatist outfits, which have been involved in destroying and damaging the utility infrastructure – gas pipelines / electricity pylons, security installations.

Another reason behind the exodus from Dera Bugti was the inter-family feud. After Bugti's assassination in August 2006, the PPL and OGDCL stopped payments to the family because Nawab Bugti did not nominate any successor. This panicked the heirs, including Brahamdagh, Shazain, Aali,

Jamil and Talal Bugti (the only surviving son of Nawab Bugti).

The government apparently capitalized on the scramble for assets and persuaded Aali Bugti, one of the Bugti grandsons, to return to Dera Bugti. The objective of providing state protection to Aali Bugti was to settle the succession issue. Aali Bugti is now acting as the head of the Bugti tribe. But the government primarily used the gas royalties as an appeasement tool. Talal Bugti, one of the surviving sons, for instance, received Rs. 380 million, officials in Quetta said. The government, it seems, managed to contain the conflict, attacks on gas and power installation by doling out the money that PPL and OGDCL owed to Bugti.

Local journalists – who had good contacts with the Bugti family – believe that most of the heirs have received compensation. Earlier the authorities had to deal with one Bugti. Now its five of them; Talal, Brahamdagh, Aali, Jamil, and Shazain (who has fallen out with his father Talal over money matters).

Official statistics for the year 2010 also suggest a marked decline in sabotage and terrorism in the province. Attacks on the utility infrastructure – railway tracks, gas pipelines, and Quetta Electricity Supply Corporation – for instance came down to 25 from 135 in 2009. Similarly, incidents of subversion came down to 658 in 2010 from a staggering 1830 in 2009. The casualties of such attacks in 2009 were 651 but registered an almost 100 per cent decline with 300 deaths.

A judicial enquiry promised by the federal government has yet to determine as to what exactly caused the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti inside his cave in August, 2006.

5. Most Frequent Complaints:

The history of neglect by the center, the high-handedness of the civilian-military establishment, denial of political and financial autonomy and the continuing nexus between the provincial elite—mostly opportunistic—and the military establishment. In addition, Musharraf either gave birth to new complaints or reinforced old grievances. The Baloch nationalist narrative

also feeds off these misgivings and the insurgent groups in particular use this to justify their violent campaign. Following are some of the most frequent complaints that revolve more around the role of the Center/military and focus less on the role tribal sardars and chieftains have played – most of them as willing pawns, driven by their own economic interests.

- The Punjabi-dominated Center is not sincere.
- The present government in Balochistan lacks legitimacy as all Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the February 2008 elections as a mark of protest against an unannounced operation in Balochistan. Baloch nationalists see it as an agent of the Pakistani establishment.
- The Military Establishment wants to keep Balochistan subjugated.
- Suppression of Baloch nationalist forces is a conscious attempt to keep Balochis divided.
- The civilian-military ruling elite in the Center does not want development and prosperity in Balochistan.
- Some of the Baloch tribes such as, Jams, Raisanis, Jamalis, Rinds, Zehri's as well as religious leaders associated with the Jamiat Ulemai Islam serve as the extensions of the civil-military establishment.
- Intelligence agencies use businessmen / smugglers / gang leaders for “social support” but many of these people reportedly indulge in criminal activities like kidnappings for ransom, extortion from affluent people and smuggling.
- “Official” protection of private influential groups has contributed to the breakdown of law and order.
- The civil-military establishment is consciously promoting religio-political groups to counter Balochi nationalists.
- Intelligence agencies eliminating Baloch nationalists through target killings and police encounters to muzzle demands for rights. That is why almost all political/sectarian murders are blamed on intelligence agencies, or projected as acts of suppression.
- Intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps are playing favorites with Bugti family members, using one against the other.
- Intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps are using tribal chiefs against prominent Bugti and Marri leaders.
- A careful analysis and pointed discussions with a number of prominent

Balochis and Pashtoon stakeholders leave holes in the popular Baloch narrative. The word “Agencies”, an extremely loose metaphor to denounce the army / FC and intelligence agencies, pops up in almost every discussion on violence, deaths and murders. This phrase is employed frequently to underscore that the military establishment is guided by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI) (which during the Musharraf era was practically running Balochistan and the Sindh province).

Socio-Economic Indicators:

Balochistan has not been able to avail the resources of its land; it is one of the key factors of prolonging instability. Frédéric Grare writes in his paper 'Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism':

Balochistan has failed to benefit from its own natural gas deposits. The first deposits were discovered in Sui in 1953. Gas was supplied to Multan and Rawalpindi, in Punjab, in 1964; but Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, had to wait until 1986 for its share of the gas, which it received at that time only because the central government decided to extend the gas pipeline because it had decided to station a military garrison in the provincial capital. In the Dera Bugti district, home to the gas fields of Sui and Pircoh where conflicts have taken place recently, only the town of Dera Bugti is supplied with gas. It receives its supplies only because a paramilitary camp was opened there in the mid-1990s. Overall, only four of the twenty-six districts constituting Balochistan are supplied with gas. In fact, although it accounts for 36 percent of Pakistan's total gas production, the province consumes only 17 percent of its own production. The remaining 83 percent is sent to the rest of the country. In addition, the central government charges a much lower price for Baloch gas than it does for gas produced in other provinces, particularly Sind and Punjab. Moreover, Balochistan receives no more than 12.4 percent of the royalties due to it for supplying gas.¹⁶

According to the international law and global humanitarian ethics, the producer province would be the primary beneficiary of the provincial resources. The Gwadar port project is under the central government and the

government of Balochistan has a very brief role in it, according to the report of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) out of 600 recruitments in the Gwadar project, only 100 were Baloch, who were recruited on minor positions. Baloch have reservations that primarily Punjabis and then Sindhis would be the major beneficiaries of the Gwadar project.¹⁷

Launching of more development projects in Balochistan (without due consultation with Balochistan's government) every now and then have caused disorder as the number of cantonments and establishment of military barracks increases during the launch of the new projects—thus the apparent process of development ultimately ends up at an anti-climax.

6. Law and Order 2010:

General law and order in Balochistan presented a bleak picture even during 2010. High-profile political murders of leaders such as Habib Jalib, Secretary General of the BNP-M, sectarian killings, and the continued break-down of law and order kept the province on the boil. Every now and then shutter-down strikes to protest assassination of Balochi, Punjabi and religious leaders continued to disrupt life in districts such as Dera Bugti, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad, Mastung, Khuzdar, Kech, Nushki, Gwadar, Kalat, and Quetta, the provincial capital. Official statistics reveal that as many as 316 people lost their lives in over 400 incidents of target and sectarian killings during 2010. Target-killings basically were directed against Punjabi and Urdu-speaking settlers, including about 30 academics. They also included four Ph.D. professors as well as a pro-vice chancellor of the Balochistan University.

