Since April 2013 he has been a Senior Vice President at the Soufan Group: A consultancy advising Governments and private sector clients on security and political risk. From March 2004 to December 2012 he worked at the United Nations (UN) in New York and before that with the British Government.

Mr Barrett has served in Canada, Jordan, Turkey, and at the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations in New York. Moreover, Mr. Barrett possesses invaluable experience in CVE and counter-terrorism. He has appeared frequently on television and radio and is the author of several book chapters, articles and commentaries including op-eds for The Guardian, The New York Times, The Financial Times and The International Herald Tribune.

Former cricket star Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrike-e-Insaf (PTI ) emerged as the virtual second force with slightly over 8  million votes), edging out the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) -once dubbed as the only national party  – which could muster  6.5 million votes – its worst performance  in three decades.

Interestingly, two factions of the Islamist, pro-Taliban groups – Jamiat Uleme-e-Islam – JUI-F received 1.5 million votes, while Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – once a coalition partner of JUI-F,  could attract only about 896,718 voters across Pakistan, the largest numbers falling in its favour in the northwestern regions. The ethno-political Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) – representing Urdu speaking immigrants from India – managed about 2.36 million votes, mostly in Karachi and Hyderabad, the second largest city of the southern Sindh.

Given a 5-10 percent margin of error (largely because of incomplete or contested results of some constituencies) centrist and right-wing parties appear to have bagged roughly 25 million of the 86 million registered voters. If counted together with most of the vote cast in favour of independents, in Pakistan’s political capital of Punjab, in particular, the percentage of such vote may jump to well over 70 percent. In terms of seats, too, the parties have claimed more than 75 per cent seats in the 272 National Assembly.

Does this imply Pakistan’s is slipping rightwards? Or is it simply a vote reflecting the craving for change in status quo?

Certain indicators probably speak for the latter and also explain Pakistan’s shifting political dynamics; President Asif Ali  Zardari’s move to include former military president Pervez Musharraf’s ally Pakistan Muslim League – PML (Q) – in the ruling coalition most probably weighed heavily on their parties. Majority of PPP big wigs – all three sons of ex-premier Yusuf Raza Gilani, sons and scions of the Punjab governor, former prime minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, many ministers, regional presidents (except Sindh which is the traditional PPP stronghold) – In 2008, the PPP had won 17 seats in Northern and Central Punjab. In May 2013, practically none.

Secondly, devout PPP voters, it seems, punished their party also for embracing PML-Q – which Benazir Bhutto  and her associates had always denounced as Killer-League for all the conspiracies that it believed the “Kings Party” hatched against PPP in league with Musharraf.

Through their vote, people at large clearly spurned symbols of opportunism and a decadent political culture that has for decades ruled and ruined Pakistan. Former chief ministers and ministers Manzoor Watoo, Saifullah Khan, and several leading families across Pakistan were treated with contempt by an increasingly conscious voter.

Thirdly, Imran Khan’s PTI – often derided by opponents as a rightist party – bagged massive vote in Punjab but obviously failed in outnumbering the PML-N which does enjoy massive support at the grassroots level. The party undoubtedly emerged as the real third major force, displacing the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which had occupied this position since 1988. It certainly rode the agenda of change,  and managed to mobilize millions of educated, middle class, lower middle class youth  in particular.

The majority of nearly 47 percent of the country’s youth between 18-37years , it seems, who thronged polling stations to cast their vote , particularly in Punjab and KP, swung the pendulum in favour of the PTI,  reflecting a clear rejection of, and fatigue with, the status quo.

This also reflected the common man’s fatigue with the discriminatory status quo  that has sharpened socio-economic divisions to the disadvantage of  teeming millions in Pakistan.

Fourthly, most of the voters in Punjab sided with the Sharifs, who have dominated the political landscape of Punjab since early 1980s, when former dictator General Ziaul Haq handpicked Nawaz Sharif to become a minister and then the chief minister of the province.

Most Sindhis, be electing more than 55 percent of PPP candidates, essentially stuck to Bhuttos as well as  descendents of spiritual dynasties (Makhdooms/Peers) in the absence of an acceptable alternative.

Most ethnic Pashtoons in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa voted sort of overwhelmingly for Khan’s reformist PTI. This way the voter in KPK proved that they are not beholden to any particular personality or party (In 1993 the majority went to PPP, in 1997 to PML-N, in 2002 to MMA, in 2008 to ANP).  Sindh, on the contrary remains firmly in the clutches of the landed aristocracy, with the majority bound through kinship and patronage as well as to blind spiritual following.

The southwestern Balochistan province once again ended up politically and ethnically polarized, making almost every party represented in the provincial assembly a claimant to power. The MQM, as feared, conquered Karachi again with an unmistakable warning from its chief Altaf Hussein and leaders that “Karachi belongs to us and we will do whatever it takes to retain power there.”

The 2013 mandate indeed marks a huge step forward in Pakistan’s wobbly democratic transition but has deepened the ethnic divisions further, with mainstream parties shrinking to their traditional strongholds. This election also underscores a big vote against the status quo, which it appears, is under threat by PTI’s nationalist-reformist agenda. At the same time, the vote has swung to the right e.g. in 2008, the MMA (without Jamaate Islami) received about 2.2 percent , while both parties have secured roughly five percent seats in 2013, but taken together with PML-N and PTI, the right seems to be in ascendency. But if both PML-N and PTI are viewed as reformist parties, given more to accountability, rule of law, transparency, their rise should not worry us at all. Both believe in reforming the country through more aggressive policies focused on  economic revival and regional commercial linkages.