Police recorded about 900 cases of murder (up from 725 in 2009), some 113 offenses against persons and property (robberies, car-snatching, down from 234 in 2009), and 55 kidnappings for ransom (these numbers were the same for the previous year and included the kidnapping of two nephews of former Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Jamali as well).

The number of rocket attacks and bomb blasts at various locations registered about 40 percent decline (down from 792 incidents in 2009 to 333 in 2010).


Baloch political activists insist that thousands of Baloch nationalists are still missing but a home department list speaks of about 57 missing persons. Brussels-based Baloch activist Mehran Baloch, for instance, claims that currently, more than 7,000 Baloch youth and elderly are missing,¹⁸ their family members and relatives are not aware of their whereabouts and condition; no lawyers have access to them and they have not been produced in any court of law. Abduction of Baloch students, journalists, lawyers, teachers, and political activists are carried out on a daily basis.

Baloch political activists insist that thousands of Baloch nationalists are still missing but a home department list speaks of about 57 missing persons.

Besides forced disappearances, Mehran Baloch also drew the attention of the United Nations Human Rights Council to selective elimination of missing persons. He said that in the last four months of 2010, about 50 bullet-riddled bodies of Baloch missing persons were found in different areas of Balochistan.

Referring to recent human rights reports on the volatile situation in the resource-rich province, Mehran told the parliamentarians that even ruling Pakistan People's Party leader and Balochistan Chief Minister Raisani had admitted that some of the abductions and killings are “definitely carried out by security agencies”.

Student leaders' killing sparks protests



Workers of the BSO stage a protest outside the Quetta Press Club

In the early part of the year 2011, the issue of target-killings continued to dominate Balochistan's political landscape. In January, for instance, the mysterious killing of yet another two Baloch student leaders triggered protest rallies and shutter-down strikes in Quetta, Kech, Panjgur, Gwadar, Mand, Hub and other parts of Balochistan on Thursday.

The bodies of Baloch student leaders Qambar Chakar and Ilyas Nazar were found in a desolate place on the outskirts of Turbat on January 5. Both the victims had been listed as missing and their relatives had accused the security forces of holding them hostage during their enforced disappearance.

The Baloch Student Organization (BSO-Azad) and Baloch National Movement (BNM) had called for a complete shutter-down and wheel-jam strike to condemn what they described as "extra-judicial killings of political-opponents." All shopping and trading centers were closed during the day and there was thin attendance in Government offices.¹⁹

BSO-Azad held a protest demonstration outside the Quetta Press Club on January 6, attended also by a large number of girl students. The participants chanted slogans against security agencies and Frontier Corps, accusing them of picking up Baloch students and killing them during their illegal detention. Baloch leaders Banok Andali and President of BSO-Azad Merhab Baloch addressed the protesters in Quetta and severely criticized the security forces for their "brutal attitude" towards Baloch student leaders.

Prominent Baloch Murders since 2006:

- Nawab Akbar Bugti (Aug,26, 2006)
- Raziq Bugti, provincial government spokesman (2006)
- Balach Marri (son of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri) killed in Nov, 2007 in the Chaghai District Near Pak Afghan border
- Ghulam Muhammad Baloch and two other friends Shair Mohammad and Lala Muneer dead bodies found at Turbat at April, 8, 2008
- Habib Jalib, central general secretary of Balochistan National Party, killed in Quetta on July 08, 2009
- Maula Bakhsh Dashti, former Nazim and political worker of National Party was killed on July 11, 2009
- Shafiq Ahmed Khan, provincial Education Minister killed in 2009.

Interestingly, in the presence of the Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani on January 3, 2011, at Sui, Governor Zulfiqar Magsi demanded a thorough investigation into the issue of missing persons so that families could know as to whether their near and dear ones are at all alive and where.

Acting president of BNP, Dr. Jahanzeb told Voice of America, early January 2011 that some 28 leaders and workers of the party were killed between 2006-2010.

Similarly, a nationalist blog - BALOCH NATIONAL VOICE (BNV) - released a report on in-custody murders of abducted political activists in the last six months of 2010, detailing incidents of abductions and executions.²⁰

While one must sympathize and empathize with all those affected by the security apparatus, one, however, must exercise extreme care in dealing with such reports, which - from a professional point of view - may not be 100 percent correct or updated.

The United States Department of State's annual report on human rights in Pakistan, issued in March 2010, for instance, had said that during 2009 “politically motivated disappearances continued, and police and security forces held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their location.”

That report, citing a Pakistani human rights group, said that in August 2009, Pakistani Frontier Corps paramilitary troops arrested two members of the Balochistan National Party in Khuzdar, Pakistan. Two days later, the men were turned over to the police. “Both men showed evidence of having been tortured,” the report said. “Authorities reportedly forced them to make false confessions before their release.”

On the politically-motivated sabotage front, at least 135 oil tankers and containers carrying supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan were set ablaze in 9 different locations of Balochistan, killing as many as 34 drivers and their assistants. The restive Balochistan province serves as the second most important transit route for NATO supplies, and during 2010 Taliban as well as criminal gangs repeatedly disrupted this supply chain. No arrests in

connection with these incidents of sabotage, however, were reported anywhere in the province.²¹

In Quetta, the provincial capital, 38 oil tankers were damaged in different incidents which killed at least seven people and injured, surprisingly, only one person. Likewise, 16 oil tankers were attacked in Qila Abdullah district due to which 6 people were killed and another 6 were injured.

Since 2008, 200 teachers have been transferred out of Balochistan for fear of being killed and another 200 are currently in the process of transferring out of the province. In 2009, government schools remained open for only 120 days compared to the regular 220 in the rest of the country.²²

Sabotage & Terrorism (2009)

MONTH	Cases	Killed	Injured
January	84	40	118
February	93	35	53
March	86	36	53
April	78	26	80
May	78	24	79
June	74	33	122
July	88	22	103
August	93	26	174
September	84	14	96
October	63	16	43
November	103	9	68
December	53	13	46
Total-2008	853	357	672
Total-2009	977	294	936

Grand Total

Source: Balochistan Home Department, Quetta

Sabotage & Terrorism (1st January to 26th November, 2010)

MONTH	Cases	Killed	Injured
January	74	12	62
February	54	14	45
March	89	35	123
April	88	22	56
May	63	33	68
June	58	24	58
July	46	27	52
August	77	35	50
Sep to 26th Nov	109	98	292
Total	658	300	806

Source: Balochistan Home Department, Quetta

6.1. Attacks on the Governor and Chief Minister:

On December 7, 2010, Balochistan's Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani's convoy came under attack, and the rabidly anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) claimed responsibility for it, saying the protection given to Shii'te mourners during Muharram motivated them to attack the Chief Minister. But interestingly, the separatist Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) also took responsibility for the act to warn the Chief Minister against criticism of the Baloch armed groups. Earlier on December 1, 2010, the Governor of Balochistan Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi had escaped an assassination attempt, purportedly carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

These attacks, and the shoot-out between security forces and militants holed up in a politician's home in Turbat on Dec. 1, underscored the volatility of the situation in Balochistan, where people at large seem to have lost confidence even in the parliament. During a CRSS open seminar at the Usmania Restaurant in Quetta on the same day, for instance, most participants – political and human rights' activists, and academia – came down heavily on the government and the parliament. “It is a parliament representing criminal gangs and thugs”, was how most reacted when asked whether they considered the Provincial Assembly as a representative body.

The arrest on December 22, 2010 of Shahzain Bugti, one of Nawab Bugti's grandsons, and his 26 bodyguards at the Baleli check point in Quetta by Frontier Constabulary (FC) Balochistan stirred up Baloch sentiment further. The FC claimed that Bugti and his guards were carrying a large quantity of illegal weapons, including two anti-aircraft guns, three small machine guns, two hand grenades, 43 Kalashnikovs, 5,000 bullets and 14 unlicensed 4 x 4 Land cruisers - from his motorcade in Quetta.²³

Reportedly, Shahzain refused to come out of his tinted-glass four-wheeler and tried to escape. However, FC men intercepted his vehicle and arrested him after breaking his vehicle's window glass.

This incident once again exposed the high-handed approach that the establishment has adopted over the years; regardless of the veracity of the claims that the FC made on illegal possessions of Shahzain Bugti, the manner

he was arrested in and the way pictures of his arrest were splashed over national media, were quite provocative. As the picture explains, Shahzain looked like a helpless lamb the way two intelligence officials had grabbed him by the neck. It was a sorry comment on the handling of such an issue in



an already volatile situation. This also explained how the civil-military establishment can humiliate certain people – those who it usually pampers but treats altogether differently when it considers them at variance with its agenda.

Most Balochis view the Frontier Corps as a colonial force, which they believe is sorting out dissenting Balochis. Incidentally, FC is largely composed of Pashtoons (and some Punjabis). A Pashtoon intelligence official, who recently retired, claims that Mehmood Khan Achakzai, the PKMAP leader, holds one of the few keys to the future of Balochistan, but he seems to have cold-shouldered the Balochis and is looking the other way.

The ethnic Pashtoons hold a geo-strategic importance as well; most of the Pashtoon tribes live in regions along the border with Afghanistan, and the primary concern of the army establishment is to maintain peace in these areas at all costs.

Most Balochis view the Frontier Corps as a colonial force, which they believe is sorting out dissenting Balochis.

Shahzain, son of Talal Bugti, and Provincial President Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) called the incident a conspiracy to stop him from entering the sensitive area of Dera Bugti. Shahzain's arrest also sparked protests and a shutter-down next day. Even his father came out in his support, alleging Shahzain was being implicated in false cases.

The police and IG officials denied these allegations and justified their action as “motivated by security considerations to maintain law and order.” Shahzain also petitioned the Balochistan High Court against his arrest.

7. Balochistan in 2010 – Socio-Political Situation:

7.1. Parliamentarians Wake Up to Balochistan:

It was against the backdrop of simmering socio-political situation – sniper attacks on political leaders, strikes, murders, kidnappings, and dissatisfaction with the provincial government – that members of the National Assembly asked the government to take practical steps to remove the grievances of the Baloch people. Some legislators reminded the House that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that it was no longer possible to play the national anthem in schools (particularly in Baloch districts).

In a rare session of the national legislature on the eve of the New Year, Abdul Qadir Baloch of PML-N wondered as to why his motions for a debate on the situation in Balochistan had gone un-noticed. PPP legislator Nadeem Afzal Gondal and PML-Q's Sheikh Waqas Akram also questioned the role of the ruling elite of Balochistan. They warned the ruling party members to join hands for a debate on an explosive situation, wherein Baloch insurgents were employing all sorts of intimidation to stop schools from playing the national anthem and discouraging students from enrolling in the subject Pakistan Studies.²⁴

In the same session, the Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, addressed the security issue in Balochistan without mentioning the disappearances. “We are trying to ensure law and order in Balochistan,” he told lawmakers in the National Assembly. “I will assure that we will do everything to improve the

situation.” In August 2009, he acknowledged that 1,291 people were missing in the country. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to Washington, in a media statement said that “the courts and the government are investigating cases of disappearances with a view to establishing the whereabouts of the disappeared persons and the circumstances under which the alleged disappearances took place.”

Earlier in 2009, as Advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister, Rehman A. Malik had on April 22, stated before the Senate - the Upper House of the Parliament - that India was backing the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) for fuelling insurgency in the province and creating unrest.²⁵

Winding up a several days-long debate on the Balochistan situation arising out of the murder of three Baloch leaders in Turbat, Rehman Malik said: BLA was raised and funded by Russia during Soviet-Afghan war when Pakistan was supporting Afghans and now India is backing its activities. The BLA remained dormant since the Afghan war ended, but it was reactivated after killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, whose grandson Brahamdagh Bugti has now openly sought Indian and American support for independence of Balochistan in a recent interview.

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Malik also alleged that the Indian consulate in Iranian city, Zahedan, that borders Balochistan, was also involved in activities other than granting the visa to people. Malik also pointed to an interview by the BLA Chief, Brahamdagh Bugti, to a Pakistani TV channel in which he sought “Indian support for independence of Balochistan.”

"Barhamdagh Bugti is residing in Kabul just five kilometers away from President Karzai's palace and Pakistan has continuously been asking the Afghan government for access to Brahamdagh but the Afghan Government

has been denying Bugti's presence in Afghanistan,” said Malik.

8. 2010: The Year of Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan(AHBP) - (Rights Package):

The year 2010 saw substantial movement on the issue of provincial rights, fiscal relief and alleviation of old grievances. As a follow-up of the 39-point Balochistan Package called Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package (AHBP), announced on November 30, 2009, by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, several steps were taken to assuage the bruised Baloch egos. The package was the result of extensive work done by a parliamentary committee headed by Senator Reza Rabbani. Its members not only consulted political leaders, activists, and intelligentsia from and outside Balochistan, but also appeared to lean heavily on what a former Corps Commander Gen. Khalid Shamim Wyne had also outlined as “urgent steps needed” to restore the Baloch confidence in the center and end their alienation.

In June 2010, Prime Minister Gilani had admitted that deep mistrust between Quetta and Islamabad had existed for the past 63 years and had vowed to work for restoring the Balochis confidence in the center.²⁶ “We want to end all the injustices of the past by adopting practical measures,” the Prime Minister promised. The Prime Minister also promised that this government was trying its best to implement the AHBP as soon as possible.