Sharif’s olive branch to India, in line with his manifesto, has gone down well all over, generating goodwill messages out of Washington, London and many other important capitals. Coming months will witness as to whether the mighty military establishment of Pakistan accommodates Sharif’s reformist agenda that also includes mending fences with India.

A concise look into the casualty figures underlines that the civilians remained the major target of violent actors, as a result of various acts of violence and terror in Pakistan. As noted in pie chart I below, civilians were 46 per cent (64 percent in last month) of the total dead in April. As a whole 241 civilians were killed in different circumstances during the month. Moreover, the data suggests that the militants fighting against the state remained the second major target i.e. 38 percent (199) of the total dead. Clashes also left 80 security forces’ personnel (16 percent of total deaths) dead and these were mostly recorded in insurgency infested areas of FATA, Karachi and Baluchistan. Furthermore, during April, two CIA operated drone strikes were reported in different areas of FATA, leaving as many as 13 suspected militants dead. Meanwhile, continuing their sabotage campaign to demolish state infrastructure, militants blew up five state run and private schools and 38 other sort of infrastructure in different parts of FATA, Baluchistan, Sindh and KP during the course of month.

In contrary to preceding months, in April again, shelling, firing and mortar attacks were the major cause of deaths. As a result of which, as many as 214 persons perished, including 20 civilians and 155 militants and 39 security forces personnel in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, target killing was the second major cause of deaths. Pie chart II below shows that 37 percent of all the violent incidents were of target killing in nature, accounting for 19 percent of the total death toll. Numerically 100 persons were shot dead across Pakistan, as a result of 90 incidents of target killing. Karachi witnessed the major loss of lives as a result of target killing, wherein 60 persons (60 percent of the total dead in target killings) assassinated during the month. The third major cause of the violence was bomb blasts. In total, 67 persons including 59 civilians and eight security personnel perished in this form of attacks. Meanwhile, in April, 42 dead bodies were also recovered from different parts of Pakistan, most of them, were found in Karachi, Peshawar, FATA and Balochistan. Likewise, five suicide attacks left 38 civilians dead.

A peer into the territory and intensity of violence underlines that Sindh witnessed major loss of lives during the current month (as shown in bar chart below). After Sindh, KP and FATA turned out to be the second major hub of violence, where religio-terrorism left almost 87 and 85 people respectively, dead during the current month. Meanwhile, violence across Balochistan subsided significantly during the course of the month.

Moreover, the sporadic waves of sectarian violence continued to pile up misery in Pakistan. In March seven people were killed in sectarian attacks; majority belonging to Shia minority sect, in different areas of Sindh and KP as a result of seven violent incidents. Of the total seven attacks, six attacks that is, 86 percent took place in Karachi alone killing six, 86 percent of the total dead in sectarian violence. Shia sect people based in Karachi are among the frequent targets of sectarian terrorists.

Meanwhile, data relating to the nature of violence suggests that almost 68 percent of the total loss of lives was the direct consequence of religio-terrorism. The epicenter of faith-based violence continues to be FATA and KP. Ethno-political violence involving political parties, meanwhile, led to the decimation of 23 percent of the total dead. While both nationalist-separatist violence in Balochistan, criminal activities in Punjab and sectarian violence across Pakistan accounted for almost nine percent of the total fatalities. Accumulative data of last seven months (September-April) shows that 4427 persons have perished across Pakistan as a result of the ongoing wave of violence. Among these, February 2013 was the most violent month.

A precise look into the trends and territory of violence across the country underscores that the law and order situation across Pakistan is not satisfactory. Yet a considerable increase in the death toll has been witnessed, in successive weeks, during April. Latest trends of violence are religio-political in nature due to surge in attacks on election campaign.

Sources

1. The News
2. Dawn
3. The Express Tribune
4. Pakistan Today
5. Daily Times
6. The Frontier Post
7. Jang (Urdu)
8. Daily Mashriq (Urdu) 
9. Aaj (Urdu)
10. The Nation  

As in the case of preceding week, civilians were the major target of the ongoing spate of violence across Pakistan during the current week, wherein civilians accounted for almost 80 percent of the total death toll during the course of week. Numerically, 79 civilians were killed in violent clashes of various kinds across the country. This week the number of fatalities of security forces was nine and militants were 12. Furthermore, no CIA operated drone strike was carried out during the week. Meanwhile three sabotage campaigns were carried out by the militants to demolish state infrastructure and undermine stability. Militants blew up four election offices in KP, FATA and Balochistan, a railway track in Sindh and three schools and two Hujras of ANP workers in KP.

In two sectarian attacks a member of Sunni Tehreek   was killed in Sindh this week. Moreover, the loss of lives due to target killings slightly decreased (31 percent of the total dead against last week’s 32 percent) during the current week. Overall, 39 percent of the total violent attacks were of target killing in nature (see the pie chart below).