Although most Baloch nationalist parties had been quite dismissive of the package saying it was insufficient, yet some of the points that the Package contained did attempt to address several long-standing demands by the Balochi people. The package, for instance, promised:

- Ten thousand jobs for the youth of Balochistan.
- Facilitation of political exiles' return to their homeland.
- Immediate release of political workers.
- Launch of political dialogue with major Balochistan stakeholders.
- Fact-finding commission to investigate circumstances that led to Akbar Bugti's killing.
- Judicial inquiry into the killing of three Baloch nationalist leaders.

- End to construction of more cantonments in the province.
- Withdrawal of armed forces from Sui, Kohlu.
- Tracing missing citizens, facilitating their immediate release.
- To seek Provincial consent for mega projects in Balochistan, and allocation of jobs from Grade 1 to 16 for the local population.
- 10 percent of profits to be allocated for the development of areas with natural resources.

As of December 2010, nearly 5,000 Balochi youth and skilled professionals had been recruited to various provincial government departments.

Besides, the provincial government had also received at least 7,500 applications for provincial internship programs. The Ministry of Labor is also working on a program to provide technical training in different trades for up to 5,000 laborers with the objective of sending them abroad.

A brief that the Establishment Division submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Cabinet Secretariat, Inter-Provincial Co-ordination Committee and Special Initiatives in October stated that the federal government had released Rs.1 billion each (\$ 85 billion) to the government of Balochistan on account of flood relief and rehabilitation and settlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Dera Bugti.²⁷

As a whole, the AHBP covers reforms in a number of areas - constitutional, administrative, political and economic – As many as 61 policy recommendations are in various stages of implementation, according to the Brief.

The federal government has also disbursed Rs 2.97 billion (October 2008 to June 2010) under the cash-grants' scheme – Benazir Income Support Program. These disbursements also coincided with a test phase of a poverty survey in three districts i.e. Kech/Turbat, Muskhel and Killa Saifullah.

The Federal Government owes about Rs 800 billion to Balochistan in gas royalties but under the package the federal government would only provide Rs 120 billion to Balochistan in 12 years. The federal government also wrote -off Rs 7.5 billion that Balochistan owed to the federal government in 12 years. The federal government also wrote -off Rs 7.5 billion that Balochistan

owed to the federal government.

A poverty survey by the Population Census Organization (PCO) has meanwhile been almost completed, providing a good database for the beneficiaries.

Following on the heels of the AHBP came the 18th Amendment in April 2010, a significant response to smaller provinces' demands for provincial autonomy. On Dec 1, 2010, the federal government devolved the functions of five ministries to the four provinces. Ministries of Special Initiative, Zakat and Ushr, Population Welfare, Youth Affairs and Local Government and Rural Development would be devolved in the first phase.

The introduction of the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan marks a clear departure from Islamabad's decades-old policy on the province. With the issue of provincial autonomy covered under the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the package conceded a large chunk of demands that nationalist forces in Balochistan routinely voiced and agitated for.

Under the package, the Federal Government also accepted to grant 10% of the total profits for the development of areas with natural resources and made the provincial consent mandatory for the new exploration projects in the province. Although the government promised a sustained judicial process, accompanied by thorough investigations on issues such as missing persons, particularly to probe alleged disappearances of Balochi youth, yet the progress on this count has been relatively slow. On the important issues of political freedom and tracing the "missing persons," the government promised to facilitate the political exiles' return to Balochistan, launch a political dialogue, start a judicial inquiry to investigate the alleged political killings and trace the missing people and arrange for their immediate release. What is seen as a triumph over the establishment, the government also abandoned the construction of three military cantonments in the province and announced immediate withdrawal from Sui and Kohlu areas.

On December 14, 2010, Chief Minister Raisani indicated that talks with insurgent groups were being considered. The government also announced to form a judicial commission to probe the circumstance of the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, in August 2006.

More recently, on January 21, 2011, the Central Development Working Party (CDWP) of the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan approved 68 development projects worth Rs. 170.4 billion for Balochistan. The projects included: 37 infrastructure projects worth Rs. 107.9 billion, 28 social sector projects worth Rs. 59.5 billion, and 3 other projects worth Rs. 2.9 billion.²⁸

9. Appeasement by Army:

By December 2010, the Armed Forces had also selected about 4,200 Baloch youngsters (out of the 10,000 the Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani had promised). These recruitments were made after a significant relaxation in rules / qualification and fitness criteria. General Kayani also offered education stipends to Baloch Youth, and on Jan 3, 2011, Kayani himself visited the Sui Cantonment, inaugurated the Military College Sui and announced establishment of Education City in Sui.

In his address, COAS spoke of various projects initiated by the Army, with the support of locals and the Provincial Government. He said, “presently 22,786 Baloch students are studying in the Army and Frontier Corps run educational institutions. In addition, 4,268 Baloch students are benefitting from Chamlang Beneficiary Education Program and 662 Baloch students are studying in reputed institutions of other provinces. To enhance technical skills of the Balochi youth for better job opportunities, Balochistan Institute of Technical Education BITE, managed by the Army, has thus far trained 1,673 individuals.”²⁹

Gen. Kayani informed the participants, in the presence of the Provincial Governor Zulfiqar Magsi and Chief Minister Lashkari Raisani, that Chamlang Coal Project Loralai, on which work began under the protection of the army, created job opportunities for about

But most analysts and political activists believe that the real reconciliation would begin only when the armed forces take a back seat and allow the civilians to run the government and address burning issues, which primarily are political in nature.

74,052 locals. A 50-bed hospital was being constructed at Sui under the

Army's supervision with the support of Pakistan Petroleum Limited to improve health facilities, according to him. He further added that the Army was also assisting in the provision of Sui gas and water to locals. He expressed satisfaction over the results of the Army recruitment drive in Balochistan and said that it would contribute to a peaceful and progressive Pakistan.

By replacing the Sui cantonment with a military college, the Army Chief attempted to neutralize the Baloch nationalist opposition to the construction of cantonments in these troubled spots. Some called these moves by Kayani as a "reconciliation offensive," hoping this would balm bruised Balochi egos. But most analysts and political activists believe that the real reconciliation would begin only when the armed forces take a back seat and allow the civilians to run the government and address burning issues, which primarily are political in nature. Legal action against all those civilian and military officials accused of involvement in extra-judicial killings, for instance, would also be a big confidence-building measure.

All Parties Coordination Conference:

The first week of January 2011 also saw most political parties - the National Party (NP), Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) and Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) - got together at Quetta for an All Parties Conference organized by the Balochistan National Party (BNP).