Furthermore, data underlines that of the total 25 incidents of target killings; 62 percent took place in Karachi alone, decimating 19 persons (61 percent of the total dead in target killings). Meanwhile 12 militants were killed in different incidents across the country. On the whole, militant casualties were 12 percent of the total death toll.  Also, nine security personnel were killed and five others were injured during the week.

Moreover, 11 bullet-riddled dead bodies were recovered across the country, of which eight from Sindh and three from FATA. In sum, the number of violent incidents increased slightly from 52 reported during last week to 74 during this week. The resultant death toll, increased significantly from 68 to 99 during the current week, and the number of wounded increased from 152 to 238. An up surge is apparent in the pre-poll violent activities this week. Candidates of different parties were targeted either through bombs or grenade attack or through firing. Their security holds a major part in conducting peaceful elections. Militants had a stance to keep away the liberal democratic parties from election process. On one hand, it is a huge threat to the law and order situation. On the other hand, peaceful transfer of power through democratically held elections.

Sources

1. The News
2. Dawn
3. The Express Tribune
4. Pakistan Today
5. Daily Times
6. The Frontier Post
7. Jang (Urdu)
8. Daily Mashriq (Urdu)
9. Aaj (Urdu)
10. The Nation

The province which was known to the world for its nautral resources today faces a ruthless insurgency, compounded by an abysmal governance and an extremely indifferent civilian and military ruling elite now a days. The breakdown of law and order in the province amounted to
ultimate failure of the provincial government which, according to an October 2012 ruling by the apex Supreme Court, had lost “constitutional authority” to continue. Balochistan has also seen a systematic terror campaing targetting  shia-Hazara Muslim community, resulting in deaths of hundreds of innocent shia Muslims.

General Introduction to Balochistan

The population of Pakistan’s area-wise largest province stands at slightly over 13 Million (according to 2011 estimates, daily The News, April 05, 2012).

Reeling from a security crisis and plagued by misgovernance, Balochistan currently faces multiple socio-political challenges. Decades of socio-political neglect, economic injustices, under-development and the tribal make-up of the society has turned it into Pakistan’s  “soft belly” – reeling from the consequences of a raging Baloch insurgency ( both subversion of utility infrastructure as well as kill and dump pro-government Baloch leaders, the military’s brutal response to it (kill and dump) , wave of anti-shia sectarian violence (that spiked in 2012 with hundreds of target-killings), abysmal mis-governance and rampant crime under political patronage. The apex Court, in an October 2012 ruling on the Law and Order situation in Balochistan, also  touched on these issues and declared that the breakdown of law and order in the province amounted to gross failure of the provincial government and that it had lost “constitutional authority” to continue.

Demography: Baloch Majority Districts:

1-      Bolan

2-      Sibbi

3-      Kacchi

4-      Dera Bugti

5-      Kohlu

6-      Nasserabad

7-      Jaffarabad

8-      Jhal Magsi

9-      Mastung,

10-  Kalat

11-  Nushki

12-  Chaghi

13-  Awaran

14-  Washik

15-  Kharan

16-  Khuzdar

17-  Lasbela

18-  Panjgur

19-  Gawadar

20-  Kech

21-  Barkhan

Quetta, the provincial capital, is almost equally divided between Baloch and Pashtoon populations.

Pashtoon Majority Districts

1-Qilla Abdullah

2-Pishin

3- Ziarat

4- Qilla Saifullah

5-Loralai

6-Musakhel

7- Zhob

8- Sherani

Baloch Insurgency

At the heart of the security crisis are Baloch nationalist/separatist groups, vying for an independent Balochistan. Their demand stems from decades of neglect and denial of socio-economic and political rights by the Centre – synonymous with the civilian ruling elite and the mighty military. The resultant clash between the separatists and the Centre has sunken the province in to a black security hole.

As of early 2013, some 21 of Balochistan’s 30 districts are ethnically Baloch dominated. The common man – Baloch, ethnic Hazara (a shia Muslim community), and non-Baloch settler – is sandwiched between the tribal chief (Nawab, Sardar, Mir) the separatist militants, and the government. Certain regions in Central Balochistan – Khuzdar, Lasbela, Wadh, Chaghi, Mastung, and Kohlu epitomize the intensity of the Baloch insurgency, which has triggered a wave of exodus, particularly of non-Baloch people. Settlers – mostly ethnic Sindhis, Punjabis, and the Urdu-speaking immigrants have left. All five military operations including the ongoing army activities were also conducted in the same regions, where inhabitants largely belong to the immensely populated Marri tribe.

Between Januarys -November 13, 2012, some 727 persons lost their lives in at least 416 incidents of violence across the province. As many as 33 sectarian attacks were recorded during this period, leaving 69 persons dead and almost 95 percent of those killed were Shia Hazaras. Abduction for ransom also soared during this period, wherein 52 persons were kidnapped around the province. Meanwhile, the recovery of dead bodies continues to plague the province and 92 dead bodies were recovered so far. Target-killing, the most lethal weapon of the nationalist-separatists, resulted in the killing of 224 persons in the province – most of this violence occurred in provincial capital Quetta, Zhob, Khuzdar, Gwadar, Bugti and Kohlu districts.