BNP Acting President Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaluddin, PKMAP Secretary General Abdul Rauf Lala, Awami National Party Central Vice President Arbab Zahir Khan Kasi, Jamiat-e-Islami provincial Emir, Hazara Democratic Party Chairman Abdul Khaliq, Hazara National Party Central Vice President Dr. Ishaq Baloch, Jamiat Ahl-e-Sunat Sikandar Sultan, General Secretary of the Balochistan Bar Association Aminullah Kakar, Central Trade Association, Balochistan, President Abdur Raheem Kakar, Ihtesham Khan from Tehrik-e-Insaf, Baloch Students Organization Central Secretary General Javed Baloch were among the prominent participants.

On the occasion, almost all the leaders expressed concern over the

“continued wave of target-killings, abduction of innocent people and violation of human rights in the province. They accused the security forces – the establishment – of eliminating Baloch people and held them responsible for the breakdown of law and order and the absence of governance in the province.” Once again, this APC also resonated with the demands for minimizing the presence of the security forces and allowing the political forces to seek solutions to their problems. The APC condemned all types of target killings, violations of human rights and forced disappearances, and demanded an immediate halt to military operations going on in different areas of Balochistan.

The conference, once again, reflected the partial paradox and the state of denial that most Baloch nationalists have been living in; the participants, for instance, blamed all kidnappings for ransom on the security agencies.

10. Provincial Autonomy:

CRSS held a seminar at Quetta, on December 1, 2010, together with the Quetta-based Association for Integrated Development (AID) on the subject of the 18th Amendment. The meeting generated quite a heated debate; most of the panelists and participants welcomed the 18th Amendment as a good step but called for greater transparency and sincerity as far as realizing the letter and the spirit of the legislation was concerned. The meeting highlighted the deep-seated mistrust of Islamabad and the military, and the participants called for replacing the military-dominated militant approach with political dialogue and co-option of mainstream stakeholders in Balochistan. Most also called for fresh elections because a group of Pashtoon and Baloch nationalist parties i.e. Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM) had boycotted the February 2008 elections.

10.1. Summarized Excerpts from speeches:

Liaquat Shahabi – former Member District Council, Quetta:

He said the 18th Amendment is a good step forward in sync with Balochi demands. He was of the view that

We need more educational institutions rather than cantonments.

it would help release pressures built up over years, but that it also required the government to release all political prisoners as part of a reconciliation process. "We need more educational institutions rather than cantonments," he said. He demanded transparency and due legal process – even if one person went missing.

Lala Siddiq Baloch, Chief Editor, Daily Azadi, Quetta

"Political space in Balochistan is minimal and mainstreaming of Balochistan depends on peace and political space. It seems the state is fighting against its own people so how can peace return? The 18th Amendment is a step forward in given circumstances but prospects for peace and mainstreaming will improve if we stop militant approaches and open dialogue.

"It is essential to reverse the war on people, stop illegal abductions/ confinements and persecutions of Baloch nationalists in mysterious circumstances. Unless the military involvement comes to a halt, how can you win the hearts and minds of people?"

He further added that the province would also need resources if ministries were being devolved.

Ishaq Baloch, National Party

"The Baloch problems are rooted in denial of rights as envisaged in 1940 Resolution – the basis for creation of Pakistan. We think that resolution is still valid as a consensus federalist guiding document. This must remain the basic guiding principle and the center must respect it.

"Why should the Center award provincial lands or mineral reserves to another country or company without the provincial consent? It is good that the 18th Amendment promises distribution of natural resources on a 50-50 basis between the Center and Provinces.

"The 18th Amendment resonates the demands by Baloch nationalist parties and it must be implemented in true spirit as soon as possible.

“This should ideally help improve employment conditions within the province and not impose outsiders on provinces. Make up for the past lapses/ neglect of local manpower in Balochistan. As many as 25,000 youth in Balochistan need jobs and if they do not get this in the coming months and years, the Package and 18th Amendment wouldn't mean much.”

Aurangzeb Kasi (ANP)

“The 18th Amendment will not lead to any major breakthrough for the Baloch or the Pashtoons in Balochistan as it has come too late. The Balochi leaders had made known their grievances way back in 1973. In fact, Khair Bux Marri never signed the constitution arguing that it would not be implemented, although Bizenjo and Wali Khan had signed it. His reservations turned out to be true. More recently, Nawab Akbar Bugti also had prepared a document outlining the contours of Provincial Autonomy but the establishment did not pay any heed to it. I myself am not particularly optimistic about the impact of the 18th Amendment in pacifying the disgruntled elements in Balochistan. This will certainly not appease those seeking independence in Dera Bugti / Kohlu. Far more radical measures are needed to address problems in the restive Baloch areas.

“As far as the Pashtoons are concerned, they are facing a plethora of challenges like fundamentalism, terrorism, and the dirty games played by vested interests, both national as well as international. Pashtoons are under invasion from all sides, and similarly Baloch Pashtoons too, are feeling the heat.

“And the core of the problem is that the 'Invisible Government' [a reference to the intelligence agencies and the military] doesn't want to solve the problems of Balochistan. It represents Punjab and they all want to exploit and prosper by exploiting Baloch resources. Unless this 'Invisible Government' relents pressure, gives up militant approaches, and until it allows political forces to carve out solutions, there will be no peace in Balochistan.

“If the State institutions continue to deny the Baloch people their rights and these institutions stick to their militant approach, the Baloch people will not

be able to reap what little dividends may come about their way as the result of the 18th amendment. The 18th Amendment is in conflict with the worldview of the Military Establishment. The Army and the ISI are in conflict with the US objectives as well because they want to occupy Kabul and Afghanistan.”

Agha Hassan Baloch – Lawyer (Secretary Information, BNP)

“The real issue is that the Establishment and Intelligence Agencies continue to interfere in the political process because they never wanted nor seem willing to allow political forces to take lead in conflict resolution and problem management. It is difficult to describe the 18th Amendment as a panacea for Balochistan's long-standing problems. The Punjabi-dominated Establishment doesn't want to see Balochis prosper despite benefiting from Balochistan's natural resources.

“For the people of Balochistan, there is no difference between Musharraf and President Zardari era; earlier people went missing; now they are being abducted and target-killed. What Balochis want is not a few ministries; rather they want to be politically empowered. They only vie for their due rights.

“What hurts the Balochis most is the helplessness of their elected political government in the face of a parallel government run by the Army, intelligence agencies and FC. If the highhanded treatment continued to be meted out to the Balochis, the political process could crumble soon.”

Usman Kakar, Central Leader PKMAP

“Unfortunately, Pakistan has yet to become a nation; it continues to be a country because it stands on the foundations of non-democratic approaches. Fundamental problem in the existing system is absence of equity, provincial autonomy and real democracy. To attain these goals and to materialize their rights, the 'oppressed nations' have struggled throughout most of the country's history. The 1973 constitution too failed to safeguard the oppressed nations. It denied them fundamental rights, including their linguistic rights, national identities. The document instead

sought to perpetuate the colonial centrist rule.