Sectarian Violence

A relatively recent alarming addition to the drivers of violence is the menace of sectarianism. Widespread human rights abuses committed by the Al-Qaeda-linked, and rapidly anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) outfit is at the centre of this sectarian frenzy, which has largely targeted the minority Shia population, particularly the ethnic Hazaras, who essentially are immigrants from Afghanistan. According to certain reports, over 800 Hazaras have been killed in 24 incidents of mass-murder and 131 targeted ambushes since 2001. There is an Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda link to the Shia massacres in Balochistan. The bloodshed of the Afghan Taliban had led tens of thousands of Hazaras in Afghanistan during their rule. Hazaras in Afghanistan continue to be a part of the so-called Northern Alliance which resisted Taliban. What is, however, clear is that Hazaras’ ideological links with Iran – shiaism –has turned them into the target of some of Pakistani militant groups. 

Conspiracy Theory on the US Role in Violence

In addition to the usual blame for violence on Baloch separatist groups, the LeJ and the security apparatus led by the Frontier Corps (FC), a possible US role in the simmering violence also adds spice to the debate on causes of Balochistan’s instability. While operating in Balochistan this dimension of the provincial dynamics needs to be kept in mind.

Many Pakistani nationalists as well as the security agencies would have most Pakistanis believe that the surge in violence is because of the American support for Baloch separatist outfits.  Moreover, many Baloch and Pashtoon leaders in Quetta suspect an American hand through the radical Sunni outfit Jundullah and Lashkare Jhangvi in the Shia killings. They believe to deny Iran’s any link with Pakistan and India. The US also publicly opposes the Iran-Pak gas pipeline (Hilary Clinton and Cameron Munter, ex US ambassador to Islamabad made a few public statements, advising Pakistan not to deal with Iran). The bottom-line in such conspiracy theories is the instable and militarized Balochsitan that basically works against the proposed Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline which might eventually extend to India as well.

Nexus between Crime and Militancy

Police officials claim that currently more than 70 criminal gangs and a dozen of insurgent groups are operating in the province. Both of these actors have political supporters. The level of collusion between criminal gangs and politicians is so entrenched that National Party, Balochistan, vice president; Senator Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo and Lashkari Raeesani allege provincial ministers patronising criminal gangs.

Interviews with businessmen and transporters also support the view of the Supreme Court which in its judgment in October 2012 said rampant corruption, omni-presence of criminal gangs, abductions for ransom, looting of freight-laden trucks were a clear proof of the fact that law and order in the province had broken down. The routes running through Baloch areas such  Khuzdar, Wadh, Hub,  Taftan as well as the route that pass through the Pashtoon belt i.e. Killa Saifullah, Zhob, Muslim Bagh, Loralai, Chaman, Killa Abdullah ( particularly from Killa Abdullah to Chaman Wali Cross and Haji Muhammad Ali Bavri are also not secure any more, and almost daily cargo trucks and passenger buses are ambushed by armed robbers or sectarian killers. Sibi, Dera Murad Jamali, Chaman, and even the Sariab area of Quetta are also most vulnerable spots for crime and killings.

A  report by the Balochistan Home Department ( in March 2012)  said as many as 1,493 innocent citizens have been killed and 3,313 injured in 1,718 incidents, mostly in target killings and sectarian attacks from 2007 to February 15, 2012.The report on the deteriorating law and order situation in the province, says that militant factions like the Balochistan Liberation Army, the Balochistan Republican Army, the Baloch United Liberation Front, and Baloch Liberation Front- are spearheading violent activities. The report categorically underlined that, particularly since 2007, the aforementioned insurgent outfits have developed a nexus with criminal gangs operating in the province for financial and outreach reasons.

The report pointed out that banned militant sectarian outfits are also colluding with the insurgents and criminal gangs to enhance their outreach in the area. First case of kidnapping by Baloch insurgents surfaced in 2009, when hitherto unknown, Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) held an American United Nations official, John Solecki, for two months. Furthermore, “Baloch nationalists are also suspects in the case of a British Red Cross doctor mysteriously kidnapped from Quetta in January” this year.

Though it is difficult to establish any direct link between Baloch insurgents and kidnappings for ransom but plenty of verbal evidence on various proponents of violence and crime – the Taliban and Baloch insurgents and tribal chiefs – is available on how these groups move in tandem to mobilize funding from smuggling, extortions, car-hijacking, abductions for ransom, and   illegal weapons’ trade , which involves heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, grenades are showcased in places like Gulistan in Pishin.

Governance and Tribal Ethos

Governance in Balochistan is characterized by tribal ethos and ethnic factionalism. Four post-partition insurgencies were witnessed in the province during 1948, 1954, 1961 and 1977. At present, it is undergoing fifth insurgency, which was ignited in August 2006 after the murder of Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti who ironically was considered as a federalist politician. The ongoing insurgency started in Marri-Bugti and Mekran(southern) areas and since then the military operations have resulted in huge human and property losses and stark violation of human rights by the state as well as the insurgents.

Balochistan’s administration system is a hybrid of formal and informal systems. Only five percent of the provincial territory is governed by the formal policing. Law and order in the remaining 95% of the province is managed by a system of “levies” recruited from among local tribes, who provide security services through a mix of tribal norms and quasi-official procedures. Levies are primarily state-funded private armies of tribal chieftains. The tribal system with its archaic social structures and a justice system controlled by the tribal elite had long made formal rule of law framework irrelevant for most of the population. Such a system obviously perpetuates a high degree of conflict and insecurity— thereby, leaving the poor communities distant from the ‘formal’ state.