“Today though there is democracy, it is far from a real one as the parliament is subservient to the GHQ and the Army is dictating its terms in domestic as well as foreign policy.

“The oppressed nations of this country want provincial autonomy for transition; they want equity on permanent basis. Their strategic objective is National Equity in the federation based on language, culture and resources and concerted and sustained efforts against fundamentalism, poverty, unemployment, control over own resources.

“Nationalist parties are striving just for their own national identity but they are being branded as anti-Federation, which they are not as they never opposed federation.

“Those who call themselves Federalists are indeed hurting the Federation, and undermining its fundamental principles by denying smaller units their basic rights and resources. Even the Constitutional Reforms Committee didn't accept all our proposals.

“We think that the 18th Amendment is a good step forward but we are not satisfied with the overall thrust of it. It must be more comprehensive and should address our long-standing grievances and demands. All decisions under the 18th Amendment must be implemented as soon as possible. The Center must pay all arrears to the provinces. It must draw a new social contract between all nations living within Pakistan to redefine their role and the nature of the State.”

Conclusion :

Beyond a shade of doubt Balochistan remains volatile and seems to be sitting over a powder-keg. Its residents – ethnic Balochis, Pashtoons, Punjabi and Urdu-speaking settlers – continue to bear the brunt of decades of socio-political discrimination, economic oppression and neglect by their

“Today though there is democracy, it is far from a real one as the parliament is subservient to the GHQ and the Army is dictating its terms in domestic as well as foreign policy.”

own ruling elite that comprises tribal sardars, nawabs, and powerful businessmen. The direct involvement of the military in Balochistan, particularly since the operation against the rebellion of the mid 1970s has only exacerbated the situation, and given rise to a narrative that most Balochis share. This also has eroded people's trust in the federation to a certain extent, and decimated the government authority in most of the Baloch areas. This environment provides the space also to the sub-nationalist militant campaign, being spearheaded by the insurgent groups identified above.

The Baloch nationalist narrative is a mix of genuine grievances, political motives, and social deprivations, exacerbated by the whims of a self-serving ruling elite, including some Balochi sardars or their scions who are currently engaged in a war of attrition against the state infrastructure in the name of Baloch nationalism.

The Baloch nationalist narrative is a mix of genuine grievances, political motives, and social deprivations, exacerbated by the whims of a self-serving ruling elite, including some Balochi sardars or their scions who are currently engaged in a war of attrition against the state infrastructure in the name of Baloch nationalism.

One must, however, concede that clear indications exist on ground of how the civil-military establishment consciously promotes religio-political groups such as the JUI-F and groups similar to it. It also keeps a close liaison with elements within the Pashtun nationalist parties because they are considered as the best insulation against centrifugal Baloch insurgents. Worried by the infiltration of the insurgents ranks by Afghan and Indian agents, the military establishments keeps close contacts with religio-political and Pashtoon nationalist groups, which in the long run is very dangerous and detrimental to the federalist narrative.

The co-option of religious groups in the counter-insurgency may, in the short run, appear as an effective tool, but the inherent long-term risks are much bigger and more alarming for the simple reason that official

patronage also creates the space that the religious groups use to peddle and promote their own, at times trans-nationalist, religious agenda. This also helps in injecting religious ethos into the traditionally secular Baloch society.

Political activities by Baloch nationalists, actions by tribal leaders, abetment of crime, attempts to disguise crime and terrorism in Baloch nationalism and the militant response by security forces in Balochistan have all contributed to the extreme volatility in the province. This also constitutes the context of the acrimonious center-province relationship in Pakistan, and reflects on how the rights of provinces and ethnic or religious minorities are negotiated in a way that the military power-brokers have the final word. Given the lack of political space, aggrieved parties see no alternative to protests and violent struggle. Regardless of whether and which external powers are interfering in Balochistan, it is essentially a domestic problem, exacerbated by continued denial of socio-economic rights, and contravention of fundamental principles of the federation of Pakistan. Urban Sindh and FATA also find themselves in a similar situation. Explosive conditions in Balochistan, Sindh, FATA and many other parts of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa demand an immediate rethink on how Pakistan's ruling elite proposes to keep the federation together. Without applying political means to a conflict that primarily has resulted from denial of political rights, it will be very difficult to keep the spirit of the federation alive in Balochistan. All the stakeholders need to move as fast as possible on Balochistan to save the Federation.

In Balochistan's case J.A. Sulka, while discussing the difference between non-state and state terrorism, says that the major form of terrorism is practiced by the states and their allies, which academics, the media and the government neglect. He says that only the state terrorists have weapons of “mass (civilian) destruction” or the ability to deprive large numbers of people of basic needs and produce hunger, malnutrition, high infant mortality rates, and other chronic diseases of poverty and neglect, as a means of political intimidation and control—this example fits in the situation of Balochistan.³⁰

12. Recommendations:

Package: The implementation of the Balochistan Rights' Package must be accelerated.

Militants: Ways should be identified to bring the separatist militants to talks by developing models of general amnesty for them. This may raise hopes and revive confidence among the people of Balochistan.

Security Forces: Minimize the role of the security forces in the political governance.

Apology: The PPP-led government did offer apology to the Baloch for the atrocities committed by Gen, Pervez Musharaf and his predecessors, but solid and sustained steps need to follow this apology.

Political conflict resolution should take precedence over military intervention, no matter how difficult bringing the militants to the political dialogue seems, there is no better option to deal with them.

Missing persons: The government and the intelligence agencies must address the issue of the missing persons and must also clarify their position.

Compensation plan: A generous compensation plan for the conflict-affected Balochis and the creation of a "truth and reconciliation commission" to review past atrocities could serve as a big confidence-building measures. The compensation plan must include a well-articulated strategic plan to mainstream the Balochis at the Federal level.

Baloch Ownership: Comprehensive plans must be chalked out to include the Balochis (as much as possible) in all infrastructure development projects.

Royalty: The rates of royalty should be re-negotiated so that the value of royalty on oil, gas, coal, copper and other projects should be at par with the international standards.

Relocation: Local population around the Gwadar Sea Port should not be relocated; local fishermen should have open access to the sea.

Provincial Consent: The Provincial Government should have a greater say in all the development projects in Balochistan. Both the federal and the provincial governments must ensure consent of all stakeholders in projects that impinge on the lives and the resources of the Balochis.

Role, and Protection of the mediators: It should be understood that the

conflicting parties cannot by any means bring peace without effective mediation. Effective mediation is a tool, which would help bridge the gulf between the stabilization and the destabilization factors and neutralize the conflict through a win-win model. It must be a totally politically-led effort.