Political Landscape

Nowhere  in  Pakistan  is  the  political  landscape  as  fragmented  as  in Balochistan,  probably  because  of  the  tribal  nature  of  a  society  that  is scattered in sparsely populated regions. Balochistan is not a political society in modern socio-political terms, but still it has some deep-rooted nationalist and  democratic  political  parties,  which  can  play  a  significant  role  in influencing Baloch masses, provided they  are ready to play such role  in current peculiar political circumstances.

Currently five schools of thought dominate this landscape:

Baloch Separatists (five factions, primarily Marri and Bugti): These groups demand total independence from Pakistan. A spokesperson for three groups i.e.  the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) of Brahamdagh Bugti, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) led by Dr Allah Nazar , and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) of Harbiyar Marri told media on October 21, 2012 that  “everybody knows who is calling the shots in Balochistan … Talks are possible but only on our agenda – independence.  If the army is at all serious about having talks with us, it will have to recognise our agenda.”( http://tribune.com.pk/story/454628/balochistan-crisis-we-will-never-negotiate-with-govt-says-brp/)

2.  Balochistan National Party (Mengal) and National Party (Dr.  Malik Baloch).

These parties also stand for provincial autonomy but are vague on the real autonomy issue. The National Party led by Dr. Malik Baloch  represents the middle class , educated political workers, academia and intelligentsia, and is guided by fundamental democratic principles of plurality and inclusion. It claims  to  believe  in  liberal  and  secular  values  and  pursues  maximum national  autonomy  with  the  Pakistani  federation.  It lobbied for these demands including the ownership of oil and gas resources in the province (as spelt out in the Constitution’s Article 271). Balochistan  National  Party  (Mengal)  demands  the  right  for  self determination, a position it seems to have taken since 2008 in the face of mounting pressure by radical separatist movement  groups. At the same time, it also talks of elections and democracy, probably to stay relevant and acceptable to the majority of Balochis.

3.  Balochistan National Party (Awami):  This party represents moderate Baloch forces, and is considered as the fence-sitters. It has been part of almost every government in the province. It can be compared to the PML-Q (led by Ch. Shujaat Hussein), a party that grew under the shadow of Gen. Musharraf and was instrumental in weakening the PML-N led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

4. Jamhoori Watan Party (Bugti): This party has been in turmoil since the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and has lost its sting due to internal fragmentation. It is divided in two factions: one is led by Aali Bugti and the other by Talal Bugti.  The third faction, Baloch Republican Army (BRA), is led by Brahamdagh Bugti, which believes in total independence and is thus categorized as a nationalist militant group.

5. PPP / PML-N: Both parties are centrists/nationalist and stand for the Federation. The Jamiat Ulemai Islam (JUI-F) – a religio-political  party –  is also a pro-federation party,  primarily  an opportunistic grouping of Deobandi Maulanas,  and has been part of almost every  government.  A  Balochi, Maulana Ghafoor Haideri, is its secretary general.  Some call the JUI-F an extension of the military-dominated establishment in Balochistan. But despite the official support and boycott of the last general election by mainstream Baloch parties, the JUI-F could not win a single seat from the Baloch areas, unlike the elections in 2002, when it managed just about two National Assembly seats.

Pashtoon Parties:

1. Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP): Their agenda revolves around equality for Pashtoons in Balochistan. It also demands a new social contract, is liberal in outlook and opposed to the ultra-conservative agendas pursued by religious parties such as the JUI. It also supports the presence of America in Afghanistan and insists on eliminating militant networks operating in the border region.

2: Awami National Party (ANP): Liberal, Pashtoon nationalist party. The ANP is part of the government in the province.

3: JUI-F: It also has Pashtoon leaders like Maulana Sherani , Maulana  Wasy.

4:  PML-Q (Jaffar Mandokhel): Centrist. This is a pro- federation party but most of its leaders are considered as opportunists. This faction of the Muslim League is also called the King’s Party, as they are always with the government.

 Baloch Nationalists (Separatists)

Baloch insurgent groups are primarily nationalist-secular and their “struggle” for independence from Islamabad” is rooted in the decades’ old demand for provincial autonomy.  These groups have always kept themselves away from religion. Baloch separatist groups do not believe in elections and consider the pro-parliamentary democracy within the Federation as traitors.  Their publicly-stated struggle is centered on autonomy.  But all these groups are divided, and therefore, the religio-political Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F) and its splinters emerge as the deciding factor for any coalition.

Major Separatist Groups:

• Baloch Liberation Front (BLF, Dr. Allah Nazar)
• Baloch Liberation Army (BLA, led by Hairbiar Marri).
• Baloch Republican Army (BRA, led by Brahamdagh Bugti, grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti)
• Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB, Jawaid Mengal, son of Sardar Attaullah Mengal)
• Sarbaz Balochistan (SB)
• Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF)

They are pitched against over a dozen political groups which are pro-federation. Additionally, the ethnic Pashtoons, who constitute almost half of the province’s population, want political and economic rights without asking for independence. Furthermore, the religio-political party – Jamiat Ulemai Islam (F) – and its splinters also are predominantly Pashtoon and have been part of every government in the Centre (expedience) and in Quetta (both expedience and compulsion of requisite numbers).