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- III -

Karachi – Seething Under Violence and Terror

1. Background

One of the three largest cities in the world, and the largest in Pakistan, Karachi boasts at least 17 million multi-ethnic population. During the last couple of years, Karachi has seen recurrent outbreaks of violence which have claimed hundreds of lives. Despite repeated claims by the government of having wiped out the miscreants, the return to normalcy has always been short-lived. Some of the most heinous episodes of violence in Karachi were witnessed during 2010. In fact, the number of people who fell prey to target-killings in the city outnumbered those who lost lives to acts of terrorism across the country, during the same period. According to the statistics, 49 suicide attacks killed 1138 people during 2010 across the country, while the number of politically-motivated target killings only in Karachi stood at 1510.¹

Some of the most heinous episodes of violence in Karachi were witnessed during 2010. In fact, the number of people who fell prey to target killings in Karachi during 2010 was higher than those who lost their lives in terrorist attacks across the country during the same year.

Such frequent relapse into deadly violence of the country's commercial hub also entails huge economic consequences. Some brief comments highlighting the commercial salience of Karachi underline the significance of the aforesaid argument.

Karachi is regarded as the commercial nerve center and the financial capital of Pakistan. The tax collected in Karachi makes up over 50% of the total revenue collected by the Federal Board of Revenue. It produces a major chunk of value added goods in large-scale manufacturing and other industries and accounts for about 20% of the total GDP of Pakistan. According to a study conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers in 2007, Karachi's GDP (Currently \$55 billion) is expected to touch \$120 billion mark by 2020 at a growth rate of 5.9%. This high GDP is mainly attributed to the concentration of main centers of financial sector and mega industrial base in the city. Textile, cement, steel, heavy machinery, chemicals, food, banking,

insurance are the major sectors functioning in the city.² Its port handles two-thirds of imports meant for the NATO troops in Afghanistan.

In February 2007, the World Bank identified Karachi as the most business-friendly city in Pakistan. However, since the recent wave of violence, Karachi's economic potential has been seriously jeopardized as it has resulted in a flight of capital from the city. The hugely devastating repercussions of the violence happening in Karachi for the nation's economy make it all the more important to comprehend the causes of this violence in order to curtail it. The interplay of a number of political, social and religious factors explains Karachi's frequent descent into chaos.

2. Political Factor:

Politics, unfortunately, lies at the root of much of the violence that has befallen Karachi in recent months, with other factors such as ethnic and sectarian polarization and the activities of criminal elements coming into play only as a result of the mayhem caused by the brutal acts of the political actors. The dynamics of political violence revolve mainly around political turf wars between the various stakeholders of the city.³ The above observation is corroborated by the fact that most of the victims of these target killings had obvious political affiliation. The political component of the violence is so pronounced that the Sindh Home Minister exclaimed on the floor of the house that had he been given a free hand without having to cater to the dictates of political expediency, he would have eradicated the perpetrators of deadly violence, most of whom, he alleged, enjoyed the backing of political parties. The irony of the matter is the sudden end to all such violence as soon as the Federal Interior Minister flies to Karachi and holds meetings with the MQM and ANP – two parties whose enmity is believed to be the driving force behind much of the violence in Karachi. Such occurrences leave little doubt about the identity of the perpetrators of violence and show the cognizance of the government to the involvement of these parties behind the acts of such barbarism.

Violence in Karachi in recent years, particularly since the general elections in February 2008, has assumed alarming proportions. The situation was relatively normal during the Musharraf era. Between 2002-07 there were negligible reports of ethnic violence in the city and consequently, the city's

economic activity picked up again. The Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) won the local bodies elections in 2004 and ran the city amicably, fully supported by the central government. Also, no major suicide bomb attacks by Taliban/al Qaeda took place in the city (after 2005) and sectarian violence also witnessed an all-time low.

The contrast between Karachi's situation during the tenure of the two governments corroborates our hypothesis about the primacy of political factors in city's violence. When the MQM was able to govern the city on its own, there was no violence. However, as the Pashtuns awoke to the possibility of translating their numerical strength into commensurate political gains, which, obviously, were to come at MQM's expense, an all out conflict ensued. Pashtuns have no representation in the national assembly and only two out of the 40 Karachi MPAs [Members of the Provincial Assembly] are Pashtuns.⁴

This all started with the February 2008 elections, when ANP, for the first time, won two Sindh provincial assembly seats – a tantalizing result which encouraged ANP to aspire to expand their political gains. For MQM, however, the results were an alarm bell which raised the possibility of Karachi slipping out of their complete dominance. As the two sides were determined to pursue and preserve their interests at all costs, the result was deadly violence becoming part of Karachi's everyday life.

Politics, thus, has not only been mainly responsible for providing the backdrop that has triggered the current phase in violence in Karachi, it has also been the major factor why the omnipresent official security apparatus has miserably failed in apprehending the perpetrators of the violence. More than anything else, it is perhaps the fragility of the coalition government at the center, where both MQM and ANP are coalition partners, that has stymied the government's ability to penalize the elements responsible for the violence in what used to be called the 'city of lights.' As the government lacks political will to tackle the situation, which would require taking on elements belonging to its coalition partners and perhaps to its own ranks, Karachi continues to remain in the grips of a deadly wave of violence.

3. Ethnic Factor:

The ethnic factor is inseparably intertwined with the political factor that explains much of the violence in Karachi. Most observers of the violence choking the city of Karachi are of the view that underlying the bloody conflict between the MQM and ANP is a huge demographic shift in favor of the Pashtuns - who are believed to constitute 20-25% of Karachi's population. There has been an explosion in the Pashtun population in Karachi in recent years mainly for two reasons: Firstly, because of the military operation in FATA and Swat and secondly due to the presence of a large number of madrassas in Karachi. When Pakistan's security forces launched operations in FATA and Swat against the terrorist elements based in those areas, it resulted into a huge crisis of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) when a large number of inhabitants from these areas were forced out of their homes. Many of them came to Karachi to take refuge as most had some relative already settled here. Once settled in Karachi, they were soon tempted to eke out a living in the country's largest commercial center.

Second factor which explains the continuous rise in the Pashtun population in Karachi is the existence of a large number of madrassas in the city – three of which are believed to be the largest in the country. These madrassas cater to the educational needs of hundreds of thousands of students. It is worth mentioning here that during 2010, the number of students enrolled in these madrassas was considerably higher than in 2009. Majority of these madrassas belong to the Deobandi school of thought which is the dominant school of thought among the Pashtuns. So these madrassas continue to attract Pashtun students which end up swelling the Pashtun population.

It is worth mentioning here that during 2010, the number of students enrolled in these madrassas was considerably higher than in 2009.