Most Frequent Complaints by Baloch Nationalists

The history of neglect by the center, the high-handedness of the civilian-military establishment, denial of political and financial autonomy and the continuing nexus between the provincial elite–mostly opportunistic–and the military establishment. The Baloch nationalist narrative also feeds off these misgivings and the insurgent groups in particular use this to justify their violent campaign.  Following are some of the most frequent complaints that revolve more around the role of the Center/military and focus less on the role tribal sardars and chieftains have played – most of them as willing pawns, driven by their own economic interests.

-          The Punjabi-dominated Center  is not sincere

-          The present government in Balochistan lacks legitimacy as all Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the February 2008 elections as a mark of protest against an unannounced operation in Balochistan.  Baloch nationalists see it as an agent of the Pakistani establishment.

-          The Military Establishment wants to keep Balochistan subjugated through suppression of Baloch nationalist forces. It is a conscious attempt to keep Balochis divided.

-          The civilian-military ruling elite in the Center do not want development and prosperity in Balochistan.

-          Some of the Baloch tribes such as, Jams, Raisanis, Jamalis, Rinds, Zehri’s as well as religious leaders associated with the Jamiate Ulemai Islam (JUI) serve as the extensions of the civil-military establishment.

-          Intelligence agencies use businessmen / smugglers / gang leaders for “social  support”  but  many  of  these  people  reportedly  indulge  in criminal activities like kidnappings for ransom, extortion from affluent people and smuggling.

-          “Official” protection of private influential groups has contributed to the breakdown of law and order.

-          The civil-military establishment is consciously promoting religio-political groups to counter Balochi nationalists.

-          Intelligence agencies eliminating Baloch nation through clandestine abduct, kill and dump operations.

-          Intelligence agencies eliminating Baloch nationalists through target killings and police encounters to muzzle demands for rights. That is why almost all political/sectarian murders are blamed on intelligence agencies, or projected as acts of suppression. Baloch nationalists talk of about 500 activists having been executed through abduct-kill-dump operations.

-          Intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps are playing favorites with Bugti family members, using one against the other.

-          Intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps are using tribal chiefs against prominent Bugti and Marri leaders.

In Nov 2009, the federal government responded to these grievances by announcing an Economic Rights’ Package (AHBP). The package as well as the 7th National Finance Commission Award (a mechanism to distribute funds between the Centre and the four provinces) more than doubled Balochistan’s financial resources.  Until late 2008, the province used to get about 43 billion rupees (less than 400 million dollars) from the federal consolidated fund. Under the 7th NFC award signed at Gwadar in 2009, the share of Balochistan doubled from 5.1 to 9.09 percent i.e. a net transfer of about 83 billion rupees in 2010 and over 110 billion in 2011 (Dollar-Rupee Parity : 95 Rupees= Dollar).

Who lives where?

1.  Jhal Magsi – Jhal Magsi is a stronghold of Magsis led by Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi, Governor Balochistan. Magsi have always been close to military establishment. They hold sway over Jhal Magsi and in areas of district Shadadkot in the bordering Sindh province. Mir Nadir Magsi, the younger brother of Nawab Magsi is provincial minister in Sindh cabinet while his younger brother Mir Amir is MNA from Sindh. Mir Tariq Magsi, MPA from Jhal Magsi is Governor younger brother and another brother is senator Mir Akbar and son senator Nawabzada Saifullah Magsi. Governor wife Shama Perveen Magsi is MPA on reserved seat and holds the portfolio of IT as Minister

2.  Dera Bugti : Bugtis  (sub-tribes Massori and Kalpar). The current, official Chieftain of the tribe is Nawab Aali Bugi, who had been installed by the military establishment in 2009. The Chieftain is traditionally the person who controls Dera Bugti and the surroundings. Massori Bugtis are led by Wadera Ali Mohammad. Masooris live in Bakkar district bordering Punjab and Barkhan. Kalpar Bugtis , led by Jalalan, lives in gas producing town of Sui.

With the support of government agencies, three major players count as important for Dera Bugti. They include Mir Ahmadan Bugti (member of national parliament). He recently got injured after stepping on an explosive device laid for him. The other two are Mir Ghulam Qadir Massoori and Jalalan Kalpar.

3. Kohlu: Mohbbat Khan Marri and Shahnawaz Marri are important players here. Mohabat is the uncle of Shahnawaz Marri. They belong to Fatah Khanzai faction of tribe who have always been loyal to military establishment. There are two major factions Bijranis and Gazanis in the area. A considerable group Bijranis are controlled by Mir Hazar Khan, a former guerilla commander while Gazainis by elderly separatist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.

4. Barkhan:  Khetran tribe dominates this district which borders Dera Ghazi Khan in the east and Loarali in the north while in the south with Kohlu and Dera Bugti (both politically sensitive and volatile districts) there are three personalities Sardar Abdur Rahman Khethran, Mir Tariq Mahmood and Mir Baz Mohammad Khetran. All three are political rivals. Sardar Abdur Rahman, the chieftain, holds sway in the area for being elected MPA from the area. Militants have been attacking the camp of gas and oil companies and power pylons.

5.  Khuzdar – Dominant tribes in this district are Zehris and Mengals, Bizenjos. Zehris are known to patronize criminal gangs in the region and for harbouring. They also reportedly provide the social support network secret agencies against separatist groups.

Sardar Sanaullah Zahri is mostly elected in the elections from his area Zahri/Gath. Bezenjos are in Naal area and the chieftain is Sardar Aslam Bezenjo who is currently Minister for Irrigation.

Wadh is dominated by Mengals while Khuzdar comprises of mixed population. Khuzdar has currently turned into a battle field for rival Mengal factions. One faction is led by Chieftain Sardar Attaullah while another by Mir Naseer , the former caretaker Minister. A separatist group Lashker-e-Balochistan led by Jawaid Mengal who lives in exile in London is active in attacks against government forces and installations and rivals. While another group Nifaz-e-Defa Aman Tahrik (NDAT), which draws support from government agencies is headed by Shafiq Mengal

Around 250 persons are estimated to be killed in clashes for the last three years.

# Musakhel : Musakhail tribe is in majority in this district, and has been a stronghold of the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-Fazal). Two major political/tribal personalities here are –Sardar Azam Musakhail and Sardar Asmatullah. Azam has been loyal to Pashtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), the nationalist liberal Pashtoon party and once won in 2003 elections while Asmatullah has been associated with PML (Q). Otherwise the provincial assembly seat has always been with Jamiat Ulema Islam (Fazal).

6.  Zhob: This district, that borders Afghanistan and FATA to the north, is divided among three major tribes i.e. Kakars, Mandokhels, Nasirs.

Major political forces are two factions of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F), and JUI-Ideological. In addition to them the PML (Q) and Pashtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) also enjoy considerable support here. Senator Maulana Mohammad Khan Sheerani, the provincial head of JUI (F) and Chairman Islamic Ideological Council and Maulana Asmatullah are political rivals, though they had once belonged to the same JUI-F.  Jogezais who are considered to be head of Kakars, the biggest Pashtoon tribe, cannot even contest elections against the aforementioned clerics due to lack of support among masses. Even the nationalist Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) had to enter into alliance with PML (Q)’ Shiekh Jaffar Khan Mondokhail in previous elections. Due to fast growing influence of Jamiat Nazaryati (ideological) in the area, the activity of both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban has been on the rise in recent years. Religious militancy here is strong and Afghan Taliban use the smaller Kibzai tribe for shelter in the Murghakibzai sub-district.

7.  Naseerabad/ Jaffarabad : Umrani, Khoso, Bungalzai and Lahri tribes live in Naseerabad. Umranis dominate politics here as this both seats of the district have been won by Saqid Umrani and Babu Amin Umrani.

In Jaffarabad Jamalis and Khoso live but with open political rivalry. Being close to the military establishment, Jamalis have almost always edged out Khoso rivals.  Both PA seats and one national assembly seat have been won by Jamalis.

8. Bolan: a volatile district because of law and order (crime) and insurgency. Rind, Kurd, Bungalzai and Raisani are the major tribes inhabiting this district.

The Rind tribe is the largest of all, led by Sardar Yar Mohammad Rind, who had won one of the two seats of provincial assembly in 2008 elections. Another seat has always been bagged by Finance Minister Mir Asim Kurd Gaillu.

Sardar Yar Mohammad and Nawab Aslam Raisani, the present chief minister, have been locked in politicalrivalry for over 30 years.  Other political/tribal personalities keep shifting loyalties between Nawab Aslam and Sardar Yar Rind as and when necessary ahead of elections.

Governor Balochistan Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi ‘s role is decisive on national assembly seat for his tribe’s en-bloc votes of over twelve thousands in the favour of any candidate.

9.  Sibi: Pashtoon tribes inhabiting Sibi are Khajjak and Luni while Baloch are Dombki, Rind, Marri, Chandio etc. Dombki always win the provincial assembly seat with their enbloc votes from Lahri area. Although Barozai enjoy enormous respect among the people, yet they have not been able to win the seat to the provincial or national parliament.

10. Lasbela: Jam and Bhootani  tribes dominate the socio-political landscape here. Jams are currently headed by Jam Mir Yousaf, the federal Minister. Jams live in Uthal, Bela and Hub while Bhootanis are in the Durajee region. Jams can win the elections on one of the two provincial seats and one national assembly seat. Jam Yousaf himself and his father late Jam Ghulam Qadir remained the Chief Ministers and many times federal ministers.

11. Chaman:  Ethnic Pashtoon tribes Achakzai and Noorzai are the major tribes in Chaman. Both factions of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F) dominate politically, however Pashtoonkhawa Mili Awami Party (PKMAP) and Awami National Party (ANP) have their own pockets of influence here.

Since PKMAP boycotted the 2008 elections, the independent candidate Captain (R) Abdul Khaliq won the elections and is now provincial minister. Asghar Achakzai, Naseer Ahmad Bacha, the former provincial Minister, Maulavi Haneef, Senator Hafiz Hamdullah are the influential personalities in Chaman.