Sensing the resultant demographic shift, the MQM leadership took strong exception to this trend, accusing the ANP of Talibanizing Karachi, while the ANP took offence to such allegations, criticizing the MQM for equating Pashtuns with the Taliban.⁵

As the shifts in the city's demographics were bound to affect the respective share of each ethnic group in the city's political representation, the issue got enmeshed with the political tussle between ANP and MQM.

The tussle between the two parties, representing two ethnicities took a vicious turn after the 2008 elections when the Pashtun dominated ANP won seats in the provincial assembly – a first in Sindh's history. The election results appear to have emboldened Karachi's Pashtuns who are believed to constitute 25% of the city's population but have been excluded from the structures of power in the city. The results have awakened the Pashtuns up to their strength, who appear determined to expand their share of the political pie. This has, understandably, evoked stiff resistance from the MQM, representing Karachi's Urdu speaking majority, which has hitherto enjoyed absolute control over the city's politics and governance. This on-going conflict of interests between the MQM and the Pashtun ANP clash is believed to be mainly responsible for the recent spate of target killings in the country's industrial capital.

4. Sectarian Factor:

The sectarian dimension to the ethno-political violence has also been gaining salience for quite some time. A nexus between the political parties and the six banned sectarian outfits appears to have emerged. Besides incidents bearing sectarian trappings such as attacks on Ashura processions - the most important of the rituals practiced by the Shias - many other incidents of sectarian violence are also believed to have taken place among various groups.

According to some analysts, sectarian violence in Pakistan has always worsened when the protagonists have a base where they can operate from. A Karachi beset with a serious law and order problem offers these elements an ideal place to turn it into a base for the implementation of their nefarious designs. Karachi's huge population is a mix of shia and sunni Muslims, represented by various religio-political and purely religious groups, with links to militant organizations. A tug of war between these groups is a constant destabilizing factor and a constant threat to peace and stability in the city. These elements seem to be benefiting from the city's ethnic and

political polarization and the state's institutional decay to create room for themselves.

The ranks of sectarian elements involved in Karachi violence have swollen also due to the ongoing military operations in the country's tribal region. It's a well established fact that the Sunni sectarian organizations have had close links with the militant organizations fighting against the US forces in Afghanistan and now against the Pakistan army in the tribal belt. As these militants had to flee their areas, due to the military operations against them, most of them are believed to have come to Karachi, joining the ranks of sectarian elements.

Some analysts believe that the MQM-Haqiqi - a splinter group of MQM – has forged close ties with Sunni militant elements. This alliance appears to be responsible for the attacks on MQM's Shia leaders. Shia elements in turn are also believed to have been resorting to violence to avenge the killings of their fellow community members.⁶

Moreover, as Pushtuns are predominantly Deobandi and most of the MQM supporters are Barelvi and Shia, a section of Muhajir Deobandis support JI. This situation provides banned Deobandi outfits like outlawed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkr-e-Jhangvi with an ideal opportunity to use Karachi as their desired hunting ground.⁷

The government's attitude towards the sectarian violence has been that of denial. Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, has been harping on the theme of involvement of 'external forces' and a 'third hand' behind such violence, which he once stated on the floor of the upper house of the parliament.⁸

However, the sectarian character of many of these acts of violence is so pronounced that it leaves little doubt for any observer of the city's events to identify the true motives behind such violence.

5. Gangsters and Criminal Elements:

Close observers of the city's politics agree, however, that the central actors in the bloodshed are competing ethnic political parties and the criminal gangs linked to them. At the heart of the conflict, they say, is a fight for

control of the hugely lucrative tracts of public land that are being illegally developed, both for profits and cementing control of turf and political power.

Turf wars between drug cartels, land mafia, organized crime syndicates and extremist groups complicate the difficult task of policing vast slums.⁹

From an American perspective, it also happens to be the hub for importing life-saving relief supplies as well as material for the U.S. and NATO war effort in Afghanistan.

The presence of fleeing terrorists from tribal areas due to the army operations have added to the complex web of criminal elements in Karachi. These elements have had links in Karachi since the 1980s. They can easily find refuge in the madrassas and

slums. They do not face much difficulty in reaching Karachi from the tribal areas. The Taliban generate millions of dollars through criminal activities in Karachi, with one-third of bank robberies and ten percent of kidnappings linked to the Taliban, and average ransom sizes of \$60,000 to \$250,000.¹⁰ From an American perspective, it also happens to be the hub for importing life-saving relief supplies as well as material for the U.S. and NATO war effort in Afghanistan.

6. Solution:

Though the above narrative gives a very bleak picture about the prospects of peace and stability in Karachi, the situation can still be brought under control. In fact, government has no option but to restore normalcy in the country's commercial capital otherwise the law and order situation in the city will continue to deteriorate with hugely negative repercussions for the nation's economy, sectarian and ethnic harmony and healthy patterns of political interaction among various groups. Two steps need to be taken immediately: de-weaponization of the city and the establishment of government's writ on all parts of Karachi.

As long as it remains hostage to the politico-business interests of various competing groups, which continue to obtain arms easily, it will remain a daunting challenge to bring peace and normalcy to Karachi.

One of the ways to solve the problem of violence in Karachi is through its de-weaponization. Several attempts have been made in the past to rid Karachi of weapons and failed miserably because those supposed to cleanse the society off arms are themselves armed to the teeth. To eradicate the menace of violence from the city, it is imperative that only the state institutions possess arms and have monopoly over 'legitimate violence'. The capacity of the law enforcement agencies should be strengthened, and equipped not only with the latest arms but also with training in combating urban violence. Political will is the primary requisite for any measure of success against urban terrorism and political violence. For this, the government must ideally give a free hand to the law-enforcement agencies, which are supposed to act against criminals and terrorist without fear or favour. Only an across-the-board approach, backed up by the lead parties, can help cope with urban terrorism and political violence.

Two steps need to be taken immediately: de-weaponization of the city and the establishment of government's writ on all parts of Karachi.

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Center for Research and Security Studies [CRSS] is an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan advocacy, program implementation and research organization whose endeavours are aimed at promoting an informed discourse on crucial social-political, economic and security issues confronting Pakistan. CRSS strives to realize its goals through a vast array of activities such as widely disseminated analyses on national and regional issues, advocacy and program implementation on important issues and problems, research reports, and workshops/seminars on critical policy issues across the country.

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In February, 2011, the CRSS successfully implemented a clean-drinking water scheme in the Chaarsadda and Nowshehera districts of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, with hand-pumps at 20 different locations. The Netherlands Embassy provided the financial support for the project as part of its post-flood recovery and rehabilitation efforts.

More importantly, the Centre continues to work together with the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Germany in areas of security and governance. The Centre is indebted to the Stiftung for the crucial support it has provided to the Centre since its creation to-date, and hope to continue working together on issues of democratisation and security.

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