12. Loralai: (Pashtoons) Kakar, Luni, Tareen, Jogezais and Nasaar are the major tribes in the area. The district in the north borders Zhob district, in the east Dera Ghazi Khan, in the south Musakhail, Barkhan and Kohlu. Lunis always won one provincial assembly seat regardless of which party they represent. Another seat is won by JUI (Fazal) or Pashtoonkhawa Mili Awami Party. Sardar Yaqub Nasaar, the sitting member of national assembly and a former federal Minister, Sardar Masood Luni, the provincial Minister, Sardar Gul Mohammad Jogezai are the major socio-political personalities of the area.

A closer look into the casualty figures underlines that the civilians remained the major target of violent actors, with the civilians accounting for about 1542 deaths. Moreover, the data suggests that the militants fighting against the state emerged as the second major target i.e. 856 casualties. Clashes with militants, target-killings or ambushes of military convoys also left 276 security forces’ personnel dead, mostly recorded in insurgency infested areas of FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. Furthermore, during the four months under review, as many as 12 CIA operated drone strike were reported in different areas of North Waziristan Agency (FATA), leaving about 71 suspected militants dead. Between March 2012 and February 2013, 51 drone attacks had killed over 351 suspected militants. Meanwhile, continuing their sabotage campaign against  state infrastructure, militants blew up 39 state run and private schools in different parts of FATA, Balochistan and KP during the course of four months.

As a whole target killing topped as the major cause of deaths. Pie chart II above shows that 45 percent of all the violent incidents were of target killing in nature. Karachi witnessed the major loss of lives as a result of target killing. Meanwhile, bomb blasts were the second major cause of deaths. As a result of which, as many as total of 405 persons perished, including 343 civilians and 7 militants and 55 security forces personnel in different parts of the country. The third major cause of the violence was military operations. In total, 356 persons including 339 militants and 11 security personnel perished in this form of attacks. Meanwhile, from January to April 2013, 241 dead bodies were also recovered from different parts of Pakistan, most of them, were found in Karachi, Peshawar, FATA and Balochistan. Likewise, 25 suicide attacks left 168 civilians dead.

Data suggests that the southern Sindh witnessed major loss of lives during the last four month (as shown in bar chart below). After Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa turned out to be the second major hub of violence with the death toll 418, and Balochistan followed it where national- separatist and sectarian violence left almost 403 people dead during the last months. Meanwhile, violence across FATA subsided significantly during the course from January to April 2013.

Moreover, the sporadic waves of sectarian violence and religio-political violence continued to pile up misery across Pakistan, with Shia Muslims based in Quetta and Karachi becoming the frequent targets of sectarian terrorists. A precise look into the trends and territory of violence across the country underscores that the law and order situation across Pakistan continues to deteriorate. Meanwhile in first two months, ethno-political and sectarian violence in Karachi and Quetta led to the decimation of majority of the dead. Shia sect people belonging to ethnic Hazara community in Quetta continue to seethe under the deadly spate of violence unleashed by Lashkar-i-Jhangivi this year. The security situation in Balochistan continues to reel under the specter of multiple threats i.e. nationalist-separatist, sectarian, criminal, etc. Latest trends show a spate of violence in targeting the election campaign which has given rise to the religio-political violence in KP, Balochistan and Sindh.

Sources

1. The News
2. Dawn
3. The Express Tribune
4. Pakistan Today
5. Daily Times
6. The Frontier Post
7. Jang (Urdu)
8. Daily Mashriq (Urdu) 
9. Aaj (Urdu)
10. The Nation  

Religion has been one of the most sensitive issues for the communities living in the Indian sub-continent. During the British colonial rule, too, India experienced several religious riots which necessitated the enactment of ‘Blasphemy Laws.’ It was in fact the absence of an appropriate law to handle blasphemy offenses committed in the written format that led the British India Government to introduce the Blasphemy Law 295-A in 1927.Following the partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan in 1947, the latter inherited and retained these laws. The lethal blend of politics and religious extremism was also evident in most of the communal riots and sacrilegious acts (directed at one or the other religion or its followers) that took place before and after the creation of Pakistan.  The cause was a few sacrilegious offences committed by one religious community that offended the other community – triggering a chain of events that resulted in targeted murders or communal riots.

Despite the presence of a legal framework, violence rooted in or flowing from faith continued unabated in Pakistan, whereby conservative religio-political parties faced no systemic hurdle in perpetuating hate-speech and sowing seeds of communal and sectarian hatred. In 1974, the then government led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto caved in to pressures by religio-political and declared the minority Ahmadis sect as  non-Muslim. Real religiousization of state and its legal framework, however,  began under former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq who enforced controversial regulations he called “Islamic.” This laid foundations for religious radicalization within the society, precipitated by the US-led anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Gen Zia also added radical Ahmadi-specific clauses into the blasphemy laws which have often been exploited by religious extremists or even individuals to settle personal feuds, and thus condemning the accused to years of imprisonment and tedious litigation.

Despite the existence of nine different Blasphemy laws, Pakistan has seen a gradual surge in blasphemy-related cases in the last decade or so. The laws made and enacted presumably to prevent mob violence and deter abuse, has instead resulted in more conflict and acts of violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims. A CRSS report  provides an overview of the developments surrounding the issue of Blasphemy with a view to create greater awareness on this subject.

For Details Please go to REPORTS